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Skooby

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Spurs are NBA's 'luckiest' team

It's the summer of 2010, and it looks like the San Antonio Spurs' dynasty era is winding down. Coming off of an uncharacteristically mortal-looking 50-32 regular season, San Antonio ousted the Mavericks in the first round of the playoffs but were subsequently swept aside by the Suns, a team whose number they've traditionally had in the postseason. Worse yet, shrewd acquisitions like drafting Manu Ginobili 57th overall and signing Bruce Bowen from the scrap heap have been replaced by head-scratching moves, such as giving Richard Jefferson a $40 million extension. Nothing great can last forever, and the Spurs seem to be intent on proving that, as their best days are fading further into the rearview mirror.

That's what most analysts were saying three years ago -- and who could blame them? But fast-forward to today, and the Spurs are sitting atop the Western Conference standings once again, a place they've occupied the last three seasons. And if anything, they seem to be getting stronger as more time has passed since the seeming crossroads they faced in 2010. Rather than a sign of trouble to come, or even the new normal, their aberrant 50-win 2009-10 campaign looks more and more like merely a flukish down year from one of the league's best clubs.

However, there is some evidence that the San Antonio narrative -- which seemed to be building back in 2010 (namely, that the team's true quality has in fact declined from the peak of Tim Duncan's heyday) -- wasn't 100 percent off the mark. Casual observers might point to the Spurs' stunning first-round loss to Memphis in 2011 and their collapse from a 2-0 lead against Oklahoma City a year ago as evidence, but there's even stronger underlying support for this hypothesis if you use a technique to identify teams that have been playing above their heads due to "luck."

Ah, luck. Formerly a dirty four-letter word in sports, the recent rise of analytics has made it a major fulcrum of any sophisticated study of the game. Luck comes in different flavors, but the common thread is that it can't be repeated, inflating or diminishing a team's record in ways that belie its true quality.

The seminal work on the subject of team luck was conducted a decade ago by sabermetric researcher (and Sloan Conference panelist) Phil Birnbaum, who wondered whether a team like the Montreal Expos -- who unexpectedly won 74 of their first 114 games before the players' strike prematurely ended the 1994 baseball season -- were truly a great team, or just fortunate in a small sample. He looked at traditional factors like whether a team overperformed relative to their pythagorean record (run differential), but also an often-overlooked component of any team's success: whether all of their players happened to sync up their "career years" at the same time. And as it turned out, those Expos were lucky on all of those fronts; not only did they win more than Pythagoras predicted, but their hitters and pitchers had much better performances in 1994 than in the surrounding seasons. Because of this, Birnbaum estimated that Montreal was really only a 61-win team that got to 74 wins purely because of luck.

When we replicate his study for NBA basketball, we can search for luck in similar areas. Teams can get lucky by exceeding their pythagorean win expectation; they can be lucky in terms of players producing above what projections say their true talent levels are; and they can be lucky due to favorable scheduling. For instance, through Saturday's games, the 2012-13 Warriors have won 37 games, but they've been extremely lucky in close games, and have gotten better seasons than expected out of many key players (though they have faced a more difficult schedule than the typical team). A system like Birnbaum's would suggest that Golden State is really a 31-win team that has received six wins' worth of luck so far this season.


"Luckiest" teams in the NBA, 2012-13

Team Wins SOS Career Years Pythagoras Total True Wins
San Antonio Spurs 51 +3 +245 +16 +264 42
Los Angeles Clippers 45 -5 +327 -71 +251 37
Brooklyn Nets 38 +19 +81 +103 +203 31
Golden State Warriors 37 -41 +98 +131 +188 31
Memphis Grizzlies 44 -20 +139 +51 +171 38


That makes the Warriors the league's fourth-luckiest team this season (Brooklyn is third and the Clippers rank second), but even they haven't been as fortunate as the Spurs, who rank first with an estimated 8.8 more wins than they deserve due to luck. Some of that has been under the auspices of schedule strength and Pythagoras, but mainly it's because of career years -- they've gotten unexpectedly great seasons from Tony Parker (adding 3.4 more wins than expected), Duncan (2.8 more wins), Boris Diaw (2.4 more wins) and Tiago Splitter (1.9 more wins), to name a few. Further, 8.2 of San Antonio's excess wins are due to players performing at a higher level than could have been foreseen based on their ages and established levels of play.


San Antonio Spurs player performance, 2012-13

Player Age MP Net Pts Projected Diff (Wins)
Tony Parker 30 1846 +205 +104 +3.4
Danny Green 25 1778 +65 +43 +0.7
Tim Duncan 36 1668 +143 +59 +2.8
Tiago Splitter 28 1631 +85 +27 +1.9
Boris Diaw 30 1491 +15 -58 +2.4
Kawhi Leonard 21 1392 +96 +101 -0.2
Manu Ginobili 35 1269 +90 +76 +0.5
Gary Neal 28 1217 -60 -29 -1.0
Stephen Jackson 34 928 -55 -37 -0.6
Matt Bonner 32 704 -3 +2 -0.2
DeJuan Blair 23 684 -2 +21 -0.8
Nando de Colo 25 677 -33 -4 -1.0
Patty Mills 24 580 -8 -2 -0.2
Cory Joseph 21 223 +4 -10 +0.5
James Anderson 23 94 -3 -5 +0.1
Aron Baynes 26 73 -5 -0 -0.1


The bad news for the Spurs is that such good fortune is fleeting. Computing this luck metric for every NBA team going back to the NBA-ABA merger in 1976, the correlation between luck in one season and the next is 0.03, meaning there's essentially zero carry-over from season to season. In other words, teams (like the Spurs) who have relied on luck to inflate their win totals should go into the following season expecting none of that over-performance to be retained going forward.

You might think one saving grace for San Antonio in this department is its coach, Gregg Popovich, known as one of the best the game has ever seen. Certainly we can attribute to Popovich some of the unexpected contributions of a player like Diaw, whose expectations were set relative to the overweight, undermotivated version we saw in Charlotte, not the semi-useful player he's been in San Antonio. But clear-cut coaching credit like that is rare. While the Spurs have defied luck in recent seasons (they've won 16.6 more games than they "should have," according to this luck metric, since the 2010-11 season), in more than 1,300 career games as an NBA coach, Popovich has only raised his teams' luck by about 1.2 wins per 82 games on average.

