Sooo....no talk on Kiev's gradual descent into Mad Max beyond Thunderdome status??
- Thread starter 2Quik4UHoes
- Start date
Torrential
LWO
Update a breh, who is just now lookin' to know more about the situation
I'm lost
I'm lost
theworldismine13
God Emperor of SOHH
Update a breh, who is just now lookin' to know more about the situation
I'm lost
This is old but has some info
Last time an Afghan leader sided with the Russians, some Arab fukk named Osama assembled goons to take him out. I'm sure OBL was like "Ok, so make another al Qaeda." right before the Seal team shot em like Alonzo did Roger. CIA bout to get loose.
Could be her, she was known for corruption too. Plus during her days in the gas/oil business she was a real cut throat businesswoman. I can't stress enough that both sides have their unscrupulous characters.
I was thinkin tho yall, this situation might be what gets the Keystone XL passed by the State Dept. Not only does America want to get Europe off Russian energy, but the void will provide a potential boom for American/Canadian natural gas.
Along with it being a possible benefit if the Canadians help Obama fund infrastructure projects and high speed rail as a "Thank you" for the project...its funny tho that it may take Putin to be a catalyst for the Keystone XL to finally happen
Lol@first off it's russia today.
rt report that crack better than anything from the west media npr included. maybe you're just brainwashed.
the bytch admitted it.
rt exposes so many fakkits no wonder they're anti-gay over there in russia.
88m3
Fast Money & Foreign Objects
‘Ukraine’ or ‘the Ukraine’? It’s more controversial than you think.
In recent weeks, politicians including President Obama and Mitt Romney have used the construction "the Ukraine" while speaking about that country and Russia's recent annexation of Crimea.
(CBS News)
"And unfortunately, not having anticipated Russia's intentions, the president wasn't able to shape the kinds of events that may have been able to prevent the kinds of circumstances that you're seeing in the Ukraine," Romney said on CBS's "Face the Nation" Sunday.
“It is important that Congress stand with us. I don’t doubt the bipartisan concern that’s been expressed about the situation in the Ukraine," Obama said earlier this month.
Placing "the" in front of Ukraine may appear to be harmless syntax, but the word has a long, controversial political and social history.
"I don’t want to say it's derogatory, but it’s putting it in a subordinate position," said William B. Taylor Jr., the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from 2006 to 2009. "When you talk about 'the Ukraine,' that suggests that you really don’t think that Ukraine is a sovereign independent country."
Historically, the name Ukraine is thought to have derived from a Russian word that roughly means "borderlands" or "on the border," said Donna Farina, a professor of multicultural education at New Jersey City University in Jersey City, N.J.
When Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, it was referred to as "the Ukraine" because it was a region in a larger country, according to linguists and historians. It would be the equivalent of saying "the Northeast" or "the Rockies" in the United States, said Michael Flier, a professor of Ukrainian philology at Harvard University.
Russians used the construction "na Ukraine," roughly "in the Ukraine," while it was part of the Soviet Union, he said.
Shortly after Ukraine gained independence in 1991, it asked Russia to stop referring to it as "na Ukraine" and instead switch to "v Ukraine," which basically means "in Ukraine" as opposed to "in the Ukraine."
David Lightfoot, a professor of linguistics at Georgetown University, said "the" appears before independent countries whose names are plural, like the United States or the United Kingdom, as well as the Netherlands, a "confused title" that actually refers to the low countries.
Growing up in Great Britain, Lightfoot remembers calling Argentina "the Argentine" and Lebanon "the Lebanon" before they gained independence.
"My sense was the the forms were archaic forms that would refer to the area before it became an independent country," he said, noting it is more of a British way of speaking.
Taylor, however, thinks using "the" is "more of a Russian construct as opposed to a Ukrainian construct or an international construct."
Russian and Ukrainian are distinct but similar Slavic languages. Both are spoken in Ukraine, although Ukrainian is the official language. Flier compares them to the relationship between Spanish and Italian or Portuguese.
