Essential The Official Contemporary Haitian Geopolitics/Event thread

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Enter Hugo Chavez
In a Feb. 7, 2007 cable, Ambassador Sanderson reports that the Embassy learned from the Haitian media on Feb. 2 “that Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez planned to visit Haiti as early as the following week.” She recalled that in March, 2006, prior to his inauguration, “President Préval told visiting [Western Hemisphere Affairs Assistant Secretary of State] WHA A/S Shannon that Chavez was pushing a visit to commemorate the bicentennial of Venezuelan flag day on March 12 in Jacmel” but that “Préval told A/S Shannon he would do his best to avoid Chavez, and the visit did not occur. Since Préval’s inauguration, however, Haitian-Venezuelan relations have warmed considerably… Haitian officials report that Chavez continues to aggressively court Haiti.

Indeed, Hugo Chavez arrived in Haiti on Mar. 12, 2007 to an unorganized, spontaneous hero’s welcome by tens of thousands of Haitians, who jogged alongside his motorcade to the Palace from the airport. And the Venezuelan president came bearing many gifts.

First, Chavez pledged a $20 million grant, which he had announced in Venezuela a week earlier. “Reportedly, the money will serve as humanitarian reserve fund for Haiti in order to back social, infrastructure and power-supply programs,” Sanderson noted in a Mar. 13 cable.

rene-preval-and-hugo-chavez.jpg

Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez (right) and his Haitian counterpart Rene Preval attend a welcome ceremony at Miraflores palace in Caracas April 24, 2006. Preval was in Caracas for talks on launching Petrocaribe in Haiti.
Next, Venezuelan Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Rodolfo Sanz had in January “announced a Venezuelan donation of five garbage trucks and one tanker as part of ‘operation pure air for Haiti,’ which he attributed to Chavez’ earlier remarks to GoH officials that Venezuela owed a ‘historic debt to Haiti,’“Sanderson had noted in a February cable. Chavez “re-announced his donations of garbage trucks to Haiti,” Sanderson’s Mar. 13 cable reported.

Thirdly, “the Venezuela president said he would augment the amount of fuel Haiti will receive through PetroCaribe from 5,000 barrels [in reality, 6,000] a day to 14,000 barrels,” Sanderson continued, surpassing Haiti’s daily fuel consumption of 11,000 barrels.

Finally, the icing on the cake: “Venezuela pledged funds for improvement to provincial Haitian airports and airport runways (also previously announced) and experts on economic planning to help identify development priorities. Other pledges include Cuban commitment to bring medical coverage to all Haitian communes, Cuban and Venezuelan electrical experts to improve energy generation, and a trilateral cooperation bureau in Port-au-Prince,” Sanderson wrote.

Somehow, Sanderson had to give all this good news a negative spin. She did so with her SBU “Comment” at the cable’s end: “[Former long-time USAID employee and now presidential economic counselor] Gabriel Verret, one of Préval’s closest advisors, told the Ambassador that the trip could have been worse. The GoH stopped a rally that was supposed to take place in favor of Chavez and tried to limit Chavez’ speaking time at the press conference. While waiting at the airport, Verret had let the Ambassador know that he (and presumably the President) were frustrated with Chavez’ late arrival. Overall, disorganization and last-minute planning were evident, and even the pledges of aid and assistance are either old news or vague. GoH officials have complained to post privately in the past that Venezuelan aid can be a burden [on] the GoH…”

But Sanderson’s real vitriol would come in her next cable on Mar. 16. She was beginning to suspect (and imply) that the Haitians were feeding her Embassy negative reports about Chavez disingenuously, but she wanted Washington to be the final judge. “To hear President Rene Préval tell it, Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez’ visit to Haiti on March 12 was a logistical nightmare and an annoyance to the GoH,” Sanderson begins the “Summary” of that cable. “Préval told Ambassador and others that he is skeptical of Chavez’s promises, especially on delivery of gasoline through the Petrocaribe agreement. Secretary General of the Presidency Fritz Longchamps told Polcouns that the GoH viewed the Chavez visit as the price to pay for whatever assistance Venezuela provides to Haiti.

