Premeditated
MANDE KANG
Meh. I'm taking bish to go watch Barbie instead
That Christopher Nolan movie "Oppenheimer" gon FLOP..
- Thread starter ROFL_GUY
- Start date
It's not conjecture and hearsay. I have quotes from nearly every major US military leader at the time saying they knew Japan was already defeated and looking for a way to surrender with honor, and that the bomb was totally unnecessary. I have similar quotes from multiple intelligence officials at the time, from the people who were literally prepping the intercepted Japanese cables on a daily basis, from multiple political leaders including the former Ambassador to Japan, and multiple of America's own official historians who had access to the US and Japanese communications both after the fact.
Here's a tiny sample, in other threads I've listed way more than this:
Hiroshima: Quotes
Quotes from prominent Americans on why the atomic bombing of Japan was probably wrong.
www.doug-long.com
That's the myth that's been pushed constantly, but the truth is that all the military folk knew an invasion wasn't necessary. Japan was already reading to surrender but the USA was refusing to negotiate terms. If they had just offered the SAME terms they ended up offering anyway (emperor can stay in control and USA will allow Japan to maintain territorial integrity without taking their land or government from them), then they would have surrendered already weeks earlier. Once Russia entered the war and started wiping out their troops, it was a wrap and they were gonna rush to surrender whether the bombs were dropped or not, cause under no circumstances did they want a Russian occupation rather than an American one. Truman even wrote "Japan fini" in his diary on the planned date of Russian entry into the war, and rushed to get the bombs dropped before that happened.
None of the 200,000 people were killed were involved with Pearl Harbor, or the decision to do it. The vast majority were women, children, and the elderly. Even unborn children who came months and years later died of the radiation poisoning from bombs dropped long before they were born.
And as evil as the decision to bomb Pearl Harbor was, at least they attacked military men who they believed were a threat to their own nation's objectives. There were hardly any civilian deaths, even though they could have bombed anywhere on the island they wanted. As opposed to us, who purposely bombed one of the most untouched remaining cities with a large area of civilian population so we could get the best live demonstration of what the bomb could do, purposely destroying the lives of hundreds of thousands of women and children who could do NOTHING to harm our country or our soldiers.
It's nothing to do with nukes, WW1 and WW2 taught everyone that modern war turns out terribly for aggressor countries regardless of whether nukes are involved or not. The aggressors in both wars got fukkED long before nukes entered the picture. The lesson was that if you're going to attack someone, you have to make sure they're small enough that the other world powers don't commit.
The formation of NATO and the Iron Curtain additionally showed that anyone who attacked a major nation would get fukked.
Seriously, nukes or no nukes, who possibly would have been stupid enough to attack another world power after what happened in the first two world wars? It was total suicide.
Flopin like a nas album
Marco Zen
Black Privilege
I mean to his credit he's done almost every genre of movie masterfully..
Super hero..
War movie..
Space shyt..
Suspense..
Sci fi ...
Time travel...
Crime drama...
Maybe he's challenging himself like watch me blow everybody mind with this history shyt
Super hero..
War movie..
Space shyt..
Suspense..
Sci fi ...
Time travel...
Crime drama...
Maybe he's challenging himself like watch me blow everybody mind with this history shyt
Formerly Black Trash
Philosopher, Connoisseur, Future Legend
You don't have to be high iqBruhs really ran in here with the. You must have a high iq to enjoy blank rhetoric. You’re no smarter than the next person, for watching Oppenheimer lol. I disagree with op but, if homie wants to watch Mission Impossible. Over Oppenheimer that doesn’t make him a dumbass.
You're just low iq if you can only enjoy certain types of movies
Yall hating on a movie that's not even out yet isn't helping your argument
The issue with this is that even after both bombs were dropped, surrendering was not a given. Even after both bombs were dropped they had a vote amongst the 6 generals. 3 said surrender, the other 3 said nah fukk that keep fighting
The emperor gave the tie breaking vote to surrender.
The issue with this is that even after both bombs were dropped, surrendering was not a given. Even after both bombs were dropped they had a vote amongst the 6 generals. 3 said surrender, the other 3 said nah fukk that keep fighting
The emperor gave the tie breaking vote to surrender.
You're begging the question. You're saying, "Even after the bombs were dropped" as if that made a critical difference. It didn't. The USA had already been bombing the shyt out of every Japanese city for months. The Tokyo firebombing killed more people in one day than the Nagasaki atomic bomb did. Japanese generals didn't give a shyt about civilian casualties, so a new bomb that increased civilian casualties made no difference to their surrender plans. Their primary concerns were the war effort, how long they could holdout to force a better negotiation standpoint, and what stipulations they were given regarding their own sovereignty after the war. The bombs didn't change those equations for them, so some weren't ready to budge. However, if the USA had agreed to negotiate and given the same assurances they gave anyway in the end (we aren't going to colonize you, you won't be a vassal state, you can keep your emperor, we'll even help you rebuild your country), then they could have gotten surrender weeks earlier, bomb or no bomb.
