Essential The Africa the Media Doesn't Tell You About

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Ethiopia begins constructing new dam in northern Amhara region

January 11, 2021
2:05 pm


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Ethiopia broke ground on Saturday and began building a new dam worth US$125 million in North Shewa, Amhara Region. Construction is expected to be completed within three years.

According to Amhara Mass Media Agency, the dam, named Ajima-Chacha, will be 45.5 meters tall, 371 meters long, and capable of storing 55 million cubic meters of water.

The ground breaking ceremony was attended by the Ethiopian Minister of Water, Irrigation and Energy, Seleshi Bekele.

Upon completion, 7,000 hectares of land will be able to be developed, benefitting more than 28,000 families in the region.

The Chinese Civil Engineering Corporation (CCEC), in cooperation with the Water and Construction Works Corporation of the Amhara Region, is building the dam.

Ethiopia also recently inaugurated its Italian-built €2.5 billion euro Koysha hydroelectric power project in Koysha, located in the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) of the country.

Although Ethiopia is often called the “Water Tower of Africa” due to its larger share of water resources, only a small percentage of its capabilities have been utilized. Access to clean water and sanitation in the country is among the lowest in the world.

Ethiopia begins constructing new dam in northern Amhara region
 

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DRC: How the CIA got Patrice Lumumba

By François Soudan
Posted on Wednesday, 13 January 2021 10:11


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The Prime Minister, as charismatic as he was unpredictable, Patrice Lumumba was tortured and shot on 17 January 1961 near Elisabethville, Katanga. ALLYN BAUM/The New York Times-REDUX-REA

On 17 January 1961, just sixty years ago, the first legally elected prime minister of the DRC was assassinated after being overthrown with help from Washington. A sinister episode that Larry Devlin, the 'Mr. Congo' of the CIA from 1960 to 1967, would reveal half a century later in his fascinating book, 'Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot Zone.'

Leopoldville, on 30 June 1960. With the declaration of its independence, the DRC finally emerges from its long colonial history. A new bilateral system is established with a head of state as cunning as he is impenetrable, Joseph Kasavubu, and a Prime Minister as charismatic as he is unpredictable, Patrice Lumumba. In bars, people dance to the rhythm of the Independence Cha Cha, but the euphoria will be short-lived.

On 5 July, a mutiny broke out in the Thysville camp (Mbanza-Ngungu), then spread to the capital. Over a matter of pay, no doubt, but also a revolt against the continued Belgian presence in the DRC by virtue of bilateral agreements. “For the army and General Janssens, who commands it, has the impudence to say that independence means nothing.”

READ MORE Death of DRC’s Lumumba: ‘The Belgians weren’t the only bad guys’, says daughter Juliana

On 11 July, the rich province of Katanga, where the Belgian “Mining Union” reigns, secedes under the leadership of Moïse Tshombe. South Kasai threatens to do the same. This new state-continent is on the verge of imploding.

A tough guy

It is in this context that the new CIA station chief landed at Leopoldville Beach on 10 July 1960. A CIA agent since 1949, Lawrence (Larry) Devlin is an experienced man and a tough guy. His “cover” is that of an ordinary consul, and his local boss is US Ambassador Clare Timberlake.

Very quickly, the two men believed in the same thing, shared in Washington by their superiors: Prime Minister Lumumba, the Kasai nationalist and co-founder of the powerful Congolese National Movement, is a dangerous man. A communist? No. A USSR agent? Probably not. A man who could be easily manipulated by the Soviets and the KGB? Certainly. It is therefore necessary to do everything possible to isolate him.

READ MORE DRC today: 60 years of independence and uncertainty

With the utmost discretion, Devlin then begins to sound out, with a view to possible recruitment, some of the most prominent Congolese political leaders, reputed for their animosity towards Lumumba. They include Albert Kalonji, leader of the Balubas of South Kasai, Paul Bolya, a Mongo leader from Ecuador, Pierre Soumialot, Lumumba’s own private secretary, the trade unionist Cyrille Adoula and, above all, the man who would become one of his most loyal contacts, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Justin Bomboko.

During the month of July 1960, the situation deteriorated a little more each day. In Matadi, on the Atlantic coast, Belgian parachutists were deployed to protect their compatriots from the Congolese army who were fighting with heavy weapons.

On the 13th, Lumumba announces the rupture of diplomatic relations with Belgium and threatens to call for Soviet intervention if the Westerners do not move. On the 17th, a first contingent of UN peacekeepers landed at N’Djili airport, led by British General Alexander, who said: “Congolese politicians have not yet come down from their trees.”

A maelstrom of violence and looting

At the heart of this maelstrom of violence and looting, the Americans are more obsessed than ever with the Prime Minister. Not only do the socialist chancelleries – the USSR, Czechoslovakia, China, East Germany, Ghana, Guinea – support Lumumba, but his own entourage is, according to the CIA, full of “KGB agents.”

We are in the middle of the Cold War, and the Americans will stop at nothing to counter their target. Learning that the prestigious Time magazine is planning to publish a cover story about Lumumba, Ambassador Timberlake warns his counterpart in Belgium, who calls up his friend Henry Luce, the magazine’s owner. The result: Lumumba disappears from the cover in the name of America’s supreme interests.

In a wired message to CIA headquarters, Devlin wrote: “Patrice Lumumba was born to be a revolutionary, but he doesn’t have the qualities to exercise power once he’s seized it. Sooner or later, Moscow will take the reins. He believes he can manipulate the Soviets, but they are the ones pulling the strings.”