Crimea is often referred to as "the Crimea," a construction to which Taylor, Flier and others do not object.
"I've heard both," Flier said, mostly because Crimea is a region of a country. "It’s like the Northeast. I’m going to the South. It doesn’t bother people."
Farina and her husband, a native Russian speaker, said they perused Russian media Web sites and the usage varied.
Obama has since dropped "the" and refers to the country as Ukraine.
But for others, old habits may just be hard to break, even though it is a political issue.
"It’s generational, but for Ukranians it is a political issue," Farina said. But even she has trouble remembering.
"Depending on the age of the speaker, it’s very hard to break that habit," Farina said. "I still usually say 'na Ukraine,' or 'in the Ukraine' even though I know it’s not the right way to do it."
- By Katie Zezima
- March 25 at 2:40 pm
In recent weeks, politicians including President Obama and Mitt Romney have used the construction "the Ukraine" while speaking about that country and Russia's recent annexation of Crimea.
(CBS News)
"And unfortunately, not having anticipated Russia's intentions, the president wasn't able to shape the kinds of events that may have been able to prevent the kinds of circumstances that you're seeing in the Ukraine," Romney said on CBS's "Face the Nation" Sunday.
“It is important that Congress stand with us. I don’t doubt the bipartisan concern that’s been expressed about the situation in the Ukraine," Obama said earlier this month.
Placing "the" in front of Ukraine may appear to be harmless syntax, but the word has a long, controversial political and social history.
"I don’t want to say it's derogatory, but it’s putting it in a subordinate position," said William B. Taylor Jr., the U.S. ambassador to Ukraine from 2006 to 2009. "When you talk about 'the Ukraine,' that suggests that you really don’t think that Ukraine is a sovereign independent country."
Historically, the name Ukraine is thought to have derived from a Russian word that roughly means "borderlands" or "on the border," said Donna Farina, a professor of multicultural education at New Jersey City University in Jersey City, N.J.
When Ukraine was part of the Soviet Union, it was referred to as "the Ukraine" because it was a region in a larger country, according to linguists and historians. It would be the equivalent of saying "the Northeast" or "the Rockies" in the United States, said Michael Flier, a professor of Ukrainian philology at Harvard University.
Russians used the construction "na Ukraine," roughly "in the Ukraine," while it was part of the Soviet Union, he said.
Shortly after Ukraine gained independence in 1991, it asked Russia to stop referring to it as "na Ukraine" and instead switch to "v Ukraine," which basically means "in Ukraine" as opposed to "in the Ukraine."
David Lightfoot, a professor of linguistics at Georgetown University, said "the" appears before independent countries whose names are plural, like the United States or the United Kingdom, as well as the Netherlands, a "confused title" that actually refers to the low countries.
Growing up in Great Britain, Lightfoot remembers calling Argentina "the Argentine" and Lebanon "the Lebanon" before they gained independence.
"My sense was the the forms were archaic forms that would refer to the area before it became an independent country," he said, noting it is more of a British way of speaking.
Taylor, however, thinks using "the" is "more of a Russian construct as opposed to a Ukrainian construct or an international construct."
Russian and Ukrainian are distinct but similar Slavic languages. Both are spoken in Ukraine, although Ukrainian is the official language. Flier compares them to the relationship between Spanish and Italian or Portuguese.
Crimea is often referred to as "the Crimea," a construction to which Taylor, Flier and others do not object.
"I've heard both," Flier said, mostly because Crimea is a region of a country. "It’s like the Northeast. I’m going to the South. It doesn’t bother people."
Farina and her husband, a native Russian speaker, said they perused Russian media Web sites and the usage varied.
Obama has since dropped "the" and refers to the country as Ukraine.
But for others, old habits may just be hard to break, even though it is a political issue.
"It’s generational, but for Ukranians it is a political issue," Farina said. But even she has trouble remembering.
