Osama timeline
We’ve been after him since the Persian gulf war where we set up a permanent military base in Saudi Arabia, also known as the reason bin laden declared war against us. A good decade before 9/11. Osama wasn’t killed until 2011, leaving two decades where Osama and/or the Taliban could have tried your peaceful protest bullshyt route.
Not gonna bother with the rest of your “ignorant” post so have a good one.
You got caught in a bucketfull of lies and ignorance, and in response just lied about one of your statements and ignored the rest?
We have NOT been after bin Laden since the Persian Gulf War, we never once tried to capture him or ask for him to be handed over until 1997. And bullshyt on trying to claim "decades before 2011" since we were explicitly discussing what had occurred before 2001, not before 2011. You made clear that you thought we'd already been after bin Laden for 15-20 years before 9/11 and that numerous Arab nations could have captured or tried him before then.
The reality is that we never tried to capture bin Laden until 1997 and numerous other Muslim nations wanted him just as bad as we did. He wasn't accessible to a single Arab nation at that point, the ONLY Muslim country that could have handed him over during that entire timeframe was Afghanistan.
[from CATO]
"And fourth, almost all countries in the world were eager to cooperate with the United States after the 9/11 shock, and this included two of the very few that had supported the Taliban previously: Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. Moreover, the Saudis had tried for years to get bin Laden, a Saudi renegade, extradited. They appear to have been close in 1998, but the deal fell through after the Americans bombed Afghanistan in response to al‐Qaida attacks on two of its embassies in Africa. However, the Saudis kept up the effort, and two weeks before 9/11 the chief Saudi negotiator had been sacked by the Crown prince because he had failed thus far to get bin Laden.
Given these conditions, the insecure regime in Afghanistan might have been susceptible to international pressure, perhaps even to the point of turning Osama bin Laden and his top associates over to international justice, which is more than the invasion accomplished."
Imagine believing the Taliban were gonna turn over bin Laden just before 9/11.
Why didnt they turn him over during the 15 years prior while he was on the most wanted list for blowing up our embassies?
These same Arab/Muslim nations had 20+ years to take him through their courts.
You live in a straight up delusional world. fukk a monolith, pick ANY Muslim nation to go prosecute him. You act like America hadn't tried to capture him for fukking decades.
You claimed that we had been after bin Laden for decades before 2001 and suggested numerous Muslim nations had refused to hand him over or prosecute him. You even said explicitly that he was on the "most wanted" list for 15 years before 2001. Your ignorance on that point is incredible.
#1: The FBI's most wanted terrorist list wasn't even created until 2001, and Osama was put on it for 9/11, not for the embassy bombings
#2: The Saudis had already tried to get Osama extradited from Afghanistan since at least 97/98 so they could prosecute him themselves
#3: The USA didn't attempt to capture bin Laden or ask anyone else to do so until 1997
#4: Osama didn't declare war on the USA until August 23, 1996 and the ONLY nation he lived in from then on was Afghanistan
#5: Osama was first identified as a potential financier of terrorists and put on the TIPOFF watchlist (the sort of thing that would keep him from getting a US visa) in 1993
This straight from the 9/11 Commission's official report:
Until 1996, hardly anyone in the U.S. government understood that Usama Bin Ladin was an inspirer and organizer of the new terrorism. In 1993, the CIA noted that he had paid for the training of some Egyptian terrorists in Sudan. The State Department detected his money in aid to the Yemeni terrorists who set a bomb in an attempt to kill U.S. troops in Aden in 1992. State Department sources even saw suspicious links with Omar Abdel Rahman, the "Blind Sheikh" in the New York area, commenting that Bin Ladin seemed "committed to financing 'Jihads' against 'anti Islamic' regimes worldwide." After the department designated Sudan a state sponsor of terrorism in 1993, it put Bin Ladin on its TIPOFF watchlist, a move that might have prevented his getting a visa had he tried to enter the United States. As late as 1997, however, even the CIA's Counterterrorist Center continued to describe him as an "extremist financier."