On 26 August 1960, Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, replied: “If Lumumba continues to be in power, the result will be at best chaos and at worst an eventual seizure of power by the communists, with disastrous consequences for the prestige of the UN and the interests of the free world. His dismissal must therefore be an urgent and priority objective for you.”

While Ambassador Timberlake is working to convince President Kasavubu to dismiss Lumumba (this requires a parliamentary vote), Devlin is working to undermine the Prime Minister’s authority. With the help of agitators hired for the occasion – he had a budget of $100,000, a considerable sum at the time – the CIA station chief organised anti-Lumumba demonstrations that often degenerated into violence.

On 5 September, Kasavubu dismissed Lumumba and replaced him with Joseph Ileo. However, the nationalist leader fights back, refuses to leave his post and wins parliamentary backing. The constitutional path seems blocked. The CIA believes the time has come to get down to business: the coup d’état.

The enigmatic Joseph-Désiré Mobutu

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After Lumumba’s death, Mobutu rehabilitated Kasa-Vubu as head of the country but kept him in command of the army, which was facing a rebellion led by followers of the assassinated Prime Minister… until he took official power on 24 November 1965. © Archives Jeune Afrique

It was then that a certain Joseph-Désiré Mobutu appeared. Admittedly, the man is not a stranger to the Americans, but they misunderstand his motivation. On the one hand, they consider him temperate, competent and pro-Western; on the other, they are unaware that he was one of Lumumba’s closest collaborators, who made him Secretary of State and then Chief of Staff of the army. In short, this colonel, barely 30 years old, is still an enigma – one that will soon become clearer.

One evening in early September 1960, Devlin had a meeting with Kasavubu at the president’s house. While he is waiting in the living room, Mobutu appears. “I wanted to talk to you very much,” he said. “I’m tired of these political games, this is not how we are going to build a strong, independent and democratic Congo. The Soviets have invaded the country. Do you know that they sent a delegation to Camp Kokolo to teach Marxism to the soldiers and distribute their propaganda? They claim that you Westerners are plundering the Congo whereas they are our real friends. I spoke to Lumumba about this. He told me to mind my own business. I gathered together my zone commanders: they all agreed with me. So let me be clear. The army is ready to overthrow Lumumba and set up a transitional government made up of my supporters. Will the US help us?”

READ MORE DRC: A history of pillage, destination unknown

At this point in the conversation, Foreign Minister Bomboko, whom Devlin considers practically one of his agents, enters through a back door. Before sitting down next to Colonel Mobutu, he slips Devlin a little note folded in half on which he has written : “Help him.”

Convinced, the CIA station chief replied: “I can assure you that the US is willing to recognise a transitional government made up of civilians.” Mobutu has a final request: “I need $5,000 for my officers: if the coup fails, their families will be left penniless.” The request is granted.

On 14 September 1960, Mobutu seized power for the first time. Lumumba was arrested, a civilian government in which Bomboko remained foreign minister was appointed, and diplomatic relations with the USSR, China and Czechoslovakia ended. But there is a snag. Mobutu, who has placed Kasavubu under house arrest, is the de facto head of state. Devlin immediately went to see him: “You have a big problem of legitimacy,” he told him, “especially since you dismissed the National Assembly. Restore Kasavubu to power.”

“Legitimacy? You should say hypocrisy!” says an angry Mobutu. However, he will do it as he doesn’t have much of a choice. On at least three occasions in the weeks following the coup d’état, the CIA, filled in by one of its informants who is a part of the very Lumumbist Pierre Mulele’s entourage, allowed Mobutu to thwart assassination attempts.

Devlin personally gets involved by accidentally neutralising a killer while he was visiting his friend at the Kokolo camp. This creates a bond. The CIA’s Chief of Station no longer hides his admiration for this young colonel who not only possesses astonishing physical courage, but who is also capable of mastering a horde of rampaging and threatening mutineers by the mere magic of his words and charisma.

Mobutu is, after all, well surrounded. He is a member of the “Binza group”, who also advises him. This group is composed of people who are either “friends” of the CIA, or recruited by them: Bomboko of course, Adoula and the new director of Security, Victor Nendaka, a former right-hand man of Lumumba, originally from the Oriental Province and considered particularly brilliant.

An operation authorised by Eisenhower

That leaves, of course, the issue of Lumumba. Although placed under arrest, the former Prime Minister has still not left his official residence. Worse, in the eyes of the CIA, he is now protected by UN peacekeepers. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjöld’s representative in Leopoldville, Rajeshwar Dayal, whom the US considers highly suspicious, has learned that the Congolese soldiers will be replaced by those of the UN. Lumumba’s multiple statements are as courageous as they are inflammatory. In short, he must be stopped.

On 19 September 1960, Devlin received a secret message from Langley: “A certain ‘Joe from Paris’ will arrive in Leopoldville on 27 September; he will contact you, and you will need to work together.” On the designated day, he and “Joe” will meet in a bar and then in a safe house. “Joe” is a chemist who works for the CIA, and he has brought a whole collection of poisons to liquidate Lumumba.

“Who authorised this operation?” asks Devlin. “President Eisenhower himself,” replied “Joe,” adding: “It will be up to you and you alone to carry it out.” He then handed him a package containing the poisons: various powders and liquids for food, drink and even a special toothpaste. “If our man brushes his teeth with it, he will catch a staggering polio. He will be here today, gone tomorrow.”