"Depending on the age of the speaker, it’s very hard to break that habit," Farina said. "I still usually say 'na Ukraine,' or 'in the Ukraine' even though I know it’s not the right way to do it."
88m3
Fast Money & Foreign Objects
Belarus Wants Out
There is a bitter irony at the heart of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea. Putin’s short-term victory is already coming at the expense of his most cherished long-term strategy -- the creation of a Eurasian Union, a trade union linking Russia and its closest neighbors. In other words, as the invasion expands Russian territory, it will diminish Russian influence in the very places he’d like to increase it. One need only look to Belarus, which is already beginning to hedge against its alliance with Moscow, to see why.
Fanciful as it might sound, the Eurasian Union was never idle talk for Putin. It was meant to serve as a genuine alternative to the West for the countries bordering Russia, including those on Europe’s eastern frontier. For now, only Belarus and Kazakhstan have volunteered to be part of the formal January 2015 launch. But Putin has been closely eyeing other countries in the region, particularly those that have been targeted by the EU’s Eastern Partnership program, which was designed to foster closer ties between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed the strategic ambiguity of Putin’s project. Russia liked to emphasize that the Eurasian Union would serve as an equal partnership among its member states and a vehicle for each to better pursue its political and economic interests. But Moscow’s interests suddenly seem much more expansive than they did just a few months ago. Putin has justified his Crimean gambit with a vast but vaguely defined “responsibility to protect” doctrine. No one knows whether Putin now intends to back up the doctrine with military force, or even whom he aims to protect: ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, or any people at all that Russia thinks might need help.
Russia’s partners are understandably spooked. Early in the Ukraine crisis, when pro-Western protesters were camping out in Kiev, Aleksandr Lukashenko, Belarus’ president, seemed happy to see Russia encourage the Ukrainian regime to crack down. Like Putin, he had no desire to see Ukraine’s fellow Slavs in Russia or Belarus copying the slogans and tactics of the Ukrainian protestors. (Lukashenko is still scarred by the demonstrations that followed the controversial 2010 elections, in which he won a fourth term in office.) But Russia’s military intervention in Crimea was a very different matter. Lukashenko pointedly refused to send observers to Crimea’s March 15 referendum. He has also defied Moscow by saying that he will work with the new pro-Western government in Kiev (which Putin has described as “illegitimate”).
There are good reasons for Belarus to feel threatened. It does not have any single enclave with a majority ethnic-Russian population like Crimea, although approximately eight percent of the population in eastern Belarus is ethnically Russian. But Russia is the dominant language across all of Belarus. According to Putin’s reasoning for seizing Crimea, even Belarus could one day be a target of Russian pressure. (It’s similarly plausible, if not even more likely, that Russia would stage an intervention in Kazakhstan’s Russian-speaking north.)
Even if it is unlikely that Russia would invade Belarus anytime soon, Lukashenko does have reason to worry about the consequences of joining Putin’s Eurasian Union. For one, Lukashenko may already sense that the Eurasian Union won’t be the economic boon for Belarus that he had once imagined. Although he may have hoped that it would provide an open market for cheap Belarusian goods, its precursor, the Customs Union, has so far underscored that Belarusian goods have difficulties competing in a free market, even with goods produced in Russia or Kazakhstan.
Further, even as Russia talks of creating a mutually beneficial partnership, it has been trying to weaken the states around itself. Ukraine is not the only such example. Georgia and especially Moldova have come under pressure as they try to tie up their EU Agreements in 2014. The last thing that Lukashenko wants is to become another weak leader challenged by domestic revolt, often fomented by Russia, who then becomes dependent on Russia to survive -- as Yanukovych would have become if he had not overreacted to the protests in Kiev and been forced to flee, or as Serzh Sargsyan has already become in Armenia. Even worse, Lukashenko knows he could end up as a tin-pot dictator of a mini-state, like Yevgeny Shevchuk, the president of Transnistria, or Sergei Aksyonov, the new prime minister of Crimea.
