The Combat and Military Systems of Africa and its Diaspora

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

Kenyan military says it launches strikes against al Shabaab forest base | Top News | Reuters

By Joseph Akwiri

MOMBASA, Kenya (Reuters) - Kenya's military said on Monday it had launched air strikes on the forest hideout of Somali Islamists blamed for deadly attacks on civilians and security personnel.

Heavily-armed attackers have in the past two weeks beheaded nine civilian men and killed three police officers in coastal Lamu district, which borders Somalia. Al Shabaab Islamists claimed responsibility for the police killings.

Kenyan police say the militants have used Boni forest as a base for attacks in the region.

“A serious operation has started in Boni forest. We are flushing them out of the forest," Nelson Marwa, Coast region coordinator, told journalists in the port city of Mombasa.

"We will do all it takes to secure the forest and we are urging the neighbouring communities to stay away to avoid any injuries."

An armed group, many of whom appeared to be ethnic Somalis, attacked two villages on Friday night, going from house to house and seizing non-Muslim men, whom they later beheaded.

The government on Saturday imposed a dusk-to-dawn curfew for three months in Lamu and two other neighbouring counties.

Al Shabaab is fighting to overthrow Somalia's western-backed government and establish its own rule, based on the group's strict interpretation of Islam's sharia law.

The Islamists frequently launch attacks on Kenyan soil which they say are intended to force the country to withdraw its troops from Somalia.

Kenyan troops form part of the African Union-mandated AMISOM peacekeeping force defending Somalia's central government against al Shabaab.

 

[Bawon Samedi]

Kenya has to do something about these terrorist attacks. shyt is getting ridiculous.

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

ELSEWHERE IN AFRICA...
Security forces kill six suspected militants in shootout in southern Egypt | Top News | Reuters

CAIRO (Reuters) - Egyptian security forces have killed six suspected militants sympathetic to Islamic State in a shooutout in the southern province of Assiut, an Interior Ministry said on Monday.

A ministry statement said security forces were carrying out a raid on the group's apartment in Assiut when a firefight ensued in which all six militants were killed. It did not say when the incident took place.

The apartment was "an organisational base where (the group) was preparing to carry out a series of terrorist operations in the provinces," the statement said.

Egypt faces an Islamist insurgency led by the Islamic State group in the Sinai Peninsula, where hundreds of soldiers and police have been killed since 2013.

But Islamic State has also intensified attacks in the mainland in recent months, often targeting minority Coptic Christians.

Egypt on Friday saw one of the worst attacks on its security forces in years when 23 soldiers were killed after two suicide car bombs were detonated in North Sinai.

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

Kenya has to do something about these terrorist attacks. shyt is getting ridiculous.

The Kenyan gov't poked a hornet's nest when it invaded Somalia along with other AU forces. According to an article I posted earlier in the thread, the war is eroding/exposing the weakness of the Kenyan Defence Forces and is diminishing good governance in the country.

As to what can be done, the Kenyan Army doesn't have enough troops to fully police the North-East counties. They need to increase their intelligence operations in that region in order to find Al-Shabab militants and their paths into Kenya/domestic Kenyan Al-Shabab members.

In addition, it has to start treating the Somali community in Kenya better.

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

FINALLY, A LOOK AT WEST AFRICA'S DEADLIEST ONGOING CONFLICT...
Technically Defeated: The Nigerian Army’s Operation Against Boko Haram
Part I

Nigeria’s’ Chief of Army Staff (COAS) Lt Gen Buratai recently visited the UK, giving a presentation on ‘The Nigerian Army’s Operation Against Boko Haram’ at the Royal United Services Institute in London.

We will examine this lecture and what it tells us about how the Nigerian Army perceives its operations against Boko Haram and equally importantly how it wishes the rest of the world to perceive its operations.

The COAS identified 12 key factors that helped turn the tide against Boko Haram as:

• Provision of Purposeful leadership
• Understanding the Operating Environment
• Nature and type of conflict
• Strategy and tactics employed
• Logistics support
• State of manpower
• Intelligence
• Media and information operations
• Psychological operations
• Respect for human rights
• Cooperation with other security agencies
• International collaboration

Provision of Purposeful leadership: was exemplified by the change in political and military leadership, reorganisation at the operational and tactical level (the nature of which was unspecified), the relocation of theatre command to Maiduguri and the COASs’ personal visits to the operational area were considered key

Understanding the Operating Environment: the operational area was defined as Adamawa, Borno, Yobe, Bauchi and Gombe States, with Borno, Adamawa and Yobe alone estimated (why it is still an estimate is curious) at 152,000 square kilometres, with poor infrastructure and limited government involvement. To overcome this, he stated the Army had opened up inaccessible areas through road construction and improved situational awareness by the creation of the Nigerian Army Special Forces School (NASFS), Buni Yadi to conduct pre deployment training for troops about to deploy to the operational area.

