The Combat and Military Systems of Africa and its Diaspora

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

UN peacekeeper killed in Mali identified as Liberian

Bamako - A UN peacekeeper killed in a rocket and mortar attack claimed by a powerful jihadist alliance in Mali was identified on Thursday by the United Nations as a Liberian soldier.

A UN mission known by its acronym MINUSMA has been stationed in the west African country since 2013 and is considered the world body's most dangerous active peacekeeping deployment.

MINUSMA said nine others were injured by shelling on its camp in the troubled historic city of Timbuktu on Wednesday afternoon.

Liberia had 78 troops serving in the 13 000-strong MINUSMA force which is assisting Malian troops struggling to secure the country.


It has faced frequent jihadist attacks that have claimed the lives of dozens of peacekeepers.

Liberia's deputy chief of defence staff confirmed on Wednesday that Liberians were among the injured and Sweden's military said one of its nationals was wounded.

The UN mission said it had reinforced the camp's defences and deployed air cover to identify where the enemy fire had originated, describing it as a "terrorist" attack.

The attack was the most high profile yet claimed by the "Group to Support Islam and Muslims" (GSIM), which is a fusion of three Malian jihadist groups with previous al-Qaeda links led by high-profile Malian jihadist Iyad Ag Ghaly.

The group, also known as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimeen in Arabic, confirmed late Wednesday it had "bombarded Timbuktu airport with rockets" and had left "several injured among the international forces".

It has also claimed an attack on April 5 in the central Douentza area which killed a French soldier serving with France's counter-terror Barkhane force, also present in Mali to aid domestic security forces.

Northern Mali fell to jihadist groups linked to al-Qaeda in March 2012, and although these forces were driven out of key towns by a French-led military intervention the following year, the Islamists have now spread further south.

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

Egypt air force destroys vehicles crossing from Libya

Egypt air force destroys vehicles crossing from Libya
Military says 15 trucks carrying weapons from Libya demolished in air attacks but no details given on who was driving.

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• Libya, deploying fighter jets and helicopter gunships in an operation that spanned 48 hours.
  
  The military didn't say who was driving the vehicles or give details of any casualties, news agencies reported.
  
  The only information provided on Monday came on the Egyptian military's Facebookpage, which claimed the trucks were carrying weapons and other contraband.
  
  The air force operation came as security forces killed eight fighters identified as members of the Muslim Brotherhood in an attack in the country's south, according to the interior ministry.
  
  READ MORE: How Sisi is using the law as a tool to restore tyranny
  
  WATCH: Leaked video shows Egyptian army killing unarmed men (1:33)
  
  President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has launched the toughest crackdown on armed groups in Egypt's modern history since toppling former President Mohamed Morsi of the Brotherhood in 2013.
  
  Those killed included Helmi Masri Mohareb, a commander from Libya who transported fighters across Egypt's southern border to join training camps, the interior ministry said in a statement.
  
  The fighters planned "to form groups to carry out a series of hostile operations in the coming period by sending elements from these groups to join training camps abroad", it said.
  
  Egypt has outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood and designated it a "terrorist" group. The organisation maintains its activities are peaceful and had no immediate comment.
  
  Morsi was elected as Egypt's first civilian president in 2012, but the army overthrew him a year later following mass protests against his divisive rule. Since then, an extensive crackdown on the group has left it in disarray after security forces violently quashed their protests.
  

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

THE GUNS OF OCTOBER: How The Invasion Of Somalia Changed Kenya | The Elephant

When Kenyan troops crossed the proverbial Rubicon and entered Somalia nearly six years ago, it caught almost everyone by surprise. It was Kenya’s first sustained and significant foray into its troubled neighbors territory and ran counter to the country’s historic pacifism -at least in international if not necessarily in domestic, affairs- as well as against the grain of the advice she had received from her much more experienced friends and patrons in the international community.

