New WikiLeaked Cables Reveal: How Washington and Big Oil Fought PetroCaribe in Haiti
Kim Ives -
June 1, 2011
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On May 14, 2006, Venezuelan Vice President José Vincente Rangel (right) signed a PetroCaribe accord with newly inaugurated Haitian President René Préval. Credit: Kim Ives/Haïti Liberté
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Version française)
René Préval, who passed Haiti’s presidential sash to Joseph Michel Martelly on May 14, was described by U.S. Ambassador to Haiti Janet Sanderson as “
Haiti’s indispensable man” in a
Jun. 1, 2009 Embassy cable released by WikiLeaks last December.
Sanderson judged him “
still moderately popular, and likely the only politician capable of imposing his will on Haiti – if so inclined.” At the same time,
“dealing with Préval is a challenge, occasionally frustrating and sometimes rewarding,” she continued.
“He is wary of change and suspicious of outsiders, even those who seek his success.”
Préval’s suspicions about “
outsiders” seeking his “
success” turned out to be justified. In two rounds of presidential and legislative elections held in November and March, Washington aggressively intervened, pushing out of the presidential run-off Jude Célestin, the candidate of Préval’s party Inite (Unity), to replace him with Martelly, a neo-Duvalierist
konpa singer who vocally supported the 1991 and 2004 coups d’état against former president Jean-Bertrand Aristide.
Now the U.S. has even challenged the legislative races which would have given Inite virtual control of the Parliament, and hence approval of the President-designated Prime Minister, Haiti’s most powerful executive post. With U.S. support, challenges were brought against Inite victories in 17 Deputy and two Senate races. The Provisional Electoral Council (CEP) ruled in favor of only 15 challenges, leaving four seats with the original Inite winners. The U.S. is not even letting this mild, partial impertinence go, yanking the U.S. travel visas of six of the CEP’s eight members.
How did Haiti’s “
indispensable man” become so dispensable? Why has Washington so brazenly intervened in Haiti’s elections to limit the power of Préval’s party and oust Inite’s presidential candidate from the run-off?
Clues to the answer lie in secret U.S. Embassy cables which the transparency- advocacy group WikiLeaks has provided to
Haïti Liberté. The cables reveal that the U.S. was primarily irked by Préval’s dealings with Cuba and Venezuela, where the former Haitian president was unable “
to resist displaying some show of independence or contrariness in dealing with [Venezuelan president Hugo] Chavez,” as Sanderson griped in a
2007 cable.
U.S. dismay began when Préval signed – the very day of his inauguration – a deal to join Venezuela’s PetroCaribe alliance, under which Haiti would buy oil paying only 60% to Venezuela up front with the remainder payable over 25 years at 1% interest. The leaked U.S. Embassy cables provide a fascinating look at how Washington sought to discourage, scuttle, and sabotage the PetroCaribe deal despite its unquestionable benefits, under which the Haitian government “
would save USD 100 million per year from the delayed payments,” as the Embassy itself recognized in a
2006 cable.
A review of PetroCaribe’s genesis and the Embassy’s response to it provides a window into understanding why the U.S. has been so forceful in backing the U.S.-centric Martelly team over Préval’s two-timing sector.
Venezuelan Trial Balloon Shot Down
Venezuela first offered a PetroCaribe deal to Haiti under the de facto government of Prime Minister Gérard Latortue, whom Washington installed in March 2004 after the Feb. 29 coup against Aristide.
“The government of Venezuela planned to send a negotiating team to Haiti (exact time undetermined) to negotiate a deal to sell oil at a preferential rate via PetroCaribe,”Embassy Chargé d’affaires Timothy Carney (the Charge) reported in
an Oct. 19, 2005 cable.
“Upon returning from a recent trip to Venezuela, Minister of Culture and Communication, Magali Comeau Denis told the Charge she was bringing Venezuelan oil back to Haiti with her.”
Prior to that trip, Carney “
and Econ Counselor [his economic counselor] had spoken to acting Prime Minister Henri Bazin who said that the Interim Government of Haiti [IGOH] was looking for concessional terms for oil purchases from Mexico and Nigeria –but not Venezuela, he was quick to emphasize,” Carney continued. “
In a follow-up conversation, Charge reiterated the negatives of such a deal with Venezuela. Bazin listened and understood the message,” that Washington would be unhappy about any oil deal with Venezuela.
U.S. dismay began when Préval signed – the very day of his inauguration – a deal to join Venezuela’s PetroCaribe alliance
To drive the point home, “
Econ Counselor met with a contact at the Finance Ministry October 13 who confirmed that the IGOH has no plans to participate in any PetroCaribe deal,” Carney explained. “
He added that our message to Bazin had an impact: Bazin had seen a draft of comments to be made by Haiti’s representative to the IMF [International Monetary Fund] that included a vague reference to someday purchasing oil at concessional prices from Venezuela, and Bazin had the sentence deleted, the only change he made on the text.” This was the kind of ultra-servile response Washington expected from a puppet regime in Haiti.
But Carney understood that Venezuela had not really expected to strike a deal with Latortue’s de facto government.