Nature and type of conflict: he identified that the nature of the group was peculiar, was very resilient with a loose structure and unconventional tactics

Strategy and tactics employed: he identified strategic changes such as the creation of the theatre command, deployment of Tactical Divisional HQ’s for 3 and 7 Division and the creation of 8 Division, as well as the adjustment of unit boundaries. Operationally he identified the use of IED clearance vehicles and detectors to improve mobility, the creation of a Nigeria Army Aviation unit, the deployment of Motorcycle Battalions and CIMIC activities.

Operational activities have included the deployment of blocking forces (he did not specify where), Special Forces action and mobile clearance operations which had cleared over 200 villages and freed 46,000 abductees

Logistics support: he highlighted the importance of logistics, emergency procurement of arms and equipment and establishment of logistics bases

State of manpower: he stated there had been an improvement in the quality and number of troops deployed, with an increase from 58 to 112 units (he did not specify the type of units, one can assume he means battalions) from July 2015 to date whilst troop numbers had increased from 18, 350 to 36,500 in the same time period. Facilities at the Nigerian Army School of Infantry (NASI) had been improved and expanded to include counter IED, anti ambush, patrols, cordon and search and raids techniques as well as regular troop rotations, medical evacuation, leave passes and prompt payment

Intelligence: he stated that seamless links between operational cells and intelligence were vital and that HUMINT, TECHINT and SIGINT, information from captured enemy, IDPs and escapees were being used to develop an intelligence picture, in addition to the use Nigerian ISR platforms and those of the P3 Partners (USA, UK and France).

Media and information operations: the COAS stated he had implemented a new media policy to better inform the public, using embedded journalists that accompanied senior officers and the increased use of social media

Psychological operations: he stated the Army had targeted hearts and minds through quick impact projects like roads, boreholes and medical outreaches as well as using leaflets to disseminate information.

Respect for human rights: in order to establish respect for human rights he stated that the Department for Civil Military Affairs expanded to include a human rights desk. A Code of Conduct and Rules of Engagement had been developed and distributed to troops and international NGOs such as the ICRC invited in to inspect detention facilities. He also stated they had provided an enabling environment for 69 international NGOs to provide humanitarian assistance

Cooperation with other security agencies: he highlighted the NAF was providing close air support, air interdiction, aerial surveillance, casualty evacuation, air lift and resupply. The Navy had deployed the Nigerian Navy Special Boat Service (NN SBS) to Lake Chad and the provided patrol boats. The police, NSCDC, Immigration and Customs were also identified as having been deployed in Borno and Yobe States

International collaboration: he highlighted joint operations around Lake Chad by the MNJTF, intelligence sharing, training, logistics with others such as the P3, Community of Sahel Saharan States and Islamic Coalition against Terrorism.

Current Situation: he stated that since July 2015, the number of LGA’s in Borno State with a military presence had increased from 4 to 27 (out of 27), as well as parts of Yobe and Adamawa State, 3,133 enemy killed, 5,475 arrested, 32 IED making facilities destroyed, 81 IEDs destroyed, 689 successful ambushed, 1,155 arms captured, 85,349 x rounds of ammunition captured, 100, 852 persons rescued and enemy numbers reduced from approximately 35,000 to 1,500.

Friendly casualties were put at 269 troops had been killed, 524 wounded and 12 missing.

Stabilisation: the COAS concluded by stating that the Army was transitioning into the stabilisation phase, moving from major operations to small scale mop up, clearance operations, moving to highly mobile brigades, a phased draw down of troops, rotation of troops in theatre, the deployment of police and other security agencies and facilitating the restoration of civil administration

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

PART II

Analysis:

The presentation gave out very little information that could not be gleaned from open sources which was disappointing as the COAS schedule of public meetings in the UK, such as the RUSI presentation, the Land Warfare Conference and media appearances were obviously part of a programme of engagement with the international defence and security community to sell the narrative of the ‘technical defeat of Boko Haram’.

Overall it is safe to say that the factors identified correctly led to the technical defeat of Boko Haram, The COAS correctly identified leadership as a key problem at the political, strategic and operational level but he did not expand on what the Army’s strategy was or any particular tactics used, rather he highlighted organisational changes such as boundary adjustments, operational activities such as mobility, the use of blocking forces, special forces and mobile clearance operations without specifying how they functioned in his concept of operations much less identify his intent.