Devlin, who is not convinced of the need to suppress Lumumba – “he’s no Hitler,” he thinks – nevertheless contacts his only agent within Lumumba’s entourage. But the agent withdrew: he did not, he assured him, have access to the kitchens and private flats of an increasingly distrustful Lumumba. Over the next few weeks, Devlin continued to drag his feet as Langley became more and more impatient: “Where are you at, Larry?” Larry would be saved by the bell.

On 27 November 1960, on a stormy night, Lumumba secretly left the capital to travel to Stanleyville (now Kisangani), his stronghold. He was arrested a few days later in Kasai, severely beaten and flown back to Leopoldville, before being incarcerated in the Thysville military camp.

Dayal begged Hammarskjöld to allow the Ghanaian UN contingent to attempt a rescue mission. But the secretary-general, under direct pressure from the Americans, does not grant this request. At the very least, the poisoning operation is abandoned.

“Let the Congolese take care of the Congolese”

As Antoine Gizenga, Mulele, Anicet Kashamura and most of Lumumba’s companions from Province Orientale to North Katanga, via South Kivu, launch the uprising, another American plan emerges: let the Congolese take care of the Congolese. In other words: let the army do the dirty work itself.

On 13 January 1961, the Thysville camp, where Lumumba was being held, erupted into mutiny. Very soon, the CIA learns that disgruntled soldiers have freed the former prime minister and are considering placing themselves under his orders. In Leopoldville, the whole government is in panic, except Mobutu and Nendaka, who, after seizing Kasavubu and Bomboko, fly to Thysville.

READ MORE Africa is seeking a new brand of leadership

Once more, the chief of staff confronts his troops, brings them under his control and orders that Lumumba be arrested again. This hero of Congolese independence is thrown into a plane heading for Elisabethville (now Lubumbashi), the capital of the secessionist province of Katanga, where his sworn enemy Tshombe is waiting for him.

Lumumba, with his swollen face, was seen arriving on the airport tarmac on 17 January. He would be shot later that very same day. On 20 January, in Washington, President John Kennedy took office. In Langley, everyone welcomes the fact that the new administration will not have to deal with the Lumumba case.

DRC: How the CIA got Patrice Lumumba
 

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Gates 'failing green revolution in Africa'
Stacy Malkan | 14th August 2020 | The Author

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Source: Flickr | Global Justice Now CC BY 2.0

Green revolution is locking African farmers into a system that is not designed for their benefit, but for Northern multinational corporations.

Billions of dollars spent promoting and subsidising commercial seeds and agrichemicals across Africa have failed to fulfill their promises to alleviate hunger and lift small-scale farmers out of poverty, according to a new white paper published by the Tufts University Global Development and Environment Institute.

African and German civil society organisations produced a report based on the research, “False Promises,” calling on governments to stop funding and subsidising the so-called “green revolution” and shift support to programs that help small-scale food producers, particularly women and youth, develop climate-resilient ecologically sustainable farming practices.

The research examines the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), a nonprofit launched by the Bill & Melinda Gates and Rockefeller foundations in 2006 with promises to double yields and incomes for 30 million farming households while cutting food insecurity in half in 20 African countries by 2020.

Failures

The effort has fallen far short of those goals, according to the new research led by Timothy A. Wise, former director of the Tufts GDEI program and now a senior advisor at the Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy.

In 14 years, AGRA has collected nearly a billion dollars in donations and disbursed $524 million, primarily in thirteen African countries, promoting the use of commercial seeds, chemical fertilisers and pesticides – a technology package further supported by about $1 billion per year in subsidies from African national governments.

According to the Gates Foundation, AGRA’s largest funder, these investments are “the surest path to reducing poverty and hunger in Africa.” But AGRA has provided no evaluation or comprehensive reporting to support that claim. To evaluate progress, the Tufts researchers relied on national-level data for agricultural productivity, poverty, hunger and malnutrition.

The researchers found "little evidence of widespread progress on any of AGRA’s goals, which is striking given the high levels of government subsidies for technology adoption." The paper documents slow productivity growth, no significant increases in food security or small-farmer incomes, and worsening hunger in most of AGRA’s target countries.

Wise said: “It’s a failing model, failing results; it’s time to change course."

Evaluation

AGRA disagreed with the analysis, claiming in a statement that the research failed to meet “basic academic and professional standards of peer review and asking the subject to comment on the ‘findings.’” AGRA accused Wise of having “a history of writing unfounded allegations and uncorroborated reports about AGRA and its work.”

In an email, Andrew Cox, chief of staff and strategy at AGRA, criticised the researcher as “not professional and ethical” and said they “prefer to have transparency and engagement with reporters and others directly around the issues.” He said that AGRA “will do a full evaluation against its targets and results” at the end of 2021.

Wise, whose 2019 book Eating Tomorrow was critical of aid that pushes high-input agricultural models in Africa, said he contacted AGRA repeatedly with requests for their monitoring and evaluation data. The organization said it would provide the information but ceased responding to requests. Wise said: “If AGRA or the Gates Foundation has data that contradicts these findings, they should make them available."

The Gates Foundation responded to the Tufts paper with a statement from its media team: “We support organisations like AGRA because they partner with countries to help them implement the priorities and policies contained in their national agricultural development strategies.

