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[Skooby]

Atlanta Hawks: 2012-13 Forecast

Overview
Their place in the standings might not shift much from the past few seasons, but in terms of mindset, the Hawks' franchise has undergone a full-scale reversal. Danny Ferry took over as general manager in June and immediately started remaking a roster and cap situation that was as committed to the status quo as any in basketball, leaving the Hawks' future potentially much brighter.

Under previous GM Rick Sund, the Hawks seemed locked into a strategy of preserving their seat at the Eastern Conference playoff table for as long as possible. An absurdly expensive contract for Joe Johnson and a less pilloried but still objectionable one for Marvin Williams kept them afloat in that regard, and effectively trading two first-round picks for Kirk Hinrich (probably the worst move of the previous regime) propped them up a bit longer.

Nonetheless, this house of cards was doomed to fall at some point. That it hadn't in either of the past two seasons owes largely to some brilliant work the previous administration did in finding inexpensive role players to fill out the bench. For a second straight season, Atlanta rolled out a mostly minimum-wage second unit that consistently kept it in games and occasionally increased its advantage.

But with Johnson's contract dollars escalating, ownership reluctant to pay luxury tax, and Josh Smith entering free agency in 2013 and pining for an exit, the handwriting was on the wall. The Hawks would be able to keep this nucleus together for one more year, and that would be it.

Enter Ferry, who has reworked this team's balance sheet in such a way that the Hawks are $40 million under next year's cap, give or take a few ducats. They likely won't be that far under come summer, since they intend to re-sign Smith (who now appears more amenable to doing so), but the Hawks have put themselves in position to nab a major free agent should one shake loose.

And the best part is that, if not, they really don't seem to be headed for a major dropoff from the past two seasons, even without Johnson. Atlanta now has the best of both worlds -- the likelihood of making the playoffs, combined with the hope that in the future it can be something more than a postseason speed bump for the league's elite. Ferry still needs to deliver on the second part of the equation, but he's off to a heck of a start.


2011-12 Recap

It was a wildly successful season, considering the Hawks played nearly all of it without All-Star center Al Horford, who tore his pectoral muscle 11 games into the season and didn't return until Game 5 of the Boston series. And it was a surprising one, as the Hawks figured to be a mid-tier Eastern club even with Horford but instead had the fourth-best record in the conference.

The key was a wholesale improvement at the defensive end, where the Hawks moved up to sixth in defensive efficiency -- again, a feat made more impressive by the fact Horford missed most of the season. With a full season of Jeff Teague at the point rather than Mike Bibby, Atlanta's defense at the point of attack improved dramatically, and it had to resort to less cross-matching to hide Bibby. Additionally, Marvin Williams showed up healthier and more active, and the minimum-wage second unit of Willie Green, Tracy McGrady, Vladimir Radmanovic and Jannero Pargo performed surprisingly solid work.

HOLLINGER'S '11-12 STATS
W-L: 40-26 (Pythagorean W-L: 43-23)
Offensive Efficiency: 102.4 (15th)
Defensive Efficiency: 98.6 (6th)
Pace Factor: 92.5 (23rd)
Highest PER: Josh Smith (21.14)


But mostly, the season was about Larry Drew's emergence as a coach. The team had a series of puzzling mail-ins in his first season at the helm and it didn't seem like he was in total control, but in 2011-12, the Hawks played hard every night and his schemes worked. Atlanta did nothing exceptionally well at the defensive end, but the Hawks were above average across the board. The only thing they did worse than league average was block shots, ironic given that Smith is one of the league's top shot-blockers.

Offensively, Drew also reworked Atlanta's attack to space the floor better. The Hawks led the NBA in corner 3-point attempts and finished fifth in 3-point shooting at 37 percent; Johnson in particular benefited from this approach, as he got much easier long-range looks than in past seasons.

The one thing they didn't do was rebound on the offensive end, ranking just 26th. But even without second shots, Atlanta finished a respectable 15th in offensive efficiency -- again, impressive given the absence of Horford and the lack of a superstar. Contrary to the Hawks' iso-heavy reputation, they also ranked sixth in the percentage of assisted baskets.


Offseason Moves

Ferry had scarcely gotten his keys to the office before he began a dramatic restructuring of the roster, one that leaves the Hawks notably smaller in the backcourt but massively more flexible in terms of the salary cap:

Traded Joe Johnson to the Nets for DeShawn Stevenson, Jordan Farmar, Jordan Williams, Anthony Morrow, Johan Petro and two draft picks: The most dramatic move came shortly after Ferry took over, doing the unthinkable by not only jettisoning the leaden contract of Johnson, but getting actual assets in return. Stevenson came via a sign-and-trade; technically it's a three-year deal but only the first year is guaranteed, at $2.2 million. After this season, he'll either be a trade asset or be waived. Petro is a nonfactor with one year left on his deal, but Morrow is genuinely useful -- an absolutely deadly shooter with an expiring contract.

The kicker is that the Hawks received two draft picks as well, as opposed to having to include one as a bribe to take Johnson's contract. The more important one is a lottery-protected first-rounder from Houston that they might not be able to exercise for a couple more years, but the Hawks also got a 2017 second-rounder from the Nets.

There's an obvious negative here -- Johnson was the Hawks' best offensive player, and we shouldn't gloss over that -- but he had four years and $89 million left on his deal, and seemed headed into his decline years. Unloading this contract was a minor miracle, especially for a team that can't afford the luxury tax.

Waived Jordan Farmar and Jordan Williams: Apparently Ferry still hates the name Jordan after that fight with MJ all those years ago. In reality, Farmar was waived as a courtesy so he could sign in Israel and is owed only $1.5 million. Williams' exit was more of a surprise, as the second-year pro showed signs of being a contributor and the Hawks are not awash in frontcourt depth.

Let Vladimir Radmanovic and Tracy McGrady go; traded cash to Chicago for Kyle Korver: The other hidden benefit of the Johnson deal was that the Hawks created a $5 million trade exception; conveniently enough, Korver makes exactly $5 million this season, and the Hawks were able to get him basically for free thanks to the belt-tightening in Chicago.

Let Kirk Hinrich go; signed Lou Williams for four years, $20 million. In the most underrated move of the Hawks' summer, Atlanta nabbed the Sixers' highest scorer and PER leader for just the midlevel exception. Williams has his faults, as he is more of a 2 in a 1's body and isn't much of a defender. Plus, fitting him in with Atlanta's other small guards might prove troublesome. But you'd have a hard time finding a less expensive scoring source than this, and Atlanta badly needed a perimeter creator without Johnson.

Traded Marvin Williams to Utah for Devin Harris: The icing on Ferry's salary-cap sundae was this deal. While Williams is a slightly better player than Harris, the deal dumped a $7.5 million obligation to Williams in 2013-14 and thus freed up even more space for Atlanta's 2013 offseason. The deal does leave a hole at small forward, with Korver the only natural 3 on the roster, but again, the Hawks are thinking long term here.

Let Willie Green go; drafted John Jenkins and Mike Scott: Jenkins might have been a reach late in the first round but his shooting ability should help flesh out the wing rotation. He also adds a bit more size to a very short guard group. Second-rounder Scott has some potential as a pick-and-pop 4 if he proves he can defend the position.

Re-signed Ivan Johnson for one year, $962,195. Johnson accepted his qualifying offer as a restricted free agent after a productive rookie season. The oddity in the fine print is that he'll be a restricted free agent again next year if the Hawks qualify him again. It's a good deal for Atlanta at this price, and a necessary one after it waived Jordan Williams.

Signed James Anderson and Damion James for one year, minimum: Anderson is an interesting signing because Ferry came from San Antonio, which had drafted Anderson in 2010. James was another player from that draft who washed out; the Hawks took a no-risk dice-roll on each heading into camp. The fact that both are wings with some size probably helped in persuading Atlanta to take the plunge, given the lack of such players on the rest of the roster.


2012-13 Outlook

Break down the numbers, and the surprising thing about these Hawks is that they don't look much worse than the version that preceded them ... even though they have a dramatically improved cap situation going forward. In particular, take a look at the backcourt, where Lou Williams and Harris replace Joe Johnson and Hinrich. While Williams isn't Johnson's equal as a two-way player, he had a better PER last season and is nearly half a decade younger, so he should provide considerable bang for Atlanta's buck. Harris, meanwhile, played off the ball for Dallas earlier in his career, and although he's small for a wing, he probably can handle this role in stretches. Offensively, he's vastly more dynamic than Hinrich, more than offsetting the defensive downgrade.

Now factor in that Horford will be back and that Zaza Pachulia returns to playing the backup 5 and that three guards with elite quickness are supported by some serious shooting (Morrow, Jenkins, Korver), and one can start getting genuinely excited about this team, especially at the offensive end.

Defensively, however, the Hawks are almost certain to take a step back. On paper, the starting wings are Morrow and Korver, leaving it unclear how the Hawks will prevent any good wing from hanging 30 on them. Additionally, Atlanta's likely closing backcourt of Williams and Teague has major size issues that could leave the team re-enacting its Bibby-era smoke-screen tactics.

One option is to bust out Drew's big lineup, which has Josh Smith on the wing and Horford at the 4, but this solution seems better suited to short stints given how it strains the team's frontcourt depth to its maximum limits (Johan Petro, anyone?).

As a result of those shortcomings, Atlanta still won't emerge into the league's upper crust. But this is a playoff team that is likely to have one of the league's top 10 offenses, with the added benefit of becoming much more in the offseason if the Hawks play their cards right.


Prediction: 45-37, 2nd in Southeast, tied for 6th in Eastern Conference

 

[the cool]

uppin good shyt

 

[manyfaces]

Pistons please.

 

[thelonious21]

Where my Blazers

 

[Skooby]

Pistons and Blazers are not on there yet.

