The Real Reason for the Mali country being destroyed...

[88m3]

Socialist.....doubt it.


character? When does a troll have that?

Btw...you still like coming into my thread.

I only exist in your imagination

 

[Sonni]

Mali’s Tuareg Rebellion
March 27, 2012


This interview with Andy Morgan offers a detailed and fascinating look at the background to the Tuareg conflict in Mali. Tracing the unrest back over 50 years, he looks at the outside influences of Muammar Gaddafi, local Al Qaeda groups, Algeria and Mauritania.

Could you give us the general picture of what is going on in Mali at the moment?
The Tuaregs have been fighting an insurgency against the central power in Mali since the late 1950s but in terms of open fighting, since 1963. So this is a very old story. What we are seeing is the latest chapter, but a chapter with a great many differences. The Tuaregs this time are better equipped, better trained and better led than they ever have been before and as a result they have been able to clinch a series of military victories which have given them control of the northern half of Mali – bar the big cities, such as Timbuktu and Gao, which they haven’t attacked yet although I suspect now with all the confusion that is going on in Bamako they might take their chances in the next 48 hours and do just that.

This time people are referring to a Libyan knock-on effect, with Tuaregs returning from Libya, having fought with Gaddafi, now heavily armed and with a lot of money to spend. Is this a true picture?
The answer is both yes and no. The relationship between Gaddafi and the Tuaregs goes back to the 1970s, when Gaddafi had a romantic vision of the Tuaregs as superlative warriors. Gaddafi himself, as everyone knows, had a vision of himself as a liberator of oppressed peoples throughout the world. He took it upon himself to bring the Tuaregs into his fold and he trained them up to be soldiers. This happened particularly in the 1980s. The relationship between them at that time was always very ambiguous, as on the one hand he said that he wanted to help the Tuareg people to win back their homeland, but on the other hand he seemed to do precious little to help make that happen in concrete terms – apart from giving a bunch of young Tuareg men some military training in Libya, who he then sent to fight wars in Chad and Lebanon but not back home in Mali or Niger. They have always had a complex relationship, which I like to compare to the Irish Republican movement and the USA. Libya was a source for money and support but no actual encouragement to reach their goals.

How did the Tuaregs end up working in Libya?
The reason why a lot of Tuaregs ended up in Libya is that it is a very oil-rich nation which had a lack of manpower. Not only Tuaregs, but many sub-Saharan Africans ended up working in Libya. Some of those Tuaregs were actually a part of the Libyan army. The Malian press have accused the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) of being Libyan mercenaries but in reality they weren’t mercenaries but actually regular members of the Libyan army and had been for 20 years. For example the leader of the MNLA, Mohamed Ag Najm, was a colonel in the Libyan army. The story goes, and I need to check some of this but, it appears that there was a very well known Tuareg rebel/freedom fighter/bandit depending on your point of view called Ibrahim Ag Bahanga who was a real thorn in the side of the Malian authorities from 2006 onwards until he was defeated militarily in 2008 and exiled to Libya. There, he started to make connections with all these Tuareg officers in the Libyan army, many of whom were in the same clan and the same tribal group as he was. When the Libyan uprising started in Benghazi and things started to go very wrong for Gaddafi, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga and others persuaded some Tuareg officers in the Libyan army to defect, raid the Libyan army arsenals and take the weaponry back to Mali. I have also heard a rumour, which I have not been able to confirm, that they actually had a meeting with the National Transitional Council, the anti-Gaddafi rebels, to get their blessing for this project.


This seems the perfect way to get them out of the way
Yes, exactly, and weaken Gaddafi’s army. So this is what they did, and throughout the autumn and summer of 2011, they were ferrying arms back into Mali. During one of these trips, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga was killed, some people say in a car accident, although he had so many enemies that it seems incredible that he could have died in a mere car accident. So what you have is a group of very experienced Libyan Tuareg soldiers, who had been trained and employed in Libya, now in the north-east of Mali with a great deal of weaponry. From about October 2011 onwards, they basically started preparing the uprising, with long meetings out in the desert where they indulged in a great deal of soul searching about what had gone wrong in previous uprisings, so as to get it right this time. What happened is that they entered into an alliance with a much younger group of Tuaregs, you might say young intellectuals, very Internet savvy young Tuaregs, who set up the National Movement of Azawad, the MNA at the end of 2010. They eventually merged with the MNLA. This was an important move as one of the aspects that was deemed to be lacking in previous uprisings was good communications with the international media, and with the world at large. This alliance, this youth wing, if we can call it that, has been very active on the Internet since the uprising started, posting opinions, press releases and denunciations. This is a completely new development, which has led to there being a propaganda war between Mali and the MNLA, alongside the actual military operations.

When we talk about Tuaregs we are talking about many different tribes, spread over different countries. Some say the MNLA is just a small group of a few thousand fighters. What sort of support does the MNLA have from Tuaregs as a whole?
There are roughly 1.5 million Tuaregs, although an accurate census does not exist. They are spread out over 5 countries: Mali, Algeria, Libya, Niger and Burkina Faso. They have a very complex clan and tribal structure, at the top of which you have 5 large confederations which are then broken down into tribes, then clans and families etc. It’s very complex. They don’t all see eye-to-eye and historically they have fought against each other, sometimes very bitterly. The idea of a Tuareg identity is a relatively recent phenomenon. Up till about 50 years ago, they did not see themselves as a unified people, they saw themselves as different families, tribes and clans – nomads from different parts of the desert who often fought against each other.


So who are the MNLA?
The MNLA are basically led by Tuaregs from the north-east of Mali, especially by two particular clans, called the Iforas and Idnan. The Iforas are the traditional rulers of north-eastern Mali. The Idnan are also a traditional warrior clan, bearing in mind that their society is very hierarchical and each clan had its different role. All of these old structures have been modified and deconstructed over the last one hundred years, but basically these two groups, the Iforas and the Idnan, are very much at the head of the MNLA. Support for the MNLA amongst Tuaregs is quite broad, partly as a result of the MNA’s propaganda and certainly before this latest conflict happened, I got the feeling from talking to various friends, that a lot of Tuaregs felt that at last they had a rebel organisation that was worthy of their cause. However they do not represent all Tuaregs by any means, and even less, all the people living in the north of Mali, where there are quite a number of different ethnicities apart from the Tuareg, including Arabs, Songhai and Peulh. All I can say is that it’s been along time since a rebel movement has enjoyed the level of support that the MNLA have, but this support is by no means universal.