The immediate trigger of Kenya’s offensive was a spate of kidnappings of aid workers and tourists near the Somalia border, which had devastated the country’s lucrative tourism industry and which the government blamed on the al Shabaab terror group. Since 2007, the al Shabaab, had been fighting to oust the then transitional government in Mogadishu which was protected by AU forces under the AU Mission to Somalia (AMISOM). Allied to Osama bi Laden’s Al Qaeda, the al Shabaab had carried out atrocities both inside and outside Somalia, including the July 2010 bombings in the Ugandan capital, Kampala, which targeted football fans watching the soccer World Cup final and killed 76 people.

The objectives given by the Kenyan government for the invasion were both confused and confusing. Spokesman Alfred Mutua initially claimed the KDF was pursuing the alleged kidnappers across the border but later admitted that the kidnappings had been an excuse to launch a plan that had “been in the pipeline for a while.” Despite the fact that the al Shabaab had strongly denied having anything to do with the kidnappings and the government produced no evidence to back up its allegations, it still dispatched a letter to the UN Security Council citing the “latest direct attacks on Kenyan territory and the accompanying loss of life and kidnappings of Kenyans and foreign nationals by the Al-Shabaab terrorists” as reason for “remedial and pre-emptive action” undertaken “to protect and preserve the integrity of Kenya and the efficacy of the national economy and to secure peace and security.”

The stated objectives for the incursion quickly escalated. They ran the gamut from rescuing the kidnapped foreigners to pushing al Shabaab away from the border and establishing a buffer zone, to the capture of the port city of Kismayo, the dismantling of al Shabaab and the stabilization of Somalia. “We are going to be there until the (Somali government) has effectively reduced the capacity of al-Shabaab to fire a single round … We want to ensure there is no al Shabaab,” declared military spokesman, Major Emmanuel Chirchir.

The first few weeks were greeted with euphoric displays of patriotism from a polarized populace desperate for something to rally around. Less than four years prior, the country had almost torn itself apart following the shambolic and disputed elections of 2007. For a country used to seeing itself, despite the testimony of history, as “an island of peace in a sea of chaos”, the episode was profoundly traumatizing and left in its wake deep and disturbing questions about what it meant to be Kenyan. The adoption of a new constitution in 2010, a seminal moment in any nation’s history, had done little to quieten the nagging doubts. A Government of National Unity formed in the aftermath of the violence was proving to be a testy affair. The power struggles and political realignments within it, as well as the continuing and blatant theft of public resources it presided over, undermined rather than reinforced the already shaky idea of Kenya.

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

But if there’s one thing that can be relied on to rally a people, it is war. And war was what the media branded the invasion. “Kenyan troops off to war” blared the Daily Nation headline. “We are in a war against terrorists in and outside our country,” President Uhuru Kenyatta would declare in December 2014. However, there has never been an official declaration of war, either against Somalia or against Al Shabaab, which according to the constitution requires the authorization of Parliament.

Regardless, following the invasion Kenyans were treated to breathless coverage of the exploits and capacities of their valiant and heroic troops. Tales came about captured towns that few had ever heard of and one front page article even proclaimed the “imminent fall of Kismayo”. Uncomfortable questions about the aims and wisdom of the invasion were quickly swept aside. Still, as John Adams, the second President of the United States said, “facts are stubborn things; and whatever may be our wishes, our inclinations, or the dictates of our passions, they cannot alter the state of facts and evidence.”

The first hints of the morass Kenya had got herself mired in came quite early on. Within weeks of setting foot in Somalia, the troops were literally stuck in mud as the invasion had been conducted at the height of Somalia’s dehr short rain season. 60 days into what had been branded Operation Linda Nchi, Franklin would report that “KDF ground units are bogged down in the mud of South Central Somalia or marooned in the vicinity of Ras Kamboni on the Indian Ocean. Bad weather seems to have severely limited sorties by fixed wing ground attack aircraft as well as KDF attack helicopters”. It would take the KDF nearly 7 months to capture Afmadow, al Shabaab’s logistical base, and a year to get to Kismayo, Somalia’s second largest port, which was the real prize. By this time, Operation Linda Nchi had been wound down without achieving any of its objectives and 4600 Kenyan troops transferred to AMISOM.