And the truth is that few coaches have shown any statistically significant impact on their teams' ability to produce positive numbers in the "luck" ledger. Rick Carlisle's teams have won 4.0 more games per season than they should; Pat Riley, Phil Jackson and Flip Saunders have added roughly an extra 3.5 wins per season; Chuck Daly added 3.1 and George Karl adds 2.3. Beyond those names, it's hard to find coaches who consistently make big impacts on their teams' luck factors. (And Popovich isn't even in that group -- his plus-1.2 mark isn't statistically significant from zero.)

Time and again, the Spurs have shown an ability to reinvent themselves and cobble together strong regular seasons in the face of an expected decline. But despite posting the best record in the West again this season, it needs to be recognized that a chunk of San Antonio's apparent success is built on unsustainable premises. Don't be surprised if that fact comes back to haunt the Spurs once more in the playoffs.
 

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How contenders compare to past

The Denver Nuggets pose a problem for NBA analysts. Usually, we act as historians, looking to past precedent to figure out how teams will perform in the future. But there's never been a team quite like the Nuggets -- not even the Denver squads that have lost in the opening round of the playoffs the past two seasons. The Nuggets' current 13-game winning streak has lifted them into territory rarely seen by a team without a current All-Star, and Denver's nightly dominance of points in the paint is also unique.

Trying to come up with a comparison for the Nuggets led me to the same exercise for the rest of the NBA's top teams. For the eight teams with a .600 winning percentage or better, I chose one past doppelganger. Although I started by using my database to search for teams since the NBA-ABA merger with similar offensive and defensive ratings (adjusted for league average), my comparisons also factored in pace of play, style, players at key positions and even narrative, where appropriate.

Miami Heat: 1991-92 Chicago Bulls

Although there are other teams that more closely adhere to Miami's combination of dominant offense and there-when-needed defense, in terms of storyline the Heat's defense of the championship looks a lot like the second title run for Michael Jordan & Co. After breaking through in the 1991 postseason, Chicago won six more games the next season. (Miami is playing at a pace nearly eight wins better.) Given the level of competition before the NBA expanded in 1995, there's an argument to be made that the Bulls' 67-15 record in 1991-92 was nearly as impressive as their record 72-win season in 1995-96.

The other frightening comparison for the Heat is the 2000-01 Los Angeles Lakers, another team defending a first championship. The Lakers sleepwalked through the regular season -- their defense was worse than league average -- before flipping the switch when Derek Fisher returned just before the playoffs. The Lakers went 15-1 en route to the title. Miami has shown this kind of potential in its current winning streak.

The biggest difference between this Heat team and Phil Jackson's champions is Miami's current 24-game winning streak. The most a Jackson team ever won was 19 in a row (the Lakers in 1999-2000, their first season under Jackson); the Jackson Bulls peaked at 18 consecutive wins in 1995-96. In "Basketball on Paper," Dean Oliver of ESPN Stats & Information showed that Chicago's 72-win team should have been expected to have a 23-game winning streak at some point in the season.


San Antonio Spurs: 2009-10 Orlando Magic

For years, the most similar team to the Spurs was always a past San Antonio contender. The past few seasons have flipped that script. After becoming an offensive-minded team a year ago, the Spurs have found balance unprecedented at the Alamo. San Antonio ranks in the NBA's top five in offensive and defensive rating. Add in the Spurs' heavy dose of 3-pointers and fundamentally sound defense built around a star center and the best match for San Antonio is the best of the Stan Van Gundy/Dwight Howard Orlando teams. The Magic swept through the first two rounds of the playoffs before falling to the Boston Celtics in the Eastern Conference finals, which sounds a lot like last year's Spurs.

Oklahoma City Thunder: 1990-91 Chicago Bulls

Technically, the Thunder's combination of the league's best offensive rating and a fourth-rated defense is more similar to the 1991-92 Bulls, but we can't repeat the comparison, so let's lean toward the narrative of a Chicago team that, like Oklahoma City, was trying to win its first championship. Structurally, the Heat and Thunder are built in the rough image of the Bulls, with a star wing, another star perimeter player and a power forward as their third option. Of course, Chicago had nothing quite like Miami's small lineups loaded with shooters. The Bulls were much more conventional, especially at center, which matches up better with Oklahoma City.

Memphis Grizzlies: 2007-08 Houston Rockets

These Rockets, whose 22-game winning streak was the longest in the past 40 years before Miami's run, have been much in the news lately. Overall, their combination of an elite defense and an average offense is much more similar to the Grizzlies, who have used it to post the NBA's fourth-best record. Like a Houston team that lost Yao Ming to injury, Memphis has made a major adjustment at midseason -- in this case because of the Rudy Gay trade. Memphis will hope that holds up better than Houston's run in a similarly stacked Western Conference, which came to an end in the opening round of the playoffs after an injury to starting point guard Rafer Alston.

Denver Nuggets: 1988-89 Phoenix Suns

As mentioned in the intro, finding a precedent for Denver is nearly impossible. Most "starless" elite teams are built around defense, not offense, and few played at the extreme pace the Nuggets employ. The closest match seems to be the 1988-89 Suns, who went 55-27 with a single All-Star (Tom Chambers) and eight players averaging at least 20 minutes per game. That formula worked well in the postseason; Phoenix reached the Western Conference finals before running into a Lakers team that went 11-0 en route to the NBA Finals.

Los Angeles Clippers: 1992-93 Seattle SuperSonics

I was originally thinking the 1992-93 Sonics, also coached by George Karl and similarly democratic in late-game situations, as a match for the Nuggets, but they were too defensive-minded. Instead, Seattle's ability to force turnovers and convert them as lobs at the other end is a much better fit for this year's Clippers. Blake Griffin-Shawn Kemp comparisons are nothing new, and the Sonics (who lost to Phoenix in seven games in the Western Conference finals) were similarly deep, bringing Nate McMillan, Eddie Johnson and Sam Perkins off the bench. The biggest difference between the teams is at point guard; a young Gary Payton hadn't yet reached All-Star status, but Chris Paul is the best lead guard in the NBA.

