The ISW further speculates that Prigozhin saw the Ministry of Defence’s 1 July deadline for all irregular forces, including his Wagner group, to sign contracts with the government as an “existential threat to his political (and possibly personal) survival”.
He therefore “gambled that his only avenue to retain Wagner Group as an independent force was to march against the Russian MoD, likely intending to secure defections in the Russian military but overestimating his own prospects”.
Due to the speed and coordination of Wagner movements, Prigozhin “almost certainly planned this effort in advance,” the thinktank writes – that aligns with
US media reports that US intelligence suspected up to two weeks ago that he was planning to take action against Moscow.
The thinktank also suggests that the rebellion may have eroded support for Prigozhin among the utranationalist community and even within Wagner itself, as it forced Wagner-affiliated regional authorities and recruitment organizations to denounce the effort.
Prigozhin also likely angered many Wagner personnel and Wagner-sympathetic ultranationalists by not following through with his attempted march on Moscow.
The agreement brokered by Belarus may also upset Wagner personnel, as it marks the end of efforts to keep Wagner from being subordinated to the MoD.