Back in Kenya, the novelty of war had worn thin and the country was settling down to yet another divisive and scary election campaign. It was also coming to terms with the fact that the battle with the al Shabaab would not just be fought in Somalia. Almost immediately after the invasion, al Shabaab leaders had begun promising “huge blasts” in Nairobi. An initial campaign attacks using hand grenades and improvised explosives badly damaged the already fragile perception of security. But what completely shattered it was the attack on the Westgate Mall in September 2013 where 4 terrorists murdered at least 68 people and ruthlessly exposed the incompetence and corruption at the heart of the national security establishment.

In fact, it is arguable that the biggest casualties of the invasion of Somalia have been the national security agencies and especially the KDF. Prior to the invasion, the KDF was seen as a professional, disciplined, if spoilt and coddled, military force. It was widely thought to be immune to the foibles and prejudices and moral and material decay afflicting the rest of the public service. Westgate put paid to all that. Few will ever forget the grainy CCTV footage of soldiers, who were meant to be battling the terrorists, instead strolling out of the Nakumatt supermarket carrying plastic shopping bags. The four-day fiasco, the friendly fire incident in which the KDF shot and killed a commander of the General Service Unit’s Recce Squad, the looting of the mall, the confused public updates and the inability to take on 4 armed men at the heat of the city destroyed public confidence in the KDF and in the intelligence agencies.

The carefully cultivated reputation of the National Intelligence Service, honed during its time as the Directorate of Security Intelligence, better known as the “Special Branch”, and favorite tool of surveillance and repression by the brutal regime of Daniel Arap Moi, was also in tatters. It would be completely obliterated by a series of large attacks which came within the two years following Westgate. These include the massacres in Mpeketoni and at the Garissa University College, and the attacks on buses and workers in Mandera, all of which claimed tens and sometimes hundreds of lives, and which were all, somewhat unfairly, blamed on failures of intelligence.

For the KDF, the bad news would keep on coming. It was again at the centre of the failures in both Mpeketoni and Garissa University, and was accused in a November 2015 report of profiteering from the Somalia deployment. A report titled “Black and White” by Journalists for Justice, accused the KDF of colluding with al Shabaab, the very enemy they are supposed to be fighting, to illegally export charcoal out of Somalia ports and to smuggle sugar into Kenya. Similar allegations had been made by the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea and the KDF’s vehement denials and empty promises to investigate did little to salvage its reputation.

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

On January 15, 2016 the AMISOM base at the nondescript Somali town of El Adde, which was manned by troops from the Kenyan contingent, was overrun by the al Shabaab. Up to 200 soldiers were killed and a dozen kidnapped. A UN report by the accused KDF of failure to implement basic defensive measures and concluded that the al Shabaab faced “relatively little resistance from the Kenyan troops”.

Back home, the government and the KDF retreated into silence, obviously hoping the questions and calls for accountability would go away. They would be temporarily jolted out of their reverie a year later when another KDF-manned camp was overrun by al Shabaab, this time at Kulbiyow. Different accounts of what happened have been offered with The Standard claiming up to 68 soldiers were killed and the KDF putting the number at 9 with 15 injured.

None of this has done the KDF’s reputation much good. Today, its star is considerably diminished. It has turned out to be just as vacuous, corrupt, incompetent and unaccountable as nearly all the other public institutions in the political firmament.

Regardless of this, the government has not shied away from increasing the deployment of the KDF internally. In fact, especially since October 2011, the military has taken on a much more public profile. For a country which has never experienced the misfortune of military rule, Kenya has always had an uneasy relationship with its soldiers. Following two failed coup plots in the 70s and the 80s, the political elite has preferred to keep the troops happy, well fed and watered in their barracks. But, as Daniel Branch noted in Foreign Policy, by 2011, the KDF had “been trained and equipped to do much more than parade on national holidays.” Increased counter-terrorism funding from Washington had underwritten a stronger Kenyan military which in turn had “grown more confident and combative”.

