because Korean women don't want to have children.
Korea to Triple Baby Payments After It Smashes Own Record for World’s Lowest Fertility Rate
- Thread starter bnew
- Start date
you could sum it up by how much money they throw at women for being women.I see less education on the list and it's something I've been noticing. The more educated a society (which is necessary), there comes a host of other problems. Indigenous uncontacted tribes only worry about what they gonna eat tonight or if they're gonna be eaten (for the most part).
Educated western countries deal with anxiety, trehs, racisim, being tik tok famous, low birth rates
There's welfare and simps to make up for any shortfall in what a woman wants.
That's not the reason.
It's high cost of living, low income, lack of jobs, and rising housing costs.
It's as simple as people not being able to afford children. These greedy ass governments want to do everything except admit they created a system that's unsustainable. If you can barely provide for yourself there's no way you can have a child.
if that were the case and if women felt they were financially stable then why aren't they having more children?
DrBanneker
Space is the Place
You are right to an extent though finance is part of it. The biggest driver of high TFRs in history and currently in developing countries is infant mortality. People in Niger (and South Korea in the 1960s) had 6 kids per family because sadly some weren't going to make it to adulthood or even out of infancy. Once infant mortality was a rare issue, that becomes the first crack in the wall.
The second is higher education which makes people stay in school longer. It affects both sexes but especially hits when many or most women are getting college educated. This is not a comment pro-sexism or keeping women uneducated, because this limits a society's economic and social potential, however there is a strong correlation between education in a population and age of first marriage which leads to age of first birth. In advanced societies, we have people getting married/having kids in late 20s early 30s. Even if there is a desire you have limited time to have kids due to career and biological issues. Pregnancies after 35 are defined at risk due to the jump in possible abnormalities and there are higher rates of infertility for men and women as you get older.
Third, and this is the money part, is that societies that heavily invest in education tend to have some of the most expensive costs to raise kids. In Korea, you have the same costs of the USA but also expensive after-school cram schools that are like another tuition just so your kids can be competitive. You can't afford more than two in such a society unless you are balling. High real estate costs makes it hard for people to get homes and in East Asia you often live at home until you are married.
Fourth, and unique to East Asia, is the near zero tolerance for kids out-of-wedlock. Out of wedlock birth percentages are usually low single digits in S. Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and China. Most of northern Europe, and even AAs, would have drastically lower fertility if we had a zero tolerance for kids born outside marriage. Married Black women in the US have lower fertility rates than married White women, so our TFR would be a lot lower (as would most of Europe (except like Greece and Israel) and lots of Latin America) if you took out of wedlock births out the picture.
Financial payments and child care only address the third issue. The only time you have a reverse is a war typically like WWII. Fertility was crashing in US and Europe before the Depression/War and the Baby Boom gave us another 50 years breathing room but we are back in crisis now.
Drakes2ndCousin
Banned
People with low incomes are the ones statistically having the most kids. Including in third world countries. So yeah...no. That's not the issue.
The issue is more cultural/legal than economic. If people want to have kids, they're going to have them no matter what
Because they don't want to be tied down with children.
if that were the case and if women felt they were financially stable then why aren't they having more children?
Do you think women dream of dealing with colicly babies changing shytty diapers?
Everytime they throw money at women to have children the shyt fails it never works.
Most women want to play the field until their mid 30's then settle down and have maybe 1 or 2 kids max.
Not a baby factory - South Korea tries to fix demographic crisis with more gender equality
In just over a decade, South Korea has spent the equivalent of a small European economy trying to fix its demographic crisis, yet birthrates have dropped to the lowest in the world.
www.reuters.com
It’s all tied to gender equality.
Women were complaining about this stuff for a long time. Korea is VERY backwards when it comes to gender roles and now the government is scrambling to incentivize women to fulfill these roles.Highlights from the article:
Oh well. Either humans adapt or go the way of the dinosaurs.Efforts on gender equality are very timely,” said Shin Eun-kyung, an economist with the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. South Korea is the worst place for women to work in the OECD, despite women being among the organization’s best educated, and more highly so than men.