 

[Skooby]

Why is there an '*' in place of the number 'four'? What am I missing here?
--------------------------------------------



2012-13 Forecast: Brooklyn Nets

Overview

Welcome to a new era in the history of the Nets. For the first time, money is no longer an issue. And for the first time, this franchise is viewed as a destination rather than an unfortunate layover en route to someplace more habitable.
For both of those developments, credit the franchise's move from New Jersey to Brooklyn. While folks on the Jersey side rightly question why the lesser side of the Hudson has so much appeal, logistics dictate that the Nets can fare much better in their new digs. No longer stranded out in the suburbs, it's far more accessible for fans who work in Manhattan and, of equal importance, the night life in Manhattan is far more accessible to the players. (Although, to be fair, there's a perfectly fine Houlihan's on Route 17 near the Meadowlands.)

Brooklyn's status as a destination was hammered home over the summer by two decisions -- first, that of Deron Williams to stay with the Nets rather than bolt for his hometown Mavericks, and second, that of Dwight Howard to push hard for a trade to Brooklyn. While the latter didn't come to fruition, thanks largely to the scourge of base-year compensation rules (seriously, don't ask -- we'll be here all day), the Nets showed they can join teams like the Knicks, Heat and Lakers in showing up on nearly every prospective free agent's wish list.

Befitting their new status as a big-market magnet team, the Nets spent like drunken sailors. Why? Because they could. The Nets' strategy would have been somewhere between catastrophic and idiotic for about 25 of the league's 30 teams, but for Brooklyn it was an acceptable approach -- the Nets went over the cap, used every exception, re-signed their own players to inflated deals and ended up with an $82 million payroll for this season.

Next year the books show $85 million, and that's with only 11 players. It gets worse from there -- in 2015-16 they owe $76 million to just four players, and before you ask they've already used their amnesty clause on Travis Outlaw. Their players aren't worth that much, or even close to that much, but these moves enabled a quick fix.

As a result, a team that was horrible last season is likely to be the most improved squad in the league in 2012-13. There's another part of the puzzle here, too: If there was ever a time to overspend, this was it. The Nets absolutely, positively had to be relevant entering their new building in Brooklyn this fall, and they pulled it off. While doing so likely gave them a lower long-term ceiling, they get to kick off the Brooklyn era with a solid four-year run of likely playoff teams.

2011-12 Recap

The Nets were hit by one bad injury, losing Brook Lopez for all but five games because of foot problems, but overall their injury problems weren't that bad.
Instead, the Nets had two severe problems that held them back. The first was how unbelievably bad their small forwards were for two-thirds of the season. I mean, coming off a season when Outlaw was their starter at the 3, you couldn't have imagined New Jersey being worse in that department in 2011-12.
And then the season started … and it was Shawne Williams, DeShawn Stevenson and Damion James manning that spot. Among players who played at least 500 minutes, Stevenson had the league's worst player efficiency rating (4.33) and Williams had the second worst (4.96). James was the "star" of the bunch at 6.17 before an injury ended his season.
I can't emphasize this enough: This was almost certainly the worst small forward combination any team has had in the history of basketball. It was so bad the Nets often just threw their hands up and used guys like Anthony Morrow or Sundiata Gaines as their 3.
HOLLINGER'S '11-12 STATS

W-L: 22-44 (Pythagorean W-L: 17-49)
Offensive Efficiency: 99.7 (23rd)
Defensive Efficiency: 106.9 (29th)
Pace Factor: 92.7 (21st)
Highest PER: Deron Williams (20.34)

That changed when the team brought in Gerald Green from the D-League and traded Mehmet Okur and its first-round pick for Gerald Wallace. (Side note: We shouldn't allow the line about the small forwards to detract from how ghastly awful Okur was in his 17-game stint.) With a real NBA small forward, the Nets went a respectable 11-10 after the All-Star break in games Williams played; prior to the break, that number was 10-24. Of course, they also went 1-10 in the games he missed.

But this takes us to the other big problem. Regardless of whether it was Williams, Wallace or somebody else in the lineup, the Nets' defense was just horrific. Deron Williams was as guilty as anyone else, in fact, often playing with sullen indifference. New Jersey (as the Nets were known at the time) ranked 29th in defensive efficiency, which is as bad as you can do in a league with the Bobcats in it.

New Jersey was either 28th or 29th in several sub-categories, including 2-point percentage, 3-point percentage, rebound rate, blocks and true shooting percentage (TS%). The initial instinct is to blame this on the absence of their center, but Lopez is actually terrible on defense -- if anything, the Nets probably benefited from having Shelden Williams and Johan Petro in his place (Okur, not so much).

Instead, it casts a harsh light on coach Avery Johnson. While his situation was less than ideal last season, the Nets have finished 21st and 29th in defense in his two seasons at the helm. Suffice it to say that won't be acceptable this time around.

Offseason moves

The Nets weren't able to rope in Dwight Howard despite multiple close calls over the summer. Their best shot was right before the trade deadline, and it might have happened if not for Howard's momentary change of heart and surprise opt-in to another season on his contract.

Plan B was to use their money as a weapon and dive into the market headfirst, and man did they ever:

Traded Anthony Morrow, DeShawn Stevenson, Johan Petro, Jordan Williams and Jordan Farmar, a future first-round pick and a 2017 second-round pick to Atlanta for Joe Johnson: The exclamation point on their financial splurge this summer, the Nets basically handed Atlanta a get-out-of-jail-free card for Johnson's onerous deal -- one that still has four years and $89 million remaining on it -- by giving the Hawks a bunch of expiring contracts and even throwing in two picks for good measure. Most wonks expected Atlanta would have to pay somebody to take Johnson, so this was a bit of an overpay on the Nets' side. The fact the Nets were the ones giving up picks, including a lottery-protected first-rounder from Houston, drew some gasps around the league.

It got them a starting shooting guard, however, and one who should immediately provide some help for Williams at the offensive end. In fact, a lot of the off-ball plays the Nets ran for Williams last season likely will be run for Johnson instead.

Sent 2016 second-round pick to the Clippers for a signed-and-traded Reggie Evans (three years, $5 million): Making clever use of a small trade exception they had lying around, the Nets brought in Evans to be their backup center on a low-dollar contract. My major complaint with this deal isn't the use of the exception, it's the player. Evans isn't particularly good and shouldn't be a rotation player on a playoff team, but he will be counted on as Brooklyn's backup center.

Let Sundiata Gaines go, signed C.J. Watson for one year, minimum: Personally, I would have preferred just keeping the underrated Gaines, but the Nets were able to get Watson for the minimum and the difference between these two is pretty much po-tay-to, po-tah-to. One key advantage for Watson is that he's definitely better playing off the ball, which he may do a lot in small lineups given the other talent on this roster.

Re-signed Gerald Wallace for four years, $40 million: You knew the Nets would overpay Wallace after trading their lottery pick to Portland to get him at the trade deadline, and that's exactly what happened. He may deliver reasonable value in the first year or two, but the back end of this deal is likely to be ugly -- athleticism-dependent wings rarely have glorious runs through their early 30s. Between Wallace and Johnson in particular, the Nets have assumed some major risk three and four years down the road.

Re-signed Deron Williams for five years, $99 million: The Nets' most important free-agent goal was accomplished, as Williams stayed put after a dalliance with Dallas. This was part of the logic behind the reaches for Johnson and Wallace, as it showed Williams he'd have a real team if he stayed. Williams' deal itself is a fairly expensive one for a non-superstar, but it was basically the key to keeping the Nets relevant.

Re-signed Brook Lopez for four years, $60 million: Brooklyn gave Lopez the max, partly because the team told him that was what he'd get if he hung around on the sidelines waiting on a Howard deal. (He would have been signed-and-traded to Orlando and had to get the max to make the salaries match.) The weirdest part is that it appears the Nets gave him a fourth-year opt-out. If you're already maxing out a second-tier center, do you really needed to throw in the option year to close the deal?

Re-signed Kris Humphries for two years, $24 million: Once they'd done all the above and figured they were shooting money out the fire hose anyway, the Nets brought Humphries back at this inflated price. He quietly had a solid 2011-12, and at least the Nets limited the risk by making it only a two-year deal, but let's just say this will be a difficult contract to trade.

Let Gerald Green go, signed Mirza Teletovic for three years, $9.2 million: The Nets had one taxpayer midlevel to use and their options were to bring back Green -- a revelation on the wing last spring -- or go for the floor-spacing Bosnian Teletovic, who is coming off a strong season in Europe. I think they made the right call, as a floor-spacing 4 is much more of a need on this roster given the lack of other shooters. Besides, the Nets' frontcourt was (and still is) painfully thin. Based on his translated European stats, Teletovic will be worth the money.

Drafted Tyshawn Taylor, Tornike Shengelia and Ilkan Karaman. Given the Nets' lack of depth the first two here may actually need to play considerable minutes. Of the two I like Taylor much better; he was undervalued on draft day, has better shooting stats than his reputation and his defense could allow him to play immediately. Shengelia's translated Euroleague stats see him as a fringe player at best, and he may need some D-League seasoning. Karaman is an overseas stash pick who wasn't high on a lot of radars, but this is what you get with the 57th pick.

Let Damion James and Shelden Williams go, signed Josh Childress, Keith Bogans and Jerry Stackhouse: Start planning the parade.

2012-13 Outlook

The names are nice, but will they guard anybody? The Nets lazed through the season defensively last season, and the frontcourt in particular contains some huge question marks -- the Lopez-Humphries combo isn't exactly an imposing one, especially when it comes to help defense, and not much backs them up. The best of the bunch, Teletovic, is an offensive weapon but one who will struggle on D.

One can optimistically hope that Deron Williams will play harder now that his team has a chance, and certainly the wings have been upgraded with Johnson and Wallace. Nonetheless, between the soft frontcourt, lack of depth and Avery Johnson's questionable track record in getting his troops to commit at this end, there's a lot of reasons for doubt.

