Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger: new pan-African winds?
By Vanessa Sanches
August 2, 2023
©REUTERS/ANNE MIMAULT
The Sahel region, comprising countries such as Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, has faced serious political and military challenges in recent decades. The three countries have been dealing with the growing threat of jihadist terrorism, which has generated instability and insecurity in the region. However, there is another struggle that prevails in these three countries: the separation from the Françafrique project, which maintains a pernicious influence of the former colonizer in the region — at the political, financial and military level. Despite the complex geopolitical, economic and social contours, in this article, we uncover what led to the latest events in the Sahel, with the considerations of
Sumaila Jaló, a Bissau-Guinean activist and researcher, and
Mamadou Ba, a Portuguese-Senegalese political activist.
Mali: Withdrawal of French troops
In Mali, after nine years of presence, France officially withdrew its troops in August, ending Operation Barkhane, a military campaign to combat terrorism that began in 2013. The operation was initially successful in recapturing cities in the central north of the country, but subsequently faced significant challenges. In January of this year, Mali decided to expel the French ambassador from its territory, after intense tension between the two countries.
The relationship between Paris and Bamako deteriorated after the military coup in May 2021 and disputes over democratic elections in January 2022. The French government cited the lack of commitment of the military junta — led by Colonel Assimi Goïta — to resolve the security issues as a reason for its withdrawal. However, public opinion in Mali also became increasingly opposed to the French presence in the region, seeing it as a form of neocolonialism.
Under the new Constitution — overwhelmingly approved with 96.91% of the votes in the June 18 referendum — French ceased to be an
official language in the country, thus relegated to a working language.
A strategic region for uranium exploration
Mali is among the 25 poorest countries in the world; 80% of the population works in the primary sector (it is also known for its cotton exports). Its subsoil contains gold (seven mines), especially near the border with Senegal, where it is extracted in sometimes dubious conditions. It is the third African producer (after South Africa and Ghana) of the yellow metal, exploited by Anglo-Saxon multinationals, but it also has iron ore, bauxite, phosphate and marble mines. However, explorations do not reach the level of a mining giant like the Democratic Republic of Congo or South Africa.
Although France does not have relevant economic interests in Mali, it does in the sub-region. Starting with uranium (a chemical element used as fuel to generate nuclear energy and also to produce atomic weapons) from Niger.
The country is the third world producer of the mineral and is the main supplier (one third) of France — which is one of the five States with nuclear weapons and with nuclear energy representing 75% of its electricity matrix.
In 2008, supplies from Niger represented 43% of the total registered by French company Orano (formerly Areva), the world's largest manufacturer of nuclear reactors and present in Niger since the 1970s. It should be noted that the company is also involved in a public health scandal in that region, due to the high rates of cancer, respiratory diseases and deformities caused by exposure to radiation.
At the end of July this year, a military coup took place in Niger, with the aim of overthrowing the government of President Mohamed Bazoum — an important French ally. In response to possible intentions of intervention by ECOWAS and France, the military governments of Mali and Burkina Faso issued joint statements, warning that any military intervention against the coup leaders in Niger would be considered a “declaration of war” against their countries. Mali and Burkina Faso affirmed their solidarity with the people of Niger, arguing that the latter have the right to assume control of their destiny and sovereignty.
Burkina Faso: opposition to French presence
In Burkina Faso, there is also current resistance to French military presence. In early 2023, the Burkinabé government announced the end of the French Saber Force in its territory, withdrawing from the 2018 defense agreements that allowed the presence of 400 French soldiers in the country. Demonstrations and acts of vandalism against French targets such as cultural institutes and the embassy reflected discontent with the French presence and influence of “Françafrique”.
The transitional president, Captain
Ibrahim Traoré, has been a scathing critic of the Gauls' role in the region and is looking for new partners — such as Russia and Turkey — to guarantee Burkina Faso's sovereignty. Speeches have also echoed ideals of assassinated President Thomas Sankara, advocating a more independent and nationalist approach to the country.
Pan-Africanism and ECOWAS challenges
Despite clear power asymmetries and a long postcolonial history of meddling in the domestic affairs of its former colonies, France has demonstrated an inability to support local governments with policies that might help restore their legitimacy and autonomy.
Recent events in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger reflect growing anti-imperialist sentiment and a demand for greater political and economic autonomy by countries in the Sahel region. The cause is particularly supported by the youth of these countries, who have been affected by instability and poverty caused by terrorism and foreign interference, especially from the West.
According to Mamadou Ba, a Portuguese-Senegalese political activist, “the degradation of democratic aspirations has a lot to do with the mafia scheme of Françafrique. There is, obviously, a geopolitical dispute between the ʽWestʼ and Russia for the control of raw materials, but what precipitated the situation was
France's desire to weaken the central powers in order to blackmail them in the negotiations over the control of resources, setting up nebulous organizations. These organizations invoke the territorial card but, essentially, are
branches of capture and control of natural resources and implement parallel networks for the exploration and sale of raw materials in order to condition the sovereignty of the states in defining the ways of exploration and production of these raw materials”.
The strength of this new political and military uprising against France gains power in the streets. The populations, especially the youth, are serving as a sounding board for discontent and supporting local authorities in their search for new partners, such as Russia.
