Philadelphia 76ers: '12-13 Forecast
Overview
This would be a great story if they hadn't sabotaged it along the way. The Sixers, with a classic no-stars team in a non-marquee northern market, somehow got themselves a big-time star, some nice young pieces and a deep roster with a strong coach. All of the pieces should be in place for this team to make a big run toward the East's elite.
Alas, they botched the rest of their offseason so badly that it won't happen. (More on that below.) Which is a shame, because Philly's story potentially offered a real counterweight for the league to offer the "other 25" teams -- the Sixers got a star center from Los Angeles instead of watching one of theirs go there, and had used a stretch of solid drafts (Jrue Holiday and Thaddeus Young weren't top 10 picks; Lou Williams and Lavoy Allen weren't even first-rounders) to build a strong nucleus in the post-Allen Iverson years.
HOLLINGER'S PLAYER PROFILES
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Unfortunately, the little-known story out of Philly was the takeover of the front office by the coach. With nominal general manager Rod Thorn having one foot out the door en route to retirement, Doug Collins effectively took over all of the decision-making. That led directly to some of the disastrous salary-cap management that preceded the trade for Andrew Bynum, which is the reason that Philly won't be contending for anything important this season. The announcement of Tony DiLeo's internal promotion to general manager only cemented that fact. This is now Collins' show from top to bottom.
Philly was an interesting case study for other reasons. Offensively, it stumbled into an interesting concept that other teams might wish to emulate: If you don't have post players, don't run post-ups. The Sixers basically didn't run any the entire season (I'm sure they ran one or two, but it was as rare as an Eric Snow 3-pointer), and it was a big reason they set a record for fewest turnovers in a season. That will change dramatically this season.
When Collins wasn't sabotaging himself with personnel moves, he had another strong go at it on the sidelines. He's engendered a fairly immediate turnaround of the Sixers into one of the league's elite defensive teams, a dramatic U-turn from the Eddie Jordan years, and while the offense was ridiculously conservative, it also kept them out of trouble. The biggest concern with Collins is burnout -- both for him and the players who have to listen to him every day -- and there already were mutterings that Andre Iguodala had heard enough. In that sense, perhaps having five new rotation players won't be such a bad thing.
2011-12 Recap
Jrue HolidayJesse D. Garrabrant/NBAE/Getty ImagesAfter a hot start the Sixers slumped to the No. 8 seed, but they still booted the ailing Bulls in Round 1.
Philly blasted out of the gate 18-7, with a spectacular point differential. We thought that was too good to be true, and it was: Philly went 13-23 in its next 36 games to fall out of the division lead and ended up barely making the playoffs.
Nonetheless, there were a lot of positives here. The Sixers had the scoring margin of a 45-win team; their 10-win differential between real and Expected Wins is the largest since I began tracking this stat. In comparison, the next closest team, the Knicks, were only 5.8 wins off their expected track.
In fact, Philly finished the season fifth in point differential. Partly this was because it was extremely fortunate health-wise: Spencer Hawes missed 29 games but every other key player played at least 60 of the 66 contests, and the health of the backcourt in particular avoided exposing what was a tenuous depth situation.
Offensively, as noted above, the Sixers were an extreme, low-risk outfit that mostly took long 2-pointers. This was partly because all of their big men were a lot more comfortable playing pick-and-pop than posting up or diving to the basket, but also because the perimeter players rarely had the green light to attack. Despite Philly's fearsome transition game, it was one of the league's slower-paced teams overall; in the half court, things slowed to a crawl.
Lowest Turnover Rate, 2011-12
Team TO Rate
Philadelphia 12.1
San Antonio 14.2
L.A. Clippers 14.4
Milwaukee 14.6
Golden State 14.6
League average 15.3
As a result, the Sixers set two records: One for the fewest turnovers, and another for the lowest free throw rate. The charts show just how far outside the norm they were in these two phases, in particular with turnovers: The difference between Philly and No. 2 San Antonio was larger than the margin between No. 2 and No. 25.