Sanderson highlighted the Haitian government’s negative feedback. “Préval told Ambassador the evening of March 13 that Chavez was a difficult guest” and “did not have a GOH invitation but insisted on coming to mark Venezuelan flag day.” Préval then did his best to smooth Sanderson’s ruffled feathers. “Responding to Ambassador’s observation that giving Chavez a platform to spout anti-American slogans here was hard to explain given our close relationship and support of Haiti and of Préval’s government in particular, Préval stressed that he had worked hard to stop much of Chavez’ proposed grandstanding,” Sanderson wrote. “He vetoed a Chavez-led procession/demonstration from the airport to the Venezuelan Embassy (substituting a wreath laying at Port-au-Prince’s monument to Bolivar) and limited the length of the press conference. Chavez, for his part, insisted that the press conference proceed as scheduled, thus cutting into bilateral meeting time. Préval added that he, Préval, is ‘just an independent petit bourgeoisie’ and doesn’t go for the grand gestures that Chavez favors. Haiti needs aid from all its friends, Préval added, and he is sure that the US understands his difficult position.

Préval then addressed the massive show of support Chavez received. “He refused to get out of the car when Chavez insisted on greeting his demonstrators in the street on his way in from the airport,” Sanderson relayed. “Préval and others in the government believe that the Venezuelan Charge d’Affaires orchestrated and paid for the demonstrations by Fanmi Lavalas militants at the airport, the Venezuelan Embassy, and the Palace, which numbered roughly 1,000 and also called for the return of former President Aristide.” (This absurd account, whether concocted for Washington’s benefit or not, is scoffed at by several popular organization leaders who joined with thousands in the rapidly organized and largely spontaneous unpaid outpouring that day, similar to the human flood which greeted Aristide’s return to Haiti on Mar. 18, 2011.)

But despite the complaints of Haitian officials, Sanderson speculates that “Préval and company may be overselling their irritation toward Chavez for our benefitIt is clear that the visit has left a bad taste in our interlocutors’ mouths and they are now into damage control.”

So Sanderson felt compelled to read the Haitians the riot act. “The Ambassador and Polcouns have voiced concern to senior officials that Chavez had used his visit as a platform for an attack on Haiti’s closest and steadiest bilateral ally, most recently with [Prime Minister Jacques Edouard] Alexis yesterday,” she wrote, ending characteristically on a rationalizing note: “At no time has Préval given any indication that he is interested in associating Haiti with Chavez’s broader ‘revolutionary agenda’” but “it is neither in his character — nor in his calculation — to repudiate Chavez, even as the Venezuelan abuses his hospitality at home.”
 

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Préval Continues to Play “Oblivious”…
Despite his hand-wringing and Sanderson’s scoldings, Préval kept angering the Americans. On April 26, 2007, Longchamps told the Embassy’s Political Counselor that “Préval will attend the ALBA [Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas] summit in Venezuela as a ‘special observer’ for the express purpose of finalizing a tri-lateral assistance agreement between Haiti, Venezuela, and Cuba, whereby Venezuela will finance the presence of Cuban doctors and other technicians in rural Haiti,” wrote Sanderson in a cable the same day. “Longchamps expressed surprise that the USG [U.S. Government] would take issue with Préval’s attendance at this meeting.” Longchamps reminded the Polcouns “how President Préval had curtailed Chavez’ activities during the visit and how uncomfortable Chavez’ behavior had made everyone during his stay.” Unimpressed, “Polcouns replied that though that may have been the case, for the USG, the net result was that President Préval gave Chavez another platform from which to attack the United States and then saw him off from the airport,” and that Washington “did not understand why he continued to participate in fora where Chavez vilified Haiti’s most important and reliable bi-lateral partner. USG officials would ask President Préval this question during his upcoming trip to Washington in May.

Sanderson said the meeting was “specifically to raise our displeasure with Préval’s Venezuela trip” and that “Longchamps’ reaction probably reflects Préval’s own obliviousness to the impact and consequences his accommodation of Chavez has on relations with us.” Longchamps “betrayed a common trait among Haitian officials in misjudging the relative importance that U.S. policy makers attach to Haiti versus Venezuela and Chavez’ regional impact.” Sanderson suggested the U.S. “convey our discontent with Préval’s actions at the highest possible level when he next visits Washington.

…While Getting More Aid from Venezuela
Préval returned from Caracas with “Chavez’ promises to provide a combined total of 160 megawatts of electricity” to Haiti, after “parading with Chavez’ rogues gallery of ALBA leaders,” Sanderson fumes in a May 4, 2007 cable.