Above all, Lukashenko wants to avoid having to make a decision between Russia and the West. He has always been happy to be Russia’s ally, but only as the leader of a strong, independent state capable of steering its own course. The key to his staying power -- he has led Belarus for nearly 20 years -- has been his ability to make the case, to his audience at home as well as in Russia, that he holds some bargaining power with the Kremlin. Belarus benefits greatly from Moscow’s assistance in the form of cheap oil and gas, and other Russian subsidies and scams that are estimated to add over 15 percent to Belarusian GDP. But, in exchange for that help, Lukashenko has provided services. He has made money for Russian oligarchs in transit trade through Belarus, supported Putin’s historical revisionism about the Soviet Union, and put down any hint of civil unrest that could spread to Russia. He suggests that no other Belarusian leader would be capable of doing the same.
Lukashenko’s economic model also depends on good relations with countries in the European Union. Belarus can’t afford to lose its trade relations with Latvia and Lithuania, for example. But Russia’s aggression in Ukraine -- and Putin’s suggestion that the competition in the region is zero-sum -- is now threatening to put those relationships in jeopardy. With a massive ethnic Russian minority population of its own, Latvia in particular understandably feels threatened by Putin’s Crimean gambit. Putin may not worry about worsening trade ties with the Baltic states, but Lukashenko must.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea could also have other costs for Belarus. In order to keep Crimea afloat, Russia will have to make substantial investments in transportation, water, and gas infrastructure. The money used for those investments will not be available for further Belarusian subsidies. If Russia’s invasion leads Europe to change its energy policy, that will also have a negative impact on Belarus. The Belarusian economy depends largely on its status as a transit hub for Russian oil heading toward the EU. Belarus’ biggest single source of income is its sale of refined petroleum produced from subsidized Russian crude. Sanctions on Russian oil, or increased oil production elsewhere that reduced oil prices, would hit Minsk hard.
It should not be surprising that Lukashenko has been demonstrably edging away from Putin in recent weeks. Belarus has started hinting that it wants better relations with the EU, agreeing in February to participate in visa negotiations with Brussels. But any shifts toward the EU are going to be a gradual process; Lukashenko is still a dictator, after all, who has little interest in meeting Europe’s democratic standards. For now, Lukashenko is inside the Russian tent looking out. And he is not about to head for the door just yet. But ever since Putin’s aggressive takeover of Crimea, Lukashenko has been more anxiously looking toward the exits.
Russia cannot afford to gain Crimea while losing more post-Soviet friends. Yet that is precisely what its behavior will do in the longer run. Countries like Belarus and Kazakhstan may eventually be obliged to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea -- if and when Russia absorbs the territory, they will have no choice. But those countries’ current silence speaks volumes about their present worries and future plans.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/artic...twitter-in-snapshots-belarus_wants_out-032514
There is a bitter irony at the heart of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea. Putin’s short-term victory is already coming at the expense of his most cherished long-term strategy -- the creation of a Eurasian Union, a trade union linking Russia and its closest neighbors. In other words, as the invasion expands Russian territory, it will diminish Russian influence in the very places he’d like to increase it. One need only look to Belarus, which is already beginning to hedge against its alliance with Moscow, to see why.
Fanciful as it might sound, the Eurasian Union was never idle talk for Putin. It was meant to serve as a genuine alternative to the West for the countries bordering Russia, including those on Europe’s eastern frontier. For now, only Belarus and Kazakhstan have volunteered to be part of the formal January 2015 launch. But Putin has been closely eyeing other countries in the region, particularly those that have been targeted by the EU’s Eastern Partnership program, which was designed to foster closer ties between the EU and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed the strategic ambiguity of Putin’s project. Russia liked to emphasize that the Eurasian Union would serve as an equal partnership among its member states and a vehicle for each to better pursue its political and economic interests. But Moscow’s interests suddenly seem much more expansive than they did just a few months ago. Putin has justified his Crimean gambit with a vast but vaguely defined “responsibility to protect” doctrine. No one knows whether Putin now intends to back up the doctrine with military force, or even whom he aims to protect: ethnic Russians, Russian speakers, or any people at all that Russia thinks might need help.