Is there any internal opposition?
There is one group that is seemingly opposed to the MNLA and they are called the Inghad. They are the former subordinate or ‘vassal’ class in the old hierarchical structure, subordinate to the more noble Idnan and Iforas Tuaregs. Many of the Inghad were in favour of the Tuareg lands becoming part of the Republic of Mali, as the socialist principles upon which the Malian Republic was built meant that they were freed from their subservient status in Tuareg society. One of the most frequently touted names in this conflict is a Tuareg military commander called Colonel al-Hajj Gamou. He has been the Malian army’s champion in the north-east for quite a number of years and he is an Inghad, from one of these vassal tribes. Ag Gamou has been built up as the defender of the Malian cause in the north. Apart from the Libyan Tuareg presence in the MNLA, there have also been a lot of desertions to the MNLA from the Malian army since December, as the Malian army did comprise a large number of Tuaregs. The actual number of people in the MNLA is difficult to gauge but I am sure that the numbers are growing.


What are the aims of the MNLA?
They want a country of their own, a country called Azawad, which will comprise the three northernmost provinces or regions of present-day Mali – Timbuktu, Gao and Kidal. There has long been a debate within Tuareg society about what they want; autonomy within a federalist Malian structure or a completely independent state. After the last big rebellion in the early 1990s, when the suffering among the civilian population was quite extreme, many Tuaregs fell back to a more conciliatory position, saying that they did not want an independent country but wanted their rights; cultural rights and economic rights. This position has hardened in recent years to the point where the MNLA want absolute independence for Azawad, the long-dreamed-of Tuareg state.

Is there a historical basis to the Azawad borders?
The Malian border was invented by the French. It’s the border that was drawn up between French Algeria and French Sudan in 1904, so it really has no basis in tribal geography. There is some logic to it, as southern Algeria is deemed to be the zone of influence of a Tuareg confederation called the Kel Ahaggar and north-eastern Mali that of the Iforas, who I mentioned previously – the more dominant group. By saying that they are only interested in Mali, the MNLA are trying to limit the fear and concern of neighbouring states that a Tuareg uprising in Mali will lead to Tuareg uprisings elsewhere in all the 5 other countries where Tuareg are present.

So the neighbouring countries are very nervous.
Yes, they are terrified, especially the Algerians. This uprising could have a twofold effect on Algeria. Not only do the Algerians not want the Tuaregs in the south to get any strange ideas, although in the history of independent Algeria, the Tuaregs in southern Algeria have never shown any desire to stage a mass rebellion, so if one were to happen it would be completely unprecedented. But more important is the solidarity with the Malian Touareg uprising which is being felt in Algeria by the Berber peoples who have their own cause. The Tuaregs are a Berber people, Imazighen, which means they have linguistic and cultural ties with the Kabyle, the Chaoui, the Chleuch etc further north. There is a lot of noise about this rebellion coming out of the Algerian blogosphere from Algerian Berber groups, especially from Kabylia, but elsewhere as well. The Algerians are scared of a knock-on effect on the Berbers.


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[Sonni]

...
What about the coup that happened recently? How do you read that?
It is all very confusing, it has all just happened. It sounds like all this started last Wednesday when the Malian Defence Minister, Sadio Gassama and another desert fox officer, Major Colonel Abderrahmane ould Meydou - who along with Ag Gamou is Mali’s champion up in the desert – visited the barracks in Kati, a suburb of the capital Bamako and a military town of sorts. They received a very aggressive reaction from the soldiers and they were more or less chased off the premises. Remember this is a Minister of Defence sent running from the barracks by his own soldiers. The soldiers then marched into Bamako, took over the Koulouba palace which is the presidential palace and the ORTM (TV station) and declared they were suspending the constitution, until further notice.


What are their grievances?
The conduct of the war against the MNLA has in their eyes been a thing of shame. They feel the army is underfunded, undersupplied and there are stories of soldiers almost dying of hunger because of not getting enough food. There was also supposedly a massacre of Malian soldiers in a village north of Kidal called Aguel’hoc, which the Malians claim was perpetrated by AQIM (Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb) but the jury is out on what actually happened. But in Bamako, people certainly believe that the soldiers were badly treated and brutally murdered in Aguel’hoc. The Malian army also suffered some serious defeats a couple of weeks ago, in Tessalit, which is up near the Algerian border. The MNLA captured a lot of soldiers, and the head of the MNLA, Mohamed Ag Najm, in an interview with El Watan, the Algerian newspaper, said that the MNLA had tried to hand back the soldiers to the Malian authorities but that Mali did not seem to want them. So there is also the feeling that the soldiers are being abandoned. There is a lot of anger and this anger has clearly boiled over. The big question is “Who is behind this putsch?” The leader of this little junta, Captain Sanogo, is a complete unknown, although he has fought on the frontline and has experience of the north-east. Whenever he and his junta make declarations on the TV, it is clear that there are no senior officers involved in this coup at all - no-one above the rank of captain. I think it is generally accepted that when there is a military coup in an former French colony, the French army have got something to do with it, or at least some prior knowledge, as the links between the armies in Mali and Senegal for example and the French army are very close. Most senior Malian officers will have been trained in French military academies. It is possible that this coup may be the exception and that it is being led by a group of fairly young junior soldiers who are clearly very angry. It looks like they have taken over but it is not clear if the rest of the army has gone over with them. The jury is completely out on this, we will see how this situation develops.

What about the AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb)? Does this group exist and are there any links with the MNLA as some have suggested?
No Tuareg has ever killed or maimed another human being in the name of religion – certainly not in the last sixty years. I say that just to make clear that there is no cultural affinity between the Tuareg and AQIM. There is no question that AQIM does actually exist, this has been verified, but the more difficult question is who are its friends and enemies? They carry out kidnappings and have murdered people, including soldiers and policemen and have carried out suicide attacks. But there is a great deal of conjecture about this whole issue. What does certainly happen is that many western African and North African governments use Al Qaeda to discredit political or independence and autonomy movements.