The Sixers were also 27th in 3-point attempts per field goal attempt, and that, combined with the lack of free throws, meant they had the league's worst secondary percentage. They were also a bad offensive rebounding team -- not a surprise, given that the bigs were always 20 feet from the basket -- and as a result they were just an average offensive team overall, despite the historic lack of turnovers.
Lowest Free Throw Rate, 2011-12
Team FTA/FGA
Philadelphia .217
Golden State .227
Houston .235
Dallas .246
Milwaukee .250
League average .276
Defensively, however, they did gangbusters. Philly cut off the 3-point line (only Chicago permitted fewer attempts) and held opponents to just 45.0 percent shooting on 2s. The Sixers also did strong work on the defensive glass, helped by the fact that two wing players (Iguodala and Evan Turner) posted epic defensive rebounding numbers for small forwards. Contrary to their reputation, the Sixers didn't force many turnovers; they were just a fundamentally solid team with a great wing stopper in Iguodala and no glaring weaknesses.
All that, plus Derrick Rose's knee injury, left the Sixers one game from a spot in the conference finals, but their lack of scoring and outside shooting came back to bite them in a winnable series against Boston.
Offseason Moves
Andrew BynumDavid Dow/NBAE/Getty ImagesPhilly made a splash by acquiring Andrew Bynum, but minor moves beforehand may slow its growth.
The trade for Bynum was a major coup, but the Sixers preceded that with a series of disastrous decisions that essentially undid all of the positives of the Bynum trade. They have an $80 million payroll, once you factor in the $16 million they're paying Elton Brand to play against them. Had there been an overarching plan rather than a series of one-off fire drills, they could have a better team, with a payroll between $60 million and $70 million.
Drafted Moe Harkless; traded the No. 45 pick and a future first to Miami for the No. 27 pick; draft Arnett Moultrie: I thought both of these picks were reaches, although Moultrie has enough size and athleticism that he could overcome his deficient ball skills and become a halfway decent big man, similar to what Lavoy Allen did last season.
But the Sixers traded a future first-round pick to Miami to move up 18 spots and grab Moultrie, and I'm still not sure why. It's a classic loan-shark trade, with an absolutely ginormous implied interest rate. The pick they obtained was No. 27 overall; the one they gave up is likely to be in the high teens a year later (it's top-14 protected each of the next three years), and in the meantime Miami still got to use Philly's second-rounder. Moultrie didn't solve any pressing roster need, either.
Re-signed Lavoy Allen for two years, $6 million: Here's the quiet, unrecognized, year-old stink bomb that was the catalyst for the disastrous moves below: Coming out of the lockout, Philly gave Allen, a second-round pick, a one-year deal with no team option for a second year. There was no reason to do this. No other second-round pick has a deal this player-friendly, and as the 50th overall pick, Allen had zero leverage.
So instead of having Allen at the second-year minimum for his sophomore season, he was a restricted free agent and the Sixers, being over the cap, had to dip into their midlevel exception to re-sign him. Like a butterfly flapping its wings to start a hurricane, Allen's deal led to the following ...
Amnestied Elton Brand, let Lou Williams go, signed Nick Young for one year, $5.6 million: This move was so bad on so many levels it's hard to know where to start. The Sixers got a sudden yen for Nick Young -- no, I don't know why either -- and decided they had to have him. But with half of their midlevel gone to Allen (see above), the only way to get Young was to create cap space.
And the only way to create cap space was to unload two of their most productive players from the previous season. Williams led the team in scoring and PER and is just 26, and ended up signing for reasonable money in Atlanta. Brand, though fading, was still quite useful, especially at the defensive end. Certainly, both players are better than Young by a substantial margin.
This actually cost the Sixers a bit of money rather than saving it, as they still owe Brand $16 million for this season after his amnesty auction only shaved $2.1 million of the price, and they still had to pay for a replacement. All so they could pay Young more money than Atlanta paid Williams.
Wait, it gets worse ...