What isn't in doubt is that this team will score. There's no superstar here, but all five starters need to be guarded, Teletovic and MarShon Brooks provide some offensive punch off the bench, and the Nets weren't that bad on this end last season. Williams orchestrated some elite offenses in Utah with similar-caliber frontcourt talent, so one surmises that this could be a top-five offense with reasonable health.

If Brooklyn is a bottom-five defense again, alas, that won't matter. I suspect the Nets will be better than that, if only by a bit, and that they'll cruise into the playoffs as a result. But watch the defense carefully in the early part of the season, because there's an upside buried here: If the Nets get consistent stops and stay healthy, they could be very, very good.

Prediction: 47 - 35, 2nd in Atlantic Division, 4th in Eastern Conference

 

[Skooby]

Chicago Bulls: 2012-13 Forecast

Overview

Turns out that the biggest threat to Chicago's title hopes wasn't the Miami Heat, but rather two other little-discussed threats: Derrick Rose's knee ligaments and Jerry Reinsdorf's wallet.

Chicago was the East's top seed despite an injury-plagued season from Rose, but when he blew out his knee in the first round of the playoffs, Chicago's offense never recovered. He's expected to miss most of the current season too, although we may see a late-season cameo, so the best-case scenario is that Chicago's title hopes are on hold for a year.

But it might be longer given Reinsdorf's stance toward the luxury tax. The Bulls have never paid it and apparently have no intention to; as a result, they refused to match an offer sheet to Omer Asik, and either cut or gave away three other important members of last season's hugely productive second unit.

The scary part is that the Bulls are still hurtling toward their financial cliff. Restricted free agent Taj Gibson is due for a major payday next summer, one that may result in the Bulls using the amnesty provision on Carlos Boozer to make ends meet. The non-guaranteed deal of Richard Hamilton also may fall under the ax, if he hasn't been traded by then.

Of course, this is all speculative. What Chicago has done to date can easily be defended; it's the owner's reputation that has everyone worried. For starters, the Bulls are still over the tax by about $3 million, although they could easily trade their way under during the season. Even if they do, that might not be such a bad idea if they plan on going over the threshold in future seasons, as it would push back when the Bulls would be subject to the league's "repeater" penalties.

Moreover, the Bulls aren't not be in bad shape in other respects. Their other best players, Joakim Noah, Luol Deng and Gibson, all are 27 or younger, and there may be more help on the way once Euro-stash pick Nikola Mirotic and 2012 first-rounder Marquis Teague are ready.

In the short term, the good news for Chicago is there is still enough talent on hand to field a very competitive team. The Bulls went 18-9 without Rose last season, and their two most identifiable characteristics -- manic defense and prolific rebounding -- had little to do with their floor general. Nonetheless, the playoffs showed how much harder it is for Chicago to sustain a cohesive offensive attack without him. It will be even harder after the Bulls made several secondary cuts.

The net result is a team that several fan bases would be glad to have, especially if Tom Thibodeau can keep it playing hair-on-fire defense, but one that will likely disappoint those who witnessed the past two campaigns.

2011-12 Recap

Some wondered whether Thibs' players could maintain their intensity over a second season, especially one as grinding as the lockout campaign. Man, did they ever. Despite not having Rose for half the year and battling various and sundry other injuries (Hamilton missed half the year, Deng was nagged by a wrist problem most of the season, and C.J. Watson also missed significant time), Chicago's intensity never flagged.

HOLLINGER'S '11-12 STATS

W-L: 50-16 (Pythagorean W-L: 54-12)
Offensive Efficiency: 104.5 (5th)
Defensive Efficiency: 95.3 (1st)
Pace Factor: 91.8 (26th)
Highest PER: Derrick Rose (23.10)

This was most obvious at the defensive end, where the Bulls just suffocated opponents with their persistent help, active bigs and refusal to concede a 3-point shot. The latter is an underrated factor in their excellence: Only 17.3 percent of Chicago's shots against were 3-point tries, by far the lowest rate in the league (see chart), and it's why the Bulls led the league in opponent TS percentage.

Of course, the Bulls also led the league in opponent 2-point percentage, so you were screwed either way, and they cleaned up the misses by boarding 74.3 precent of missed shots. Perhaps the most amazing part is that, as hard as they played, Chicago had the third-lowest foul rate in the league, with only .236 opponent free throw attempts per field goal attempt. The only thing Chicago didn't do well was force turnovers.

Lowest opponent 3-point rate, 2011-12

Team Opp 3A/FGA
Chicago .173
Philadelphia .202
Phoenix .205
Houston .209
San Antonio .210
League average .226
Causes for Chicago's defensive dominance weren't hard to find. Noah, Gibson and Asik are three of the best frontcourt defenders in basketball, while Deng is an ace wing defender and Brewer a vastly underrated pest off the bench. Throw in Thibodeau's schemes and preparation and a 12-deep roster, and there were few weak links to attack (coughBoozercough).

Offensively, the Bulls were average in most respects but had two characteristics that lifted them above the masses. First, while they didn't shoot 3s often, they shot them well: Chicago was fourth in the league at 37.5 percent, an impressive performance for a team with only one elite shooter (Korver).

Best Offensive Rebound Rate, 2011-12

Team Ast/FGA
Chicago 32.6
Utah 30.2
Memphis 29.8
L.A. Clippers 29.5
Indiana 29.2
But mostly, the Bulls were about quantity over quality. Chicago was phenomenally good on the offensive glass, retrieving 32.6 percent of its missed shots; for comparison, the Bulls' offensive rebound rate was nearly double that of Boston's. What made this particularly amazing is that the Bulls appeared to suffer no loss in transition defense as a result of this approach. Often the best offensive rebounding teams are also bad defensively because they overcommit players to the glass, but Chicago was awesome on D.

This fact may have some carryover into their playoff struggles. We have a fair amount of anecdotal evidence that teams with a "volume" offensive strategy, like Chicago, are more easily defended in the postseason. Of course, a more accessible explanation is that Rose, Noah and Deng all were hurt and they were facing the league's No. 3 defense.


Offseason Moves

See if you can detect a pattern here. The Bulls will have four of the same five starters as a year ago, but the offseason completely eviscerated their bench, with five key reserves replaced by minimum or rookie-salaried alternatives.

Let Omer Asik go, signed Nazr Mohammed for one year, minimum: The Bulls couldn't afford to match Houston's offer sheet to Asik, since it contained a "poison pill" in the form of a third year at $14.9 million -- right when the Bulls' cap situation looked to be at its worst anyway. The luxury tax bill was likely to add $15 million on top of Asik's salary, making it a $30 million season.

Nonetheless, not matching will leave a dent. While Asik couldn't score, he was one of the best defensive centers in basketball. Additionally, Chicago made a pretty uninspired choice as a replacement in the veteran Mohammed, who fell out of the Thunder's rotation last season and may not have much left in the tank at 35.

Cut C.J. Watson, drafted Marquis Teague: The Bulls waived the nonguaranteed deal of Watson and drafted Teague; certainly we can agree that the latter was a solid move given how late Chicago picked. Teague was up-and-down in his one year at Kentucky but still graded out as one of the top prospects at his position. He's only 19 and may need some seasoning, but it's rare for this much ability to be available with the 29th pick.

Cut Ronnie Brewer, signed Marco Belinelli for one year, minimum: Another money-saving move, and a hurtful one. Chicago cut the nonguaranteed Brewer, who was one of the keys to the second unit's defensive power, and replaced him with the barely replacement-level Belinelli. While he started the past two years in New Orleans, he wasn't particularly good, and the Bulls are going to take a step back at this position.

Traded Kyle Korver to Atlanta for cash, signed Vladimir Radmanovic for one year, minimum: Seeing a pattern yet? The Bulls even got paid for cutting salary on this move. However, there was at least a sneaky upside to the Korver deal in the form of a $5 million trade exception that the Bulls have until next July to use. Chicago is likely to keep that in its pocket until the draft or free agency, at which time they'll be able to take in a $5 million player from someplace else. Basically, it can act almost as a second midlevel exception for sign-and-trade deals, which will be important if they amnesty Boozer.

As for Radmanovic, he was a fine pickup for the price given his ability to play both forward spots and rain 3s, but again, this was a downgrade from Korver.

Let John Lucas go, signed Nate Robinson for one year, minimum: This is the one move I'd argue made the Bulls better. Robinson played very well in Golden State last season, and his offensive explosiveness will be very important for the second unit. While Robinson is flaky, Thibodeau has dealt with him before in Boston, and he gave the Warriors few problems last season. Don't be surprised if he finishes games, too, given this team's need for offense.

Signed Kirk Hinrich for two years, $8 million: The one genuine expenditure of the Bulls' offseason was actually a fairly risky one, and one I'd argue was made more with their hearts than their heads. Hinrich struggled in Atlanta last season, and in particular has had a tremendously difficult time playing point guard since becoming a Hawk. So plugging him in as a starting point guard for $4 million a year seems, shall we say, suboptimal. Looking out further, there's likely an idea that he can replace Hamilton at shooting guard once Rose returns, and that may be more plausible ... except that he's been in steady decline since leaving Chicago the first time, and he really shouldn't be starting on a good team anymore.


2012-13 Outlook

A lot of unknowns go into this prediction, not least how many games Rose will play. I have him pegged for 20 games at a level that's not quite where he was a year ago, but tinkering with this variable understandably produces large shifts in the projected outcome for this team.

Past that, the Bulls can still hang their hats on the defense and frontcourt. Even without Asik, the Bulls project to be pretty beastly up front. In fact, one hot debate topic is likely to be whether Gibson should replace Boozer as the starting power forward. This may not be the year for it, as the Bulls will be desperate for Boozer's scoring, but it seems an inevitable shift at some point.

Defensively, Chicago will take a slight step back because the bench won't be as good at this end. Belinelli, Robinson, Radmanovic and Mohammed all are ordinary-to-bad defenders, and two of the departed players, Asik and Brewer, were very, very good. No matter how much you believe in Thibodeau's mojo, it's unrealistic to think this won't leave a dent. It's possible second-year pro Jimmy Butler helps here, and he may play ahead of one of the two Euros.