What are AQIM’s relations with the Tuaregs?
Before this rebellion, the supreme leader of the Tuareg rebel movement was Iyad Ag Ghali, who is an Iforas Tuareg. He led the rebellion in the early 1990s and was also involved in the 2006 rebellion. But he got religion in the late 1990s, thanks to Pakistani preachers who started visiting northern Mali with the aim of converting the Tuareg to the Salafist fundamentalist view of Islam. In most cases they were unsuccessful, but they did manage to convert Ag Ghali who has, apparently, over the last 10 years, become increasingly extremist. In the run up to this uprising, he went to see the MNLA and offered to be their leader, as he had been in the past, but this time his candidature was rejected. The MNLA have made it absolutely clear on many occasions that they are a secular and democratic revolutionary movement, with the emphasis on secular. Iyad was also apparently rejected as leader of the Iforas clan too. The Iforas are still being led by a very ancient man called Intala Ag Attaher, so despite an imminent succession crisis in the clan, he was turned down as the amenokal, as they call a leader in the Tuareg language. He declared that he wanted to bring shariah law to the Tuareg homelands and most Tuaregs do not want shariah. The role of women is relatively prominent, free and strong in Tuareg society. Tuareg society is not profligate or hedonistic, but it is religiously tolerant and people are free to express their own minds. It is a matriarchal society and very different from Saudi Arabian society, for example.

Was that the end of Iyad Ag Ghali?
No, he went on to form a movement called Ansar Al Din, which means the “followers of the faithful”. There are reports that he got together a group of like-minded Tuaregs with similar tribal allegiances and they, it is said, are fighting alongside the MNLA as a semi-autonomous wing of the rebel movement. They were apparently very present in the Aguel’hoc and Tessalit battles. The problem is that their presence has allowed Mali to construct the theory that the MNLA are in cahoots with Al Qaeda. There is also the fact that the Tuareg, probably for monetary reasons, have done odd jobs, a bit of kidnapping, a bit of supplying, guiding and driving for Al Qaeda. It is important to understand that when Al Qaeda arrived in the area in 2007/2008, they destroyed the tourist industry, destroyed the NGO industry and destroyed any kind of outside involvement in the area, which catapulted it into a state of economic crisis. So if someone comes along and says: “I’ll give you $500 to drive this van” or whatever, you can imagine that the temptation is extraordinary.

Is unemployment a big issue in this conflict? What is the social background?
The social context is that the north-east of Mali has been more or less forgotten in terms of the general development of the country. The first uprising was in 1963 and for the next 20 years, right up until the next uprising in the 1990s, the area was completely marginalized – it was a no-go area, you couldn’t even visit it. It was basically a military occupied zone. Then in 1991 there was a revolution of sorts in Mali and the dictator Moussa Traoré was thrown out. What is ironic is that the current President Touré came to power in that military coup in 1991 which came off the back of a Tuareg uprising. Since then there have been attempts to develop the north. Rather large sums of money have been thrown at the north, some of which, it has to be said, have been embezzled by unscrupulous Tuareg leaders. However what really angered many of the Tuaregs was that a large chunk of the fund called the PSPDN was being used to build military barracks, and to remilitarize the north. That is one of the reasons why the fighting broke out on 17 January this year. This made them feel it was either now or never, otherwise the military presence was going to become too well-established.

On a normal day when the conflict is in abeyance, how are relations between Malians and Tuaregs?
They normally get on pretty well. Until recently, there were a lot of Tuaregs living in Bamako, the capital. They worked in the Malian administration in various jobs, working for NGOs, government bodies, teaching in the universities. That kind of social mixing was happening in other cities like Segou, Mopti, Timbuktu and Gao as well. But there is a historic enmity as well. Malians sometimes think that the Tuareg are fundamentally racist and possess this ‘slave owner’ mentality. Tuaregs often think that black southerners are racist towards them, calling them the ‘Red Skins’ and other pejorative names. So there is some social tension between them. Having said that, I think that many Tuaregs had made their peace with the idea that they were a part of Mali and that they were just going to have to get on with living in Mali.

And what about the neighbours, like Mauritania? Mali has accused Mauritania of actually interfering in Malian affairs by supporting the Tuareg. Is there any truth in these accusations?
If you read the Malian press there are constant accusations against various outside entities and countries, such as Mauritania. That particular accusation is based on the fact that the MNLA’s political wing has basically set up shop in Nouakchott, the capital of Mauritania. So the political leaders are based there and there is a suspicion in Mali that there have been high level governmental links between Mauritania and the MNLA. The official statements from the Mauritanian President all say that Mauritania respects Malian territorial integrity and that conflicts must be resolved by peaceful means. Behind the scenes, who knows? That said, I don’t think any country wants to see an independent Azawad. It is too dangerous. They are also suspicious in Mali regarding Algeria, as Algeria considers north-eastern Mali to be its backyard, its own zone of influence. The Algerians have always manipulated Tuareg politics in that area. They did so especially to counteract the influence of Gaddafi when he was in power. So there was something of a fight between the Algerians and Gaddafi as to who was the real friend of the Tuaregs.

What about oil and gas? Is the area strategic in terms of its mineral resources?
Yes, one thing that has been happening in the last 5 years is that northern Mali has been explored, and parcelled off as lots for oil drilling. Those lots have already been sold off – and I should say this is where things get very murky and where some serious investigative journalism needs to be done. Total, the French oil company, were involved in the exploration, as were the Qatar Petroleum Company. As we know, both Qatar and France were heavily involved in the overthrow of Gaddafi and many Malian commentators see a conspiracy theory in which France (remembering that France and the Tuaregs did try and set up a Tuareg state back in the ’50s prior to Malian independence which was quashed by the FLN in Algeria and the leaders of independent Mali) have always rued the fact that they lost all their colonies and access to the rich minerals in northern Mali. So many Malians see the Tuareg rebellion as being engineered by the French. In general, the Sahara is very fertile ground for conspiracy theories as it’s so hard to verify anything that goes on there. Even people who know a lot about Al Qaeda are convinced that Al Qaeda in Islamic Maghreb is a creation of the Algerian secret services. Others are convinced they were invited into northern Mali by the Malian government itself in order to be able to delegitimize any Tuareg insurgency. The Sahara plays on the mind. There are also rumours about drug trafficking and that the Malian government and army have had a role in that. Tuaregs too. The whole area is a dream for authors of crime and conspiracy novels.