She outlined the essence of the Venezuelan/Cuban aid package: “The Cubans will replace two million light bulbs throughout Port-au-Prince with low-energy bulbs. The initiative will cost USD four million, but save the country 60 megawatts of electricity, which costs the country USD 70 million annually. Venezuela promised to repair the power plant in Carrefour, generating an additional 40 megawatts of electricity. Additionally, Venezuela will by December of this year build new power plants across the country to add 30 megawatts to Port-au-Prince’s electrical grid and 15 additional megawatts each for Gonaïves and Cap-Haitian, all of which will use heavy Venezuelan fuel oil, a more efficient and less-expensive alternative to diesel.” Venezuela did carry through on all these “extravagant promises and commitments,” as Sanderson called them. Chavez also “promised to build a petrochemical complex, a natural gas plant, and an oil refinery to refine the crude sent from Venezuela.” Those are still under construction but almost finished.

On May 4, Sanderson sent a second cable explaining that Lecorps “gave the four oil companies operating in Haiti until July 1 to sign the GoH contract on Petrocaribe,” hoping that they “will sign the agreement voluntarily, instead of passing legislation obliging oil companies operating in Haiti to participate in the Petrocaribe agreement.” After talking to ExxonMobil Caribbean Sales Manager Bill Eisner, the Embassy reported that Eisner “was shocked when he realized that Lecorps expected the oil industry to coordinate the PetroCaribe deal on behalf of the GoH” which would “make the oil industry prisoner to two incompetent governments,” Haiti and Venezuela, in Sanderson’s words.

Meanwhile, Préval continued trying to bluff Sanderson that things were not so rosy with the Venezuelans, this time sending Senate President Joseph Lambert to deliver the spin. Lambert “described a ‘very tense’ atmosphere behind the scenes of the ALBA summit between President Préval and President Chavez in a meeting with Embassy staff on May 4,” Sanderson’s Public Affairs Officer James Ellickson-Brown reported in a May 7 cable. “According to Lambert, Préval refused to join ALBA and told Chavez that if ALBA membership were a condition for Venezuelan aid, he would leave the summit,” he wrote. “Lambert added that Préval and Chavez also clashed over drug-trafficking, diplomatic representation, what to wear to the summit’s closing ceremony (Chavez wanted everyone in red), and the terms of the energy agreement Chavez offered Haiti.” Lambert said that “Préval would never do anything to compromise relations with his ‘friends to the North’” and that Chavez “complained that for all the he gives to Haiti, the Haitians give nothing in return.” Lambert trumpeted that “Préval’s resistance to signing the ALBA accords so upset Chavez that the Cubans tried to get Préval to play along,” but “Préval stood firm, in the end agreeing only to a ‘very general’ cooperation agreement.

The Americans clearly felt Lambert’s report was a little fishy, prompting the Political Counselor to ask “why Préval had not shared some of this with the Ambassador during their meeting,” Ellickson-Brown wrote. “Lambert replied that Préval would be uncomfortable revealing details regarding such a sensitive subject.

Despite the Embassy’s misgivings, Sanderson chose to take Lambert at his word when reporting to Washington on May 24, just prior to Préval’s trip there to meet President Bush. She said that Préval “appears to be losing patience: Lambert told Emboffs [Embassy officers] that Préval took an anti-ALBA stance during private meetings with Chavez at the ALBA summit in April, telling Chavez he can keep his aid if ALBA membership is a condition.” She judged that Préval was coming to the realization that “seeing is believing when it comes to promises from Venezuela, and Chavez’ words are empty until he arrives with cash in hand.

Perhaps this generous appraisal explains why Bush administration officials were so nice to their wayward ally when Préval visited Washington a few days later. “Préval was very pleased with the reception he received from President Bush, Secretary Rice, other USG officials and members of Congress,” Sanderson reported in a May 29 cable, and he “was neither surprised nor taken aback by President Bush’s concerns regarding Haitian-Venezuelan relations.” Nonetheless, “Préval’s visit appears to have underlined for the delegation the importance of the Haiti-U.S. partnership and their need to cultivate Washington decision-makers,” Sanderson reported, while expressing “hope that President Bush’s clear message on Venezuela sank in, but only time will tell.
 

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“Stonewalling” of PetroCaribe Continues
Two weeks after Préval’s return, a transport strike on June 12 and 13, 2007 “gripped Haiti’s major cities and underscored a mounting crisis over fuel prices, which rose nearly 20% in just two weeks,” the IPS reported. Many in Haiti believed that Haiti’s joining PetroCaribe “would alleviate high gasoline costs,” and word was leaking out that “the two large US oil companies that export to Haiti are said to have stonewalled negotiations” for PetroCaribe’s implementation. The July 1 deadline for PetroCaribe compliance was fast approaching.