Signed Kwame Brown for two years, $5.8 million: For reasons that aren't entirely clear, Philly has been obsessed with getting more size the past two years. The Sixers were the No. 3 defense and fifth in defensive rebound rate, but decided they needed to overpay for Kwame, a non-solution to a non-existent problem. He's not one of their 10 best players, but there's a worry he'll play anyway.
Let Jodie Meeks go, signed Royal Ivey for one year, minimum: Nobody has really commented on this, but the Sixers don't have a backup point guard this season and don't seem terribly troubled by the lack of one. The closest thing is Ivey, who is neither a backup nor a point guard; he is at best a fifth guard, and that's only on a really sunny day if the lighting is just right.
Traded nothing for Dorell Wright: Finally, some good news. Using their remaining cap space after the Brand amnesty, Philly took in Wright from Golden State. Hard to argue with the price, obviously. Technically it wasn't "nothing," as Philly gave up the rights to Edin Bavcic, a 2006 draftee who will never play in the league, but effectively Wright was free. He's a better player than people think, too. I'm not sure why he fell out of the Warriors' plans, but he can shoot 3s and is a decent defender.
Re-signed Spencer Hawes for two years, $13 million: This wasn't a bad price to pay for a starting center, especially because the Sixers didn't know at the time that they'd be getting Bynum. Although there's a fair amount of skepticism that Hawes can re-enact his outstanding play in the first month of last season, he's young enough to get better and he's a decent player even if you throw that month out.
Traded Iguodala, Nikola Vucevic, Moe Harkless and a future first-round pick for Jason Richardson and Andrew Bynum: This was the big move that should have put Philly in position to contend in the East, were it not for all of the other assorted silliness above. The Sixers parlayed a pretty good wing player into a dominant big man, and Richardson isn't dead weight, either.
Besides Iguodala, all they had to give up was Vucevic -- a quality backup center who had fallen out of the rotation by season's end -- and two late first-round draft picks (if you count Harkless as one of them). There's a risk here because Bynum is an unrestricted free agent after the season, but he's from the Philly area and has hinted that he'd like to stick around.
2012-13 Outlook
Andrew Bynum and Spencer HawesJesse D. Garrabrant/NBAE/Getty ImagesLed by their reshuffled frontcourt, the 76ers look to break into the top four in the top-heavy East.
Philadelphia is going to have to change its stripes significantly with Bynum in the fold, as last season's conservative pass-pick-and-cut approach is replaced by force-feeding Bynum on the block and surrounding him with shooters. The Sixers have more shooting at least, as Young, Richardson and Wright can all bust the 3-pointer, and Holiday may get more spot-up chances out of double-teams on Bynum.
As a result, this will be a higher turnover outfit -- post-ups invariably lead to more turnovers, especially ones involving Bynum and double-teams -- but also one that will draw fouls and make 3-pointers. Basically, it will look a lot more like a normal NBA offense.
Defensively, however, the Sixers also will change, and probably for the worse. Iguodala was an elite wing defender and Philly has nobody to fill that void. Nick Young and Richardson are bad defenders, and Turner and Wright are merely adequate. Bynum will swat away some mistakes in the middle, but on balance I'd be surprised if this is a top-three defense again.
Digging deeper, more questions emerge. The Sixers have high hopes for Turner, but I don't, and I think they should trade him before others catch on to what a hugely negative offensive player he is. They seem remarkably cavalier about the lack of a backup point guard, and if they really go into the season with Ivey (or some other replacement-level backup), that's a massive drop-off from what Williams gave them last season. Finally, I didn't include minutes for Brown in this projection because I only have him rated as their fifth-best big man, but if he plays ahead of Allen that will take them down a peg, too.
Subjectively, one must also consider Collins' history of self-combusting in his third season in a city; the new blood may prove helpful here.
Overall, however, the offseason moves amounted to running in place. The Sixers will be a different team, but I'm not sure it will be a better one. If they still had Brand and Williams rather than Young, Wright and Brown, then I'd be singing a different tune. But this group looks like a mid-tier, one-and-done outfit.
Prediction: 46-36, 3rd in Atlantic Division, 5th in Eastern Conference