If the situation deteriorates in Mali surely the French will not sit back and watch it happen?
It is difficult to say, it depends what links they have with these young soldiers involved in the coup. It is not clear if the French have any control over them. I am inclined to think the French will try and re-install President Touré – presenting themselves as the defenders of democracy – and bring things back to the way they were. The French are also terrified of the Islamic threat. They have already lived through their Algerian experience so this is nothing new to them, but they will not want Mali to become an Islamic state. One thing that is not talked about very much is the creeping influence of Salafist fundamentalist ideology in southern Mali. This has been happening over the last three years. But as for the big picture, we will have to wait and see how this coup plays out.

Mali’s Tuareg Rebellion « The Global Dispatches

 

[Sonni]

What do the Touareg want?
February 1, 2013

ANALYSIS: Secular nationalist? Loyalist? Die-hard Islamist? - what are the currents of opinion among the Touareg of Northern Mali?

What do the Touareg want? Well, find me a person called ‘the Touareg’ and maybe he or she will tell us. You might as well find ‘the English’ or ‘the Japanese’ and ask them what they want while you’re at it.

A nation or people rarely if ever think as one. In the case of the Touareg, difference and disharmony is exacerbated by their vast desert habitat and dispersed nomadic lifestyle, both of which tend to foster an allegiance to blood and tribe that is stronger than their attachment to nation or ideology and militate against collective thought or action.

It can be argued that the very notion of a people called ‘The Touareg’ is an invention of 19th century explorers and anthropologists, who adopted this supra-tribal and alien, i.e. Arab, collective noun to group together the Amazigh or Berber speaking nomadic tribes of the southern Sahara. Before ‘Touareg’ there were only different clans loosely affiliated by their language and cultural habits; Taitoq, Kel Ghela, Kel Ajjer, Kel Gress, Kel Fadey, Kel Ferwan, Ifoghas, Taghat Mellet, Iwellemeden, Chamanamas, Kel Antessar, Daoussahak…the list is long.

And all these clans were further sub-divided into sub-clans and sub-sub-clans. Within one of the six large confederations – the Kel Ahaggar, Kel Ajjer, Kel Aïr, Kel Adagh, Iwellemeden and Kel Taddemakkat – clans and sub-clans were organized into a complex hierarchy of nobles, vassals, warriors, artisans, marabout and slaves. This intricate social structure, which is well nigh-impossible for an outsider to grasp instinctively, underpins modern Touareg politics, despite the considerable erosion of the old clan system in the past century or so.

This historical backdrop, coupled with the fact that the Touareg share their living space with other ethnicities like the Arabs, Fulani and Songhoi, all of whom have their own layered clan structure, makes the Sahara one of the most complex places on earth for an outsider to understand.

Today, the Touareg are a made up of individuals with residual tribal allegiances, different levels of wealth and social position, different attitudes to religion, life and the world beyond their horizon.

Amongst the Touareg of northern Mali, you will find every shade of opinion from diehard nationalist through moderate Islamist, convinced Salafist and heartfelt loyalist – loyalist to the Republic of Mali that is. Some of the secular cadres and footsoldiers of the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) still cling to their nationalist dream of complete independence from Mali. Others realize that forces beyond their control won’t them to realize this ultimate goal, and are pragmatically realigning the aims and objectives with a autonomy within the current borders of Mali, or some kind of federal solution.

The leaders of what remains of the hardline Islamist militia Ansar ud-Dine trust that Allah and his unbending law will put their world to rights, whilst maintaining links with out-an-out mafia-terrorist organisations such as Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) or the West African Movement for Oneness and Jihad (MUJAO). The ‘moderate’ Islamic Movement of Azawad (MIA), either for ideological or opportunistic reasons, most likely both, has severed all ties with Ansar ud-Dine, and is pursuing a more conciliatory line which nonetheless shares most of the MNLA’s autonomous ambitions. Loyalists like the Touareg militia leader Alhaji Ag Gamou, who has re-entered the fray in northern Mali after languishing for ten months in exile in Niger, keep faith with the Republic of Mali and its promise of advancement for Touareg social groups that were once firmly at the bottom of the tribal pile.

Disharmony and enmity between different Touareg groups and individuals has always existed. At independence in 1960, Mali, Algeria and Niger effectively co-opted the French strategy of divide and rule to deal with their Touareg populations, favoring and advancing ‘friendly’ tribal chiefs whilst curtailing the power of hostile ones. When seething tensions in the north east of Mali burst into open rebellion in 1963, the two sons of the amenokal or chief of the noble Ifoghas clan who ruled in northeastern Mali, were on opposite sides of the argument. Intallah Ag Attaher favoured making peace with the Malians and finding an accommodation within the new socialist republic, whilst his brother Zeyd Ag Attaher sided with the rebels and paid for it by spending over a decade in one of the remotest prisons on earth, up near the salt mines of Taodenni in the far north of Mali.

Perhaps, at this stage, it’s worth giving a brief answer to the most essential of questions: why did the Touareg of northeastern Mali rebel in the first place? Nina Wallet Intallou, ex-Malian politician and member of the MNLA’s executive council, proffers the simplest of answers; because the new nation was a mistake. What she means is that the new borders of Mali divided the Touareg of north eastern Mali from the Arab and Berber dominated desert lands further north, with which they had deep economic, cultural and historical ties, and lumped them together with the sedentary black people of the south, with whom they had less in common.