Indiana Pacers: 1992-93 New York Knicks

Airtight defense unwilling to surrender easy baskets? Check. Anchored by a center from Georgetown? Check. Biggest threat in the East to the defending champs? Check. Yes, the Pacers have become their biggest rivals in the 1990s, save for Spike Lee cheering courtside. In fact, several '90s Knicks teams are among the best matches for Indiana, although the 1992-93 team came closest. For all its talent, New York ranked just 22nd in the league in offensive rating; the Pacers are 20th.

New York Knicks: 2000-01 Dallas Mavericks

It's safe to say that this year's Knicks squad won't draw any comparisons to its Pat Riley/Jeff Van Gundy predecessors. New York's offense-first mentality and heavy reliance on the 3-pointer is similar to the Don Nelson Mavericks. Although the Knicks don't have a point guard like young Steve Nash, Carmelo Anthony is actually playing something of a Dirk Nowitzki role as a stretch 4. This Dallas team, which began a 12-year playoff run that could end this season, upset the Utah Jazz in the opening round before losing to the Spurs.
 

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Lohse deal sets Brewers up for a fall

The Miami Marlins are doing a Buy One Get One Free thing with their Opening Day tickets, like a grocery store selling pickles. The Houston Astros are prepared to open the year with a $20 million payroll (plus $5 million in Wandy Rodriguez salary) and a team that could match Casey Stengel's Mets for consecutive 106-loss seasons.

Within that context, Brewers owner Mark Attanasio deserves this: No owner in baseball can say he has made a more concerted effort to win within the confines of his market than Attanasio has over the past six seasons.

It was Attanasio who greenlighted the trade for CC Sabathia in 2008, who fired manager Ned Yost with a week to go in a push to make the playoffs. It was Attanasio who made a serious offer in an attempt to keep Sabathia, and then did the same with Prince Fielder -- deals that would've really stretched the Milwaukee budget. It was Attanasio who gave the go-ahead for the deals for Zack Greinke and Shaun Marcum, and for the free-agent signings of Randy Wolf and Aramis Ramirez. Attanasio greenlighted the winter offer to Ryan Dempster a few months ago, and is the reason Ryan Braun is locked up through 2020.

Attanasio is like the Juan Pierre of owners: Somewhat limited in how much production he can generate, but you cannot ever fault the effort.

To the great credit of the Brewers' fan base, it has responded, strongly supporting the team; Milwaukee had a payroll of $96 million last year, and the team finished sixth among 16 NL teams in attendance.

But there is a price to be paid for all of that aggressiveness, and that credit card bill is going to land in the mail sometime soon. Which is why I don't think the signing of Kyle Lohse made sense for them.

Look, Lohse is a good pitcher, and I agree with what GM Doug Melvin said Monday: The Brewers are a better team with him. Their rotation was very thin, which is why they tried to sign Dempster in the offseason, and now they can run out Lohse and Yovani Gallardo, with improved chances to make the playoffs.

Maybe this will be enough to push them into the postseason again. And they get Lohse on really nice terms. Because of the deferred money in the deal -- Lohse will make $4 million in salary in 2013, with $7 million deferred to 2016-2018, along with salaries of $11 million in 2014 and 2015 -- officials estimated the present-day value of Lohse's contract to be something in the range of $9.5 million annually. This for a pitcher who finished eighth in the majors in ERA in 2012. That's only about two-thirds of what Dempster is making annually, and not a whole lot more than Joe Blanton.

But through the years, the Brewers' farm system has been gradually eroded by trades, and back in February, Keith Law ranked the Brewers' player development strength at 29th among 30 teams.

Now, in signing Lohse, the Brewers sacrifice their first-round pick, which was 17th overall. A rival general manager mused about this possibility last week, noting that history is filled with examples of players picked at 17th or earlier who never made a dent in the big leagues.

"But then you have the case of someone like [Mike] Trout," the GM continued, noting that Trout was picked 25th overall by the Angels. "You have Shelby Miller [picked 19th in 2009]. You lose the opportunity to get talent -- relatively cheap talent. When you give up the picks, you lose the access to the talent."

The Brewers' first pick won't come until No. 54 overall; in fact, they will be the last team to make a selection.

That's especially important for a mid-market team such as the Brewers, who are surrounded by teams with a macro view in the NL Central. The Cardinals' payroll is a little higher than Milwaukee's, and their farm system is generally regarded as the deepest in the majors. The Reds' organization has a ton of talent. The Pirates are viewed as a team with very good player development right now, starting with pitcher Gerrit Cole. The Cubs are rebuilding their farm system.

Meanwhile, the Brewers have pushed to win every year, and meanwhile, they are drifting into more talent debt. They have Braun to build around, but their major league roster is thin in high-end players, and in depth.

This is what happened with the Minnesota Twins over the past decade, and now the Twins are faced with a massive rebuilding, especially in their organizational pitching -- and it could be a long road back for Minnesota.

None of that will seem to matter in the great moments this summer, if the Brewers challenge the Reds and Cardinals, and if they make the playoffs. But to me, the signing of Lohse feels like a tipping point, when Milwaukee pushed forward at a time when it really needed to take a step back.

Phillies lineup construction

The Phillies have to decide what to do with their leadoff spot. It's an odd lineup to construct, given all of the various elements -- most notably, how heavy it is in left-handed hitters.

A. Chase Utley and Ryan Howard, both left-handed hitters, will hit third and fourth.

B. Jimmy Rollins is a switch-hitter and can run, but isn't really a high on-base percentage guy (.296, .320, .338 and .316 in OBP from 2009 to 2012). In addition, Rollins doesn't hit that well as a right-handed hitter -- .218 last year.

C. Domonic Brown has had a great spring and the Phillies are excited about him, but he's left-handed, like Utley and Howard, and Charlie Manuel won't want to put too much on him at the outset.

D. When Michael Young is swinging the bat well, he can hit anywhere from second to sixth in a lineup. And he's having a decent spring.

E. Carlos Ruiz will open the season with a 25-game suspension, meaning that Erik Kratz will catch.

F. Ben Revere is fast and doesn't hit for power.

So if you're in Manuel's shoes, you probably start with this: Utley, Howard and Brown are going to hit third, fourth and sixth, respectively.