In the aftermath of the invasion of Somalia, it has now become almost routine for the government to deploy this capability to deal with local trouble spots within the country without seeking authorization from the National Assembly as required by the constitution. Neither does it appear that the Inspector General of Police is made “responsible for the administration, command, control and overall superintendence of the operation” as required by the KDF Act.

In December 2013 President Kenyatta raised hackles when he announced the formation of the Nairobi Metropolitan Command of the KDF citing the need to combat “the current threats in the country emerging from terrorism, drug trafficking, proliferation of small arms, and crime, among others, that tend to flourish in highly urbanised areas like Nairobi.” And seven months later, a bill was proposed (and later dropped) which sought to strip Parliament of its power to approve the deployment of the KDF within Kenya. “We need to ensure that we remove the roadblocks on the way that may derail the process of deployment of the military locally so that we can respond faster and swiftly,” declared National Assembly Majority Leader, Aden Duale.

Further, in addition to the larger role played by retired officers in the civilian security and intelligence agencies, President Kenyatta earlier this year appointed the serving Chief of Defense Forces, Gen Samson Mwathethe to chair the Blue Economy implementation Committee which oversees the implementation of government programs.

A scared people are much more willing to bargain away their freedoms for a sense of safety, however ephemeral. And by the end of 2015, Kenyans were a pretty scared lot. The Somalia invasion had backfired spectacularly and not only failed to deliver the promised safety, but made matters much worse. According to a report by the Daily Nation’s Newsplex, which cited data from the Global Terrorism Database, the most comprehensive unclassified database on terrorist events conducted by non-state actors and the Nation Media Group’s own archives, in the 45 months after Operation Linda Nchi began, there were nine times as many attacks as in the 45 months before the mission. The attacks were also more ferocious, with deaths and injuries multiplying eight-fold in the same period.

The government has instrumentalized the fear this has generated to scapegoat particular communities in order to distract attention from its own actions and to try to roll back the freedoms guaranteed in the 2010 constitution.

According to Andrew Franklin, a security consultant and former US marine, “Declarations of war justify extraordinary – and temporary – restrictions on all manner of normal domestic activities and curbs on many constitutionally protected freedoms. This is why going to war is considered a big deal and not just a matter of semantics.”

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

Yet the government has invoked the idea of a country at war to justify the concentration of power in the Executive, especially in the Presidency, the removal of existing constitutional restraints on the exercise of that power and the clampdown on media freedoms and civil liberties. In December 2014, the government forced through Parliament legislation expanding the powers of the President and imposing limitations of civil liberties, including the right to protest and fair trial, as well as curtailing media freedom to publish terrorism-related stories. Just two days before, State House spokesman, Manoah Esipisu, penned a telling op-ed in the Daily Nation in which he justified these measures on the basis that it was a “time of war”.

The primary targets of the government’s fear-mongering and scapegoating have been the Muslim community and especially, though not exclusively, ethnic Somalis. Be they Kenyan citizens or refugees from Somalia, they have been collectively blamed for the atrocities committed by al Shabaab and this has led to repressive “anti-terror operations” and deportations. In April 2014, the government deployed, according tosays Human Rights Watch, about 5000 police officers and KDF troops in Nairobi’s Eastleigh neighborhood following a series of grenade and gun and in Mombasa. Operation Usalama Watch lasted several weeks during which “the forces raided homes, buildings, and shops, extorted massive sums, and harassed and detained an estimated 4,000 people – including journalists, registered refugees, Kenyan citizens, and international aid workers – without charge, and in appalling conditions for periods well beyond the 24-hour legal limit.” Further, in violation of its international obligations, the government is trying to close the Dadaab refugee camp, the world’s largest, and to force nearly half a million refugees back across the border.