But the measures go beyond the workplace: mothers can choose to give the baby their own last name and a tickbox on birth certificates showing whether a baby was born outside marriage will be removed.
Fertility treatments will be offered to single women and unmarried couples as well. Social campaigns will encourage men to participate more in child care and household chores.
But seriously, even tho gender equality is a huge issue here, these issues also reveal the limitations of capitalism and how it can actually hurt family building if people can’t afford them or are working too hard to sustain them.
Drakes2ndCousin
Banned
Remote work is great in theory but in practice serves to create a larger divide between the educated knowledge workers and un-educated service worker classes.
Not to mention a divide between each other even within the same class.
I think just a small group of people are only now just beginning to understand how the internet is on the verge of dismantling society entirely.
Potentially could work long enough to tide us over to the point where the robots take over.
Not a joke.
So lots of people are debating the economic side of things, here's an actual study from South Korea and it looks like lack of income/housing security DOES play a role in the low birthrates.
Here I'll copy-paste the conclusion:
Results from discrete-time hazard models provide evidence of substantial socioeconomic differentials in fertility. For instance, the husband’s higher education and better employment status (e.g., college education, standard employment) are positively associated with having a first and second childbirth. Also, those who can secure enough money to purchase a house or to deposit a lump-sum for a Jeonse lease have a higher likelihood of having first and second births than those who rent by the month (Weolse).8 At the same time, it is important to note that the association between socioeconomic status and fertility often varies across indicators and gender. In general, higher socioeconomic status seems to be conducive to the transition to parenthood and second birth; however, employed wives are less likely than housewives to have a first child. This reflects the difficulty of combining work and motherhood due to gender norms emphasizing women’s domestic responsibilities and a family-unfriendly work culture (e.g., long work hours and after-work social gatherings) (Brinton 2001; Choe, Bumpass, and Tsuya 2004). While women’s labor force participation is negatively associated with childbirths, the underlying reasons for delaying births may differ by employment status. For example, women in nonstandard employment, who in light of a strong preference for status homogamy in Korea are likely to have husbands with insecure jobs, might delay (or give up) childbearing for economic reasons. On the other hand, women with standard jobs might postpone childbearing for career reasons, since the opportunity costs of leaving standard employment are high in the Korean labor market, where it is almost impossible for married women to find standard employment upon reentry (Brinton 2001). Indeed, the likelihood of making the transition to a second birth is the lowest among wives in standard employment (Model 7, Table 3). A recent qualitative study on highly educated Korean women provides supporting evidence for this possibility by documenting that those who continue working full-time consider having only one child (Brinton and Oh 2019).
In addition, fertility differentials by husbands’ employment status are worth taking into consideration. Women have a lower likelihood of giving birth if their husbands hold nonstandard jobs compared to those whose husbands work in standard employment or self-employment. As discussed above, employment status is not only an indicator of one’s current labor market status but also of one’s future career trajectory in a rigidly segmented Korean labor market. In this context, married couples may postpone having their first child or subsequent children if the husband is not in secure standard employment (or does not run his own business), reflecting the persistent malebreadwinner norm. These findings are consistent with the finding that deteriorating employment prospects for young men are linked to declining marriage and fertility rates (Cherlin 2014; Karabchuk 2020; Ruggles 2015; Yeung and Yang 2020). By considering employment types of both husband and wife, this study also finds that the role of employment in fertility may differ depending on whose labor force participation is examined. Given that prior studies on fertility have often focused only on one spouse’s employment (e.g., including wife’s employment status without considering the effect of husband’s labor market status) (e.g., Kim 2014; Ma 2016), the results of this study show that it is important to understand fertility decisions by looking at the dynamics of couples’ employment status.
Another important finding of this study is the role of homeownership in fertility behaviors. For both first and second births, those with Weolse (monthly rent) are least likely to make the transition to parenthood.9 With skyrocketing home prices and the lack of affordable housing, securing ‘key money’ becomes a challenge and is causing rising household debt in Korea (Sohn 2019). Therefore, policies to help relieve the burden of high housing costs for young couples need to be implemented and expanded as a measure to boost fertility. For instance, Seoul Metropolitan Government provides newlyweds with low mortgage rates and public housing (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2020).