In 1996, the CIA set up a special unit of a dozen officers to analyze intelligence on and plan operations against Bin Ladin. David Cohen, the head of the CIA's Directorate of Operations, wanted to test the idea of having a "virtual station"-a station based at headquarters but collecting and operating against a subject much as stations in the field focus on a country. Taking his cue from National Security Advisor Anthony Lake, who expressed special interest in terrorist finance, Cohen formed his virtual station as a terrorist financial links unit. He had trouble getting any Directorate of Operations officer to run it; he finally recruited a former analyst who was then running the Islamic Extremist Branch of the Counterterrorist Center. This officer, who was especially knowledgeable about Afghanistan, had noticed a recent stream of reports about Bin Ladin and something called al Qaeda, and suggested to Cohen that the station focus on this one individual. Cohen agreed. Thus was born the Bin Ladin unit.
In May 1996, Bin Ladin left Sudan for Afghanistan. A few months later, as the Bin Ladin unit was gearing up, Jamal Ahmed al Fadl walked into a U.S. embassy in Africa, established his bona fides as a former senior employee of Bin Ladin, and provided a major breakthrough of intelligence on the creation, character, direction, and intentions of al Qaeda. Corroborating evidence came from another walk-in source at a different U.S. embassy. More confirmation was supplied later that year by intelligence and other sources, including material gathered by FBI agents and Kenyan police from an al Qaeda cell in Nairobi.
By 1997, officers in the Bin Ladin unit recognized that Bin Ladin was more than just a financier. They learned that al Qaeda had a military committee that was planning operations against U.S. interests worldwide and was actively trying to obtain nuclear material. Analysts assigned to the station looked at the information it had gathered and "found connections everywhere," including links to the attacks on U.S. troops in Aden and Somalia in 1992 and 1993 and to the Manila air plot in the Philippines in 1994-1995.
The Bin Ladin station was already working on plans for offensive operations against Bin Ladin. These plans were directed at both physical assets and sources of finance. In the end, plans to identify and attack Bin Ladin's money sources did not go forward.
In late 1995, when Bin Ladin was still in Sudan, the State Department and the CIA learned that Sudanese officials were discussing with the Saudi government the possibility of expelling Bin Ladin. U.S. Ambassador Timothy Carney encouraged the Sudanese to pursue this course. The Saudis, however, did not want Bin Ladin, giving as their reason their revocation of his citizenship.
Sudan's minister of defense, Fatih Erwa, has claimed that Sudan offered to hand Bin Ladin over to the United States. The Commission has found no credible evidence that this was so. Ambassador Carney had instructions only to push the Sudanese to expel Bin Ladin. Ambassador Carney had no legal basis to ask for more from the Sudanese since, at the time, there was no indictment out-standing.
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
govinfo.library.unt.edu
The Saudis hated him even before we did and had been trying to get him extradited and put on trial for years before 9/11 even happened. The Egyptians hated him long before 9/11 because he tried to assassinate Mubarak. The Sudanese didn't trust him and kicked him out in 1996 to make US and the Saudis happy. There was NO Muslim nation where he was safe other than with the Taliban, and even they had repeatedly asked him to stop directing acts of terrorism if he wanted to remain in safe haven in the country. The combination of the distaste of 9/11 (which they did not support), the fact that he had gone against their requests, and the fact that he was now an existential threat to their country were three clear reasons not to protect him anymore.
And the rest of the Muslim world did NOT want to protect him. Your ignorance on that point is insane. He was absolutely hated by the Saudi monarchy, he was despised by the Egyptian government for trying to assassinate their PM, he had few friends in the Muslim world which is why he was working out of Afghanistan in the first place.
If we had agreed to negotiate there is a very strong possibilty they would have turned him over. Instead we aimed for total war, and of course that hardened the Taliban and eventually other Muslim groups and nations against us. Why are you so clueless as to suggest we didn't have an obvious opportunity in October 2001, when they offered to turn him over, that we didn't have any longer a couple years later?
I hope everyone else can see this and see the combination of how incredibly confident you are in your assertions with how incredibly little you know of the situation. I swear you, Pressure, 88, and wire literally just make shyt up off the top of your head based off narratives and agendas you've heard and have never once attempted to educate yourselves in the slightest on these issues.
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