Offensively, the Bulls' bench reshuffle won't hurt them nearly as much -- Robinson should help quite a bit and Asik, for all his defensive merits, was a terrible offensive player.

Instead, it's the little matter of replacing Rose with Hinrich, who flopped as a point guard in Atlanta and now must guide an offense without a ton of scoring help. Chicago will still get some cheap points on second shots, but it seems a long shot they'll finish in the top five on offense again.

The good news is that Thibodeau's robust D will keep them in games, even if it does decline a bit from the past two years. Look for them to stay in the top six or seven teams on defense, offsetting what's likely to be a 20th-ranked or so offense. Yet the net effect is that, even with a quarter-season of Rose, Chicago makes the playoffs. Which doesn't seem so crazy, given how well the Bulls did without him a year ago.

Prediction: 43-39, 2nd in Central Division, 8th in Eastern Conference

 

[Skooby]

Utah Jazz: 2012-13 Forecast

Overview

There's a mile-wide gap between "having a chance to do big things" and actually doing big things. Having said that: The Jazz have a chance to do some big things.

On paper, no team is better set up for the future. The Jazz have four talented young players, all of whom are on rookie contracts and all of whom play different positions. The only spot not represented among that group is point guard, the easiest position to fill.

And otherwise, the Jazz are almost completely unencumbered contract-wise. They have two hugely productive frontcourt players on the final year of their respective contracts in Al Jefferson and Paul Millsap, have other veterans on expiring or nearly expiring deals and could have as much as $30 million in cap space entering this summer.

Additionally, they've put themselves in good shape by hiring the well-respected Dennis Lindsey from San Antonio to be their new general manager, with former GM Kevin O'Connor moving into an oversight role.

Unfortunately, the term "cap space" has a very different meaning for the Utahs of the world than it does for the New Yorks and Miamis, which is why there's a good chance we see the Jazz use it to do something other than sign players to big contracts. They have more than $40 million in expiring contracts, which presents some very interesting trade chips, and they're also sitting on a potential lottery pick from Golden State (top-six protected).
Regardless, the brightness of Utah's future depends more than anything on four youngsters: Derrick Favors, Gordon Hayward, Alec Burks and Enes Kanter. Each has shown flashes of potential stardom, but none is a fully-formed star and there's no guarantee any of them will be. Of the group, Favors is the one who showed the most star potential so far; in fact his development late last season was so rapid that it sets a scenario in which the Jazz might trade Jefferson or Millsap just to clear more minutes for him.

STAGE SET FOR NEW JAZZ AGE

The Utah Jazz have young talent and future cap room. Will they be able to capitalize? Chad Ford Utah's present is interesting as well -- this should once again be a decent team that contends for one of the West's final playoff spots after last season's surprising surge to the No. 8 seed. But Jazz fans should be watching two factors more intently: first, obviously, how the four young players progress, and second, how Ty Corbin evolves in his third season on the job. While they finished strongly last season, his overall campaign was fairly rocky. Inherited coaches tend not to stay on the job long when a new GM arrives, so he'll need to show he can move Utah past its Sloan-era stuff and make more coherent personnel decisions.

2011-12 Recap

It was your typical Utah season on many levels, as the Jazz exhibited virtually every trait that most older Utahns now can recite by heart: an insanely high foul rate, a very high rebound rate, lots of free throws and only a rudimentary understanding of where the 3-point line is and how it might benefit them.
One other thing that stood out, however, is that Corbin, in his first season as head coach, favored his veterans to a near-comical extent. The most notable manifestation was his decision to start Raja Bell and Josh Howard on the wings, even though Bell was plainly finished and Howard had seen much better days as well. This maneuver kept the vastly better Hayward as a reserve for much of the year and left first-rounder Burks as a fringe fourth wing player. Playing with three other starters who had strongly positive plus-minus numbers, both Bell and Howard still managed to land in the negatives.
HOLLINGER'S '11-12 STATS

W-L: 36-30 (Pythagorean W-L: 35-31)
Offensive Efficiency: 103.7 (7th)
Defensive Efficiency: 103.6 (20th)
Pace Factor: 93.9 (13th)
Highest PER: Al Jefferson (22.88)

A more humorous twist came midway through the year, when Bell and Corbin began feuding, even though Corbin was basically the only thing keeping Bell in an NBA lineup. When eventually injuries knocked Bell and Howard out, the Jazz hit another gear with Hayward starting, Burks playing more and Paul Millsap occasionally featuring in a monstrous frontcourt with Jefferson and Favors.
The powerful frontcourt was the centerpiece of a surprisingly efficient offense, thanks to Jefferson's ability to create shots with virtually no cost in turnovers. The Jazz had the league's seventh-best turnover rate, a shocking development for a team that scored nearly all its points in the paint or on post-ups. Thanks to their frontcourt muscle (which also included Favors and Kanter), Utah also had the league's second-best offensive rebound rate, and between that and the low turnover rate, the Jazz were fourth in shot attempts per possession.

They had a high 2-point percentage and drew lots of fouls, too. So what held them back? The fact that they scored entirely in 2-point increments. Only 15.3 percent of Utah's shots were 3s, the second-lowest figure in the league and an awful one for a team with a dominant post player. The Jazz made only 32.2 percent of their triples, ranking them 27th, and of note was how rarely they took the 3 from the best spot on the floor, the corner: The Jazz took only 168 all season, according to NBA.com's advanced stats tool, about half the league average and more than 30 fewer than every other team except Charlotte.

Some may point out that the Jazz also had few players capable of making the 3, so the two problems go hand in hand. Nonetheless, players like Hayward, Bell and C.J. Miles should have had more easy looks from the corner than they had, and this is an area the Jazz need to improve going forward.

Defensively, Corbin stayed loyal to the Sloan-era mentality of fouling first and asking questions later, although one might consider it slight progress that they were "only" 28th in opponent free throw rate. Even aside from that, this wasn't a particularly good defense, ranking 22nd in opponent 2-point field goal percentage and middling-to-poor at everything else except rebounding. But throw in the fouls, and Utah finished only 20th in defensive efficiency.

The good news here is that Favors showed monstrous potential at this end late in the season, and the other three kids got better as the year went on. But this is another area in which Corbin needs to prove himself, because Utah can't realistically contend for anything important fouling this frequently.

Offseason Moves

Other than Lindsey, the Jazz's biggest offseason moves were to address their shooting deficiencies and the need for a wing stopper. Utah also has one piece of unfinished business regarding Bell, with whom they're working on a buyout.

Traded Devin Harris to Atlanta for Marvin Williams: I wasn't crazy about this move because the Jazz should have been able to extract a draft pick in return for taking on the additional year on Williams' contract. Basketball-wise, however, this improves them. Williams is a decent small forward who can space the floor reasonably well and guard opposing 3s; as such, he fills a glaring need on the Jazz roster. (Aside: This is if you presume Hayward is a 2. Personally, I think he's better as a 3 and would have rather seen the Jazz add a pure 2 to play next to him, but that's nitpicking.)

Traded rights to Tadija Dragicevic and cash to the Clippers for Mo Williams and rights to Shan Foster: Here's the backstory: Utah had a $10 million trade exception lying around from the previous winter's trade of Mehmet Okur to New Jersey (a masterful unburdening of dead weight that somehow netted them a 2015 second-round pick in return), and thus were able to take Williams into it pretty much for free when the Clippers needed to create a salary slot for Lamar Odom. Williams is a great fit in Utah because he provides the shooting this team craves, as well as a caretaker point guard who can get them into their stuff -- that's all they need, given that they mostly post up. I'm not sure he's a better player than Devin Harris, but he seems to be a better fit given their needs.

Signed Randy Foye for one year, $2.5 million: This wasn't a bad play, all things considered; Foye is small for a wing, but he can shoot spot-up jumpers and is capable of playing point guard in a pinch -- something that might need to happen given that Jamaal Tinsley and Earl Watson are the other point guards. With a one-year deal, it's risk-free, too.

Re-signed Jeremy Evans for three years, $5 million: Evans is a weird player -- he has good per-minute stats, but his only functional offensive maneuver appears to be the alley-oop, and his rail-thin frame is a major limitation defensively. As such, Utah's approach was probably the most sensible one: Lock him up cheaply for a while and see if he becomes a worthwhile rotation player.

Let Josh Howard go, drafted Kevin Murphy: I'm not a fan of Murphy, who had fairly poor athletic numbers (blocks, steals, rebounds) even against a low level of college competition, and a senior-year jump in 3-point percentage that looks to be an outlier. If he surprises, it will be because he proves the 3-point jump was a genuine improvement and not a one-year fluke.

2012-13 Outlook

The Jazz are an up-and-coming young team that made the playoffs last season, so one might assume that, at a minimum, they'll make it again. They might, but it won't be simple. The Jazz indeed played very well at the end of last season, but they also benefited from tremendous health for their best players and the bizarre fact that their only two serious injuries actually helped them by eliminating underperformers.

The Jazz have other issues going on outside of that. Several players are playing for contracts, and the possibility of a trade involving Jefferson or Millsap looms. Also, the backcourt depth is a potential issue, especially if Mo Williams -- who has missed at least a dozen games in seven of his nine seasons -- can't stay on the floor.

The two things to like, on the other hand, are that a healthy Jazz team would likely be better in the two areas that plagued them most a year ago: defense and 3-point shooting. Mo Williams and Foye give them some genuine knockdown shooters on the perimeter, and Hayward should be better as well. Defensively, another year of experience for their young players, increased playing time for Favors and the addition of Marvin Williams should all spell an improvement.

They'll need it, though, because there's no guarantee their best players will glide through the regular season injury-free again. Additionally, any defensive improvement will be marginal if Corbin can't change their approach from the mad-hacking system of the past decade-plus into a more sensible approach based on eliminating high-percentage opportunities (such as free throws, for instance). Similarly, the added shooting will be of a lot more benefit if Corbin can help them make use of the heretofore abandoned short corner.