Negotiations between the GOH and fuel vendors operating in Haiti to implement the PetroCaribe agreement with Venezuela remain stalled,” Ambassador Sanderson begins a Jul. 20 cable. Oil company “representatives seem to accept that the government may eventually force them to accept PetroCaribe terms, but in the near term, they appear to hold most of the negotiating cards” because “in light of Haiti’s weak infrastructure and precarious distribution system, the departure of any of the four companies from the market could severely disrupt the supply of gasoline throughout the country.

Préval strictly paid his oil bills, despite having to borrow money from the PetroCaribe fund following the disastrous events of September 2008

The stand-off over PetroCaribe would continue throughout the rest of 2007 with Chevron the most resistant to working within the PetroCaribe framework. But Haiti needed Chevron to ship the oil from Venezuela.

It was ridiculous because they had been buying and shipping petroleum products from Venezuela for 25 years,” said Michael Lecorps when asked by Haïti Liberté last week why Chevron put up such a fight. “And you know, Chevron is an American company, so maybe there were some politics behind that too, maybe because of Venezuela and Chavez. But they never said anything about that.

Indeed, the cables suggest that Lecorps’ suspicions that Chevron had a political beef are correct. After returning to Haiti on Dec. 22, 2007 from a PetroCaribe summit, Préval announced the negotiations with Chevron were nearing a close. “We’re going to sign with Chevron and then we’re going to start ordering oil,” he said at the airport, reported the AP, adding that Venezuelan technicians would visit Haiti to consult on the project. But “Chevron management in the U.S. does not want to make a lot of ‘noise’ about the agreement because they do not want to appear to support PetroCaribe,” Sanderson explained in a Feb. 15, 2008 cable. The AP also reported that “Chevron officials at the company’s San Ramon, California, headquarters did not respond to requests for comment.

Sanderson explained that the deal was sealed when “Chevron finally obtained its desired terms from the GOH” whereby the Venezuelan state-owned oil company Petroleum of Venezuela, Inc. or PDVSA “will sell to the GoH, which will then sell to private oil traders, who finally will sell to the oil companies in Haiti for distribution… Chevron also agreed to ship the refined petrol on one of its tankers. The GoH expects to receive a PetroCaribe shipment in late February or early March.

And PetroCaribe shipments, covering all of Haiti’s fuel needs, did begin on March 8, 2008, marking a victory for Venezuela and Haiti in surmounting the roadblocks thrown up by the U.S. Embassy and oil companies.

Préval strictly paid his oil bills, despite having to borrow money from the PetroCaribe fund following the disastrous events of September 2008, when four tropical storms slammed Haiti in as many weeks. “The Sixth PetroCaribe Summit in St. Kitts on June 12 [2009] congratulated Haiti as the ‘best payer’ out of [PetroCaribe’s] 13 countries, having paid approximately USD 220 million to Venezuela,” reported Tighe in a June 19, 2009 cable. “As of April 30, Haiti’s PetroCaribe account (after Haiti’s withdrawal of USD 197 million for its emergency response to the 2008 hurricanes), had a balance of USD 58.5 million. On May 27, the Government of Haiti (GOH) announced that its total fuel imports under PetroCaribe, since the first shipment was received in March 2008, amounts to approximately USD 489 million. Haiti’s long-term debt, payable over 17 to 25 years, amounts to approximately USD 240 million.

Tighe also reported that Chavez renewed his pledge, made at the July 2008 PetroCaribe Summit, to construct an oil refinery in Haiti. “Lecorps put its capacity at 20,000 bpd [barrels per day] and the cost at USD 400 million,” Tighe wrote. He also noted that although Haiti was not an ALBA member, “a tripartite (Haiti-Venezuela-Cuba) energy cooperation agreement is waiting to be ratified by Parliament” whose “purpose is to decide how 10% of funds from Haiti’s PetroCaribe revenue would be spent on social programs in Haiti.

Tighe continued: “Lecorps stated that PetroCaribe ‘…is very good for the country.’ He noted that Venezuelan-financed electricity generating plants are operating in Port-au-Prince [30 megawatts], Gonaïves and Cap Haïtien [15 megawatts each] and have led to longer hours of power in those areas. Haiti receives shipments of PetroCaribe fuel every two weeks… Lecorps asserted that Haiti is satisfied with the PetroCaribe agreement and that it should not be ‘politicized.’”