Many Touareg could not see why the Bambara, Soninké and Malinké people of the south should impose their language, culture and socialist ideas on them, especially as these ‘blacks’ had never actually vanquished the Touareg in battle, which, although painful, might at least have given their new overlords some kind of legitimacy. And, yes, racism was part of mix as well. Some northern Touareg and Arab leaders argued that they came from noble Cherifian lineages that went right back to the Prophet Mohammed and, as such, found the idea of being subservient to less ‘favoured’ southern blacks completely unacceptable.

Meanwhile, the new rulers of Mali, hundreds of kilometres down south in the capital Bamako, thought of the Touareg as belligerent, racist, feudal, arrogant and lazy. They couldn’t understand why these recalcitrant nomads refused to salute the new Malian flag and accept the government’s bright new socialist ideas, especially their modern ‘scientific’ collectivised farming methods or the secular school curriculum, all of which, the new leaders hoped, would drag the Touareg kicking and screaming from their outmoded, ‘medieval’ way of life and into the 20th century.

It was, in short, a dire mismatch. The first rebellion of 1963 and its brutal suppression by a paranoid and inexperienced Malian army ensured that relations between the central government and their far-flung nomads in the north got off to the worst possible start. The bitterness generated by the conflict was deepened by the terrible droughts of 1972-3, during which up to 80% of the northern animal herds died and thousands of Touareg families were forced to flee the country in search of food and work. The corrupt misappropriation of aid by government officials during the crisis only made things worse.

From about 1985 right through to the signing of the National Pact in 1992, which signaled the official end of the great rebellion of 1990-1, the Touareg rebel movement was perhaps more unified under the leadership of the then firmly secular and nationalist Iyad Ag Ghali than it has ever been, before or since. But after the Pact was signed, the movement split along tribal lines into a chaotic alphabet soup of different militias, some of which ended up actually fighting each other in open combat. At the roots of this split was a jealousy and fear of the ruling Ifoghas tribe, to which Iyad Ag Ghali belonged. Other competing tribes like the Idnan and Taghat Mellet formed their own rival rebel group, in which Imghad or ‘vassal’ groups, think of them as the Touareg working classes (a gross over simplification, but I fear more complexity at this stage will simply loose you dear reader), slowly gained prominence and eventually ended up fighting a bitter internecine war with the Ifoghas.

As the 1990s progressed, the new democratically elected Malian government of President Amadou Toumani Touré, an ex-soldier who many Touareg accused of perpetrating atrocities against civilians during the rebellion, did little to honour the promises made in the National Pact and continued the policy of divide and rule in the north. Rebellion broke out again in 2006 and then again in January 2012. In fact, many Touareg argue that the north has been in one constant state of rebellion, with periods of greater or lesser open armed conflict, since 1963.

Nonetheless, the status of the Touareg within the Malian republic has undoubtedly changed over the years, whatever the ultra-nationalist Touareg might say. When Mali threw out the military dictatorship of Moussa Traore and brought in multi-party democracy in 1992, which heralded a period of great hope and social dynamism in the country, the total isolation that the Touareg of the far north east had known since independence was broken. Touareg leaders were given representation in national politics, and in 2002, for the first time ever, a Touareg was nominated prime minister. Even though many of the funds allocated to developing the north were embezzled, either by corrupt local leaders or central government officials, some of the money did get through and some schools, wells and clinics were built, although far too few in the eyes of those who continued to clamour for development and independence.

Touareg clans who had been subservient to the warrior-nobility in colonial times, such as the vassal Imghad or Bellah (‘slaves’) favoured the weakening of the old social hierarchies that being citizens of the Republic of Mali inevitably entailed. It gave them the chance to climb up the social ladder and achieve both wealth and status, a redrawing of social boundaries that often angered old clan bigwigs. The Malian government also favoured a few talented Imghad men when it came to filling important vacancies in local administration or the army, much to the envy and fury of some belonging to ‘nobler’ tribes.

Furthermore, many younger Touareg, born after the years of drought and deprivation in the 1970s and 1980s were less driven by the notion that a future within Mali was impossible. They had, de facto, been Malian all their lives. Many had traveled to the south and learned at least a few words of Bambara. They listened to southern music and watched TV programmes made in Bamako. Whilst they still felt separate in many ways, that sense of alienation was weaker than it had been in their parents’ day.

But the bitterness and frustration remained and so did the marginalization. Touareg soldiers like Hassan Ag Fagaga, leader of the 2006 uprising, seethed at being denied promotion in the Malian army. Touaregs saw injustice in the fact that there was hardly any Tamashek music on national TV and absolutely no Tamashek language programmes. They bemoaned the lack of proper schools, clinics and roads in the north east. Furthermore, bitter old memories continued to die hard. Most of the Touareg rebel leaders in northern Mali are the “sons of ‘63”, in other words, men whose parents suffered great injustices in the uprising of 1963. Ghali Ag Babakar, the father of Islamist leader Iyad Ag Ghali, was killed in that uprising, as was the father of Mohammed Ag Najm, the military leader of the MNLA. Their hurt is still visceral and deep, as is their mistrust of the government in Bamako.

Islamism, however, is an entirely new element in this story. Until the mid 1990s, no Touareg leader had ever fought a rebellion in order to impose his brand of Islam on others by force. It was around 1995 that proselytising preachers from the Tablighi Jama’at, a peaceful Pakistani Muslim missionary organisation, started spreading their daw’ah or ‘summons’ throughout Mali. Iyad Ag Ghali, fascinated by their message, invited them up to Kidal in the northeast. He was disillusioned by the fractiousness of Touareg tribal politics and had more or less come to the conclusion that an independent Touareg state in northern Mali would never work. Moreover, although he doesn’t belong to the sub-clan of the Ifoghas from which the clan chief is chosen, he hoped that by associating himself with this new Islamism he would reinforce his prospects of becoming the first non-hereditary leader of the Ifoghas Touareg. No one doubted his supreme talents as a military and political leader, but Ag Ghaly lacked legitimacy as a religious figure. He figured that an association with the ‘alien’ Salafi doctrines of the Tablighi Jama’at and their logical ‘modern’ view of Islam might provide him with that legitimacy and allow him to contest the authority of Intallah Ag Attaher, the current aging leader of the Ifoghas clan.

