Striking the right balance between relations with the West and relations with Russia has always been Ukraine’s central foreign policy challenge.
Ukraine’s leaders have sought to have it both ways: to grow relations with the United States, European Union and NATO while also trying to maintain a stable relationship with Russia.
Kyiv pulled off this balancing act in the 1990s. Its first steps to engage the West did not appear to threaten key Russian interests. Boris Yeltsin accepted Ukraine as an independent state. Vladimir Putin, however, is not Boris Yeltsin, and today’s Russia is not the Russia of the 1990s. The current Russian president wants to
prevent Ukraine from slipping too far toward the West, has significant leverage over Kyiv and is prepared to use it. The Russians’ spectacularly ill-timed February 26 decision to launch a snap military exercise is not an encouraging sign, nor are the February 27-28 developments in Crimea.
Ukraine regained its independence following the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. While a small minority of ardent Ukrainian nationalists wished that Russia would simply disappear, Kyiv had no realistic divorce option. The Soviet system left the Ukrainian and Russian economies thoroughly intertwined. The Ukrainian energy sector remained hugely dependent on Russia for natural gas, oil and fuel rods for its nuclear reactors.
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A Ukraine moving toward the West seriously threatens Putin’s geopolitical construct. Moreover, he strives to appear to his domestic political base as a strongman and protector of Russia’s national interests. “Losing” Ukraine would undermine that carefully cultivated image.
Putin thus has responded very differently than Yeltsin to Ukraine’s pursuit of its westward vector.
In January 2008, Ukrainian President Victor Yushchenko requested a membership action plan (MAP) from NATO. A few weeks later, Putin stood next to Yushchenko at a Kremlin press conference and calmly threatened to target nuclear missiles on Ukraine. The MAP request failed to win consensus support at the April 2008 NATO summit in Bucharest.
Fast forward to 2013. Ukraine, now under President Victor Yanukovych, neared signature of an association agreement with the European Union, which includes a free trade arrangement. Its full implementation would prepare the ground for a future EU membership bid—and pull Ukraine irretrievably out of Moscow’s orbit.
Putin accordingly cranked up the pressure. Last summer, Russian customs inspectors began to block the import of Ukrainian goods. Kremlin officials threatened all manner of financial ruin should Kyiv go forward with signing the agreement.
The threats worked. Yanukovych suspended the association agreement process and instead accepted Putin’s gifts of a $15 billion credit line and cheaper gas. But the European Union exerts a powerful pull.
Tens of thousands took to the streets of Kyiv in November in protest. Stoked by anger over brutal police tactics, the protest swelled to the hundreds of thousands, ultimately bringing down the Yanukovych regime.
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-f...aines-perpetual-east-west-balancing-act-pifer