Then you look for the right-handed hitter who follows Howard, in the No. 5 spot, someone who can do some damage against lefties, and Young is probably that guy. If Manuel hits Rollins fifth, then he'll essentially create a string of four consecutive hitters who are more vulnerable against lefties, from Utley to Brown. You could hit John Mayberry Jr. fifth against lefties, with Young batting second, Rollins in the leadoff spot and Revere eighth.

Then you decide the best spot for Revere -- and he is a higher OBP guy than Rollins right now, and more likely to run. I'd hit him leadoff, with Rollins in the No. 2 spot. That means Mayberry probably would hit seventh when he starts against lefties, with Laynce Nix platooning against righties and Kratz eighth.

Here's the bottom line: It's a lineup that will be better against right-handers than lefties, no matter how Manuel draws it up, and it'll be important for Utley and Howard to get back to doing damage against lefties. Howard, who hit .173 against lefties last season, has come into spring training refocused on hitting the ball to left field, and that will help him against southpaws.

For the readers: How would you construct the Phillies' lineup?

More on Puig

Wrote here yesterday about how Yasiel Puig had a higher batting average than on-base percentage in spring training -- because he had no walks, and a sacrifice fly -- and so in preparing for Monday's podcast about Puig, Jayson Stark looked up the history of players accomplishing that rare feat in the regular season and discovered this: Billy Beane, the lord of Moneyball and advocate of on-base percentage, is one of the few. In 1989, he batted .241, with a .238 OBP.

"I am reformed," Beane said Monday, laughing. "Do as I say, not as I do."

Ticket dirt

From Chris Matcovich of TiqIQ.com, some interesting ticket data points regarding the secondary ticket market for this upcoming season (all numbers are as of Monday morning).

• The two teams who broke from the StubHub deal, the Yankees and Angels, have seen 11.06 percent and 34.23 percent increases respectively.

• Although Red Sox tickets are down 21.43 percent from last season at this time, Fenway Park hosts six of the top 10 highest-priced games currently.

• The highest premium for an Opening Day game is 216.48 percent for the Giants compared with their season average ticket price

• The American League has the highest average ticket price at $84.44; the AL East is the highest priced division at $94.22, while the NL Central is the cheapest division at $73.56

• Year-over-year MLB ticket prices are up 5.87 percent ($75.08 vs. $79.49).

Teams with top five average price
1. Red Sox: $118.72
2. Tigers: $111.72
3. Blue Jays: $100.99
4. Yankees: $100.19
5. Cubs: $98.58

Teams with lowest average price
1. Brewers: $57.74
2. Rockies: $59.00
3. Braves: $60.90
4. Marlins: $62.48
5. Royals: $63.47

Highest priced Opening Day tickets
1. Giants: $254.04
2. Orioles: $237.24
3. Red Sox: $230.69
4. Yankees: $216.88
5. Tigers: $202.84

Largest percent increase from 2012
1. Tigers: 69.68
2. Dodgers: 45.04
3. Astros: 42.95
4. Pirates: 40.83
5. Padres: 36.51

Largest percent decrease from 2012
1. A's: 29.38
2. Red Sox: 21.43
3. Marlins: 18.56
4. Braves: 17.27
5. Phillies: 16.08

Five most expensive games
1. Sept. 26, Rays at Yankees: $411.56
2. April 5, Cardinals at Giants: $254.04
3. Aug. 17, Yankees at Red Sox: $248.93
4. July 19, Yankees at Red Sox: $244.35
5. Aug. 16, Yankees at Red Sox: $241

Hicks and service time

Aaron Hicks won the Twins' center field job. From Mike Berardino's story:

By starting Hicks' service time "clock" now, the Twins could cost themselves additional millions through salary arbitration as soon as 2016 and could allow Hicks to reach free agency one year sooner (after 2018) than he otherwise might.

Twins general manager Terry Ryan seemed to take offense Monday, March 25, at this notion.

"The guy has earned it," Ryan said of the former 14th overall draft pick in 2008. "I find it almost humorous that people are talking about service time, starting the clock. We didn't trade (Denard) Span and (Ben) Revere to stall the next guy.

"I don't know in the last 20 years or however long Bill (Smith) and I have been in the general manager's job that we have put a guy back because of service time. Who have we done that to? I don't recall it."

In my opinion: The question of when to start service time is just part of the business. If Hicks has a down year in 2016, he won't think it's wrong to take a raise through arbitration. No, he would make what the parameters of the business, shaped by the collective bargaining agreement, allow him to make.

When the Rays hold a prospect down in the minor leagues to ensure the timing of his service-time clock maximizes his value, that's not personal; that's a company doing what it believes to give itself the best chance for success.

Along the same lines: Tim Britton writes that sending Jackie Bradley Jr. to the minors at the start of the season is a smart move. I agree completely.

With Bradley in limbo, Ryan Sweeney is in a tough spot.

Chavez on Mo

From Charlie Moynihan, producer at ESPN: "I interviewed Eric Chavez at Diamondbacks camp. As a former teammate of Mariano Rivera and someone who faced him many times when he was with Oakland, Chavez knows the Yankees' reliever very well. Below is a phenomenal quote Chavez gave me on camera, and I thought your blog readers might appreciate it. Chavez said:

"'Being able to throw one pitch [cutter] his whole career and dominate the league is a feat we will probably never see in the game again. To me, it is the single greatest accomplishment in sports. What he did over a period of time with just one pitch is pretty amazing.'"

The fight for jobs

1. As expected, Scott Kazmir was named the No. 5 starter with the Indians. He had been throwing great all spring.

2. Shelby Miller is the No. 5 starter for the Cardinals.

3. Edinson Volquez will be the Opening Day starter for the Padres.

4. The Angels have a few decisions remaining.

5. Brandon Maurer has had a great spring, and appears to have won a job in the Seattle rotation.

6. Steve Clevenger is going all out to make the Cubs.

7. The Twins cut Drew Butera.

8. The Rockies sent Drew Pomeranz to the minors.

9. Evan Gattis appears to be the backup catcher for the Braves.

10. Jeff Baker made the Rangers' roster.

Moves, deals and decisions

1. Chris Young opted out of his deal with the Nationals. Which makes sense, because he's nearing the end of his career and he wants to pitch in the big leagues.