But politicized it was, and Tighe sounded the alarm, concluding: “In addition to three power plants already in operation and promises to modernize the airport in Cap Haïtien, Venezuela’s oil refinery project… would expand Venezuelan and Cuban influence in Haiti.

Aftermath of a Struggle
Haiti’s Parliament did ratify the Tripartite agreement between Haiti, Venezuela and Cuba in late 2009, and in October 2009, Dinasa acquired Chevron’s assets and operations in Haiti, which included 58 service centers, the country’s largest gas station network. Shell Oil tankers now transport the PDVSA oil from Venezuela to Haiti, Lecorps told Haïti Liberté.

Under the current PetroCaribe terms, Haiti pays up front 40% to 70% of the value of the petroleum products it imports from Venezuela – asphalt, 91 and 95 octane gas, heavy fuel oil (mazout), diesel and kerosene – with the remaining 60% to 30% paid over 25 years, with a two year grace period, at an annual interest rate of 1%.

The U.S. Embassy’s campaign against the South-South cooperation represented by PetroCaribe – which provides such obvious benefits for Haiti – reveal the ugly nature and true intentions of “Haiti’s most important and reliable bi-lateral partner,” as Sanderson calls the U.S.

Préval and his officials employed a preferred form of Haitian resistance, which dates back to slavery, known as “marronage,” where one pretends to go along with something but then does the opposite surreptitiously. The U.S. got wise to this tactic and began to doubt Préval’s reliability. This is why Washington moved so forcefully to see that Martelly and his crew of pro-American Haitian businessmen were put in power.

So now we may see a marked shift in Haiti’s political direction. Instead of Préval, who tried to walk the battle-line between Washington and the ALBA alliance, we find a pro-coup, long-time Miami resident in power who makes no secret of his antipathy towards Haiti’s “stinking” masses, as he described them in a YouTube video.

We have been on the wrong road for the past 25 years,” Martelly recently declared, placing Haiti’s wrong turn, in his opinion, at about the time of the U.S.-backed Duvalier dictatorship’s fall and the emergence of the democratic nationalist movement that became know as the Lavalas. Martelly had a pre-inauguration meeting not with Venezuela’s Foreign Minister, but with that of Colombia, whose development plan he has said he will emulate.

His reception by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, after his highly controversial and fraud-marred election, was exceedingly warm.

All of this augurs woe for Cuban and Venezuelan projects in Haiti, and possibly for the PetroCaribe agreement, despite its tremendous and evident contribution to the Haitian people’s welfare.
 

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Haitians Want to Know What the Government Has Done with Missing Oil Money
Haitians Want to Know What the Government Has Done with Missing Oil Money
This past summer in Haiti was one of the hottest I can remember. My husband and I and our two daughters visited my mother-in-law in a small town in the country’s south, where we spent the long, scorching days showing our U.S.-born niece, who was in Haiti for the first time, the sights, and watching World Cup soccer games in the back yard of a neighbor who happened to have a television and was charging people the equivalent of a quarter to watch each game.

The World Cup was an obsession in our area, as it was in the rest of Haiti, where the Brazilian team is a perennial favorite. There were Brazilian flags everywhere—on cars, motorcycles, and homes—not because Brazil had led minustah, the multibillion-dollar, decade-long United Nations peacekeeping debacle in Haiti, or because thousands of Haitians had migrated to Brazil during the past decade, but because most Haitians claim Brazil’s soccer team as their own and were hoping that the team would win its sixth World Cup in the last sixty years.

Alas, it was not to be. On July 6th, we drove to the home of a family friend in Port Salut, a beautiful coastal town about thirty miles from where we were staying, to watch Brazil face Belgium in the quarter-finals. So many of our friend’s neighbors had come to watch the game that he pitched a makeshift tent in front of his house to accommodate us all. When the match ended and Brazil lost, scoring only one goal to Belgium’s two, the young woman sitting next to me began sobbing. I thought she was a superfan who was overcome with grief at the loss, but as she rocked herself she said, “What am I going to do with all the merchandise?” She’d been hoping that the Brazilian team would make it to the finals, she said, and had got a high-interest loan to buy Brazil jerseys, flags, and bracelets to sell. Now the items would be practically worthless, and she was deep in debt. Her anguish was a reminder that the fate of some of the poorest people in Haiti is linked to factors far beyond their control.

Port Salut felt like a graveyard when we left it that evening, and not just because of the disappointment over the World Cup. During Brazil’s final match, the Haitian government had announced that, in order to insure that the country would qualify for low-interest loans from the International Monetary Fund, it was substantially raising the price of gasoline and diesel. Even the price of kerosene, which was used to light most homes in the Haitian countryside, was going up by fifty-one per cent.