Clarifying those points would also have helped in understanding how CIMIC intelligence, media ops and psyops were being used in the campaign. Each of these areas have shown improvement but it is not clear how they fit into the overall campaign plan beyond a directive from the COAS to improve all these fields.

Logistics was mentioned as important but no details as to what logistical problems they had or if and how they were overcome.

Although the presentation summarised the key points that the COAS needed to get across quite well, the lack of detail and unimaginative delivery did not do justice to this fascinating story of defeat into victory.

More worryingly the brief had no clear picture of the Enemies situation or even an honest appraisal of the current situation for friendly forces, rendering the conclusion about transitioning into Stabilisation Operations slightly suspect.

For a war that is being fought for the people, amongst the people the section on ‘Nature and type of conflict’ was one of the shortest parts of the presentation with little indication of an in depth understanding of the enemy. ‘Understanding the nature of the conflict’ related to problems related to the terrain, with nary a mention of the peculiarities of the physical and human terrain. Even the exact size of Borno, Adamawa and Yobe State were an estimate.

It is unclear if this is because the Army does not wish to share this information or does not have it.

Without a fundamental understanding of the operating environment much less the enemy, their objectives, origins, structure, intent, motivation and capabilities it is impossible to categorically state that that enemy is defeated much less to move into the post conflict stage.

Boko Haram commanders may not have read Mao Tse Tsungs’ treatise Yu Chi Chan (On Guerrilla Warfare) but they have followed it and its Vietnamese variant, which breaks a conflict into 3 flexible stages of Defence (Preparation and Organisation), Equilibrium (Terrorism/ guerrilla warfare) and Offense (Conventional warfare).

In recent months, the enemy has successfully raided Maiduguri, repeatedly ambushed friendly forces in the past few months and launched dozens of suicide bombing attacks against Maiduguri and in Extreme Nord Region Cameroun.

The enemy appears to have a strong presence in the LGA’s around Sambisa Forest such as Jere, Konduga, Damboa and Biu and whilst quiet in the areas around Lake Chad, have not been reduced or defeated.

Raids on villages to steal food, livestock and people have continued unabated

All of this is happening whilst the experienced and combat hardened units are being replaced or completely rotated out.

If one recalls the Maoist dictum ‘The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy stops, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue’ then it’s safe to argue that these actions are not those of a defeated enemy, rather an enemy that is organising and preparing, whilst engaging in terrorism and guerrilla warfare in preparation for an offensive.

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

PART III

Conclusion:

The Nigerian Army is keen to impress a narrative on the world, their foreign partners and within Nigeria that reforms and a change in leadership have been effective and have led to a defeat of Boko Haram.

This narrative is broadly correct however the Army also appears to have drawn the conclusion that the operational defeat of Boko Haram is the same as the strategic defeat of Boko Haram and thus they can transition from major combat operations to stabilisation.

This is clearly contrary to the nature of insurgencies as well as the clear actions of Boko Haram themselves who have accepted their operational defeat as simply part of an extended campaign, in which, they have simply traded space for time, without losing the will or capability to fight or to take the fight to the Army and to its headquarters in Maiduguri.

It is a curious and disappointing that at the stage of the campaign where the Army should be reinforcing success, by flooding the operational area with more troops to hunt down and destroy the weakened remnants of Boko Haram, the Army is in essence declaring victory and withdrawing.

Whilst it remains true that Boko Haram is technically defeated, they will not remain so for long.

 

[Yehuda]

 

[BigMan]

Anthony Bourdain 's recent Trinidad episode featured calinda

Pretty cool

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

Finally! But as you will see, knowledge production lies chiefly in the West ( )
Journal of African Military History  »  Brill Online

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

An American view on China's military base in Djibouti
Here’s why China built that military base in Africa | War College on acast

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

Boko Haram thwarts attempt by the Nigerian government to search for oil in Borno State/Lake Chad region

Boko Haram attack on Nigeria oil team killed more than 50: sources

 

[JahFocus CS]

Gonna see if I can find something about the brehs and brehettes who fought in the Red Summer or were involved with the Panthers or BLA :toure:

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

Gonna see if I can find something about the brehs and brehettes who fought in the Red Summer or were involved with the Panthers or BLA :toure:

If you do, please post it. I'd love to read about it. I'm half-searching for info on the ANC's guerrilla campaigns in the 1970s and 1980s with Umkhonto we Sizwe. If you know anything about that, add to the knowledge breh

 

[The Odum of Ala Igbo]

Horrific tactic for civilians, but it likely stops spies from entering their territory.
@Karbaash

Al-Shabaab militants ban starving Somalis from accessing aid