2. The Rockies may trade catcher Ramon Hernandez soon, Troy Renck writes within these notes.

3. Within these Derrick Goold notes, there is word that Matt Adams will start the year in the big leagues and that Michael Wacha is being assigned to Triple-A.

4. The Tigers traded catcher Curt Casali to the Rays to keep a pitcher they like.

5. The Royals cut two veterans.

6. Laynce Nix is in the outfield mix for the Phillies, but Charlie Manuel described what he's really looking for: Someone who gets hot.

7. Chien-Ming Wang is back with the Yankees and happy about it, writes Erik Boland.

8. The Orioles traded for another pitcher, writes Roch Kubatko.

9. Placido Polanco is doing something for the first time: Batting cleanup.

10. The Marlins are signing Matt Diaz, as Juan Rodriguez writes.

11. Hiroyuki Nakajima may start the year in the minors, writes John Shea.

12. Scouts watched Chris Capuano throw.

Dings and dents

1. David Freese got an injection in his sore back.

2. Brett Lawrie is going to miss the start of the season.

3. Wilson Betemit appeared to suffer a significant knee injury.

4. Henry Rodriguez was cleared to pitch.

5. Jesse Crain is facing some final exams.

6. Bronson Arroyo escaped injury, and his manager called it a miracle.

7. Derek Jeter is being reevaluated today.

8. Alex Rodriguez is on the mend, Page Six reports.

9. The Diamondbacks will soon have to decide what to do with Cody Ross, writes Steve Gilbert.

10. Shaun Marcum is hurt again, as Andy Martino writes.

Monday's games

1. Homer Bailey was hit hard.

2. Brett Myers was hit hard again.

3. Mike Minor had a bad day.

4. Matt Moore's command continues to be an issue.
 
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NL East

• A scout on the swing of Bryce Harper, who has been wrecking baseballs this spring: "Controlled violence."

• I've heard Pedro Feliciano is throwing at 82-83 mph, so little wonder the Mets want him to work on his velocity in the minors.

NL Central

• Alfonso Soriano might be indispensable to the Cubs, writes Gordon Wittenmyer.

• The Pirates won't have good weather at the start of the season, it appears.

• Baseball is fun again for Pedro Alvarez.

NL West

• Wilin Rosario has evolved into a big-time power hitter.

• Colorado is a place that makes a riddle out of pitching, writes Tyler Kepner.

• Zack Greinke struggled in his return to the mound, but appeared healthy.

• Yasiel Puig's stay with the Dodgers won't be long, writes Dylan Hernandez.

AL East

• J.P. Arencibia has convinced his manager he can catch the knuckleball.

• Brandon Gomes has a future in the Rays' bullpen.

• Toronto GM Alex Anthopoulos spoke with Richard Griffin.

• For Mike Napoli, it's all systems go, writes Scott Lauber.

AL Central

• Billy Butler offers a constant for the Royals, writes Bob Dutton: He can hit.

AL West

• The return of Derek Holland's changeup could be big for the Rangers.

• Aaron Hill gives back.

• The Astros are getting close to settling their roster.

Other stuff

• Nolan Ryan sounds very much like a man saying his goodbyes, writes Kirk Bohls.

• Bo Porter remains upbeat this spring, writes Amanda Comak.

• Read this story about a Lenny Dykstra-related book at your own peril.

• If you need to recover from that Dykstra story, read this, about a couple of Dunstons.

And today will be better than yesterday.
 

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Hard fouls part of today's game

"I know that a lot of my fouls [against me] are not basketball plays." LeBron James said it in a clipped tone after Chicago snapped Miami's 27-game win streak Wednesday. James went on to cite a drive in which Kirk Hinrich tackled him and another possession on which Taj Gibson got him by the collar and yanked, only two of the incidents in which James was hit hard. Each was called a common foul, not a flagrant foul.

Late in the game, James responded with a hard shoulder on Carlos Boozer screen, correctly called a flagrant.

LeBron neglected to a mention a key, bizarre, fourth-quarter play in which Hinrich wrested the ball from Chris Bosh by grabbing his wrists and pulling the big man downward. That foul actually went uncalled, epitomizing a choppy, sloppy game, replete with ignored contact.

Hard fouls are common fouls

James' detractors, including Gibson, classified his comments as mere whining, of course. But Gibson admitted committing a hard foul, and added, "Every game we played them was a physical game. You're going to know things are like that; tough, hard fouls are going to be called. … You just try to slow him down. We're not trying to intentionally hurt him."

In fact, as NBA analysts and coaches have made clear, it's well known that the best way to stop the Heat is to get physical with them.

No one denies, with a straight face, that James was fouled hard, repeatedly, during the game. Mike Breen said, late in the game, "James has taken about four or five hard, hard hits tonight."

In fact, the main case made against LeBron is that this kind of thing happens all the time. As Jeff Van Gundy aptly noted during the game, when Gibson's foul was initially called a flagrant (then downgraded to a common foul), "That's a good fake help-up. That's, you hit him hard, and then, to avoid the flagrant foul, you go to help him up. That's not a flagrant foul. … It's not excessive. … That's not even a hard [call]. That's not even one that's close."

In other words, this is just ordinary basketball these days. Which is to say, hard fouls are common fouls in the supposedly soft modern game. This is "tackle basketball," as Henry Abbott has termed it on TrueHoop, the willingness to upend an opponent rather than cede the layup or dunk he earned from beating your defense.

It is intentional harm, inflicted on driving players, codified into strategy by successful coaches such as Tom Thibodeau. Rugged, physical play did not cease when the 1990s ended. In some ways, today's game is even more physical than what we witnessed back then, and the collisions involve bigger and stronger players.

Were the 1990s really rougher?

Our collective infatuation with Michael Jordan's golden era has spurred some mythology about toughness in those times. Jordan himself has passionately asserted that LeBron could not have thrived as he does now in an era that was not as "soft."

The problem with such assertions is that there isn't much evidence to support them.

One way to define the physicality of the game is the effectiveness of the defense. When people say the game is soft now, they are saying it was much harder to score then. It is often asserted that Jordan could easily score 40 or perhaps 45 or 50 points per game in today's "soft" game.

