- The Western militarization of Africa has been a breeding ground for political instability and the emergence of military regimes. As a reaction, the pan-Africanist and popular uprising that started in the Sahelian epicenter now threatens to engulf neighboring neocolonial regimes labelled “democracies.”
-There is no “return” of coups (Africa). There is rather a long-standing Francophone Africa coup problem. Explanations in terms of “bad governance,” poverty, and so on lack specificity. These features can be found in many countries across Africa where government overthrow is a thing of the past (which does not imply that they are “democratic”). Nine coups happened in Africa since 2020: eight in French-speaking countries and/or in a geopolitical context militarized by the West (the French-speaking Sahel countries and Sudan)
- One of the “specificities” of military coups in Francophone Africa is that, from an historical perspective, they have been the only means to get rid of facets of French imperialism. This is not to say that military coups are inherently progressive. Not at all. Most of them have been reactionary and worked to further cement the neocolonial order. But, given the French grip on the “choice” of African leaders, and its long-term success in crushing the civilian left, the rare leaders who had a project to break from French neocolonialism came from the military. We might think for example of charismatic and honest leaders like Thomas Sankara in Burkina Faso.
-The recent period in French-speaking Africa is marked by the “return” of practices from the era of single-party rule. Incumbents increasingly allow themselves to rig elections by choosing their own opponents, manipulating constitutional norms and laws, pressurizing the judiciary, and deploying an unprecedented level of violence against their own populations — all of this with the complicity of the “international community,” which equates “democracy” with neocolonial servitude and the implementation of the neoliberal agenda.
-The circumstances that led to the recent coups are different from one country to another. So is their political “profile.” While some putsches allow French neocolonialism to reorganize and to prevent an undesirable regime change (like in Gabon and in Chad), the bloodless putsches in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger are clearly opposed to so-called Françafrique.
-Providing security services has been Russia’s comparative advantage in Africa, particularly in its French-speaking part. Russian influence on the continent is often singled out in the West. But the Western mainstream narrative usually omits to say that Russia, including the Wagner Group, has helped and is helping countries like the Central African Republic and Mali to reestablish their territorial unity, where France (including private French security groups) has failed. In Mali, France has been present since 2013. Its results on the front of the fight against jihadism have been more than mixed. French troops have gradually been perceived by the population as occupying forces.
-Prior to the arrival of the military in power, the “democratically elected” government in Mali could rarely deploy its troops in its own airspace, for lack of authorization from France! Following the departure of French and MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) troops, the military regime succeeded in retaking Kidal, a town that France had left in the hands of separatist groups.
apnews.com
www.aol.com