Russia’s partners are understandably spooked. Early in the Ukraine crisis, when pro-Western protesters were camping out in Kiev, Aleksandr Lukashenko, Belarus’ president, seemed happy to see Russia encourage the Ukrainian regime to crack down. Like Putin, he had no desire to see Ukraine’s fellow Slavs in Russia or Belarus copying the slogans and tactics of the Ukrainian protestors. (Lukashenko is still scarred by the demonstrations that followed the controversial 2010 elections, in which he won a fourth term in office.) But Russia’s military intervention in Crimea was a very different matter. Lukashenko pointedly refused to send observers to Crimea’s March 15 referendum. He has also defied Moscow by saying that he will work with the new pro-Western government in Kiev (which Putin has described as “illegitimate”).
There are good reasons for Belarus to feel threatened. It does not have any single enclave with a majority ethnic-Russian population like Crimea, although approximately eight percent of the population in eastern Belarus is ethnically Russian. But Russia is the dominant language across all of Belarus. According to Putin’s reasoning for seizing Crimea, even Belarus could one day be a target of Russian pressure. (It’s similarly plausible, if not even more likely, that Russia would stage an intervention in Kazakhstan’s Russian-speaking north.)
Even if it is unlikely that Russia would invade Belarus anytime soon, Lukashenko does have reason to worry about the consequences of joining Putin’s Eurasian Union. For one, Lukashenko may already sense that the Eurasian Union won’t be the economic boon for Belarus that he had once imagined. Although he may have hoped that it would provide an open market for cheap Belarusian goods, its precursor, the Customs Union, has so far underscored that Belarusian goods have difficulties competing in a free market, even with goods produced in Russia or Kazakhstan.
Further, even as Russia talks of creating a mutually beneficial partnership, it has been trying to weaken the states around itself. Ukraine is not the only such example. Georgia and especially Moldova have come under pressure as they try to tie up their EU Agreements in 2014. The last thing that Lukashenko wants is to become another weak leader challenged by domestic revolt, often fomented by Russia, who then becomes dependent on Russia to survive -- as Yanukovych would have become if he had not overreacted to the protests in Kiev and been forced to flee, or as Serzh Sargsyan has already become in Armenia. Even worse, Lukashenko knows he could end up as a tin-pot dictator of a mini-state, like Yevgeny Shevchuk, the president of Transnistria, or Sergei Aksyonov, the new prime minister of Crimea.
Above all, Lukashenko wants to avoid having to make a decision between Russia and the West. He has always been happy to be Russia’s ally, but only as the leader of a strong, independent state capable of steering its own course. The key to his staying power -- he has led Belarus for nearly 20 years -- has been his ability to make the case, to his audience at home as well as in Russia, that he holds some bargaining power with the Kremlin. Belarus benefits greatly from Moscow’s assistance in the form of cheap oil and gas, and other Russian subsidies and scams that are estimated to add over 15 percent to Belarusian GDP. But, in exchange for that help, Lukashenko has provided services. He has made money for Russian oligarchs in transit trade through Belarus, supported Putin’s historical revisionism about the Soviet Union, and put down any hint of civil unrest that could spread to Russia. He suggests that no other Belarusian leader would be capable of doing the same.
Lukashenko’s economic model also depends on good relations with countries in the European Union. Belarus can’t afford to lose its trade relations with Latvia and Lithuania, for example. But Russia’s aggression in Ukraine -- and Putin’s suggestion that the competition in the region is zero-sum -- is now threatening to put those relationships in jeopardy. With a massive ethnic Russian minority population of its own, Latvia in particular understandably feels threatened by Putin’s Crimean gambit. Putin may not worry about worsening trade ties with the Baltic states, but Lukashenko must.