Taking a step back and looking at last season's top eight in the West, I think that Minnesota is likely to join the group, which means somebody else has to fall out. The two most likely candidates are Dallas and Utah, which tied for the conference's seventh and eighth spots last season. It's a close call, and I had Utah out until Dallas' Dirk Nowitzki started having knee problems. Now I'm thinking the Jazz just squeeze in.

Prediction: 44-38, 4th in Northwest Division, tied 7th in Western Conf.

 

[Reggie]

Miss the days of seeing NBA and NFL insider on Sohh every day. Now it just seems like people were paying for infor that was free on the net the whole time. Nothing in these articles are something that i would pay for.

 

[Skooby]

Miss the days of seeing NBA and NFL insider on Sohh every day. Now it just seems like people were paying for infor that was free on the net the whole time. Nothing in these articles are something that i would pay for.

You get ESPN the Mag with it. Which isn't much lol...but I just like having it.

 

[Skooby]

Milwaukee Bucks: 2012-13 Forecast

Overview

Milwaukee has been one of the league's more forgettable teams in recent times -- they're a small market team in an aging arena and haven't won a playoff series in a dozen years.

But keep an eye on these guys, because they could be very interesting this season on multiple levels. The coach and general manager are both in the final year of their contracts after three seasons spent largely spinning their wheels. They have a ton of trade assets, even if there isn't a single superstar player, and could have massive cap space in the summer depending on how things shake out. Combine the two, and you have both the motive and the opportunity to do something huge. Sooner rather than later, I'm guessing, something's gotta give here.

In the meantime, the Bucks have become something of a monument to averageness, finishing slightly below .500 in the standings but slightly ahead in point differential, and bursting at the seams with half-good players. They may become the first team in history with 12 players having a PER of exactly 15.00. Don't put it past them.

The other issue in Milwaukee is that the pieces, while interesting, don't fit together particularly well. Last season's decision to jettison Andrew Bogut saved a ton of money and may pay huge dividends next summer, but for the moment it's left them with two pint-sized, shoot-first, ball-dominating guards trying to play together.

Yet the Bucks have depth everywhere -- consider that first-round pick John Henson and shot-blocking ace Larry Sanders don't show up high on the depth chart -- and there isn't a bad contract in the bunch. (That's what made the Bogut deal so appealing -- they dumped Stephen Jackson's contract, which was the residue from previously dumping John Salmons' contract, which is the one big mistake that got them in this spot in the first place).

Basically, the Bucks' front office has fulfilled a lot of its objectives, save for the part about making the playoffs. It's not easy building a roster this deep, especially one with clean books. Unless a star emerges, alas, it may not help much.

2011-12 Recap

Milwaukee began the year as a low-scoring defensive team centered around Bogut and ended it as an offensive team that couldn't stop anybody. This, of course, was necessitated by the early-season ankle injury suffered by Bogut, in the midst of a dominant defensive performance against Houston. Milwaukee went to Plan B, playing smaller with Drew Gooden at center and firing away on offense. The likes of Ersan Ilyasova, Mike Dunleavy and Gooden, in particular, performed far better than anyone expected.

Milwaukee also had particularly good ball movement in this phase, with Gooden seeming to discover the joys of passing as a high-post center. The Bucks were second only to Boston with assists on 62 percent of their baskets, and it wasn't because Brandon Jennings suddenly turned into Steve Nash. This was a teamwide thing -- Milwaukee would start pinging the ball around the perimeter and finding an open shooter or a layup. It was fun to watch.
Highest pct. of assisted baskets, 2011-12

Team % assisted
Boston 65.5
Milwaukee 62.0
Chicago 61.9
Denver 61.5
L.A. Lakers 61.1
League average 57.5

Monta Ellis' arrival took some of the steam out of that approach, however, as the Bucks now had two ball-stopping guards on their side; although Ellis has a high assist rate for a shooting guard, the dimes weren't happening in the same organic way Milwaukee produced them in the middle part of the year.

Nonetheless, the Bucks went 12-9 with Ellis after the trade. It was against a soft schedule and a couple of the losses (particularly the all-but-season-ending one to Washington) were disappointing, but it's a bit rich to blame their failure to qualify for the playoffs on Ellis monopolizing the rock. The bigger issue was that they just had too much ground to make up.

Defensively, however, the Bucks lost the mojo they'd shown in previous seasons under Skiles. Losing Bogut obviously hurt, and they had some bad luck too -- Milwaukee opponents shot a league-best 76.9 percent from the line, and you can't really blame the Bucks' "free throw defense" for that one. (Net cost: about 22 points, or 0.9 wins).

Nonetheless, the Bucks weren't particularly good at any aspect of defense and, sans Bogut, were notably awful on the glass -- Milwaukee was just 25th in defensive rebound rate. Moreover, even if you adjust for the Bucks' suboptimal luck on free throws and point differential, this was still the ninth-best team in the East. There were lots of microreasons you can point to for why they didn't make the playoffs, but the overarching macroreasons was that they didn't deserve to.

Offseason Moves

It was a fairly quiet offseason, aside from the mutterings that Skiles was interested in a buyout of the final year of his contract, as the Bucks' main "offseason" trade was the Bogut-Ellis deal at the deadline. The other piece of unfinished business was an extension for Jennings, but the Bucks might be wise to wait on that one given that, as a restricted free agent, they can match any offer a year from now. Check out these moves:

Traded Shaun Livingston, Jon Leuer and Jon Brockman to Houston for Sam Dalembert: Milwaukee aggressively went after its biggest weakness from the previous season by sending some leftover pieces to Houston for Dalembert. While losing Leuer was unfortunate -- he was a surprisingly effective second-round pick -- Dalembert answers the need for a strong defensive rebounder in the middle, and one who will let Gooden play his more natural power forward position. On a one-year deal, he also keeps the Bucks' pristine salary cap situation in order.

HOLLINGER'S '11-12 STATS

W-L: 31-35 (Pythagorean W-L: 34-32)
Offensive Efficiency: 102.4 (16th)
Defensive Efficiency: 102.4 (17th
Pace Factor: 96.4 (3rd)
Highest PER: Ersan Ilyasova (20.55)

Let Carlos Delfino go, drafted Doron Lamb: Milwaukee had enough of a crowd on the wings that it didn't make sense to pay Delfino to stay, especially after he declined noticeably in 2011-12. His rotation spot will be taken not by Lamb, but by 2011 first-rounder Tobias Harris, who showed promise in limited minutes a year ago. Lamb, a second-rounder, gives the Bucks another potential catch-and-shoot weapon -- Mike Dunleavy is really the only other one on the roster -- and looked to be good value early in the second round.
Drafted John Henson: Milwaukee's first-round pick faces a logjam in the frontcourt, and despite the fact he was taken in the lottery he may see a lot of time in the D-League if everyone is healthy. Henson has a lot of upside but he has a very thin frame and may need to spend the time working on his body. A year from now, the Bucks are likely to have a lot more minutes available for him, and he's a lot more likely to be able to fill them.

Signed Joel Przybilla and Marquis Daniels: End of the roster filler. Move along. Nothing to see here. I was actually surprised to see the Bucks give either of these cats guaranteed money, but they're so far under the tax line that it's unlikely to matter.

Re-signed Ersan Ilyasova for five years, $40 million: Milwaukee's most important move was keeping Ilyasova after a breakout 2011-12 season. There's a risk that it was a contract year thing, but Ilyasova is also just 25 and wasn't a bad player even before last season. The Bucks also kept their risk fairly reasonable, as the fifth year isn't guaranteed and the contract doesn't contain annual raises. Most importantly, the dollars are just low enough that Milwaukee can still be a free-agent player next summer.

2012-13 Outlook

So how is this backcourt thing going to work? Ellis and Jennings are not only an odd couple in the backcourt, but could be at cross purposes as both look to get paid this summer. Jennings will be a restricted free agent, most likely, while Ellis has an opt-out that I'd say he's at least 50 percent likely to exercise.

Yet the biggest question with both is at the other end; each is undersized and Ellis in particular has shown little inclination to expend much effort defensively. Which gets to the real crux of the problem: Ellis is a sixth man masquerading as a go-to guy, and unfortunately the Bucks reinforced this by playing him 40+ minutes many nights after the trade.

Of course, for the Bucks this is an issue more in theory than in practice, as they don't have a starting 2 anyway. They don't have any wing defenders either, with the glaring exception of Luc Richard Mbah a Moute, but his inability to shoot creates substantial problems in its own right -- and is why the Bucks have often used him as a 4 in recent seasons. That won't be an option with the top-heavy frontcourt, and it may be that the Bucks look to trade from their surplus to fill in the backcourt more ably. In particular, dealing Gooden for a starting 2 that can shoot and defend would solve several of these problems at once.

In the meantime, keep an eye on Harris, who will be the backup small forward and could emerge as the go-to guy for the second unit. (If it isn't Ellis, that is). Milwaukee will again have an extremely strong bench; in fact, as Gooden is one of the best No. 3 bigs in basketball, backup center Ekpe Udoh is an outstanding defender, reserve guards Beno Udrih and Dunleavy are very solid players, and even fifth big Larry Sanders is a crazy shot-blocker with some upside.

The bench strength guarantees that the Bucks can survive the regular-season grind in decent shape, but the bigger question is whether there's sufficient star power and defensive gravitas to push them above the East's lottery flotsam. That's particularly true given that Skiles may be at the end of his road here, as his track record is that he burns out after a few years in one city; this is now in his fifth in Brewtown, and Year 4 wasn't pretty.

It wouldn't shock me to see Milwaukee return to the postseason, especially if the Bucks can make another roster tweak or two. But the more likely scenario is that they challenge for the playoffs again -- and once again fall short. The Bucks either need a defensive renaissance or a breakout season from one of the guards to exceed that projection; either is possible, but neither is particularly likely.