"We also support AGRA’s efforts to monitor progress continually and collect data to inform what’s working and what’s not working. We encourage you to look to AGRA’s newly released annual report for the latest data on its goals and impact. “

Hunger

The Tufts paper concluded: “The evidence suggests that AGRA is failing on its own terms. Its model of high-input agriculture is failing to reach large numbers of smallholder farmers. When it does reach farmers it is failing to significantly increase their productivity, and incomes are not increasing in a way that would reduce poverty and food insecurity.”

Among the key findings of the Tufts paper was that the number of hungry people in AGRA’s thirteen focus countries has jumped thirty percent during the AGRA years, despite the massive investments in agricultural productivity gains.

Productivity increased just 29 percent over twelve years for maize, the most subsidised and supported crop – far short of the goal of a 100% increase. Many climate-resilient, nutritious crops have been displaced by the expansion in supported crops such as maize.

Even where maize production has increased, incomes and food security have scarcely improved for AGRA’s supposed beneficiaries: small-scale farming households.

Although AGRA’s programs have long been pitched as an effort to boost the incomes of small farmers and a key focus of the Gates Foundation is advancing the economic power of women, researchers found no evidence AGRA is reaching a significant number of smallholder farmers or women. While some medium-sized farms may see productivity improvements, “those are overwhelmingly farmers – mostly men – with access to land, resources, and markets,” the report said.

Devastating

Jan Urhahn, agricultural expert at the Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung, which funded the research, said: "The results of the study are devastating for AGRA and the prophets of the Green Revolution."

He added: "We are interested in having an evidence-based debate with policy makers about the approach taken by AGRA. We see no reason to focus, as AGRA does, on individuals and 'personalize’ the arguments. With our study we have taken a very comprehensive and holistic approach and, in addition to data analysis, have carried out country research and spoken to small-scale food producers among others. The results confirmed all our doubts."

Muketoi Wamunyima, country coordinator for PELUM Zambia, said the findings bolster his group’s longstanding “fears and apprehension about AGRA in Africa.” He said AGRA is not an African organization, although it presents itself as such.

Wamunyima said: “As civil society organizations working in Zambia, we have challenged AGRA’s model and engaged with our local government to highlight the fact that AGRA’s approach does not respond to the needs of the small-scale food producers."

Small scale food producers are increasingly going into poverty while adopting AGRA solutions such as the Farmer Input Support Program. AGRA should have responded to the study by providing evidence that says otherwise.”

Diet

Rwanda is widely touted as the success story of AGRA, with a 66 percent growth in maize yields since 2006 and an increase in daily per capita calorie production. The country is on track to become self sufficient in its supply of hybrid maize seeds thanks to the partnership between AGRA and the government, according to AGRA.

These achievements helped elevate Rwanda’s former Agriculture Minister, Agnes Kalibata, to the presidency of AGRA in 2014 and to an appointment as Special Envoy of the 2021 UN Food Systems Summit.

Wise explained that Rwanda is “a striking story. They tripled maize production." However, his research found weak overall productivity improvements across staple crops in Rwanda as farmers abandoned more nutritious local crops to grow maize. Meanwhile, according to the latest figures just released by the UN, the number of undernourished people in Rwanda grew by 41 percent in the AGRA years.

Wise said: “Rwanda is a clear indictment of the AGRA model." Malaysian economist Jomo Kwame Sundaram, a former assistant director general of the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, shared a similar viewpoint in IPS News, saying that the AGRA model is “replacing hunger with malnutrition."

Sundarm continued: “As most farmers cannot afford AGRA’s expensive recommended commercial seeds and fertilisers, African Governments subsidise them at the cost of about a billion dollars annually.” The subsidies have mainly promoted “starchy” crops such as maize and rice which have been replacing “more climate-resilient, nutritious crops such as sweet potato and millet.”

Variety

The AGRA package, he notes, has been “imposed with a heavy hand,” with the Rwandan Government even “reportedly banning cultivation of some staple crops in some areas.” Although opposition from Rwandan farmers forced the government to relax some crop restrictions and allow more diversity, maize and other commodity crops remain heavily subsidized and supported.

Sundaram wrote: “The AGRA model imposed on previously relatively diverse Rwanda farming almost certainly undermined its more nutritious and sustainable traditional agricultural cropping patterns." He said “hidden hunger” involving micronutrient deficiencies “is best addressed by dietary diversity, supported by crop diversity in farming, rather than the Green Revolution’s exclusive focus on raising caloric intake.”

AGRA’s Kalibata sees it differently: “The bottom line is, people need to meet their caloric needs,” she said in a July discussion about Covid-19 and the hunger crisis. Until their caloric needs are met, Kalibata said, “it’s a luxury” for starving people to think about dietary diversity.

The debate over the merits of starchy commodity crops and calories versus more nutrition diverse and locally controlled cropping systems is headed for a showdown at the UN World Food Summit in 2021.

Hundreds of groups are on record opposing Kalibata’s appointment. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General, 174 civil society organizations and farmer groups from 83 countries called for the appointment to be revoked. Given AGRA’s history, they said, it will “result in another forum that advances the interests of agribusiness at the expense of farmers and our planet.”
 

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Summit

They described AGRA’s approach as a “finance-intensive and high input agricultural model” that is “not sustainable beyond constant subsidy” and is “capturing and diverting public resources to benefit large corporate interests.”