We only heard the news on the drive back to my mother-in-law’s, when we began receiving messages from family members and friends advising us to get off the roads to avoid running into roadblocks that had been erected in protest. We encountered nearly a dozen on the way, most of them made from piles of rocks and flaming tires and being guarded by anxious young men. At a back-road riverbed—a last-resort detour—a young moto-taxi-driver, explaining why he and his friends would not let us through, detailed how the sudden gas hike would chip away at the life they were struggling to build for themselves and their families. “We want a future, but they keep snatching it away,” he said.

Twenty-four hours later, the government announced that it was reversing its decision on the gas hike. Days of nationwide protests followed nonetheless. Haiti’s President, Jovenel Moïse, made sometimes scolding and sometimes pleading speeches on television. His Prime Minister resigned. A new government was formed. But a lingering flame of anger remained. Or, at least, rekindled.

In October of 2017, a Haitian Senate report detailed how, between 2008 and 2016, funds that had been accumulated through Haiti’s participation in Venezuela’s oil-purchasing program, Petrocaribe, were misused, misappropriated, or embezzled by government officials and their cronies in the private sector. The Petrocaribe agreement, which Haiti signed in 2006, allowed the Haitian government to buy oil from Venezuela, pay sixty per cent of the purchase price within ninety days, and then defer the rest of the debt, at a one-per-cent interest rate, over twenty-five years. This debt has grown to almost two billion dollars over the past decade. The Haitian government controlled the sale of the oil and was supposed to use those funds for social and development projects, including sanitation and health, at a time when ten thousand Haitians had been killed and nearly a million had been affected by a cholera epidemicthat was introduced by the United Nations. The funds were also supposed to be used to build infrastructure and grow the agricultural sector—the supposed specialty of Moïse, who had nicknamed himself Nèg Bannann, or Banana Man, during his Presidential campaign. The funds could have been used, too, for education, one of the stated priorities of Moïse’s predecessor, Michel Martelly, whose government added a dollar-and-fifty-cent surcharge on each money transfer to Haiti from abroad to finance free and universal education. (These funds, totalling millions of dollars a year, remain mostly unaccounted for.)

The pilfering of the Petrocaribe funds has been a concern in Haiti for years, but it wasn’t until this summer, when the writer and filmmaker Gilbert Mirambeau, Jr., tweeted a photo showing himself blindfolded like a kidnapping victim, holding a handwritten cardboard sign reading “Kot Kòb Petwo Karibe a???” (“Where is the Petrocaribe money???”), that these grievances began spreading widely online. #KotKòbPetwoKaribea became a popular hashtag, and other Haitians posted images of themselves inspired by Mirambeau’s. Anti-corruption street protests became larger and more frequent, culminating in massive demonstrations on Wednesday in cities in Haiti and in the diaspora. In Port-au-Prince, there were reports of two deaths and clashes with police.

I attended a march of around a hundred people in Miami’s Little Haiti neighborhood, where, between chants of “Where’s the money?” and “Catch the thieves,” the protest leaders were already talking about their next outing, on November 18th. That date will mark the two hundred and fifteenth anniversary of the Battle of Vertières, the last major conflict fought before Haiti won its independence from France, under the leadership of, among others, the Haitian founding father Jean-Jacques Dessalines, whose death was also being remembered on Wednesday.

In a commemorative speech delivered near the site where Dessalines was assassinated, Moïse made empty promises about fighting corruption at the highest levels of power. But it seems highly unlikely that his government will perform a satisfactory investigation into the missing Petrocaribe funds—a probe that could implicate himself, his predecessor, and their friends and colleagues. It seems equally unlikely that Haitians will stop asking, on social media and in the streets, “Kot kòb Petrocaribe a?”—“Where’s the Petrocaribe money?”
 

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This has been mentioned before, but this ties into the riots that occurred because of the rise in gas prices.

Haitian Workers Fight for Higher Minimum Wage Suppressed by Clinton's State Department

According to memos obtained by Wikileaks in 2008 and 2009, the U.S. State Department blocked a proposal to increase the minimum wage in Haiti.


Clothing factories in an industrial park in Haiti's capital were closed Friday and have remained shut for three days as thousands of garment workers have taken to the streets demanding a raise in the minimum wage.