Other figures in the Ifoghas nobility were also seduced by the ‘purist’ Salafi teachings of the Tablighi preachers, including Alghabass Ag Intalla, the current leader of the MIA, and the notorious war lord Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, who was killed in a ‘car crash’ in the summer of 2011. [NB Getting 'killed in a car crash' is often a desert euphemism for being assassinated in some way]. But in the end it only was Iyad Ag Ghali and a very close coterie of fellow Ifoghas who immersed themselves entirely in this new religious philosophy. Some, including Iyad, went so far as to further their studies at a Tablighi centre near the city of Lahore in Pakistan and at mosques in Bamako and Paris. He also became very strict and puritanical in his outlook and personal habits.

...

 

[Sonni]

...
After Islamist terror groups from Algeria started to operate in northern Mali from about 2001 onwards, they soon made common cause with Iyad and a small but growing group of Touareg Salafists. Moreover, the GSPC, precursor of Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), began to earn large sums from kidnapping, smuggling and money-laundering. Their presence and nefarious activities skewed the economy of northeastern Mali, such as it was, and realigned it around kidnapping, and the smuggling of drugs, arms, cigarettes, stolen cars. Tourism died a swift death, and, thanks more to desperation than religious fervour, some young Touareg accepted employment with the Islamists as drivers, informers, foot soldiers and runners.

In order to undermine the continuing Touareg insurgency, the governments of Mali and Algeria at best tolerated this presence and, at worst, actually encouraged it in clandestine ways. Confusing the cause of Touareg self-determination with that of Islamic militancy bought Mali kudos in the international community and enrolled their decades old secessionist problem into the much wider and better publicised global war on terror. France and the USA reacted to the creeping presence of Al Qaida-affiliates in northern Mali by boosting military aid, money that often disappeared into the pockets of corrupt politicians and generals. Eventually, the Touareg nationalist cause became synonymous with Islamism, Al Qaida, Osama Bin Laden and the global war on terror. The effect was a very neat emasculation of Touareg dreams and a deep tarnishing of the Touareg image in the eyes of the rest of the world.

With weapons stolen from Colonel Khadafy, a man who had always dampened Touareg ambitions whilst seeming to support their cause, the latest and most far reaching rebellion was launched a year ago. But it was hobbled from the outset by disunity. A large number of the Touareg soldiers who returned from Libya belonged to a tribe called the Idnan who had traditionally competed with the Ifoghas for dominance in the northeast. Iyad Ag Ghali demanded to become leader of the new rebellion but his advances were rejected. He also tried to impose his Salafi philosophy on the movement, but he was once again turned down. Smarting from this rejection he formed his own militia, Ansar ud-Dine, to which the best Ifoghas fighters soon swore allegiance. Blood proved thicker than water, or political philosophy for that matter, and furthermore, his coffers full of AQIM money, Iyad was able to pay and equip his army properly. His aim was not independence but Shari’ah law for all of Mali. He ‘lent’ his muscle to the MNLA but when the Malian army were defeated in May, he and his backers in AQIM hi-jacked the whole uprising and turned it into an Islamist takeover. The MNLA meanwhile, abandoned by most potential backers at home and abroad, limped along without the necessary funds.

Now, the Touareg nationalist cause has been as good as buried under a tempest of paranoia about “Al-Qaida linked terrorists” in the Sahel, a new front in the global war on terror and all the other pat phrases that the media habitually resort to in these circumstances. Iyad Ag Ghaly and his fellow Ifoghas Salafists will obviously bear the brunt of the blame for this turn of affairs. His reputation in certain Touareg circles, once fairly glowing and venerable, is now devilish indeed.

France has piled in to stop the rot. Malians are understandably jubilant. But contrary to what the British Prime Minister David Cameron said in the House of Parliament recently, this isn’t primarily a global problem. It’s a very local one. Yes, the Algerian terrorists who run AQIM have sworn allegiance to the global Al Qaida franchise. Yes, they dream the same dreams and talk the same flowery language as jihadis in Somalia, Yemen and Afghanistan. But the prime reasons behind the existence of radical armed terrorist groups in northern Mali are all to do with local problems; poverty, underdevelopment, corruption, crime, regional self-determination, ethnic aspiration etc etc. To wade in with MIGs, tanks and boots on the ground without understanding the specific local problems facing people in northern Mali is to court eventual defeat and disaster.

Perhaps, on deep reflection, it’s possible to define a few hopes and dreams that unite most Touareg. I say ‘most’, because total agreement seems virtually impossible. A visceral attachment to their earth, to the beauty, pristine wildness, simplicity and space of their desert home seems to be almost universal. So is the deep nostalgia or assouf felt by most Touareg when they’re absent from it, either by compulsion or of their own free will. This feeling alone accounts for the emotional power of 90% of all Touareg music, including that of world famous Touareg guitar groups like Tinariwen, Tamikrest and Terakaft.

Most Touareg want to see this natural beauty, this freedom of the wide open spaces preserved and with it the nomadic pastoralism that has been practised there for millennia. Then again, there are some, a few, that consider nomadism to have no future at all and who urge their fellow Touareg to accept the sedentary life as the only route to a modern and sustainable future.

Allied to nature and nomadism is the Touareg’s unique Berber culture, especially their language, which is called Tamashek and their alphabet, the oldest in the world to have been kept in continuous use, which is called Tifinagh. Keeping Tamashek alive has been a major motivation behind the Touareg rebellions of the past, spurring demands for Tamashek education and Tamashek speaking television channels

Then there are the other mainstays of Touareg culture that most Touareg treasure. Among them are music, poetry, jewellery-making, leather-working, story-telling, traditional healing, camel breeding and more. But, once again, this cultural pride isn’t felt by all Touareg. A tiny ‘lunatic’ fringe of Salafi Touareg consider their Berber culture to be backward and irrelevant in the modern world, a folksy throw-back kept alive by meddling western anthropologists. They would prefer their people to adopt Arabic, the language of the Qu’ran and of the wider Muslim community. With that they would welcome a greater Arabisation of the Touareg. They deem certain other aspects of Touareg culture, especially music and dance, to be licentious and ungodly and they object to the relative freedom and social power that Touareg women enjoy. They also revile the old ‘backward’ Sufi traditions of Islam that most Touareg adhere to.It’s important to stress however that these Salafi attitudes are shared by a small minority of Touareg. Unfortunately, that minority includes a few of the most powerful men in Touareg society, including Iyad Ag Ghali.