Do you think you know more than these people?
"The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment. . . . It was a mistake to ever drop it. . . . [the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it. . . . It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before."
- Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet (the one that fought on the Japanese home islands until the end of the war)
"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into the war....The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan."
- Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander in Chief U.S. Pacific Fleet
"we brought them [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs."
- Brigadier General Carter Clarke, officer who prepped intercepted Japanese cables for Truman
"It is my opinion at the present time that a surrender of Japan can be arranged with terms that can be accepted by Japan and that will make fully satisfactory provisions for America's defense against future trans-Pacific aggression."
- Fleet Admiral William Leahy, Chairman of Chiefs of Staff
"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.
- Chairman of Chiefs of Staff William Leahy
"General MacArthur definitely is appalled and depressed by this Frankenstein monster [the bomb]. I had a long talk with him today, necessitated by the impending trip to Okinawa."
- Weldon Rhoades, transport pilot for Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur, writing in his diary the day after the Hiroshima bomb was dropped
"MacArthur's views about the decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were starkly different from what the general public supposed." He continues, "When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor."
- Supreme Commander Douglas MacArthur to Norman Cousins, his consultant during the American occupation of Japan
"The Potsdam declaration in July demanded that Japan surrender unconditionally or face prompt and utter destruction. MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary."
William Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964
"I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..."
- Supreme Commander Dwight Eisenhower
"...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing."
- former President Dwight Eisenhower
"On the other hand if they knew or were told that no invasion would take place [and] that bombing would continue until the surrender, why I think the surrender would have taken place just about the same time."
General Carl Spaatz, Commander of U.S. Strategic Air Forces in the Pacific
"The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air....
it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse."
- Commanding General of U.S. Army Air Forces Henry H. "Hap" Arnold
"I didn't like the atom bomb or any part of it."
- Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations
"Russia's entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped."
- General Claire Chennault, Army Air Forces Commander in China
"Both men . . . felt Japan would surrender without use of the bomb, and neither knew why the second bomb was used."
- private notes of former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman, describing the opinions of General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, commander of the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force and deputy commanding general Frederick L. Anderson
"said flatly at one press conference that the atomic bomb "had nothing to do with the end of the war." He said the war would have been over in two weeks without the use of the atomic bomb or the Russian entry into the war."
- Major General Curtis E. LeMay, Commander of the Twenty-First Bomber Command
"Obviously . . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor's decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war."
- Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, in charge of psychological warfare on MacArthur's staff
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@Bolzmark
And if y'all are the types who prefer the office types to military brass....
"Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia....I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds."
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Ellis Zacharias
"What prevented them from suing for peace or from bringing their plot into the open was their uncertainty on two scores. First, they wanted to know the meaning of unconditional surrender and the fate we planned for Japan after defeat. Second, they tried to obtain from us assurances that the Emperor could remain on the throne after surrender."
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Ellis Zacharias
"[T]he poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia."
"Obviously . . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor's decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war."
- Colonel Charles "Tick" Bonesteel, Chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section
"I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and, I think, the Swiss. And that suggestion of [giving] a warning [of the atomic bomb] was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted...In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb."
- Under-Secretary of Navy Ralph Bard
"During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for."
- Under-Secretary of Navy Ralph Bard
"...in the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision. If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer."
Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew
"I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs."
Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy
" Primarily it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate...It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world...".
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy Lewis Strauss
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."
Vice-chairman of U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Paul Nitze
On May 28, 1945, Hoover visited President Truman and suggested a way to end the Pacific war quickly: "I am convinced that if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll have both wars over."
former President Herbert Hoover
"...the Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945...up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ...if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs."
former President Herbert Hoover
"I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria."
former President Herbert Hoover
"Careful scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts opened over the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why the Truman administration used atomic weapons against Japan.... The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it.... The hoary claim that the bomb prevented 500,000 American combat deaths is unsupportable."
J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, publishing in the academic journal Diplomatic History
“First, intelligence and other advice to President Truman, in significant part based on intercepted and secretly decoded Japanese cable traffic, indicated that from at least May 1945 on, Japan wished to end the war and seemed likely to do so if assurances were given that the emperor would not be eliminated. Second, similar advice to the president suggested that the shock of Soviet entry into the war (expected in early August) would likely tip the balance, almost certainly if combined with assurances concerning the emperor.”
historians Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, writing in the Christian Science Monitor
"As early as April 29, 1945 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that increasing 'numbers of informed Japanese, both military and civilian, already realize the inevitability of absolute defeat...The entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war would, together with the foregoing factors, convince most Japanese at once of the inevitability of complete defeat.'"
