Which finally culminates in 1988 with the Palestinian Declaration of Independence, acceptance of partition, acceptance of a two-state solution, and so on. This is a popular option among Palestinians.
Now, Hamas arises at just this moment to take up the banner of complete liberation, and to take up the banner of violent resistance. And if you read the Hamas Charter of 1968 — which is a pretty bloodthirsty document — you can see that what they are doing is reprising the former position of the PLO with an Islamic flavor, with an incredibly forceful Islamist flavor. It’s worth looking at that document, and then looking at what was amended, much, much later by Hamas.
In any case, that was a very popular approach, the PLO’s approach, and Hamas was a tiny minority. Arafat and the PLO, as they went to negotiate — first at Madrid and Washington, and then at Oslo, and afterwards — had the support of overwhelming majorities of Palestinians. That support melted away when it became clear that the Oslo formula was designed and was leading to a reinforcement of occupation, not the end of occupation.
The walls, the barriers, the checkpoints, the restriction of Palestinians to Area A and Area B, Israel taking over 60 percent of the West Bank in so-called Area C; these are results of Oslo. Occupation becomes infinitely more onerous as a result of Oslo. Settlement expands. Rather than being restricted, the settlement process goes on steroids.
When we went to Madrid, I was an advisor to the Palestinian delegation, in 1991. There were around 100, 120,000 settlers. There are three-quarters-of-a-million settlers today. This is the Oslo process. And one could go on and on.
Palestinian GDP per capita has gone down since 1991, Palestinian freedom of movement has gone down since 1991. Palestinian public opinion? People are not stupid. They turned away from the PLO, they turned away from the Palestinian Authority, and began to contemplate other approaches, because this approach had, in their view, conclusively failed. And that’s the shift that you see towards Hamas, which, even then, never gets a majority of Palestinians from that point on, including in the elections of 2006; they got 42 percent of the vote for the Palestinian Legislative Council, having lost the presidential election of January, 2005, to Abbas.
So, they never were a majority party, but the shift towards them is a result of the perceived failure of the approach of the PLO and Fatah