Russia’s annexation of Crimea could also have other costs for Belarus. In order to keep Crimea afloat, Russia will have to make substantial investments in transportation, water, and gas infrastructure. The money used for those investments will not be available for further Belarusian subsidies. If Russia’s invasion leads Europe to change its energy policy, that will also have a negative impact on Belarus. The Belarusian economy depends largely on its status as a transit hub for Russian oil heading toward the EU. Belarus’ biggest single source of income is its sale of refined petroleum produced from subsidized Russian crude. Sanctions on Russian oil, or increased oil production elsewhere that reduced oil prices, would hit Minsk hard.
It should not be surprising that Lukashenko has been demonstrably edging away from Putin in recent weeks. Belarus has started hinting that it wants better relations with the EU, agreeing in February to participate in visa negotiations with Brussels. But any shifts toward the EU are going to be a gradual process; Lukashenko is still a dictator, after all, who has little interest in meeting Europe’s democratic standards. For now, Lukashenko is inside the Russian tent looking out. And he is not about to head for the door just yet. But ever since Putin’s aggressive takeover of Crimea, Lukashenko has been more anxiously looking toward the exits.
Russia cannot afford to gain Crimea while losing more post-Soviet friends. Yet that is precisely what its behavior will do in the longer run. Countries like Belarus and Kazakhstan may eventually be obliged to recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea -- if and when Russia absorbs the territory, they will have no choice. But those countries’ current silence speaks volumes about their present worries and future plans.
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/artic...twitter-in-snapshots-belarus_wants_out-032514
Okay, grade my homework;
Ukraine has historically had beef with it's ties to Russia.
Through years of war & peace, they've had to fight between being apart of Russia (which is hard because of it's physical seperation) and being for friendly with Eastern Europe (which is more workable because they are physically connected).
Through the switching of leaders; they end up with a guy that's pro-Russia. He abandons plans to ball out with the EU and then, switches sides to Russia. The people lose it. He's osted. Putin ain't having that and sends the goons in and that's where we are, today.
It's that, about, it?
Thanks for the info, breh.
theworldismine13
God Emperor of SOHH
Okay, grade my homework;
Ukraine has historically had beef with it's ties to Russia.
Through years of war & peace, they've had to fight between being apart of Russia (which is hard because of it's physical seperation) and being for friendly with Eastern Europe (which is more workable because they are physically connected).
Through the switching of leaders; they end up with a guy that's pro-Russia. He abandons plans to ball out with the EU and then, switches sides to Russia. The people lose it. He's osted. Putin ain't having that and sends the goons in and that's where we are, today.
It's that, about, it?
Yeah, except it's important to note that Putin sent the goons to Crimea, which is technically Ukraine but it's not exactly Ukraine, this was easy because there are so many Russians there but if he sent soldiers into Ukraine itself shyt might really hit the fan
It's looking like Russia is gonna keep Crimea and Ukraine will side with the west
Lol@first off it's russia today.
rt report that crack better than anything from the west media npr included. maybe you're just brainwashed.
the bytch admitted it.
rt exposes so many fakkits no wonder they're anti-gay over there in russia.