In addition to this, extrajudicial assassination and disappearances have also become a preferred way to deal with those suspected of links to al Shabaab. Several radical Muslim clerics at the coast have been murdered and the Anti-Terror Police Unit has been accused of disappearing Somali and Muslim youth across the country and, more specifically, in the arid counties of the former North Eastern Province. This is not new. As the report of the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission demonstrates, Somali and Muslim communities have historically suffered the bulk of atrocities committed by both the colonial and post-colonial governments. However, for much of that history, such oppression was carried out in the remote north and hidden from most of the public. During Usalama Watch, however, the state was blatantly carrying out large scale, systematic campaign of extortion and abuse right in the heart of the capital city and targeting a specific minority in broad daylight and with the tacit approval of a large segment of terrorized society.

Similarly, surveillance too has come out of the shadows. During the Moi dictatorship, the perception of widespread surveillance through networks of informers was key to keeping the population compliant and afraid. Citizens were afraid to criticize the state since one did not know who might be listening. However, today they welcome even more comprehensive and ubiquitous surveillance, via CCTV cameras and listening in on phone and online conversations, as reassurance that the state is looking out for -rather than watching- them.

In the weeks following the Westgate attack, the government introduced a programme labelled Nyumba Kumi which encouraged citizens to form neighbourhood teams that would spy on members and report “suspicious activities” to the government. It was borrowed from Tanzania where it was used by Julius Nyerere’s government as a means of political control, to strengthen one-party rule. The late Michael Okema in his 1996 book on the Political Culture of Tanzania wrote that the system was “designed to make the citizen more security conscious” and expected him or her “to be all ears on behalf of the state”. Nyumba Kumi has much more ancient roots in 4th Century BCE China where, as described by Rev. John MacGowan of the London Missionary Society in 1897, the Ten House System “was a small division of a ward in a city, and consisted of ten dwelling houses. Each of these was responsible to the government for the conduct of the rest.”

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

THE GUNS OF OCTOBER: How The Invasion Of Somalia Changed Kenya | The Elephant

The invasion of Somalia and the brutal reaction it inspired have generated a climate of fear and fostered an unthinking and unquestioning patriotism which has paved way for the enforcement of an orthodoxy of “official truth”. Querying government misdeeds especially in the security sector and in the prosecution of its “war on terror” immediately attracts accusations of harboring terrorist sympathies. National security has become the carpet under which governmental ills are hidden. When, in November 2015, journalists reported on security procurement queries raised by the Auditor-General, three were immediately summoned to the Directorate of Criminal investigations and one was subsequently arrested, apparently on the orders of Internal Security Minister Joseph Ole Nkaissery. He demanded that they reveal their confidential sources claiming that their reports contained information “calculated to create a perception that there were malpractices relating to procuring security items within the Interior ministry” that could “expose our security forces to significant risk”. Ironically, they were accused of endangering public safety for reporting that the Auditor-General had specifically stated that the corrupt “purchase of second-hand arms and ammunition… had “seriously compromis[ed] the operations of the security agencies”.

Although the severity and regularity of terror attacks within the country have significantly reduced since their peak in 2015, Kenya remains a country on edge. Mass surveillance, ubiquitous security checks, xenophobia and state-sanctioned murder and disappearance of citizens have become normalized. Parliament, the media and civil society have shown little inclination to either demand accountability from the security sector or to encourage an honest public debate over the wisdom, strategy and objectives of continuing military operations in Somalia. Neither has there been anything resembling a deep introspection over the expanded domestic role of the KDF.

The October 2011 invasion may yet help provide Somalia with an opportunity to recover from its decades of turmoil but the experience has already severely degraded Kenya’s institutions and dented her ambitions of entrenching democratic and accountable governance at home. Its effects will be felt for generations to come.

 

[Yehuda]

The Calinda of Trinidad

The Calinda is a musical accompaniment that has become synonymous with the practice of competitive stick fighting, popularized in Trinidad and Tobago and several other Caribbean islands. It is both a martial art, a sport, a dance, and a musical form, with origins traced to the 1720s. As popularized during French rule of the island nation, Calinda is a French spelling variant. This practice is particularly popular during Carnival season, and stick fighting has been linked to civil unrest, including the Canboulay Riots in Trinidad. More specifically, the Calinda itself is the music and singing, and the term in its narrowest form has been used to refer to the three drum combination of bouller, the fouller and cutter that accompanies the dancing and stick fighting.