A group of 500 civil society organizations, academics, and social movements also urged the UN to reconsider the appointment. Family farmers who produce more than 80 percent of the world’s food should be at the centre of the Summit, they said.

The appointment also drew support, with a letter signed by twelve individuals, including leaders from the World Bank, African Development Bank and the African Agricultural Technology Foundation, reaffirming their faith in Kalibata as a global leader and praising her leadership style, and writing: "She is a respected member of a new generation of African professionals who are shaping the future of the African development agenda."

According to an analysis by AGRA Watch, a Seattle-based organization working for global food sovereignty, all but one of the signers of the support letter has received funds from the Gates Foundation. The group referred to Bill Gates as the “man behind the curtain” influencing the UN Food Summit.

Justice

AGRA’s lack of progress toward improving conditions of poverty and hunger is no surprise to Africa-based farming and food sovereignty groups who have opposed the “neocolonial logic” of the Gates Foundation’s Green Revolution from the start.

Mariam Mayet, executive director of the African Centre for Biodiversity, said: "For years we have documented the efforts to spread the Green Revolution in Africa, and the dead-ends it will lead to: declining soil health, loss of agricultural biodiversity, loss of farmer sovereignty, and locking of African farmers into a system that is not designed for their benefit, but for the profits of mostly Northern multinational corporations."

The South Africa-based research and advocacy organization has published more than two-dozen papers since 2007 warning about the AGRA model. Mayet said: “Africans don’t need unaccountable American and European agrichemical and seed companies to develop them. We need global trade, financial and debt justice to re-cast Africa’s position in the global economy and that gives us the space to democratically build our future.”

In the context of the Covid crisis especially, she said: “This new report strengthens the argument that Africa is better off without AGRA and its neocolonial logic, and that solutions lie with people on the continent and the world that are building systems grounded in justice, and human and ecological wellbeing.”

Million Belay, who coordinates the Alliance for Food Sovereignty in Africa (AFSA), a coalition of thirty Africa-based food and farming groups, equated the current market-driven agricultural development model to a “knee on the neck of Africa.”

Colonialism

In a powerful essay in the wake of the murder of George Floyd and the global uprising for racial justice, Belay discussed a false narrative about African food systems seeded by philanthrocapitalists, aid agencies, governments, and others who “talk about transforming African agriculture when what they are doing is creating a market for themselves cleverly couched in a nice sounding language.”

Belay wrote: “We are told that our seeds are old and have little capacity to give us food and they have to be hybridised and genetically modified to be of use; we are told that what we need is more calories and we need to focus on seeds of few crops; we are told that we are not using our land effectively and it should be given to those who can do a better job of it; we are told that our knowledge about farming is backward and we need to modernise with knowledge from the West … we are told we need business to invest billions of dollars, and without these saviors from the North, we cannot feed ourselves…

It is the same knee that justified colonialism in Africa. I think the only way to remove this knee and breathe is to recognize the knee, understand its ways of working and organize to defend ourselves.”

Belay’s group and many others including the international peasant movement La Via Campesina, a coalition of 164 organisations in 73 countries, point to agroecology as the solution. AFSA documents a number of case studies documenting “how agroecology benefits Africa in terms of food security, nutrition, poverty reduction, climate change adaptation and mitigation, biodiversity conservation, cultural sensitivity, democracy, and value for money.”

The Tufts paper also notes a growing body of research showing the limits of the input-intensive green revolution model and the viability of agroecological approaches.

Messaging

In another report released last week, AGRA Watch dissected the “messaging of the Gates agenda” with a case study on the Cornell Alliance for Science and its efforts to discredit agroecology. Funded mostly by the Gates Foundation and housed at Cornell University, the Alliance for Science is a public relations campaign that promotes GMOs and pesticides around the world, with a focus on Africa.

A recent Cornell Alliance for Science post gives a sense of the messaging: agroecology “risks harming the poor and worsening gender inequality in Africa,” according to the article by Mark Lynas.

His post was widely panned by academics who said it was a “flawed analysis” and a “non-scientific interpretation of a scientific paper” that “erroneously conflates conservation ag with agroecology and then makes wild conclusions.”

The agronomist Marc Corbeels, whose paper Lynas purported to describe in the article, said the analysis made “sweeping generalizations” of his work. Marcus Taylor, a political ecologist at Queen’s University in Canada, described it as “pure ideology” and called for a retraction.

AGRA’s Andrew Cox promoted the Lynas article as a “great piece … looking at the tension between emerging thinking on agroecology and the need for the right use of biotechnology, hybrid seeds, mechanization, irrigation and other tools to transform the lives of smallholder farmers.”

AGRA “believes that African farmers must have at least the same opportunities as others, and have the benefit of African solutions for African problems,” Cox said.

Promises

One year ago, the bold promises of AGRA – to double yields and incomes for 30 million farming households in Africa by 2020 – appeared prominently on the organisation’s grants page. The goals have since disappeared from the page. When asked about this, AGRA’s Andrew Cox clarified: “We have not reduced our ambition, but have learned that other more targeted indicators are appropriate.”

He said AGRA recently updated its website and “didn’t have the resources to get it done in the way that we wanted” but will be updating it again soon.

AGRA indicated a shift in its thinking on metrics. The group said in its statement responding to critics: “Over the last 14 years, AGRA has achieved its successes, but has also learned a lot. The task of catalyzing transformation is difficult and needs exceptional commitment, structural change and investment.