maybe your just a russia dikk riding fakkit who loves the attention and a broke mans version of novel thug, hop off these pseudo-dictators nuts b
rt is the russian fox news, she did admit it tho but that was before I made my post
Update a breh, who is just now lookin' to know more about the situation
I'm lost
Ok, so back in November there were two deals on the table for former president Yanukovych to take. Russia offered 15 Bil and an extra discount on gas/oil while the EU offered 8 bil, plus Ukraine was gonna have to go through political/economic reforms before being admitted into the EU. Putin had no problem with Yanukovych taking the EU deal as long as he still took the Moscow deal, but the EU told Yanukovych he could only choose one or the other. So Yanu took Putin's more painless and cash robust deal, mind you there are parts of Ukraine that have been anti-Russian since at least WWII so the country is a delicate balance between pro Russian and pro Ukraine/Europe. Moreover, Putin's greater goal is to create a Eurasian economic bloc with former Soviet states in order to rival the EU. Ukraine is the most important piece in the Eurasian plot as it reaches far into Europe and legitimizes Russia as a European power in Moscow's eyes it's the crown jewel so to speak for the planned Eurasian bloc, but from the West perspective gaining influence in Ukraine is huge because it brings NATO right at Moscow's doorstep and more or less the humiliation of old Russia since the fall of the Soviet Union would be complete. It isn't only about that though of course, Ukraine is one of the biggest grain producers and serves as the primary go between for the EU's gas consumption and Russia's vast reserves because of a network of pipelines and the East of the country is heavily industrialized. For the opposition, Ukraine looks at its neighbors in Poland and want to follow that same path but that's means there can be only one or the other from the West's perspective they can't play both sides.
So when Yanukovych took Putin's deal instead of the EU's this was the spark that began the protests in Kiev and in the west of the country. The East, South, and Crimea were Yanukovych supporters and it was them that elected him into office so while they eventually saw protests that was more because of pro-Ukrainian contingents rather than it being indicative of the overall feeling of those regions. So as months pass the protest get increasingly violent and by January when I made this thread the capitol was basically on some Mad Max, COD type shyt it was something out of a movie/video game. The opposition comprised of moderates and legitimate candidates including Vitali Klitschko as well as extremist neo-nazi hooligans and ultra-nationalists but they were all united in their hate of Yanukovych and desire to be with the EU. Police shot with rubber bullets, the protesters used molotovs, fireworks, and anything they could get their hands on and basically mobbed on them and ganged up on individual cops. You can go to the beginning of this thread for the pics and videos.
Fast forward and an agreement is made on Feb 21st between the EU, Yanu, and Moscow(although I think I heard Putin never agreed) to hold new elections but when that agreement was made the protesters smelled blood and pulled the coup d'etat. Yanu was sent running for Russia for fear of his life, meanwhile the opposition was now the government in place. Now Moscow's position is that the government in place was not elected and therefore illegitimate, disregards the Russians and Russians speakers that voted Yanu into office, and puts their borders in danger by such a lack of regard for the democratic process because to them who's to say people won't get mad at the new govt and start more political upheaval? The West's argument is that the people have the right to decide for themselves how to be governed not to mention Yanukovych was a corrupt official. So more or less this has become a contest of geopolitical influence between the East and West. Both sides used different methods to gain what they want, Russia by force and the West by more subtle, subversive tactics. In the end Ukrainians themselves are getting fukked over regardless of which side they choose. Moscow wants to go back to the Feb 21st agreement so that the pro-Russian voting bases may be ignited enough to win back influence in Kiev, while the West want to push this shyt through as fast as possible so as to avoid any chance of Moscow regaining influence. So since Crimea is a place of historic and military importance to Russia, the Putin regime took that land back and now the West is fighting Moscow with banks instead of tanks and diplomatic language which resembles a parent scolding a child.
A few more things to note.
- The snipers that killed people in Independence Square killed both protesters and police, which calls into question who was behind it.
- A phone call were leaked between two U.S. officials(the official "fukk the EU" call) basically saying the West had to mid-wife a new pro West govt in Ukraine.
- The EU has huge economic interests in Russia, which is why Obama is on this current speech tour in Europe to consolidate support against Russia. So where things go from here is going to be interesting.
Did a little editing.
Last edited:
lol, propaganda vs propaganda is fun to watch. Obama and Putin lookin like Nadal vs Federer.
88m3
Fast Money & Foreign Objects
lol, propaganda vs propaganda is fun to watch. Obama and Putin lookin like Nadal vs Federer.
http://www.france24.com/en/
I don't think there's a middle ground on what Russia did. It's wrong, plain and simple.