Calinda has its origins in African stick fighting and drumming traditions, of which there are many varitations. Imported with African Slaves to the island, the art has developed into formalized competition during Carnival season. [...]

The stick itself is roughly thirty inches in length and made from a variety of woods selected for a balance of strength and flexibility, treated with oils and often with heat to harden it. The sticks have been referred to as “beau-sticks”. [...]

Each stick fighter is said to have his own movement patterns. However, commonly there is a rhythmic repetition akin to an exaggerated, highly stylized “chip” or shuffle. The repeated rhythm of the movement pattern can be varied to throw off an opponent, and is often used tactically. Certainly, the non-combat segment of the fight could be described as dancing. Stick fighters exchange blows. [...]

Calinda

 

[Yehuda]

The Danmyé of Martinique, also called Ladja and Ag'ya

Danmyé was inspired by African ceremonies for initiating adolescents into adulthood so it shares a lot of commonalities with Senegalese Lamb wrestling. The origin of the word comes from danm, derived from two African languages meaning “initiated,” and yé, referring to “a group”. Danmyé therefore means “those who are initiated.” The sport developed on plantations amongst slaves in Martinique from the 17th to 19th centuries and was eventually used by slave owners as a way to parade the strength of their slaves during festivals in a sort of cockfight. The Danmyé fight is carried out to music; a solo singer (Chantè), choir (La Vwa Dèyè), a tambour player (Tanbouyé) and the ti-bwa player (Bwatè épi ti bwa) make up the orchestra. Danmyé is rhythmic and regulated by the music from which the fighters draw their energy and inspiration.

The fighters, or “Majors,” begin by running in a circle to the rhythm of the tambour, representing the magical space in which the fight will take place. Anyone who enters the circle becomes an adversary. Each fighter takes turns drawing energy and inspiration from the tambour, exhibiting their strength, speed and agility face to face with the tanbouyé. This preparation calls upon supernatural elements and rites from Quimbois. There is a strong connection between the Major and the tanbouyé—he or she plays evenly for the two fighters, however when one gains an advantage, the tanbouyé pushes their foot against the head of the drum, tightening the sound in order to galvanize that fighter’s energy.

According to Pierre Dru, a Danmyé singer and historian, the combat was rejected during the 1970s as a remnant of slave culture. During the period of Créolité, a movement promoted by Edouard Glissant and Raphaël Confiant in the 1980s, Danmyé resurfaced with a nationalistic attitude of it as “by Martinicans for Martinicans”. [...]

Danmyé in Martinique

 

[Neuromancer]

Is weaponry also discussed in here?

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

Is weaponry also discussed in here?

Yes sir!

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

It'll be interesting to see how Russia and Egypt (backers of General Haftar) react to this attack.
Libya death toll 'rises to 140' at Brak El-Shati airbase - BBC News

Libya death toll 'rises to 140' at Brak El-Shati airbase

• 20 May 2017
  
• From the sectionAfrica

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Image copyrightAFP
Image captionMany of those killed were from the Libyan National Army, seen in action in this file photo
Reports suggest as many as 140 people, including civilians, may have died in an attack on an airbase in Libya.

It was originally thought 60 people died when a government-allied militia tried to take over the Brak al-Shati base on Thursday.

The UN-backed government's defence minister and the commander of the militia have both been suspended pending an investigation.

The prime minister's office has denied ordering the attack.

A militia spokesman said they had "liberated the base and destroyed all the forces inside".

The town's mayor said some aircraft had been set ablaze.

Most of the dead were soldiers of the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army (LNA), an alliance in the east of the country which does not recognise the government in the capital, Tripoli. That force has been in control of the airbase since December.