"AGRA will continue to refine its approach based on the needs of our partner farmers, SMEs [small and mid-size enterprises] and the priorities of governments.”

Cox further elaborated in his email: “AGRA has a basket of indicators to track results across farmers, systems, and governments. AGRA has been able to demonstrate that on a household by household basis, incomes do sharply increase when farmers are given access to modern seeds and inputs, supported by village level extension.”

However, he said, a number of other factors affect incomes that are beyond AGRA’s influence and AGRA’s thinking on farmer incomes has “moved to being more context specific and related to what we can influence directly.” More information will be forthcoming next year at the end of the strategic session when AGRA will publish a full evaluation.

Communications

In the meantime, AGRA is ramping up its PR efforts. A request for proposal for a three-year communications consultancy, posted in June, describes ambitions to “increase AGRA’s positive media coverage by about 35-50 percent above the 2017 coverage.” A trends report notes that AGRA received 80 media mentions a month in 2016 with an uptick to 800 articles in September of that year.

The proposal notes two key moments each September that drive media attention. The African Green Revolution Forum (AGRF), billed as the largest agriculture and food systems event in Africa; and the Africa Food Prize, a partnership with Yara International fertilizer company, the EcoNet Foundation and Corteva AgriScience (formerly DowDuPont).

The selected PR consultant will be responsible for handling media at the events and developing talking points for all “high level AGRF speakers.” The scope of work also includes obtaining “at least ten high quality editorials” placed in “influential traditional and emerging global and regional outlets like the New York Times, Ventures Africa, The Africa Report, CNBC-Africa, Al Jazeera, etc.,” and securing “25–30 prime time one-on-one interviews for AGRA experts in major global media.”

In a webinar last weekend hosted by AGRA Watch, Raj Patel, author of Stuffed and Starved, noted that “the production of knowledge” is a key aspect of how modern colonialism works. “Power needs to maintain hegemony and dominate in the field of ideas as well as in dominance of the land,” he said.

Mariam Mayet of the African Centre for Biodiversity sees the aggressive PR efforts as “more evidence of desperation. They just cannot get it right on the Continent, at least in terms of [genetic modification].” Efforts by green revolution supporters to discredit the work of African groups and food sovereignty movements “border on defamation at this point,” she said. “Why don’t you engage in a fair fight with us?”

Gates 'failing green revolution in Africa'
 

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Egypt signs framework agreement with China's Dongfeng to produce electric cars

MENA , Monday 18 Jan 2021

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A photo from the agreement signing ceremony between El Nasr Automotive Manufacturing Company, China Dongfeng Motor Industry Import & Export Co. (DFMIEC) in Cairo on Monday (Photo: Al-Ahram)

Minister of Public Business Sector Hisham Tawfiq said on Monday El Nasr Automotive Manufacuring Company is taking its first steps towards deepening and transferring the industry of A70 electric vehicles as part of a project meant to reduce emissions and limit the use of fossil fuels that have negative impact on Egypt’s citizens.

Egypt is one of the first countries to enter that race, Tawfiq said during his participation via video conferencing in the signing ceremony of a framework agreement between Egypt’s El Nasr automaker and China Dongfeng Motor Industry Import and Export Company; with a view to implementing the electric vehicle project in Egypt.

The minister added that two contracts were signed today with Dongfeng, which produces about 3.5 million A70 electric cars per year.

The first contract aims to produce electric cars in Egypt within the framework of bilateral partnership and cooperation that benefit both sides, while the second one entails rehabilitating one of the factories affiliated to Egypt's holding company for producing electric cars.

Meanwhile, Chinese Ambassador to Egypt Liao Liqiang expressed his thanks and appreciation to the public business sector minister and his ministry for ongoing cooperation between El Nasr and Dongfeng companies, noting that cooperation between China and Egypt has started since the outset of the coronavirus pandemic.

Egypt signs framework agreement with China's Dongfeng to produce electric cars
 

Yehuda

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Erdogan’s great game: Turkey pushes into Africa with aid, trade and soaps

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© FT montage; Minasse Wondimu Hailu/Anadolu Agency via Getty Images | Strategic alliances, aid and soft power have marked Turkey’s initiatives in Africa

President cements foreign policy ambitions with business and humanitarian help on the continent

Andres Schipani in Addis Ababa and Laura Pitel in Ankara | January 18, 2021 02:00 AM

This is the last part of a series exploring Turkey’s geopolitical ambitions. Previous instalments include: Erdogan’s great game: Soldiers, spies and Turkey’s quest for power, Erdogan’s great game: The Turkish problem on the EU’s doorstep and Erdogan’s great game: Turkish intrigue in the Balkans.

In a hotel bar in Addis Ababa, an Ethiopian couple wrestle with the remote control, flipping between US election results on CNN, war reports on a local newscast, and a Turkish soap opera, Adi Mutluluk (It’s Called Happiness).

In the end, they choose the Turkish drama, dubbed into Amharic. “The truth is, we both love this show,” the couple echoed.

The success of Turkish television shows in Ethiopia, the powerhouse of the Horn of Africa, is a small but telling sign of Ankara’s growing influence in a region that has become a magnet for foreign capitals. Efforts at soft power, experts say, are aimed at countering the influence of Gulf rivals such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), as well as the US, France, China and Russia.