“We suspect that the recent efforts by Venezuela here are designed more to get the issue on the agenda, and that Chavez’s strongest efforts will come after the elections, when a new Haitian government is inaugurated in February 2006,” Carney concluded.
In
a Nov. 7, 2005 cable, Carney noted that
“the pressure is still on the IGOH to strike a deal with Venezuela” as
“organizations that have organized demonstrations in the past against high prices in Haiti have publicly called on the IGOH to accept Venezuela’s offer to negotiate on a concessional deal.” However Bazin reassured the Embassy that
“Haiti was far from any agreement with Venezuela” and
“instead discussions were ongoing with the Government of Mexico to obtain a special deal from them on petroleum imports.”(Dominican Foreign Minister Morales Troncoso told the DR’s U.S. Ambassador and visiting Western Hemisphere Affairs Deputy Assistant Secretary Patrick Duddy that
“President Fox of Mexico was proposing a ‘Plan Puebla Panama’ to counter Chavez’s ‘Petrocaribe’,” reported a
Jan. 23, 2006 cable from the Santo Domingo Embassy.)
As Préval Comes In, Troubles Emerge
Haiti’s presidential election did not take place until Feb. 7, 2006, and it was won by René Préval. Even before his May 14, 2006 inauguration, Préval clearly was anxious to allay Washington’s worries that he might lean towards its South American challengers.
“He wants to bury once and for all the suspicion in Haiti that the United States is wary of him,” Ambassador Sanderson, then newly appointed, reported in
a Mar. 26, 2006 cable.
“He is seeking to enhance his status domestically and internationally with a successful visit to the United States.” This was so important that
“Préval has declined invitations to visit France, Cuba, and Venezuela in order to visit Washington first,” Sanderson approvingly noted.
The new Haitian president went to great lengths to dispel the notion that he had any political sympathies for Latin America’s socialist regimes.
“Préval has close personal ties to Cuba, having received prostate cancer treatment there, but has stressed to the Embassy that he will manage relations with Cuba and Venezuela solely for the benefit of the Haitian people, and not based on any ideological affinity toward those governments.”
But in April, shortly after his Washington visit, Préval traveled to Havana; the result confirmed Washington’s fears.
“President-elect Préval announced to the press April 18 that Haiti will soon join Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’s energy initiative, PetroCaribe,” Sanderson reported in an
April 19, 2006 cable.
“Préval made the announcement after returning from a five-day trip to Cuba, where he discussed the subject of Petrocaribe with the Venezuelan Ambassador to Cuba.” But Sanderson made clear that the Embassy – her Post – would not give up without a fight.
“Post will continue to pressure Préval against joining PetroCaribe,” she wrote.
“Ambassador will see Préval’s senior advisor Bob Manuel today. In previous meetings, he has acknowledged our concerns and is aware that a deal with Chavez would cause problems with us.”
In
a cable nine days later, Sanderson recognized that Préval was under
“increasing pressure to produce immediate and tangible changes in Haiti’s desperate situation.” She also noted that
“Préval has privately expressed some disdain toward Chavez with Emboffs [Embassy officials], and delayed accepting Chavez’ offer to visit Venezuela until after he had visited Washington and several other key Haitian partners. Nevertheless, the chance to score political points [with the Haitian people] and generate revenue he can control himself proved too good an opportunity to miss.”
Embassy cables always flag “
independence” as this one decried Préval’s being able to “
generate revenue he can control himself .” Sanderson went on to warn that Préval could “
redirect the 40% that would have been spent on fuel to ‘special presidential’ development projects” and “
we are wary of the creation of a special presidential fund…. We will encourage Préval to channel the money through existing programs,” meaning those which the State Department’s U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) had funded and therefore controlled.
In the April 2006 cable, we see Sanderson hint at an observation that she would make almost a year later, that
“Préval and company may be overselling their irritation toward Chavez for our benefit, but Préval has consistently voiced wariness of Chavez in conversations with Emboffs going back to the early stages of the presidential campaign in 2005.”
it would be almost two years before PetroCaribe oil would begin flowing into Haiti, due to a myriad of political and logistical obstacles.
On the surface, Préval feigned ignorance of the hemispheric conflict between the U.S. and Venezuela. “
One journalist asked Préval when he returned from Caracas if there would be ‘consequences’ for Haiti building links with Venezuela, which Washington increasingly sees as a regional threat,” wrote the weekly
Haïti Progrés in May 2006.
“‘The problems between the United States and Venezuela are problems that those two countries have to resolve themselves,’ Préval responded. ‘It does not affect Haiti in any way.’”
This was obviously untrue. In
a May 15, 2006 cable reviewing the now inaugurated president, Sanderson noted that “
despite U.S. discomfort with his links to Cuba and Venezuela, Préval seems determined to mine those relationships for what he can obtain.” This “
pragmatism,” as she called it, would become the nub of U.S. dissatisfaction with Préval.
ediately at the US Geological Survey’s website where earthquakes are recorded and reported instantly. There it was, information on an earthquake at 8:11 pm in Ti Port de Paix, Haiti with shock waves emanating from the town in the north of Haiti that reached both archipelagos.