Prediction: 38-44, 3rd in Central, tied for 9th in Eastern Conference

 

[Skooby]

2012-13 Forecast: Dallas Mavericks

Overview

Just because it didn't work doesn't mean it was a terrible decision.

When discussing the Mavs' failed title defense, let's start there. They made a conscious decision to let Tyson Chandler walk, retool around one or two superstar free agents in the summer of 2012 and make another go at it.

This was a calculated risk, and it failed. But if you went in assuming something on the realm of 50-50 or 40-60 odds at pulling this off, it's tough to condemn the process just because of the outcome.

This strategy represented an understanding of the context of the 2011 championship, a feat of underrated difficultly in the heat of the moment. The Mavs realized they were a spectacular example of lightning being caught in a bottle and that even if they had brought back the same players, they were highly unlikely to find themselves in the same position again.

So Dallas rolled the dice that it could remain an elite team more sustainably with the help of a Dwight Howard or a Deron Williams and that they had enough juice to stay competitive in the meantime. The latter point depends largely on what you think about "competitive" -- the Mavs had a fine season by the standards of most, but defending champions generally expect to win a playoff game or two.

All of this would have been gleefully accepted if Williams or Howard landed on their doorstep, but neither did. Plan B is far less sexy. The Mavs are left probing the atmosphere for somebody willing to accept their trove of cap space and rescue them from another one-and-done. Meanwhile, another precious year of Dirk Nowitzki's prime wilts on the vine.

Again, it wasn't necessarily a terrible decision. Paying Chandler would have led to its own problems, and that wouldn't have made their other guys any younger.

That, in the big picture, might be Dallas' more pressing problem. After years of churning on the title-chase treadmill, the Mavericks have no young stars coming up through the pipeline the way, say, Josh Howard and Devin Harris did in previous renditions. Stealing Chandler in an all-time LOL trade with Charlotte pushed that issue to the side for a year, but it never really went away.


2011-12 Recap

The defining element of Dallas' season had little to do with Chandler's absence. Look at the stats and you'd think it was J.J. Barea that was the difference-maker. The Mavs roared through the 2011 postseason with one of the greatest offensive onslaughts in playoff history, but in 2011-12, they couldn't find the bucket. Dallas finished 20th in offensive efficiency, devolving into a jump-shooting offense that rarely scored inside. The Mavs were 27th in free throw rate and 28th in offensive rebound rate; basically everybody took jumpers.

It didn't help that Nowitzki got off to a slow start, but the problems went much deeper. The vets started showing their age, most notably Jason Kidd, leaving Dirk with a much less imposing arsenal around him. No other Mav except Brandan Wright -- who was 10th on the team in minutes -- had a PER above 16. Moreover, the closest thing to a second star on the team, Lamar Odom, loafed through a disastrous season that featured the largest one-year PER decline in recorded history.

HOLLINGER'S '11-12 STATS

W-L: 36-30 (Pythagorean W-L: 36-30)
Offensive Efficiency: 101.0 (20th)
Defensive Efficiency: 99.7 (8th)
Pace Factor: 93.5 (16th)
Highest PER: Dirk Nowitzki (21.81)

Even their one positive offensive stat was really a negative: The Mavs had the fewest shots blocked of any team, at 4.9 percent of their attempts. The reason was that they were shooting almost entirely jump shots.

Defensively, Dallas' depth, versatility and masterful use of zone defenses helped paper over the absence of Chandler. The Mavs finished eighth in efficiency, providing a reasonable facsimile of their championship season on this end. It was the offensive decline that killed them.

Look deep enough and some positive stories emerged. Wright was a scrap-heap find at backup center, Delonte West was a solid two-way winger at a bargain price, Ian Mahinmi turned into a legitimate rotation player, and Nowitzki played like the Dirk of old in the second half of the season. But their most talented young player, Rodrigue Beaubois, scuffled through another disappointing campaign, and 2010 first-rounder Dominique Jones failed to gain traction.


Offseason Moves

Once it couldn't spend on stars, Dallas did the next best thing, inking a bunch of halfway decent players to short-term contracts and keeping its powder dry for next summer. Give the Mavericks props, as they were creative and found some outstanding value to keep this roster afloat for another season. But in the big picture, this still was a salvage job.

Traded Lamar Odom and a Kardashian to be named later to the Clippers for rights to Tadija Dragicevic and cash: Sadly, Odom tanked so badly that the Mavs couldn't even get a draft pick for him, and had to settle for dumping his remaining salary on the Clippers. Dallas also had to send the rights to Shan Foster to Utah as part of this deal, but he and Dragicevic were superfluous. The Mavs at least got some cash for their trouble, partly offsetting the money Odom stole from them last season.

Amnestied Brendan Haywood, signed Chris Kaman for one year, $8 million: Despite the hopeful talk out of Big D that it might be able to trade Haywood, this was a matter of if, not when. Wiping Haywood's money off the books enabled the other cap moves by the Mavs this summer, most notably the Kaman signing. In general I'm not a big Kaman guy; he's a deceptively bad low-post player because he turns it over so much. That said, his pick-and-pop game could be a real weapon on this team, and I suspect the Mavs are smart enough to realize he's not a go-to guy on the block. By any measure, he'll be a huge upgrade on Haywood, and he comes on a risk-free one-year deal.

Drafted Jared Cunningham, Bernard James and Jae Crowder: The latest hope for some youth and vitality, these three will try to add some energy and ball hawking off the bench. Cunningham might have been a slight reach late in the first round, but he is an upside pick as an athletic winger who could be potent if he refines his skills. Crowder is a defensive pest who could pay immediate dividends, although his offensive game is well behind his D, and was a good grab early in the second. James, a 27-year-old frontcourt enforcer with a great backstory, seemed like more of a reach.

Let Jason Terry go, signed O.J. Mayo for two years, $8.2 million: Dallas' cap realities dictated this mild downgrade from a great midrange shooter to a merely good one. That said, Mayo is younger, and you'll probably have to stare pretty closely to find big differences between the outputs of these two. The hope in Dallas is that Mayo has a good year and opts out of the second season of his deal, because if he stays, it may mess up their cap plans.

Won rights to Elton Brand in amnesty auction for $2.1 million: Brand has declined, but I mean, $2.1 million? This was an absolute steal, and it comes with zero risk since it's only for one year. Brand was productive at the defensive end last season and can likely play as a 5 alongside Nowitzki during crunch time, plus his pick-and-pop game should fit this system. The lone, slight downside is that he can't be traded.

Let Jason Kidd go, signed-and-traded Ian Mahinmi to Indiana for Darren Collison and Dahntay Jones: Though not quite on par with the Chandler deal as far as heists go, this was a heck of a deal for Dallas. Mahinmi was redundant with the development of Brandan Wright and additions of Brand and Kaman, and the Mavs needed a starting point guard once Kidd and Terry walked.

They not only got one, but they got him on -- you guessed it -- a one-year deal, as Collison is a restricted free agent in 2013. Better yet, his cap hold is low enough that Dallas may be able to do their free-agent shopping next summer and still keep him. The one worry with Collison is his lack of court vision, which may hinder his ability to play pick-and-pop with Dallas' bigs. Jones' final year at $2.9 million had to be swallowed to take Collison, but no worries -- Dallas could use another feisty wing defender, especially given West's injury proneness.


2012-13 Outlook

The Mavs managed to keep the ship upright with a flurry of clever moves after Plan A didn't work out, which will keep them relevant for another season. With that said, their roster looks more like a fringe playoff team than a real contender. Nowitzki is the one genuine star, and the team that surrounds him is quite deep. It is not, unfortunately, particularly talented at the top of the lineup. Dirk is the only starter with a projected PER above the league average.

Despite having one of the greatest offensive players in history, Dallas is likely to finish below the league average in offensive efficiency again. Its best shot at avoiding this fate is a breakout season from one of the young guards -- Collison, Mayo or Beaubois -- but their respective employers each waited fruitlessly the past few seasons for that same leap. Chances are, it's not happening. It would also help if at least one of them became a competent passer, especially with the quality of jump-shooting bigs on this team. Again, don't hold your breath.

Defensively, however, the Mavs should continue to frustrate opponents. Collison and West are pests, Brand is seriously underrated at this end, and Kaman provides a legit 5 to replace Haywood. Moreover, they still have one of the best and most creative coaches in basketball in Rick Carlisle, and he can be counted on to muck up games and confuse opponents with his schemes.

Nonetheless, the biggest reason for optimism in Dallas is that they've kept the powder dry for a midseason blockbuster. Should somebody like Chris Paul or Josh Smith start pining for greener pastures, the Mavs may yet bank on their post-Chandler strategy. It's also possible they go in the opposite direction come the trade deadline. Dumping Marion, in particular, would clear $9 million for their summer 2013 shopping spree. Vince Carter ($3 million), who was surprisingly guaranteed for two more seasons this summer, is another potential exile.

Meanwhile, the road between those extremes is pure triage: One that maintains a competitive team that can possibly return to the playoffs, but also portends a quick exit if and when they get there. Throw in Dirk's knee problems in training camp, and they may be on the outside looking in.

Prediction: 43-39, 3rd in Southwest Division, 9th in Western Conference

 

[Skooby]

Wash. Wizards: '12-13 Forecast

Overview

Go through the bad franchise checklist, and this one pretty much ticks all the boxes:

• Young players showing no signs of development, even after several years? Check.

• Firing the coach midseason and hiring his top assistant, then figuring what the heck and giving the gig to the assistant full-time? Check.

• Using all their future cap space to trade for mid-tier veterans with cap-clogging deals? Check.

• Short-circuiting multiple rebuilding projects for quick fixes? Check.

• Andray Blatche? Check.