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A poster for the popular Turkish soap opera ‘Adi Mutluluk’ (‘It’s Called Happiness’)

Turkish content has been a “consistent big hit”, said Elias Schulze, co-founder, alongside three Ethiopians, of Kana Television, a private satellite channel. For Ankara, trade, development aid and even soap operas have been instrumental in cementing Turkish influence on the continent. “Turkey has these soft power advantages that it can exploit,” said Michael Tanchum, an expert on Turkish foreign policy at Spain’s University of Navarra.

Pivot to Africa

In the decades that followed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey largely ignored Africa, its rulers choosing instead to focus on Europe. Yet, over the past 15 years, Turkey’s president Recep Tayyip Erdogan has spearheaded a revival of ties with the continent. Since 2009, Turkey has increased the number of embassies in Africa from 12 to 42 and Mr Erdogan has been a frequent visitor, chalking up trips to more than 20 capitals.

Turks and Africans were “destined to be partners”, Mr Erdogan said in October. He has set a goal of doubling Turkey’s trade volume with Africa to $50bn in the coming years, roughly a third of its current trade with the EU.

Ankara’s focus on big state infrastructure deals and contracts across Africa — from an Olympic pool in Senegal to its biggest overseas military facility in Somalia and a large mosque in Djibouti — underlines the economic and geopolitical importance it attaches to the continent.

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In north Africa, Turkey has been involved militarily, providing support for the UN-backed administration in Libya. A year ago, Mr Erdogan — named person of the year by an influential Senegalese non-governmental body — visited Senegal, riling France, the former colonial power. “Former French colonial African countries are looking for alternatives to France. They don’t want to trade being a French neo-colony for being a Chinese neo-colony. Turkey provides a third way,” said Mr Tanchum. In the Horn of Africa, Turkey and its ally Qatar have been pitched against the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt in a regional power struggle that centres on trade and influence.

“Erdogan sees it’s about time Turkey projects power beyond its borders — and what better place than the Horn where everyone worth their name is claiming real estate,” said Abdullahi Halakhe, an expert on the Horn of Africa. “And they’re doing much better than the rest in putting their money where their mouth is.”

‘Door to the continent’

Turkey’s Africa policy centres on the idea that the continent “had not been paid enough attention, that there was huge potential here for humanitarian and development efforts, first of all, and then also for economic ties, of course”, said Yaprak Alp, Turkey’s ambassador to Ethiopia.

Ethiopia is Africa’s second-most populous country and the big prize for powers tussling in the Horn of Africa, a region to which the Ottomans sent regular naval missions in the 16th century. It is the “door to the continent”, said Ms Alp. Over the past two decades, Turkey has been an important partner to Ethiopia, the third-biggest investor of operational capital in the African country after China and Saudi Arabia, according to the Ethiopian Investment Commission.

Turkish investors, escaping economic woes at home, have been lured by Ethiopia’s economic boom, with growth averaging 10 per cent from 2005 until recent economic and political setbacks. Since coming to power in 2018, Abiy Ahmed, prime minister of Ethiopia, has sought to push through liberal economic reforms — including privatisations.

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The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency distributes food aid to an orphanage in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, in May 2020 © Minasse Wondimu Hailu/Anadolu Agency/Getty

Out of a total of $6bn already invested by Turkish companies in sub-Saharan Africa, $2.5bn has gone to Ethiopia, said Turkish officials. In 2005, there were just three Turkish companies in Ethiopia. Today, there are 200, ranging from wires and textiles to beverages. Even the eruption of the conflict in the region of Tigray has not deterred Turkish investors.

Simge Yuksel Ozyigit, vice-president of a steel cable producer, Demes Cable, that established a new $45m factory near Addis Ababa last year, said that production had been “normal”, unaffected by the fighting. Cuneyt Coke, chair of the Turkey-Ethiopia business council of the Turkish trade group DEIK, said Turkish businesses remained ready to invest in agriculture, health and energy. “Whoever is well prepared will benefit,” he added.

Friction

For Ankara, the fact that Addis Ababa is home to the African Union carries weight. “It has symbolic value,” said Mr Halakhe. Moreover, Turkey is unwilling to lose another regional ally after the 2019 ousting of the Sudanese leader Omar al-Bashir, who was close to Ankara.

But Mr Abiy enjoys support from Turkey’s rivals, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, which helped it negotiate peace with Eritrea. And there has been friction between Mr Abiy and Mr Erdogan, both strong-minded leaders with clear visions, according to a former diplomat.

Still, Turkey’s support for Ethiopia in its dispute with Egypt over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam has boosted the friendship between both countries. Last October, Addis Ababa slammed Donald Trump for “incitement of war” between Ethiopia and Egypt, after the US president said Egypt would “blow up” the dam. “We want African solutions for African problems,” said an Ethiopian official, adding that Turkey, unlike other powers, “understands” that.

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Recep Tayyip Erdogan, centre, is welcomed by the then president of Sudan, Omar al-Bashir, third right, during an official visit to Khartoum in 2017

Turkey also sustains a presence in Somalia, where it has built roads and established a large military training camp. Last year, a Turkish company signed a 14-year contract to revamp and operate a port in Mogadishu. Ankara has been a major source of aid to the country, pouring in more than $1bn since 2011, and, in early November, it paid off $2.4m in debts owed by Somalia to the IMF. It has built hospitals, schools and provided scholarships. Such was the largesse that some parents named their baby boys Erdogan. Abdulkadir Mohamed Nur, Somalia’s justice minister, offered his “heartfelt gratitude” to Mr Erdogan “for his continued support to Somalia”.