In 2010, Jordan himself told USA Today that he could have scored 100 (his career high was 69): "It's less physical [today] and the rules have changed, obviously. Based on these rules, if I had to play with my style of play, I'm pretty sure I would have fouled out or I would have been at the free throw line pretty often and I could have scored 100 points."

But overall, in fact, scoring was much easier for most of the 1990s, including Jordan's heyday. (And it was even easier in the 1980s.) Not only was the game played faster, a clear sign that there was relatively little resistance as players went up and down the court and to the basket, but teams also scored a lot more per possession. For instance, in 1992-93, known for a rough-and-tumble series between the Knicks and the Bulls, scoring was at 108.0 points per 100 possessions. This year, it's down to 105.8, which is actually an increase from last season.

Think about that -- when the team had the ball in the 1990s, it scored more than it does now.

That's despite the following: Offensive strategy has evolved in the mathematically correct direction, which is to shoot more 3s and space the floor better. Of course, that's in part because players are more afraid to enter the lane -- watch a Clippers game for the number of times Chris Paul shies away from going to the rim because he knows he'll get hit. He has admitted as much, despite being one of the toughest, most physical point guards we've ever seen.

But defenses are so fast, physical and prepared that, even with much improved outside shooting in the game these days (the 3-point percentage across the league is 35.9, as opposed to 32.0 percent in Jordan's first championship season), scoring is down.

In the 1990s, teams shot a much higher percentage from the field than they do now, and a higher percentage on 2-point baskets. If players were getting banged on every play, why was it so much easier for the skinnier players of that decade to score? Why was it so much easier then to get to the bucket and score on 2-point shots? And, if they were better shooters then, why is 3-point shooting better now?

So, just to be clear: The case some people are making is that less effective defense was also more physical. Can that be?

Without a doubt, there was plenty of rough play in the 1990s -- far too much, in fact, which is one reason that we still talk about those days as being so rough. The players remember, the coaches remember, and the fans remember. That's when we started to realize exactly how well the rough stuff worked.

The Detroit Pistons and New York Knicks famously employed the Jordan Rules, which were designed to intimidate and stymie MJ, and those "rules" worked sometimes, too -- that's one reason that Jordan remembers those years so distinctly.

The game often disintegrated and bogged down, particularly in those notorious Knicks games, and by the time the '90s ended, the game was slowing down considerably, with an excessive emphasis on defense (often physical defense). And there are plenty of highlight reels of hard fouls, nasty play and brawls spilling into the front rows.

But if the claim is that the 1990s overall were a lot more physical than the game today, the evidence is hard to find.

Who got more whistles than LeBron? MJ

Perhaps people mean that more rough play was permitted back then.

It doesn't appear so, at least according to the statistical evidence.

In fact, in some ways players were more protected by the refs then, when we look at the number of fouls called. In those days, basketball had the aural effect of Brazilian Carnival, with whistles constantly going off. Today, the average team earns fewer free throws per field goal attempt than in any season of the '80s or '90s. And overall, this season is on pace to set the new all-time NBA record for fewest free throws attempted.

Although some of that is related to offensive strategy today, keep in mind that offensive strategy is largely dictated by how the defense plays -- if players can't get to the basket, they will go less often. It's not as if today's athletes don't have the talent and athleticism to score at the rim. It's just that today's game doesn't permit as much of that.

And the notion that old-school refs were silent as stars got walloped is bogus. Through age 28, Jordan was granted more free throws than LeBron per game, even though LeBron plays more minutes. If James is indeed playing in a softer era and getting all the calls, it's not resulting in more freebies from the stripe. As Gibson and Van Gundy said, the treatment LeBron got Wednesday night was just ordinary stuff -- and not all of it was whistled.

When it comes to LeBron specifically, one of the complaints about him is that he bullies his way to the basket -- that he is too physical. And he's not the only one: Kobe Bryant, Dwyane Wade, Derrick Rose and Russell Westbrook are among the many perimeter players known for their punishing style. It's hard to square that with the claim that the game is less physical.

Furthermore, one way that the game is more physical now is because of the new rules allowing zone defense, which means more bigs are waiting to stop (or wallop) LeBron and anyone else who wants to go to the basket. In the '80s and '90s, Jordan didn't have to play against zones and zone-style defense, because that kind of defense was illegal. Sure, he absorbed some hard fouls here and there, but he also got to the basket all the time without getting hit -- enough that several highlight videos of his exploits were released before he even made the Finals.

Of course, Jordan's era had legalized handchecking, which was certainly a deterrent for would-be drivers. Handchecking was a significant physical tactic, one that helped a defense. And it's one of the ways that the '90s were more physical than the game today. But handchecking didn't do more to thwart offensive players than legalized zone (which includes the similar tactic of bigs coming out hard to bump and stop ball-handlers). We know that because the aforementioned numbers say so.

What does the film say?

This is where someone suggests that the heightened physical play is obvious if you merely watch those old games. I would respond that you indeed should go back and watch.

What you'll find in those '90s "slugfests" might shock you. Yep, there are some hard fouls (just as there are today). But defensive communication is often weak; screens are dealt with poorly; and double-teams result in wide-open shots.

For an example, witness Penny Hardaway knifing through the Bulls for 38 points in the 1996 Eastern Conference finals. Skinny Penny does it with undeniable skill, but he also gets to the rim with ridiculous ease. Keep in mind, these are the 72-win Bulls we're talking about, the greatest team to ever play -- the team with the No. 1 defense in the league that season. Just imagine how easy it was to score on the Celtics that year as they were giving up 107.0 points per game, or the Vancouver Grizzlies, with Big Country Reeves manning the middle. Weakside defense was, indeed, weak.

Those Chicago Bulls teams were fantastic defenders. But they weren't especially physical. And neither was the era -- it was merely an era we say we like better, an era we increasingly mythologize the further we get from it. To extol the rugged virtues of the Jordan epoch often seems like a way to knock today's players, for whatever reasons. But it is analysis, or storytelling?

Athletes get bigger, faster and stronger with each passing year. Defenses would still rather hit an opponent than cede a dunk. LeBron is complaining about getting clobbered because it's actually happening. David Lee bloodied Dwight Howard's mouth Monday with an elbow without getting called for it -- it was so ordinary it barely happened.

