2017 Ramadan Offensive
It has become an unfortunate tradition for Islamist fundamentalist terror groups to increase attacks during Ramadan, of which Boko Haram is no exception.
Whilst Boko Harams offensives do not necessarily strictly comply with strict phasing’s, it is convenient to break them down thus
- Preparation of the Battlespace
- Shaping the Battlespace
- Isolating the Battlespace
- The Attack
- The Defence
Preparation of the Battlespace: following on from the Army’s successful dry season operations such as Op Rescue Finale, the enemy was forced to withdraw from the Sambisa Forest and areas surrounding Maiduguri to the Rann Forest in Kala Balge LGA. Whilst this was an inconvenience the enemy did not lose significant manpower in this action and appears to have withdrawn in good order.
They appear to have replenished their food stocks through predatory raids on local villages as well as abducting boys and girls from isolated Camerounian and Nigeran villages. It is unclear how they sourced arms, fuel and ammunition, but one can assume some of these items were bought commercially from middlemen and others through stolen in raids and ambushes.
Shaping the Battlespace: with apparently limited resources the enemy regenerated its IED networks and deployed waves of PBIEDs mainly against Maiduguri and Mayo Sava Department.
The ad hoc nature of the IED campaign can be determined from the comparatively low lethality of the devices, some of which fail to function, the relative ease with which attackers are detected as well as reduced indoctrination, leading some attackers to surrender or throw away their devices.
The vast majority detonated on the outskirts of Maiduguri on the southern and eastern approaches and whilst they have had limited direct military utility, they served the strategic purpose of diverting attention (particularly of vigilantes), whilst Boko Haram JAS reinfiltrated the Sambisa Forest.
As the rainy season advanced the enemy built up their strength in Konduga LGA and Jere LGA dominating the hinterland through their presence and predatory terror raids on civilians, thus conditioning locals to avoid the bush.
Isolating the Battlespace: Boko Harams ability to isolate the battlespace is much reduced, but by taking advantage of the rainy season which reduces security force mobility (a form of environmental isolation) and dominating the hinterland with terror attacks, ambushes and raids on villages, in essence isolating most of rural parts of the southern and eastern axis of Maiduguri, confining movement to main roads in armed convoys and restricting civilian activities to the towns garrisoned by the military, thereby giving themselves relative freedom of movement and denying it to vigilantes and civilians as well as some friendly forces .
The Attack: the raid on Maiduguri represents a major action on this axis, however it is likely that there will be more. Although Maiduguri is the headliner, attacks on Bama, Gwoza, Biu or any other towns around Sambisa or south of Maiduguri would present reasonable targets. The attacks are likely to be limited to raids as opposed to general offensives in which massed Boko Haram fighters attack towns and villages.
The Defence: it is likely that the Nigerian security forces will launch a limited operation in response to this attack, it is likely that Boko Haram will contest this with IEDs and ambushes and then withdraw deeper into the Sambisa Forest or if it is a sustained offensive once again displace to Kala Balge LGA.
Analysis:
The enemy raid was a tactical and operational success for Boko Haram JAS stemming directly from the failure of friendly forces to fix and destroy the enemy in the Sambisa and Rann Forests.
Whilst fighting in these vast forested areas are exceptionally difficult military tasks, it is clear that the enemy is comfortable with the seasonal pattern of friendly forces clearing and holding during the dry season, while enemy forces, withdraw, move and then reinfiltrate during the rainy season.
Despite their poor personal military skills the enemy is still clearly a competent foe, having successfully breached several obstacles, infiltrated a heavily militarised area in broad daylight, overrun friendly positions and then withdrawn with their captured loot. They have shown themselves to be adept at concentrating their forces and moving them around without response even when detected.
Operationally Boko Harm JAS has demonstrated that still has the ability to resource, lead and coordinate attacks such as these and that they are in no way defeated in the Sambisa Forest area.
Friendly forces on the other hand display several tactical errors. Although the video does not give a full perspective, the defensive position shown was of the same generally poor construction and siting that the author has witnessed throughout Nigeria in general and the North East in particular. There was no evidence of indirect fire from friendly forces or any other form of defensive structures other than the berm, which did not appear to be regularly patrolled or covered by fire.
Screengrab from Boko Haram video showing Captured military post. – Copyright Sahara Reporters
Fighting position in Kaga LGA-Authors collection
Operationally, friendly forces screen of vigilantes who patrol the outlying villages and forests seems to have worked well passing information about the build up as it was going on, however the information was not acted on.
A major raid such as this during Ramadan would have been intricately planned with resources husbanded, routes reconnoitred and manpower assembled, indicating it was a strategic effort for Boko Haram. It was most likely brought forward to coincide with the Acting Presidents visit for maximum impact and in the hope the visit would be cancelled.
Summary:
Compared to previous Boko Haram Ramadan offensives which spanned multiple states and countries from Borno to Plateau State, as well as Niger Republic and Cameroun, with IED, PBIED and VBIED attacks as well as offensives featuring massed vehicles, capturing towns and LGAs, few of which were even mentioned in Boko Haram propaganda, a rapidly trumpeted raid into a Maiduguri suburb indicates that Boko Haram JAS is a much weakened force.
While its use of PBIEDs demonstrates its resilience and ability to regenerate its IED logistics chains most attacks have been unsuccessful. The CBDA compound was one of the more successful and that required a full scale raid on another part of town for the bombers to penetrate deeply enough. Even then further casualties were averted by vigilantes and other active security measures.