RELATED:
Haiti Announces Fuel Price Increases to Help Public Finances

Nearly 18,000 factory workers employed in factories in Caracol Industrial Park are fighting for social benefits like food subsidies, transport, and construction of social housing as well as the wage increase.

Amid a depreciating currency and the rising cost of living, the Haitian workers said that with their current wages, they were unable to support their families. A Friday protest which first shuttered the factories occurred days after a significant increase in the price of gasoline.

According to memos obtained by Wikileaks in 2008 and 2009, the U.S. State Department blocked a proposal for minimum wage increase in Haiti.
"In 2009, while Bill Clinton was setting up one of the family’s shell companies in New York, in that same year Hillary Clinton was at the State Department working with U.S. corporations to pressure Haiti not to raise the minimum wage to 61 cents an hour from 24 cents," Lee Camp, an activist of RT’s Redacted Tonight told PolitiFact.

The memos show that U.S. embassy officials in Haiti opposed the wage hike and met multiple times with factory owners who lobbied against it to the Haitian president.


"It's gotten to the point where I can't take care of my son. I don't see any future in this," said Esperancia Mernavil, a garment worker who belongs to the Gosttra union, told the AP.

Workers are demanding 800 Haitian gourdes per eight-hour work day, that roughly amounts to US$12.47 per day. They now earn 300 gourdes, or US$4.67.

According to AP, the industrialists and government officials met in the Port-au-Prince park, amid heavy police presence. The Social Affairs and Work Minister, Roosevelt Bellevue said Monday that the government will sit down with all sides but "we can't put up the minimum salary that much," AP reported.

"We have to be competitive with other places," Bellevuea added, saying that he expected the factories to reopen Tuesday.

RELATED:
Haiti Stands Up to US, Rejects OAS 'Coup' Attempt Against Venezuela

The workers fought for years to move the wage to US$5 per day or 61 cents per hour. But still, no matter how many hours Haitian women work at the sweatshops in Haiti, they cannot afford to pay for shelter, transportation, food and their children's schooling, with the high inflation and high price of gas and cost of living.

In 2008, when the Haitian Parliament started discussing doubling or tripling the daily minimum wage of 70 Haitian gourdes to keep up with inflation, roughly amounting to US$1.75 a day or about 22 cents per hour, the Wikileaks cables show that the U.S. Embassy officials started monitoring the minimum wage during the same period.

In 2009, lawmakers voted to more than double Haiti's minimum wage for the workers in the country's apparel factories, from about US$1.75 a day to roughly US$3.75 a day. In 2014, Haiti raised its minimum wage to US$5.11.


During 2008 and 2009, the U.S. embassy officials told Washington that a hike would hurt the economy and undermine U.S. trade preference legislation, known as the Haitian Hemispheric Opportunity through Partnership Encouragement Act of 2006. According to the HOPE legislation, the garments manufactured on the island will have duty-free access to the U.S. markets. HOPE benefits corporate giants such as Levi Strauss, Haneswear, Nautica, and Dockers.

In 2011, nearly 2000 Wikileaks cables made available to the Nation and Haiti Liberte, a weekly newspaper in Port-au-Prince, also concluded that the "U.S. Embassy in Haiti worked closely with factory owners contracted by Levi’s, Hanes, and Fruit of the Loom to aggressively block a paltry minimum wage increase."
 

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Chile sends 176 Haitian migrants home on criticized 'humanitarian flight'

3 MIN READ

By Aislinn Laing and Natalia A. Ramos Miranda




Haitians disembark from a Chilean Air Force plane as they return from Chile, upon their arrival at the International Airport of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, November 7, 2018. REUTERS/Andres Martinez Casares


(Reuters) - Chile returned a planeload of Haitian immigrants to their native country on Wednesday in the first in a series of “humanitarian flights” criticized by migrant groups as “forced deportations.”

At a Santiago sports center, 176 people gathered to board coaches for the airport and a Chilean air force flight destined for the Haitian capital Port-au-Prince.

A total of 1,087 people have signed up for the flights back to Haiti, the Chilean interior ministry said in a statement.


Around 150,000 Haitians have immigrated to Chile in the past Chile in the past two years, it said
The initiative is one of several measures by the center-right government of President Sebastian Pinera to cut migrant numbers.
It requires those leaving to sign a declaration that they will not return for nine years, and asks they take any immediate family with them.

The government said the policy was aimed at those who had struggled to find work in one of Latin America’s richest economies, in some cases having been lured by people traffickers with false promises.


But the policy has generated controversy among some migrant groups, rights campaigners and academics. Haiti is still one of the world’s poorest countries, blighted by natural disasters, political upheaval and poor security.