TL/DR: If the husband has a great education, a high-paying job, a stable, secure job, or the couple owns a home they are the most likely to have a kid earlier. But if the husband has less education, a lower-paying job, a non-standard job, or the couple rents their place, they are less likely to have a kid earlier. And they are less likely to have a kid if the woman works, especially if the lower or nonstandard husband income requires the woman to work.
Here I'll copy-paste the conclusion:
Results from discrete-time hazard models provide evidence of substantial socioeconomic differentials in fertility. For instance, the husband’s higher education and better employment status (e.g., college education, standard employment) are positively associated with having a first and second childbirth. Also, those who can secure enough money to purchase a house or to deposit a lump-sum for a Jeonse lease have a higher likelihood of having first and second births than those who rent by the month (Weolse).8 At the same time, it is important to note that the association between socioeconomic status and fertility often varies across indicators and gender. In general, higher socioeconomic status seems to be conducive to the transition to parenthood and second birth; however, employed wives are less likely than housewives to have a first child. This reflects the difficulty of combining work and motherhood due to gender norms emphasizing women’s domestic responsibilities and a family-unfriendly work culture (e.g., long work hours and after-work social gatherings) (Brinton 2001; Choe, Bumpass, and Tsuya 2004). While women’s labor force participation is negatively associated with childbirths, the underlying reasons for delaying births may differ by employment status. For example, women in nonstandard employment, who in light of a strong preference for status homogamy in Korea are likely to have husbands with insecure jobs, might delay (or give up) childbearing for economic reasons. On the other hand, women with standard jobs might postpone childbearing for career reasons, since the opportunity costs of leaving standard employment are high in the Korean labor market, where it is almost impossible for married women to find standard employment upon reentry (Brinton 2001). Indeed, the likelihood of making the transition to a second birth is the lowest among wives in standard employment (Model 7, Table 3). A recent qualitative study on highly educated Korean women provides supporting evidence for this possibility by documenting that those who continue working full-time consider having only one child (Brinton and Oh 2019).
In addition, fertility differentials by husbands’ employment status are worth taking into consideration. Women have a lower likelihood of giving birth if their husbands hold nonstandard jobs compared to those whose husbands work in standard employment or self-employment. As discussed above, employment status is not only an indicator of one’s current labor market status but also of one’s future career trajectory in a rigidly segmented Korean labor market. In this context, married couples may postpone having their first child or subsequent children if the husband is not in secure standard employment (or does not run his own business), reflecting the persistent malebreadwinner norm. These findings are consistent with the finding that deteriorating employment prospects for young men are linked to declining marriage and fertility rates (Cherlin 2014; Karabchuk 2020; Ruggles 2015; Yeung and Yang 2020). By considering employment types of both husband and wife, this study also finds that the role of employment in fertility may differ depending on whose labor force participation is examined. Given that prior studies on fertility have often focused only on one spouse’s employment (e.g., including wife’s employment status without considering the effect of husband’s labor market status) (e.g., Kim 2014; Ma 2016), the results of this study show that it is important to understand fertility decisions by looking at the dynamics of couples’ employment status.
Another important finding of this study is the role of homeownership in fertility behaviors. For both first and second births, those with Weolse (monthly rent) are least likely to make the transition to parenthood.9 With skyrocketing home prices and the lack of affordable housing, securing ‘key money’ becomes a challenge and is causing rising household debt in Korea (Sohn 2019). Therefore, policies to help relieve the burden of high housing costs for young couples need to be implemented and expanded as a measure to boost fertility. For instance, Seoul Metropolitan Government provides newlyweds with low mortgage rates and public housing (Seoul Metropolitan Government 2020).
TL/DR: If the husband has a great education, a high-paying job, a stable, secure job, or the couple owns a home they are the most likely to have a kid earlier. But if the husband has less education, a lower-paying job, a non-standard job, or the couple rents their place, they are less likely to have a kid earlier. And they are less likely to have a kid if the woman works, especially if the lower or nonstandard husband income requires the woman to work.