"The diary of Walter Brown--an assistant to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes-- records that aboard ship returning from Potsdam on August 3, 1945 the President, Byrnes and Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President, "agrred [sic] Japas [sic] looking for peace. (Leahy had another report from Pacific) President afraid they will sue for peace through Russia instead of some country like Sweden."
Guide to Decision: Part I
Guide to Decision: Part II
Guide to Decision: Part III
Guide to Decision: Part IV
And if y'all are the types who prefer the office types to military brass....
"Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia....I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds."
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Ellis Zacharias
"What prevented them from suing for peace or from bringing their plot into the open was their uncertainty on two scores. First, they wanted to know the meaning of unconditional surrender and the fate we planned for Japan after defeat. Second, they tried to obtain from us assurances that the Emperor could remain on the throne after surrender."
Deputy Director of Naval Intelligence Ellis Zacharias
"[T]he poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia."
"Obviously . . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor's decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war."
- Colonel Charles "Tick" Bonesteel, Chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section
"I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and, I think, the Swiss. And that suggestion of [giving] a warning [of the atomic bomb] was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted...In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb."
- Under-Secretary of Navy Ralph Bard
"During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for."
- Under-Secretary of Navy Ralph Bard
"...in the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision. If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer."
Under-Secretary of State Joseph Grew
"I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs."
Assistant Secretary of War John McCloy
" Primarily it was because it was clear to a number of people, myself among them, that the war was very nearly over. The Japanese were nearly ready to capitulate...It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world...".
Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy Lewis Strauss
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."
Vice-chairman of U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Paul Nitze
On May 28, 1945, Hoover visited President Truman and suggested a way to end the Pacific war quickly: "I am convinced that if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll have both wars over."
former President Herbert Hoover
"...the Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945...up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ...if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs."
former President Herbert Hoover
"I told MacArthur of my memorandum of mid-May 1945 to Truman, that peace could be had with Japan by which our major objectives would be accomplished. MacArthur said that was correct and that we would have avoided all of the losses, the Atomic bomb, and the entry of Russia into Manchuria."
former President Herbert Hoover
"Careful scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts opened over the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why the Truman administration used atomic weapons against Japan.... The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it.... The hoary claim that the bomb prevented 500,000 American combat deaths is unsupportable."
J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, publishing in the academic journal Diplomatic History
“First, intelligence and other advice to President Truman, in significant part based on intercepted and secretly decoded Japanese cable traffic, indicated that from at least May 1945 on, Japan wished to end the war and seemed likely to do so if assurances were given that the emperor would not be eliminated. Second, similar advice to the president suggested that the shock of Soviet entry into the war (expected in early August) would likely tip the balance, almost certainly if combined with assurances concerning the emperor.”
historians Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, writing in the Christian Science Monitor
"As early as April 29, 1945 the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) informed the Joint Chiefs of Staff that increasing 'numbers of informed Japanese, both military and civilian, already realize the inevitability of absolute defeat...The entry of the U.S.S.R. into the war would, together with the foregoing factors, convince most Japanese at once of the inevitability of complete defeat.'"
"The diary of Walter Brown--an assistant to Secretary of State James F. Byrnes-- records that aboard ship returning from Potsdam on August 3, 1945 the President, Byrnes and Admiral William D. Leahy, Chief of Staff to the President, "agrred [sic] Japas [sic] looking for peace. (Leahy had another report from Pacific) President afraid they will sue for peace through Russia instead of some country like Sweden."
Guide to Decision: Part I
Guide to Decision: Part II
Guide to Decision: Part III
Guide to Decision: Part IV
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$cam-U-Well_Jack$on
Superstar
First day in iMAX
Cinema is back
That shyt will look amazing in IMAX.
Makavalli
Sinister is a system
I dont know too much about the Manhattan project besides brief summaries but its kinda crazy the true story of a superweapon can seem boring to some but the fantasy version of it like the Death star can generate mass fandom. Crazy The way entertainment and hollywood tries to soften the reality of cruel shyt
Subbed
$cam-U-Well_Jack$on
Superstar
Yes god! My wife wants to see it badly too but shes going to be out of town until that Sunday. She thinks I’m waiting for her. Im seeing on Friday after work and watching with her on Sunday like i ain’t never seen it
Da finesse.
Oppenheimer projected to lag behind Barbie and MI7 with a 40m opening. Making it the lowest Nolan opener since 2006. OP is right.
This movies target demo is nerds and film snobs, it's not appealing to the average person. People don't want to see a guy crying and having a existental crisis for 3 hours mixed with the occasional explosion. That's appealing to film snobs, not people.
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Shh
no no no!Barbinhiemer on gang!
?
Mister Terrific
It’s in the name
Korea petty as fukk. Releasing this movie the same day as their Independence Day 
en.m.wikipedia.org
National Liberation Day of Korea - Wikipedia
Nolan's 'Oppenheimer' coming to Korea August 15
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koreajoongangdaily.joins.com