Its spokesman gave the new death toll of 140.

"The soldiers were returning from a military parade. They weren't armed. Most of them were executed," he said.

The UN's envoy to Libya, Martin Kobler, said he was "outraged" by reports of summary executions.

• Why is Libya so lawless?
• Profile: Libya's military strongman Khalifa Haftar of the LNA
• Guide to key Libyan militias

The attack breached an informal truce between the rival forces that was reached earlier this month when the LNA's commander, General Khalifa Haftar, met the UN-backed Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

The Tripoli government has set up an investigative committee to present its findings to the prime minister within 15 days.

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

Short documentary on Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear of the Nation) - anyone got any more information on their secret activities in Angola, Zimbabwe and Mozambique?

 

[Yehuda]

How France armed Biafra's bid to break from Nigeria

By Michel Arseneault Issued on 25-05-2017 | Modified 25-05-2017 to 11:19

Biafran soldiers on 31 juillet 1968. AFP

France secretly armed Biafra in the self-proclaimed republic’s attempt to break away from Nigeria in a bid to weaken British and US influence in Africa, documents seen by RFI reveal 50 years after the beginning of a war that cost up to two million lives.

The ethnic Igbo-majority Eastern Region declared its independence on 30 May 1967, following a military coup, a counter-coup and what French diplomats described as “pogroms” of tens of thousands of Igbo living in northern Nigeria the previous year.

The attempt to break away led to a 32-month war, which was to see about between 500,000 and two million deaths from starvation caused by Nigeria’s blockade of the breakaway region.

Nigeria’s former colonial ruler, Britain, backed the Lagos government’s One-Nigeria policy, covertly providing weapons and military intelligence.

The US declared itself neutral, while the Soviet Union gave full support to the Nigerian government.

Although France – unlike allies Gabon and Côte d’Ivoire -- never recognised Biafra diplomatically, it backed what then president Charles de Gaulle called its “just and noble cause.”

Anglophone giant

De Gaulle saw the conflict as a means to weaken the “anglophone giant” of west Africa, which was surrounded by former French colonies closely aligned with Paris through a policy of defending French interests that would come to be known as Françafrique.

Nigeria with Biafra marked in grey. wikimedia.commons

While French Foreign Affairs Minister Maurice Couve de Murville declared that his country was observing a “complete embargo”, the presidential palace’s notorious “Africa cell”, headed by the controversial Jacques Foccart, sent large quantities of arms to the Biafran side, taking care to keep the operation secret from the Quai d’Orsay.

The planes carrying the weapons had to pass through the airspace of several countries that opposed the process, prompting a complaint by Morocco, which had not granted them access.

They landed at Uli, “Africa’s busiest airport”, according to Biafra supporters. But it was in such a poor state that pilots flying for Nigeria, including South African mercenaries, sometimes mistook it for a stretch of road. Pilots recruited by Biafra were in the know and managed to bring 75 tonnes of rifles, assault rifles, bazookas, grenades and cannon in just 11 days in 1969, documents show.

Appeal for more weapons

But, with the Biafran side losing ground, Foccart’s men appealed for more.
Warning that the breakaway territory could fall “before the end of October [1969]”, one of them Philippe Lettéron, wrote in a note now in the national archives and seen by RFI, “to take back control of the situation and have some hope of regaining the lost territory, a massive effort of at least 600 tonnes of arms and munitions would be needed in a very short space of time.”

Biafran leader Colonel Odumegwu Emeka Ojukwu. AFP

Defeat did in fact come in January 1970 but not for want of French arms, as telegrams from the French embassy Lagos reported, notably when French expatriates in Port Harcourt, the region’s main port, notified it that the Bounty, hailing from Bordeaux, had broken the blockade and delivered weapons.

The Foreign Affairs Ministry did find out about the arms traffic and drew up an “inventory”, declassified at RFI’s request, in 1968.