Lastly, almost all Touareg bemoan the dearth of social and economic development in their homeland since the end of colonialism. They would like to see more schools, more health clinics, more wells, better roads, cheaper petrol, cheaper food, better distribution of goods, less criminality, more peace and stability. When a Touareg musician sings that his desert is dying of thirst, this is what he means. Without development, the desert is going nowhere.

These then are the dreams that most Touareg share. It’s the conflicting views on how to make those dreams come true that divide them. The nationalists believe that Mali can no longer be trusted to serve the best interests of the Touareg. They argue that the Touareg and other northern ethnic groups, especially the Arabs, will forever be marginalised and discriminated against within a Malian state. Only independence can guarantee a future for the Touareg people and their culture. The MNLA have also been at pains to prove that this opinion is shared by all the major ethnic groups in the north – Touareg, Arab, Songhoi, Fulani, Bozo etc. Mostly however, it’s only Touareg and Arabs who buy into it in large numbers. The nationalists also look outwards and favour alliances with foreign powers and international institutions such as the UN and the EU, as long as they further the cause.

The hardline Islamists believe that borders only serve to divide up the great Muslim community or ‘ummah’ and will eventually lead to greater human suffering and evil. For them, a simple and strict adherence to the word of God and to his law is all the Touareg and the greater Malian nation need in order to eradicate the vices introduced from the west and re-establish a safe, clean and prosperous state of affairs in the Sahel. They distrust the west of course, and if help is needed, prefer to consider local resources or appeal to other Muslim states, especially those in the Middle East like Saudi Arabia or Qatar, for support. Iyad Ag Ghali himself is especially adamant that Muslims should help each other and not go running cap in hand to infidels. That is why he chose to make a pact with Al Qaida and accept their ‘dirty’ money in his fight to create an Islamic Republic in the north of Mali, even though he doesn’t necessarily share AQIM’s cold hatred of all things non-Muslim or their propensity to target innocent people. More moderate Islamists like Alghabass Ag Intalla have rejected this alliance with the ‘narco-terrorists’ and aligned themselves with MNLA whilst maintaining their insistence that the future autonomous region of Azawad should essentially be founded on Islamic principles, in legal, political and moral terms at least.

It must be said that what motivates Touareg Islamist leaders like Iyad Ag Ghali and what spurs young Touareg men to join his cause isn’t necessarily the same. For the latter, the promise of safety within a large, powerful and well-armed group coupled with the prospect of good equipment and regular salary are major attractions. Furthermore, for a young man who has known only poverty, unemployment and hopelessness is recent years, a job and concomitant status with Ansar ud-Dine can seem bright and attractive. The fact that Ansar ud-Dine has seem its ranks heavily depleted almost overnight following the French intervention is proof of the opportunistic motives of many of its former footsoldiers.

Some have even claimed, probably too charitably, that Iyad Ag Ghali created Ansar ud-Dine in order to given young Touareg a chance to express what he believed to be their natural Islamic identity whilst avoiding the compromise of joining the Arab dominated Al Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb. In other words Ansar ud-Dine offered young Touareg the opportunity to be both genuine Islamists whilst preserving their essential Targuité or Touaregness.

Lastly, there are the loyalists who prefer to see Mali remain intact. They believe that a Touareg dominated state in the north is an impossibility. The Touareg are simply too internally divided, they say, too inexperienced in terms of administration and statesmanship and too dominated by self-serving clan elites to make an independent state viable. They’ll probably admit that Mali is far from perfect, but better to build a future within its democratic and republican confines than accept the possibility of an autocratic ruler in the north, who needs must will inevitably resort to repression and violence in order to keep all the disparate tribal and ethnic tensions in an independent Azawad at bay.

Moreover, what would an independent Azawad actually live on. Gold? Oil? Phosphates? Livestock? Tourism? The economic life of the Sahara is simply too fragile, and too dependent on more urban societies to the south and north to exist independently. Lastly and most importantly, Azawad is an impossibility simply because Algeria would never allow it.

This loyalism is common not only among the Imghad clans of the far north east, but among other Touareg tribes who have had a less tortured relationship with Bamako in the past than that of the Ifoghas. These include the giant Iwellemeden confederation of the Menaka area, the Kel Antessar of Timbuktu and Goundam and the Chamanamas of the Gao region. But then again, within all those groups, the full range of opinions can still be found.

So what do the Touareg want? Impossible to say in one snappy soundbite. Except perhaps, a good drenching of rain to soak the parched earth every summer. But that, only the Almighty can provide.

ANALYSIS: What do the Touareg want? | ANDY MORGAN WRITES | Andy Morgan Writes

 

[88m3]

thanks for sharing @Sonni

 

[Sonni]

Finally an english speaking westerner who knows what he’s talking about and doesn't blindly takes over and spreads the Tuareg supremacist agenda like most western journalists do. Bruce Whitehouse, professor of sociology and anthropology at the University of Lehigh, Pennsylvania (USA). This guy actually lived in Mali interacting with Malians, studying malian culture for several years and speaks the main malian language.

He has an interesting blog about Mali: About | Bridges from Bamako

 

[Sonni]

@throughthefire for spitting that real knowledge in here

 

[Box Cutta]

I really wish that a Black African nation could find a way to become a nuclear power.

 

[88m3]

There's a special on Mali on France 24 right now if anyone is interested.

 

[Sonni]

Malians in Gao protest against French 'bias'
30 May 2013




Thousands of people in Mali's northern city of Gao have staged a protest, accusing France of favouring their rivals from the ethnic Tuareg group.

The protesters said Paris was colluding in the continuing occupation by the Tuareg of the regional capital Kidal.

The separatist rebels say they will not allow the Malian authorities into Kidal ahead of elections planned for July.

France led a military operation that ousted Islamist insurgents from northern Mali earlier this year.