Sumaila Jaló — a Bissau-Guinean activist and researcher with a degree in Portuguese Language Studies from the Tchico Té Higher Normal School, Bissau, in 2017, and a Masters degree in Contemporary History from the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Porto in 2020 — believes that the emergence of a true pan-Africanism — like that of independence supporters such as Amílcar Cabral, Thomas Sankara or Kwame Nkrumah — would require a unifying vision and a coordinated approach between Member States in the region and the continent as a whole, which is a complex task. “
It is still too early to speak of a pan-Africanism in the sense that Nkrumah and other historic leaders of the continent advocated. For this, it will be necessary to understand how the agendas of the powers to be instituted in the course of these military uprisings aim at economic and political integration on the continent. And how will this continent's unifying agenda assert itself on the geopolitical plane dominated by the usual Western forces? Russia can be referred to here as a country that sees in African countries potential allies in its dispute with the West and in the exploitation of these countries' resources, but never in the same proportion as the former colonial powers on the continent such as France”, says Sumaila Jaló.
On the recent coup prepared in Niger, the researcher and secondary school teacher indicates that “it happens along the lines of previous coups in the African region of Sahel. On the one hand, the country is faced with the difficult challenge of combating jihadist terrorism, which makes it insecure, as does the entire region; on the other hand, and linked to the first aspect, there is a growing opposition of Nigerien youth — similarly to what has been happening in the entire western sub-region of Africa — against the economic and geopolitical dominance exercised by France in the region. To these causes we can add their main consequence:
the feeling of insecurity and the desire of the population to see their country's resources being used to improve their conditions of survival“.
When questioned about the legitimacy of the new local powers — achieved through coups d'état — Mamadou Ba criticizes the vicious political game captured by a kleptocratic elite. “The electoral process has not been able to respond to the aspirations of the people, most of whom are young. And the memory of Sankara, which is still alive in the African collective conscience, makes the African peoples — namely the youth — believe that,
instead of the old corrupt political class at the service of neocolonialism, the hope for a complete liberation of the continent, with a better future, may be in the hands of young officers in African armies. What is happening in West Africa is, from this point of view, much more than a simple reconfiguration of the geopolitical dispute between potential or — if you like — foreign imperialist poles. This aspect is obviously there, just as it has always been there, but the difference here is that, more and more, young African leaders are emerging who have initiative and do not harbor any complex that ties them to a colonial affiliation with this or that other Western, Russian or Chinese partner”.
As for ECOWAS, “it also faces challenges in dealing with the situation in the region. The possibility of sending military forces to intervene in Niger places the organization in a delicate situation, as some of its members are aligned with the leaders of the coup in Niger and are opposed to an intervention. This demonstrates ECOWAS's inability to strengthen democratic institutions and resolve conflicts in the sub-region, since some of its leaders are authoritarian rulers with significant influence in the organization”, says Sumaila Jaló.
In a next step, considering the possibility of these countries dropping the CFA Franc — the currency used by 12 African nations (Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Benin, Congo, Mali, Central African Republic, Togo, Niger, Chad and Senegal) and issued by France — one of the major problems with the CFA franc, as the German newspaper Süddeutsche Zeitung reminds us, is that it is “
the last colonial currency in the world“. In fact, “member countries must deposit half of their foreign exchange reserves with the French central bank, whose representatives have the right of veto in all decisions concerning exchange rates and the money supply”.
For Jaló, the currency “will fall and it will be because of the denouncement made by young people and political sectors with which they identify in several African countries, especially the French-speaking ones. And ECOWAS knows that
there is no turning back from this determined fate for the currency that marks France's imperialist domination in West and Central Africa. It remains to be seen how the dominance of this French monetary instrument will come to an end, if only by changing the name, or by the total dominance of the countries of the sub-region over the new currency”.
In summary, the Sahel region faces complex political and military challenges, with the quest for greater autonomy and independence, the fight against terrorism and the role of foreign influence being central themes of debate and protest. The situation remains dynamic and calls for a careful and coordinated approach by regional and international stakeholders to achieve stability and sustainable development in the region.
Mamadou Ba also believes that other countries can join this triangle, after the emergence of new political leaders who are “markedly anti-system, anti-imperialist and pan-Africanist”.
This is the case in Chad, with Succès Masra and Ousmane Sonko in Senegal. Both are frowned upon by the West and are persecuted by plutocratic regimes, with the approval, if not the complicity, of the former settlers, namely France. That is why what is happening in Niger and the reaction of Burkina, Guinea, Mali and the new authorities in Niger is a consequence of this logic of
reconquering sovereignty and geostrategic and geopolitical redefinition by Africans themselves, without any complexes. What is happening also proves that
African regional and sub-regional and continental organizations will no longer be able to continue to be unions for lackeys of the West and its interests.
Ba stresses that the competition between “Western, Chinese and Russian imperialist poles on the continent will face a generation of leaders who seem to find inspiration and references in the great pan-African figures, N'krumah, Lumumba or Sankara”, which could be the unique opportunity for “
Africa finally rescuing itself, becoming its own strength and choosing which direction to go and what its contribution to the global geopolitical multipolarity“.
Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger: new pan-African winds?