It lists 16 Alouette and 12 T6-G helicopters and two planes for training pilots, delivered before the war, and two B26 bombers delivered after the independence declaration.
Support for the Biafran cause did not prevent France selling some arms to the Lagos government, mainly parts of orders placed before the war broke out.

And planemaker Sud-Aviation, then headed by Maurice Papon who was later convicted of war crimes during the Nazi occupation, lobbied to be allowed to sell helicopters, while sending a note the Africa cell, now declassified at RFI’s request, advocating “secret backing” through the supply of mercenaries to Biafra, to guarantee France a “privileged position” in an independent Biafra where high-quality, low-sulphur oil had recently been discovered.

Many French mercenaries

In fact, a number of mercenaries, many of them French, had been in the area since at least five months before the declaration of independence, as ambassador Marc Barbey had been informed by French nationals in Port Harcourt and a Soviet diplomat.

But Barbey, either believing or pretending to believe that they were working for the Lagos government, discussed their presence with Nigerian military leader Colonel Yakubu Gowon, urging him to refrain from recruiting French citizens.

Gowon warned the diplomat against any action that might threaten Nigeria’s territorial integrity but Barbey told his superiors that “France is certainly not the target” of the warning, since it was Israel that was sending mercenaries to the territory.

A child suffering from malnutrition during the blockade. Wikimedia Commons/Dr Lyle Conrad

Once the war started, the US was alarmed to see a French crew fly a B26 bomber into rebel territory, leading the French Foreign Affairs Ministry to discover that three American-built bomber were there, two of them having been flown in from an airbase at Creil, near Paris.

More arms smuggling came to light when a plane that had formerly belonged to Air France exploded in Bissau due to the munitions it was carrying.

The most notorious of the French mercenaries, Rolf Steiner, a former Hitler Youth member who joined the French Foreign Legion, formed a 3,000-strong brigade that became the elite corps of the Biafran army.

But he and most of the other mercenaries left before the final defeat.

“After departure of Rolf Steiner and his comrades, there are only three European combatants with the Biafrans, two French and one English,” French Ambassador to Gabon Maurice Delauney, a Foccart loyalist, reported in a telegram on 15 November 1968.

Not all francophone countries in Africa sided with Biafra.

Senegal sent a diplomatic envoy to Enugu, the Biafran capital, with the hopes of convincing the separatists to backpedal. And landlocked Niger, which depends on Nigeria for its access to the sea, went further. It played a key role in the transfer of Belgian and Swiss arms supplies. Weapons were flown in on Sabena flights and held in storage in the Niger presidential palace before being sent by lorry across the border to Kanu, French cables indicate.

The war dragged on until January 1970 when a young Nigerian officer, Colonel Olusegun Obasanjo announced on Radio Biafra that the conflict was officially over.
Obasanjo became Nigeria’s head of state in 1976 and again in 1999.

How France armed Biafra's bid to break from Nigeria

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

Nigerian Army repels Boko Haram attack on Maiduguri - Premium Times Nigeria

The attack by members of the Boko Haram on Maiduguri was successfully repelled, the Army said on Wednesday evening.

PREMIUM TIMES reported the attack on the Jiddari Polo area of the city, a few kilometres from the elite Government Residential Area, GRA.

In its response, the army said it “neutralized” the attackers.

“In a merciless operation, Nigerian troops have neutralized Boko Haram gunmen who attempted to attack Jiddari Polo community in Maiduguri, the Borno State capital,” Army spokesperson Sani Usman said.

The brigadier general added that “there was an attempt by a few suspected Boko Haram to attack Jiddari Polo and all have been neutralized. Situation cool and calm.”

The Army confirmed that residents of the area had planned to flee their homes but “were reassured with rapid response of Nigerian troops.”

Mr. Usman assured that there was heavy security presence in the area and the situation was now under control.

The army did not, however, provide details of the casualty figure from Wednesday’s attack.

Wednesday’s attack in the most daring by Boko Haram on Maiduguri in recent years since the military retook most of the territory once controlled by the terror group.

The Boko Haram insurgency has caused about 100,000 deaths since 2009.