Paris began withdrawing some of its 4,000 troops from the country in April and plans to gradually hand over to the Malian army and a UN peacekeeping force before the elections.
'Confused'

Organisers of Thursday's protest said that up to 3,000 took part in the rally - although officials said the number was significantly less.

The protest was staged by a coalition of the region's powerful civilian militia groups, who voiced their anger of being excluded from talks to bring peace to the north.

The coalition pointed out that the Tuareg, on the other hand, had been invited to the talks in Burkina Faso.

"We want France to tell us what they are up to," protester Moussa Boureima Yoro was quoted as saying by the Associated Press news agency.

"We are confused when they say, on the one hand that Kidal is part of Mali, and - at the same time - they act as if it doesn't belong to Mali," he added.

Hamil Toure, one of the demonstrators, told the BBC that the local militias remained armed and would block the elections if their demands were not met.

Many Gao residents - alongside with most southern Malians - accuse the Tuareg, including the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), of being responsible for the war in Mali.

Last year, the MNLA swept across the north, seizing town and proclaiming the birth of a new Tuareg nation.

But they were soon pushed out by their former Islamist militant allies before France intervened.

The MNLA later supported France in its offensive against the Islamists.


BBC News - Malians in Gao protest against French 'bias'

 

[Chris.B]

It's always the white mans fault not those murdering in the name of their God.

 

[Sonni]

Mali: France, Kidal, and the MNLA
Posted on May 24, 2013





The story I want to tell here can be told with headlines:
AFP, May 18: “France Accused of Favouring Mali’s Tuareg Rebels.”
Reuters, May 19: “After Crushing Mali Islamists, France Pushes Deal with Tuaregs.”
USA Today, May 20: “French Troops Depart Mali, Leaving Joy, Worries.”

These articles leave the reader with the impression that France is continuing to intervene in Malian politics even as it reduces its military presence there, and that its political stances are proving unpopular.

France and other outside powers have flirted heavily with the idea that the Tuareg-led National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), a movement that advocated northern Malian separatism during the early phase of last year’s rebellion, is a politically acceptable negotiating partner, and one that deserves some political stake in post-conflict northern Mali. Some Western policymakers find this belief alluring, I suspect, because it helps them categorize northern Malians into “good” and “bad” rebels and offers hope of putting various genies back into various bottles. If the MNLA speaks for northern Malians, the argument runs, reaching an agreement with it could resolve the conflict.

My own opinion is that the MNLA’s brutality and loss of political control in early 2012 refutes the notion that they can speak for northern Mali – they only speak for part of it. The recent withdrawal from the MNLA of one of its key leaders provides further evidence that the MNLA only speaks for some.

Outsiders would be wise to question the reductionist view that positions the MNLA as the most significant political force in northern Mali. Outsiders’ attempts to apply such a view could cause backlash on the ground. As the city of Kidal, which the MNLA now helps control, becomes a symbol in struggles over the future identity of Mali, France’s positions appear out of step with the views of many Malians.

The Reuters article mentioned above explains:
A standoff over how to restore Malian government authority to Kidal, the last town in the desert north yet to be brought under central control, is sowing resentment with Paris and could delay planned elections to restore democracy after a coup.

Mali’s army has moved troops towards Kidal, a stronghold of the MNLA Tuareg separatists, but missed a self-imposed deadline this week to retake the Saharan town. France, which has its own forces camped outside, does not want Malian troops to march on the town, fearing ethnic bloodshed if it is taken by force.

[...]
Many in government and on the streets of Bamako blame the January 2012 uprising by the Tuareg MNLA for unleashing the other calamities that nearly dissolved the country. Nationalists now want the army to march into Kidal to disarm the rebels.

France is instead backing secretive talks being held in neighboring Burkina Faso, designed to allow the July elections to take place, while urging Bamako to address Tuaregs’ long-standing demands for autonomy for their desert homeland.

Clashes between Arabs and Tuaregs have shown that ethnic tension remains high.

More on the talks here, and a short case study of Arab-Tuareg clashes here.

As of [URL=http://www.jeuneafrique.com/actu/20130522T205648Z20130522T205645Z/mali-mnla-d-accord-pour-une-presidentielle-a-kidal-mais-sans-l-armee.html#.UZ2TisGy0B8.twitter"]Wednesday (French), the MNLA had expressed willingness to let Kidal participate in presidential elections in July, but continued unwillingness to allow the Malian army to enter the city. The longer the political and military standoff over Kidal continues, the more frustrated other parts of the country could become – RFI (French) writes that Kidal has become “a national obsession in Mali,” and that its name “is on all the lips in Bamako.” Historical memories may contribute to this “obsession”: Kidal was created in 1991 (out of the Gao region) with the hopes of helping resolve the Tuareg-led rebellion of that time. Many non-Tuareg Malians reportedly blame the Tuareg for Mali’s crisis and view the Tuareg as angling for a greater share of government largesse than they deserve. As anger grows over the situation in Kidal, Malians who hold such views may become outraged by outsiders’ attempts to elevate the MNLA as the north’s premier political force.


by Alex Thurston - Sahelblog

^^
France has done well taking out islamist terrorists but in the 2nd fase of the operation they are favoring the Tuareg rebels over Arabs and Blacks in Mali going as far as attacking arab militia while protecting Tuareg militia from the malian army. France risks losing all the benefits of its intervention in Mali, which had led to an almost unanimous approval, in Mali, Niger and across Africa, if it engages, as it seems to do, in protection and support for the MNLA Tuareg separatists

 

[Sonni]

They(secular Tuareg rebels) are hunting blacks in Kidal (accusing them of being anti-independence,) the city they control with french benediction:

Mali: le MNLA accusé d'attaquer la population noire à Kidal

ironically some blacks got protected from being rounded up by islamist Tuaregs
Mali: la situation s'envenime à Kidal - Mali - RFI



* i will post more about it when I get english sources

 

[Sonni]

its been a year since I posted in this thread.
the islamist menace has decreased but there are still some attacks.

the separatist rebel groups and the malian government have started the long series of negotiations for peace in Algiers.