The National Platform of Haitian Organisations in Chile, which represents 30 separate refugee groups, said on Wednesday that the flights represented “an enforced deportation of people” and accused Chile’s government of adopting “racist” policies.

Jose Tomas Vicuna, director of Chile’s Jesuit Centre for Migrants, said the need for such flights should pain all Chileans. “176 people leave with significant emotional baggage from what they have experienced in Chile,” he wrote on Twitter.

Chile’s interior ministry rejected allegations of racism and deportation, saying “assisted voluntary returns” are supported by the United Nations.

Subsecretary Rodrigo Ubilla told reporters at the airport on Wednesday that migrants from Colombia were requesting a similar service.

“These people formally made this request because they have not been able to achieve their dream of finding a new life in our country,” he said.

At the sports center, returnees told Reuters they had encountered joblessness, hunger and racism in Chile.

Jean Baptiste Brignol, 38, said he had a visa, but could not find work. “The bosses of the companies here don’t want Haitians working for them. They don’t like the skin color,” he said. “President Pinera took pity on us and we are grateful.”

Reporting by Aislinn Laing; Editing by Lisa Shumaker


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Randall Robinson: Speaking on President Aristide, Haiti, and Hillary Clinton - 04/24/2016 - Snippet

Featured Speaker: Randall Robinson, Lawyer, Author, Activist, Founder & Past President of TransAfrica, Inc., and Professor of Law at Penn State Law School. This video clip was recorded on Sunday, April 24, 2016 during The “Liberation Film Series: Advance the Struggle 2015-2016” Event, featuring Randall Robinson, Esq. (Speaking on Haiti after viewing Film Excerpt from “Aristide and the Endless Revolution”) at The Charles H. Wright Museum of African American History, 315 East Warren Avenue, Detroit, MI.
 

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Nov 12, 1964: Soldiers Executed Marcel Numa 21 & Louis Drouin 31, at a cemetery in PaP, Haiti - under the Orders of Papa Doc Duvalier.

They were part of a group of "Jeune Haiti'' wanting to Overturn the US backed Duvalier Regime that Killed 30'000 Haitians 1957 - 86.


Yon 12 Novanm an 1964, solda egzekite dèyè simityè Potoprens Marcel Numa 21 lane, Louis Drouin 31 lane, sou lòd Prezidan Duvalier, filme epi pase nan tv imaj yo. Yo te fè pati yon gwoup “Jeune haiti” ki te vle kapote rejim Duvalier a. Se te dènye sou 13 jènn yo te egzekite.

 

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Owner of Orlando gun store, brother accused of shipping truck filled with guns to Haiti

By: Jason Kelly , Jeff Deal

Updated: Sep 5, 2018 - 12:23 AM

ORLANDO, Fla. - The owner of an Orlando gun shop and his brother are facing charges in an illegal firearms shipment.

They are accused of filling a truck with more than 150 guns, including shotguns and assault rifles, and ammunition and shipping it from Palm Beach to Haiti.


In 2016, customs officials in Haiti said they discovered more than 150 weapons, ammunition, tactical vests and uniforms hidden in a truck shipped from Florida.

Two years later, court documents reveal that Junior Joseph, the owner of an Orlando gun store, and his brother are believed to have been behind it.

"Well, it surprises me, because, like I said, Junior is a Marine also, and I didn't know he was involved in anything like that," said Rodney Shepherd, who owns a nearby gym.

The Global Dynasty Corps website lists Junior Joseph as a lead trainer, touting his military service and his degree in criminal justice.

Joseph and his brother, Jimy Joseph, are accused of conspiring to illegally ship the weapons in an old Mitsubishi cargo truck from the Port of Palm Beach to Haiti.

Reporter Jeff Deal visited Jimy Joseph's home Monday, but someone closed the door when Deal identified himself.

No one answered the door at Junior Joseph's home in Apopka.

Records indicate the men used WhatsApp to message people in Haiti, including a politician, about the shipment.


After the truck was discovered, one of the brothers discovered a voice message from someone in Haiti saying, "This thing is making a lot of noise, baby. Anyway, don't include yourself in this, because there is jail time involved. OK?"

Records indicate that the activity could be detrimental to U.S. foreign policy or national security.

People who work near the gun store saw a large law enforcement presence there several weeks ago. They said it didn't appear the officers were there to buy gear.

Owner of Orlando gun store, brother accused of shipping truck filled with guns to Haiti
 
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