This is what exists in the game today. Overall, modern basketball is almost certainly as physical, and probably a lot more physical, than it was in Jordan's day. Perhaps it's our collective memory that has gone a little soft and weak.
 

Skooby

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The Cosmos

LeBron James has been better

You've seen Tom Haberstroh write here in Per Diem about how LeBron James has become a deadeye shooter. You may have read Grantland's Kirk Goldsberry's story on how James broadened his offensive game to improve his efficiency. You've also likely viewed James' video-game shooting numbers -- 56 percent accuracy from the field and 40.4 percent from beyond the arc.


LEBRON JAMES' ADVANCED STATS
Year PER Win% WS/48
2008-09 31.76 .839 .318
2009-10 31.19 .828 .299
2010-11 27.34 .748 .244
2011-12 30.80 .808 .298
2012-13 31.45 .821 .316



So you might be surprised to check out his advanced stats and see one category in which James isn't setting a new career high: player efficiency rating (PER). No April Foolin'. James is still a few tenths of a point behind the 2008-09 performance that earned him his first MVP trophy. Win percentage, the per-minute measure of my wins above replacement player (WARP) metric, and win shares per 48 minutes tell a similar story. Incredible as he has been, the James of 2012-13 still falls short of the 2008-09 incarnation in terms of value.

Explaining why touches on some important truths of basketball analysis, and also gives reasons to appreciate James' ability to be great in two very different ways.


Carrying a lighter load

Like so much of basketball analysis, the James conundrum ultimately boils down to the question of usage versus efficiency. The other side of James' 2012-13 season is that he is responsible for ending 30.2 percent of Miami's plays with either a shot attempt, a trip to the free throw line or a turnover. And while that's still a hefty chunk -- James is one of just four players in the league with a usage rate north of 30 percent -- it's also his lowest usage rate since 2004-05, when he was 20 and the Cleveland Cavaliers missed the playoffs.

James' usage rate peaked in -- you guessed it -- 2008-09, when he accounted for more than a third of the Cavaliers' plays (33.8 percent, to be exact). After posting usage rates of 33.5 percent or more in each of his past three years in Cleveland, James' involvement dropped by 2 percent when he joined up with Chris Bosh and Dwyane Wade in Miami. And after bouncing back last season, when he and Wade were on the floor together less often, it's gone down nearly another 2 percent this season in large part because of the addition of Ray Allen, who is a bigger part of the offense than any player besides James, Wade and Bosh during the Big Three era.

The relationship between scoring and efficiency for James and other players is best understood visually. Check out a graph of usage and true shooting percentage (adjusted for league average, mostly because scoring was down after the lockout) over the past five seasons, with James highlighted:


In general, it's hard to show the tradeoff between usage and efficiency because the best players tend to take the most shots. So their advantage on role players shows up just in usage rate, not in true shooting percentage (TS%). However, that relationship breaks down at the extremes.

The very best scorers are at the upper right of the graph -- above average in both usage and TS%. A close look shows that they form a line that matches our research about usage and efficiency; as elite players take more shots, they do in fact score less efficiently. Researcher Evan Zamir originally found this same trend among high scorers from the past three decades, showing its staying power.

Returning to LeBron, we see that four of his past five seasons match up along the leading edge, with only 2010-11 as an exception (more on that in a bit). As a scorer, James has been about equally valuable in all four seasons, moving up and down the usage/efficiency curve based on his team's needs.

So while LeBron's efficiency this season is a testament to his hard work and improvement, it's also a story of his increased ability to pick his spots -- a luxury he never had in Cleveland.


The man in Cleveland

Let's be clear that I come not to demean LeBron circa 2012-13, but to praise the 2008-09 version. With the benefit of hindsight, the Cavaliers' success that season is all the more improbable.

Go check out Cleveland's 2008-09 roster. (I'll wait.) Of the eight players besides James who logged at least 1,000 minutes of action, four are no longer in the league. (Zydrunas Ilgauskas and Ben Wallace have both retired, Wally Szczerbiak didn't get an offer to his liking the next year and Delonte West is working to try to get back to the NBA.) Two more (Daniel Gibson and Sasha Pavlovic) are reserve role players. That leaves two players, injured Anderson Varejao and Mo Williams, who are still starters in this league. Williams owes James a big thanks for his one and only All-Star appearance in 2009. Some four years later, he's a journeyman now playing in Utah.

We haven't even mentioned the Cavaliers' coaching staff. While Mike Malone remains a respected assistant at Golden State, assistant coach John Kuester (Cleveland's "offensive coordinator") flamed out when his Detroit teams struggled to score. And I trust you've heard what happened to coach Mike Brown during his next job with the Los Angeles Lakers.

Now check out the Cavaliers' record in 2008-09. That team, which ultimately lost to the Orlando Magic in the Eastern Conference finals (despite James' averages of 38.5 points, 8.3 rebounds and 8.0 assists per game), won a league-high 66 games. Miami, 26-game winning streak and all, three stars and all, will have to go 8-1 the rest of the season just to match that total.


Changing to fit his circumstances

When James helped lead the Heat to his first NBA championship last June, part of the narrative was that he had to grow as a player to become a champion. Aside from the 2010 playoffs, I think his track record in Cleveland suggests James was already at that level, but the team around him was not. Instead, the impetus for change was adapting to an entirely different situation in Miami, which took time.

The reason James' first season with the Heat was inarguably his worst in the past five years (and, barring a huge upset in a few weeks, his only campaign in that span that did not earn him MVP honors) was his inability to turn a smaller role in the Miami offense into better efficiency. As the chart shows, James' true shooting percentage was worse relative to league average in 2010-11 than during his final season in Cleveland. James had a tough time as a spot-up shooter when Wade ran the offense, limiting his effectiveness.

Fortunately for the Heat, and unfortunately for the rest of the league, James has since broadened his skills for his new role, and Miami coach Erik Spoelstra has developed an offense that better utilizes both James and Wade simultaneously. As he told Goldsberry, James has embraced the importance of efficiency and honed his shot selection to the point where he almost never forces an attempt. The results, as we've seen, are historic in nature.