Yet one of the joys of being bad in the NBA is that the league will keep lobbing lottery picks your way until you have almost no choice but to become decent for a few years. The Wizards tried to forestall this fate a few years ago by trading a lottery pick to Minnesota for Mike Miller and Randy Foye, and it worked for a while. But after a few more lotto picks and another move that's a direct homage to the Miller-Foye deal, the Wizards may accidentally find themselves in the playoff race this season.

Certainly, the Wizards won't be the comedy routine they were at this point a year ago, when they had quite possibly the lowest collective basketball IQ in the history of the game. Washington sent out several of the dimmer bulbs from that group, with the result that Jordan Crawford is the only remaining player who routinely makes you want to smash light fixtures and throw cutlery.

Nonetheless, the Wizards' inability to develop their players is going to remain a story for as long as they have talented first-rounders stalling out after a year. John Wall is entering his third season and still can't make a jump shot or set up his man for a screen; Crawford is in Year 3 and has no idea yet what a good shot is or why it might be desirable to take one. After the failures of Nick Young, JaVale McGee and Blatche, among others, this is getting a bit repetitive.

The 'Zards have had a few successes, however, most notably with French center Kevin Seraphin. He came to Washington raw but showed some refined skill as a starter late in the season, with better post moves and an improved mid-range J. This is incredibly encouraging news for Wiz fans, proving that it's at least theoretically possible for players to improve here. Trevor Booker also showed progress as energetic combo forward, and stood out amid this team's general malaise by hustling and playing hard every night.

Hopefully some of that will rub off on Chris Singleton and Jan Vesely, a pair of 2011 first-round picks who struggled mightily as rookies. Vesely, in particular, seems cut from the fine recent tradition of athletic young Wizards with no idea how to play basketball.

Washington fired Flip Saunders and hired top assistant Randy Wittman, and while Wittman got more results out of these guys (including Seraphin) than Saunders, his past track record in Minnesota is less than encouraging. The same can be said for general manager Ernie Grunfeld, who somehow got a contract extension despite a four-year stretch where the Wizards went 88-224.

So enjoy the sugar high of playoff contention this year, Washington. Chances are it will wear off quickly.

2011-12 Recap

You really want to know?

The Wizards shattered records for unintentional comedy in the first half of the season, when their serial mental errors were guaranteed to provoke at least one hilarious YouTube clip a game. Andray Blatche showed up out of shape and barely tried, JaVale McGee showed freakish athleticism when he wasn't committing ridiculous goaltends or running the wrong way, and Nick Young and Jordan Crawford seemingly competed to see who could launch the most questionable contested jumper early in the clock.

Even the old guys weren't immune, as Rashard Lewis played with "get me out of here" zeal for 28 games before shutting things down.

In the midst of all this was Wall, the top overall pick in 2011, who showed disturbingly little progress at running the point in his second season. A tremendous talent, his primary skill remains flying down the court at warp speed in transition; in halfcourt situations, he's hardly developed at all.

HOLLINGER'S '11-12 STATS

W-L: 20-46 (Pythagorean W-L: 20-46)
Offensive Efficiency: 97.8 (28th)
Defensive Efficiency: 103.8 (24th)
Pace Factor:95.1 (7th)
Highest PER: Nene (18.65)

Washington also leaned heavily on three rookies, all of whom were found wanting -- Singleton, Vesely and Shelvin Mack each produced replacement-level output and combined to play over 3,000 minutes between them.
The Wizards fired Flip Saunders and got better later in the year largely by subtraction. The trade of McGee for Nene provided a strong pick-and-roll defender, but even more important was the fact that they stopped playing Blatche and Lewis, who were killing them. With Seraphin emerging too, the Wizards suddenly had a real frontcourt. Washington won its final six games and eight of its final 10. While we tend to take April win streaks with a grain of salt, a few of the wins came against teams that were actually trying -- most notably a win over Milwaukee that basically killed the Bucks' playoff hopes.

Big picture, however, this was a bad team, and in particular a bad offensive team. The Wizards finished 28th in offensive efficiency, with their inability to shoot being the biggest stumbling block. Washington was a quasi-respectable 21st in 2-point shooting percentage, but rarely took or made 3s and didn't draw fouls. The Wizards were 28th in 3-point percentage and 23rd in 3-point frequency, as Wall's chronic inability to shoot (3-for-42 on 3-pointers. Not a typo.) wasn't offset by any particularly prolific shooting from another spot. One hopes Bradley Beal can help fix this.

The other part of the equation, surprisingly, is that the Wizards also didn't draw fouls. They ranked just 25th in free throw attempts per field goal attempt, mostly because few teams loved taking long 2-pointers more than this one did. As a result, the Wizards were 28th in secondary percentage, and thus 28th in TS%, and thus 28th in offensive efficiency.

Defensively there were bursts of competence, especially late in the year. Most notably, Washington was second in blocks, rejecting 7.79 percent of opponent attempts. While McGee played a big role in that, there were six other Wizards who blocked at least 30 shots -- including, amazingly, 57 from point guard Wall.

The glass proved their Achilles' heel, however, as the Wizards were just 26th in defensive rebound rate. They also fouled far more than the league average, and didn't offset this with any notable strength aside from shot-blocking.

Offseason Moves

Enough with this rebuilding stuff. It's time to go all-in for the No. 8 seed again:

Drafted Bradley Beal and Tomas Satoransky: So far, so good. I'm not sure Beal was the third-best player in the draft, but he absolutely filled a need for shooting on this team, and he should be able to start and contribute immediately. Satoransky is a big guard from the Czech Republic whom they'll stash overseas for another year or two.

Traded Rashard Lewis and a second-round pick to New Orleans for Trevor Ariza and Emeka Okafor: This was the stinker of a deal that will mess up Washington's cap for the next two years, all in the name of winning 40 games rather than 30. Lewis was only guaranteed $13 million this year but the Wizards took back $22 million in 2013-14 salary, effectively killing any chance of being a player in free agency next summer or of using cap space in any number of other creative ways. (Here's one alternative; They could have cut Lewis and been $9 million under the cap once they used the amnesty provision on Andray Blatche; bid on Elton Brand in the amnesty auction for $3 million, and got Dorell Wright from Golden State for free for another $5 million. They'd still have acquired two forwards of roughly the same quality, except they'd have $22 million more in 2013-14 cap).

It would be one thing if these were the players to put Washington over the top, but of course they aren't. Okafor is a halfway decent center who struggled physically last season and will be playing out of position as a power forward; Ariza is a very good defensive player with a shaky jumper, and one whose shot selection will immediately trigger Nick Young flashbacks. It was a shortcut, plain and simple.

Used amnesty provision on Andray Blatche: Can't argue with this one. Washington's decision to extend Blatche two years ago blew up on them to the tune of $23 million, which is how much the Wizards will be paying him not to play for them over the next three years.

Signed A.J. Price for one year, minimum: Washington needed another backup point guard after Mack disappointed a year ago. Price is more of a shoot-first type, which isn't exactly what's needed here, but at least it didn't cost them much.

Re-signed Cartier Martin for one year, minimum: Martin played well for Washington in D-League call-ups each of the past two seasons, and his long-range shooting is a welcome weapon on a team that's still short-handed in this department.

Let Maurice Evans go, signed Martell Webster for one year, $1.6 million: Again, the Wizards were looking to address the shooting deficit. Webster has struggled with physical problems the past couple years and never shot as well as expected, but based on what was available this was a pretty decent gamble.

Signed Jannero Pargo for one year, minimum: An emergency measure after they lost Wall for the start of the season, Pargo played well for Atlanta last season but obviously his combination of age (32) and track record make him a somewhat risky investment. That said, this was by far the best point guard candidate left on the market and Washington did well to get him so inexpensively. I'd argue he was a better solution than Price, in fact.

2012-13 Outlook

Washington's decision to short-circuit the rebuilding process a year early will at least pay some short-term benefits, as the Wizards are likely to be genuinely competitive and with just a bit of good fortune could find themselves back in the playoffs. The problem isn't that they'll be halfway decent, but that this may represent the high-water mark in the current rebuilding program.

As for this year, you have to like that frontcourt. Nene, Okafor, Seraphin and Booker combine to form one of the league's better four-man units; I actually ran the projection with Seraphin starting ahead of Okafor, because he projects to have slightly better numbers, but the impact is small either way. The tricky part is that three of the four bigs are natural centers, and the Wizards may find themselves wrong-footed when opponents play small.

Defensively, this team should be above the league average based on talent, but it's incumbent on Wittman to get that level of performance from them. Nene is a great pick-and-roll defender, Ariza is a solid wing stopper, and Seraphin, Wall, Singleton and Okafor all are plus defenders.

On the perimeter, however, Washington looks much shakier. Beal is a rookie coming off one year of college, and not a particularly impressive one. While he may be able to start from day one, that's more because Crawford is the alternative and the 'Zards desperately need shooting. Ariza is a negative offensively, especially when he goes into hero mode, and backing him up is the offensively limited Singleton.

Backup point guard, where Mack, Pargo and Price will battle for the gig, is also a concern … especially with one of those three needing to masquerade as a starter for the first month or so while Wall recovers from a knee injury. That injury alone projects to cost Washington nearly two games in the standings.
Ultimately, I'm pegging this team to narrowly miss the playoffs based on its offense, which should improve from last season's 28th ranking but not enough to put the Wizards above .500. Washington will be potent in transition -- Ariza and Nene will happily run with Wall once he comes back -- but two of the three wings can't shoot and there isn't a go-to offensive player on the roster, which will result in lots of packed-in defenses when the Wizards can't get out in transition. For a quick sugar high, I'm not sure this will be much of a rush.

Prediction: 38-44, 3rd in Southeast, tied for 9th in Eastern Conference

 

[Skooby]

G.S. Warriors: 2012-13 Forecast

Overview

It was a landmark moment in the history of the Warriors -- a chorus of boos raining down on owner Joe Lacob during a ceremony to retire Chris Mullin's jersey. It had less to do with Lacob in particular than with the general frustration of a fan base that's suffered for two solid decades with no relief in sight.