The argument for 2012-13 LeBron over his younger predecessor is that, if need be, he could revert back to a volume mentality at any point, showing flexibility the 2008-09 LeBron did not yet have. Still, when it comes to sheer value to his team, James set a standard in 2008-09 that will be challenging for him or anyone else to top.
 

Lucky_Lefty

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You've seen Tom Haberstroh write here in Per Diem about how LeBron James has become a deadeye shooter. You may have read Grantland's Kirk Goldsberry's story on how James broadened his offensive game to improve his efficiency. You've also likely viewed James' video-game shooting numbers -- 56 percent accuracy from the field and 40.4 percent from beyond the arc.So you might be surprised to check out his advanced stats and see one category in which James isn't setting a new career high: player efficiency rating (PER). No April Foolin'. James is still a few tenths of a point behind the 2008-09 performance that earned him his first MVP trophy. Win percentage, the per-minute measure of my wins above replacement player (WARP) metric, and win shares per 48 minutes tell a similar story. Incredible as he has been, the James of 2012-13 still falls short of the 2008-09 incarnation in terms of value.



Explaining why touches on some important truths of basketball analysis, and also gives reasons to appreciate James' ability to be great in two very different ways.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Carrying a lighter load


Like so much of basketball analysis, the James conundrum ultimately boils down to the question of usage versus efficiency. The other side of James' 2012-13 season is that he is responsible for ending 30.2 percent of Miami's plays with either a shot attempt, a trip to the free throw line or a turnover. And while that's still a hefty chunk -- James is one of just four players in the league with a usage rate north of 30 percent -- it's also his lowest usage rate since 2004-05, when he was 20 and the Cleveland Cavaliers missed the playoffs.

James' usage rate peaked in -- you guessed it -- 2008-09, when he accounted for more than a third of the Cavaliers' plays (33.8 percent, to be exact). After posting usage rates of 33.5 percent or more in each of his past three years in Cleveland, James' involvement dropped by 2 percent when he joined up with Chris Bosh and Dwyane Wade in Miami. And after bouncing back last season, when he and Wade were on the floor together less often, it's gone down nearly another 2 percent this season in large part because of the addition of Ray Allen, who is a bigger part of the offense than any player besides James, Wade and Bosh during the Big Three era.

The relationship between scoring and efficiency for James and other players is best understood visually. Check out a graph of usage and true shooting percentage (adjusted for league average, mostly because scoring was down after the lockout) over the past five seasons, with James highlighted:






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In general, it's hard to show the tradeoff between usage and efficiency because the best players tend to take the most shots. So their advantage on role players shows up just in usage rate, not in true shooting percentage (TS%). However, that relationship breaks down at the extremes.

The very best scorers are at the upper right of the graph -- above average in both usage and TS%. A close look shows that they form a line that matches our research about usage and efficiency; as elite players take more shots, they do in fact score less efficiently. Researcher Evan Zamir originally found this same trend among high scorers from the past three decades, showing its staying power.

Returning to LeBron, we see that four of his past five seasons match up along the leading edge, with only 2010-11 as an exception (more on that in a bit). As a scorer, James has been about equally valuable in all four seasons, moving up and down the usage/efficiency curve based on his team's needs.

So while LeBron's efficiency this season is a testament to his hard work and improvement, it's also a story of his increased ability to pick his spots -- a luxury he never had in Cleveland.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------




The man in Cleveland


Let's be clear that I come not to demean LeBron circa 2012-13, but to praise the 2008-09 version. With the benefit of hindsight, the Cavaliers' success that season is all the more improbable.
Go check out Cleveland's 2008-09 roster. (I'll wait.) Of the eight players besides James who logged at least 1,000 minutes of action, four are no longer in the league. (Zydrunas Ilgauskas and Ben Wallace have both retired, Wally Szczerbiak didn't get an offer to his liking the next year and Delonte West is working to try to get back to the NBA.) Two more (Daniel Gibson and Sasha Pavlovic) are reserve role players. That leaves two players, injured Anderson Varejao and Mo Williams, who are still starters in this league. Williams owes James a big thanks for his one and only All-Star appearance in 2009. Some four years later, he's a journeyman now playing in Utah.

We haven't even mentioned the Cavaliers' coaching staff. While Mike Malone remains a respected assistant at Golden State, assistant coach John Kuester (Cleveland's "offensive coordinator") flamed out when his Detroit teams struggled to score. And I trust you've heard what happened to coach Mike Brown during his next job with the Los Angeles Lakers.

Now check out the Cavaliers' record in 2008-09. That team, which ultimately lost to the Orlando Magic in the Eastern Conference finals (despite James' averages of 38.5 points, 8.3 rebounds and 8.0 assists per game), won a league-high 66 games. Miami, 26-game winning streak and all, three stars and all, will have to go 8-1 the rest of the season just to match that total.



--------------------------------------------------------------------------------




Changing to fit his circumstances


When James helped lead the Heat to his first NBA championship last June, part of the narrative was that he had to grow as a player to become a champion. Aside from the 2010 playoffs, I think his track record in Cleveland suggests James was already at that level, but the team around him was not. Instead, the impetus for change was adapting to an entirely different situation in Miami, which took time.

The reason James' first season with the Heat was inarguably his worst in the past five years (and, barring a huge upset in a few weeks, his only campaign in that span that did not earn him MVP honors) was his inability to turn a smaller role in the Miami offense into better efficiency. As the chart shows, James' true shooting percentage was worse relative to league average in 2010-11 than during his final season in Cleveland. James had a tough time as a spot-up shooter when Wade ran the offense, limiting his effectiveness.

Fortunately for the Heat, and unfortunately for the rest of the league, James has since broadened his skills for his new role, and Miami coach Erik Spoelstra has developed an offense that better utilizes both James and Wade simultaneously. As he told Goldsberry, James has embraced the importance of efficiency and honed his shot selection to the point where he almost never forces an attempt. The results, as we've seen, are historic in nature.

The argument for 2012-13 LeBron over his younger predecessor is that, if need be, he could revert back to a volume mentality at any point, showing flexibility the 2008-09 LeBron did not yet have. Still, when it comes to sheer value to his team, James set a standard in 2008-09 that will be challenging for him or anyone else to top.
 
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