Last season's Warriors had offered hope that things might change, right up until they enacted one of the most brazen tanking strategies in recent memory. That's when the locals -- who have seen one playoff team in 18 years, in a league in which more than half the teams qualify -- finally snapped.

Yet the big picture in Golden State is far more encouraging. The new management has made some mistakes, and we'll discuss a few of them in a moment, but one shouldn't lose sight of all the genuine improvements since the disastrous Chris Cohan-Robert Rowell years. Basketball people are making decisions again, ownership is far more engaged and accountable, and the franchise appears to have snapped out of its decadelong habit of eating its own young.

And, unbelievably, it appears the Warriors might field a team that's interested in playing defense. The Warriors showed improvement on that end last season before they started tanking, and thanks to a trade for defensive rock Andrew Bogut, Golden State could become a league-average outfit at that end. The last time that happened was under P.J. Carlesimo in 1998-99.

Unfortunately, Lacob's tenure so far has shared two weaknesses with the previous regime: a tendency to want to win news conferences, and a questionable understanding of the salary cap. The former doesn't necessarily affect the product on the court, as long as Lacob can restrain his inner James Dolan, but the second is a bit more worrisome.

A series of iffy moves has tied up Golden State's cap for at least the next two years, most notably the decision to exercise the amnesty rights on Charlie Bell instead of Andris Biedrins. Last season's snafu came in the form of a Stephen Jackson-Richard Jefferson swap that effectively saw the Warriors pay $11 million (and give up the same in cap space) for the rights to Festus Ezeli. Not good. Between those two moves, Golden State's payroll will be about $20 million higher in 2013-14 than it should be, with essentially no difference in the quality of the product on the court.

But all that will quickly be forgiven if the Warriors put a team on the floor that competes and avoids further tanking shenanigans. Despite some missteps, there's a decent core here, with solid depth, crazy shooting and a dominant defensive anchor. It's not clear whether that will be enough to break the playoff drought, but it should at least return the Warriors to the ranks of respectable basketball teams.

2011-12 Recap

For two-thirds of the season, the Warriors hung in a tough Western Conference playoff race despite multiple injuries to point guard Stephen Curry that essentially ruined his season. With an improved bench and, more notably, a few players willing to play defense (Brandon Rush and Dominic McGuire in particular), the Warriors were 17-21 on March 12, having just beaten the Clippers on the road, when the team traded Monta Ellis, Kwame Brown and Ekpe Udoh to Milwaukee for Andrew Bogut and Stephen Jackson. (Jackson later would be rerouted to San Antonio in the Jefferson deal referenced above.)

It was a solid trade in the sense that it finally got the Warriors a real center in Bogut. But since he was out for the season and Ellis was leading the team in scoring, it also effectively crushed any chance the Warriors had of making the playoffs. Further moves reinforced that point, as Golden State embarked on a brazen tanking operation designed to avoid ceding its first-round pick to Utah; the Warriors would keep it if it fell in the top seven picks, which required a concerted effort to pile up losses. By finishing 6-22 with a crew that included luminaries such as Jeremy Tyler, Mikki Moore and Mickell Gladness, the Warriors juuuuuust finished in a tie for the seventh-worst record, and then sweated out a coin toss with Toronto and the lottery itself to land at No. 7.

HOLLINGER'S '11-12 STATS

W-L: 23-43 (Pythagorean W-L: 24-42)
Offensive Efficiency: 103.1 (11th)
Defensive Efficiency: 106.0 (27th)
Pace Factor: 94.7 (10th)
Highest PER: Stephen Curry (21.23)

Curry played only 26 games and was never totally right when he played, leaving concerns that his ankles can't take the pounding of a full season. However, positive stories abounded. Rookie Klay Thompson rebounded from a slow start to show a lot of promise as a shooter and scorer. Wing Brandon Rush had a career season, second-round pick Charles Jenkins proved a keeper and David Lee recovered from a rough first season in the Bay Area to put up more Lee-like numbers. Mark Jackson, in his first year as coach, kept his players' respect and got reasonably solid efforts from them.

But, this being Golden State, defense was still a problem. It was worsened by the late-season tankfest, but at no point was this a quality defensive squad. The Warriors finished 26th in efficiency and, plagued by a hole at the center position, landed dead last in defensive rebound rate at a pathetic 69.1 percent. A healthy Bogut will change that in a hot second.

Worst Defensive Rebound Rate, 2011-12

Team DRR
Golden State 69.1
Sacramento 70.5
New Jersey 70.7
Charlotte 70.9
Washington 70.9
League average 73.0

The Warriors also had the league's fourth-highest foul rate, were 28th in opponent secondary percentage and were below average at forcing turnovers. There was no aspect of defense at which they were good, only those at which they were comparatively less bad.

Offensively, they showed more promise, particularly with their shooting. Even with Curry playing only a minor role, the Warriors were second in the NBA in 3-point shooting at 38.8 percent. They also shot 2s better than the league average and had the league's fourth-lowest turnover rate.

But two factors held them back. The first (more minor) one was that they didn't draw fouls, finishing just 29th in free throw attempts per field goal attempt. Even their inside players, such as Lee, tended to be more shot-makers than foul-drawers, and the perimeter guys all wanted to shoot jumpers.

The real problem was a lack of second shots. Golden State was not only the worst defensive rebounding team, but it also nearly matched that feat at the offensive end, as only a historic effort by the Celtics prevented the Warriors from being league-worst at both ends. As a result, the Warriors were fifth in true shooting percentage and had the fourth-lowest turnover rate ... yet were only 11th in offensive efficiency.

Their woes on the boards marked the third season in a row the Warriors were last in the NBA in overall rebound rate -- worse even than their league-worst numbers the previous season. Golden State has been either 29th or 30th in rebound rate for an astounding six straight seasons.
To which one retorts, once again: Andrew Bogut.

Offseason Moves

Golden State continued building out its bench in the hopes of making a playoff run behind a healthy Bogut and Curry. While the offseason thankfully lacked the cap silliness of the previous two, one item to watch is the luxury tax. The Warriors are about $1 million over the threshold and might calve a secondary player at the trade deadline to slide underneath.

Drafted Harrison Barnes, Festus Ezeli, Draymond Green and Ognjen Kuzmic: The first three all should contribute this season. Barnes had his detractors, but he is big and can shoot, which should at the very least make him a reasonable facsimile of the departed Dorell Wright. Green -- a crafty, undersized 4 who can pass, shoot and rebound but will struggle on D -- was one of my favorite players in the draft. And Ezeli was more of a straight need pick; he is a backup center and will never be anything more than that, but he adds another big defender who can rebound to support Bogut.

Traded Dorell Wright to Philadelphia for Jarrett Jack: A three-way deal with the Sixers and Hornets reshaped the Warriors' lineup to get another guard in the mix. While Jack was a Fluke Rule player and is expected to decline this season, Golden State had a crowd at small forward and needed a reliable option should Curry's ankles disintegrate into a fine powder.

Let Nate Robinson and Dominic McGuire go; signed Carl Landry for two years, $8 million: I'm not as crazy about this move for two reasons. First, Landry has a player option for the second year, which means if he plays well, he's gone, and if he plays poorly, the Warriors are stuck with him. But the second reason is he's almost a perfect replication of David Lee's pros and cons, albeit in muted colors. Landry is a very poor defender and rebounder, but he can hit faceup jumpers and score in the paint. In other words, the Warriors can't ever play Landry and Lee at the same time, because they'll give up about 800 points per possession. As a straight value proposition, it's not the worst move, but that's as heartily as I can endorse it.

Re-signed Brandon Rush for two years, $8 million: Rush had a very strong 2011-12 season, and this was a reasonable value, even though he has an option for the second year just like Landry. But between his defense and 3-point shooting, Rush is a genuinely valuable player, one who likely will start if Harrison Barnes proves unready.

2012-13 Outlook

Can I get X-rays of Bogut's and Curry's ankles, and then make my forecast? The health of those two almost certainly will dictate whether the Warriors can snap their five-year playoff funk or whether they'll spend another year in the lottery. (Sans pick, this time, unless they tank even harder; Utah gets the Warriors' draft pick unless it's in the top six.)

Bogut might not be ready for the start of the season in the wake of last year's ankle trouble, and I've penciled in Curry to miss some games as well given his recurring frailty. Nonetheless, the Warriors look like a decent threat in the West if Bogut can play at least 65 games, because he so ably addresses the two failings -- rebounding and interior defense -- that have plagued this team for a decade. The Warriors also have a much better bench than in recent years, although Bogut's position is the weakest link in that second unit.

Besides Bogut, the other reason to like this team is all the shooting. Curry and Thompson are knock-down 3-point shooters who likely form the best shooting backcourt in basketball. Around them, Barnes, Rush and Jefferson all are strong 3-point threats, Lee, Jack and Landry are accomplished midrange shooters, and Green can stroke it, too. Nobody will be surprised if this club leads the league in 3-point shooting, and that could open plenty of room for Bogut and Lee to operate inside.

Unfortunately, Bogut won't have a ton of help at the other end, and on the nights he's out of the lineup, the Warriors' defense is likely to be as ugly as ever. Lee, Landry, Curry, Thompson and Green all are somewhere between bad and awful at this end, while Barnes is likely to take his lumps as well. That puts a cap on how good this team's defense can be, regardless of Bogut's dominance.

Sum it all up, and you could get a team that could easily make the playoffs, especially if Curry and Bogut stay in the lineup all season. Could. Unfortunately, I have to project what's likely rather than what's merely possible. And the most likely scenario is that Golden State's two stars miss just enough time to keep the Warriors out of the money for another season.

Prediction: 40-42, 3rd in Pacific, 10th in Western Conference

 

[Jplaya2023]

can someone post this please.

NBA - Where 2011-12 Miami Heat ranks among all-time NBA champs - ESPN