“Turkey is clearly a big player in Somalia, but mainly it is a very important commercial player in Ethiopia,” said Rashid Abdi, an independent expert on the Horn of Africa. “Ethiopia is a huge, huge, opportunity for Turkey because it’s a big market, it is a vibrant economy. So, this is the right frontier for Erdogan. It is clearly the target for the Turks to win Ethiopia.”

Beaming out of the television screens, the actors of Adi Mutluluk continue winning Ethiopian hearts at the Addis Ababa lobby bar — with chambermaids now joining in. “They’re addictive. I think we’ve learned how to make them addictive,” said Ms Alp, Turkey’s ambassador to Addis Ababa, referring to Turkish dramas. “This is also the case for Ethiopians who tell me we are so similar that they recognise themselves in them culturally.”

Additional reporting by David Pilling in London


Erdogan’s great game: Turkey pushes into Africa with aid, trade and soaps
 

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The eu using morocco, china doing this, wouldn't be surprised if the uk leaned on Nigeria.


all this free trade shyt should have waited

This is why Nigeria was against Morocco joining ECOWAS. Back door entry for EU goods to get dumped in Africa. This AfCTA will be interesting to see how it pans out...
 

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This is why Nigeria was against Morocco joining ECOWAS. Back door entry for EU goods to get dumped in Africa. This AfCTA will be interesting to see how it pans out...


Yeah...hell we talked about this in this thread.. I think it was 1 or 2.. hell maybe 3 years back :snoop:

'
Looking like Africa is gonna get gangbanged by everybody and all these finished products dumped into her :snoop:
 

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143 million Nigerian SIMs now linked with identity number | TechCabal

I'm a bit on the fence about this. I get the benefit for the Nigerian government in trying to get better understanding of its populace but the level of personal data aggregation that is taking place across the continent is worrying. Both from a privacy standpoint and a data infrastructure integrity standpoint.

The push for "digital IDs" across the continent will be interesting to watch...
 
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The Elephant in the Chinese Room

After considering China’s long-term approach to economic and social development, even the most ungenerous critics of the Asian country’s international partnerships strategy will probably concede that the idea that, in case of loan defaults, they would compromise the credibility of the Belt and Road Initiative around the world through depriving Africa of the expressways, public buildings and hydropower plants they are helping to put up, is more than a little far-fetched.

Published on December 5, 2020
By L. E. Melin


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It has become commonplace in Western media for reports about the “African indebtedness crisis” to turn into protracted exercises in China-bashing. Therefore it was only to be expected that in the aftermath of the recent G20 summit meeting in Riyadh, yet another round of similarly sanctimonious articles, op-eds and videos should come to light. Naturally enough, the fact that the G20 nations (China included) agreed on an initial proposal of debt relief to developing countries, extending up to the second half of 2021, is not viewed in such reports as a step in the right direction but, rather, as a confirmation that their claims that African countries are being crushed with debt by “irresponsible lending” were right all along.

A case in point is the piece by the otherwise circumspect German broadcaster Deutsche Welle – DW. It starts by saying that according to unnamed “critics”, the financial aid instruments employed by China in its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) have left a number of African countries “overloaded” with debt. This could have been a perfectly ordinary journalistic approach to the subject, if the other side of the story, that is, the viewpoint of those who see merit in the Chinese initiative, was also considered at some point. Unfortunately, that was not the case.

The report opens by stating that the railway link in Kenya between the capital Nairobi and the coastal town of Mombasa – entirely financed and built by China – “has been called the road to nowhere.” This derogatory epithet is offered to the public without any explanation or justification concerning its origin and validity, and the piece never mentions that Mombasa happens to be one of Kenya’s main tourist hubs. Interestingly enough, the report does mention that it is a port city, which in and of itself seems to negate the “road to nowhere” jibe since, in terms of simple logistics, building a railway between a country’s landlocked capital city and its coast is not usually considered as a particularly odd endeavour.

What is perhaps the most outstanding feature, not only of this particular piece, but also of an important portion of mainstream media coverage about BRI in Africa, is the obvious one-sidedness of the arguments. DW’s report, for one, focuses on the amount of loans given to African countries – a total mentioned as being of around US$ 100 billion, but which in reality is now closer to US$ 145 billion – in an attempt to stress how large a burden it is, and then proceed to use language such as “countries crippled under the weight of the money they owe to China” or “Africa’s unsustainable debt load.”

Yet the proverbial (and, in this case, geographically apt) elephant in the room is never really addressed: how is all this changing life for Africans? What is the money being used for? As it turns out, all of the resources mobilised under BRI partnerships are being used to put in place large infrastructure projects, a key, concrete factor that, historically, has hindered Africa’s efforts in search of social and economic development at every turn. Right from the start, when it endorses the view that the railway linking Kenya’s capital to its main port is a “road to nowhere,” DW’s report already lets us know that it will not address the issue of why – or if – US$ 145 billion in infrastructure projects can make a decisive difference to Africa’s future development and prosperity.

From 2008 onwards, in the years following beginning of what has become known as “the Great Recession,” Western commentators were for once forced to acknowledge the existence of the Wall St. self-delusion bubble, inside which twenty-somethings running convoluted but unrealistic mathematical models in credit-rating agencies validated the market value of soon-to-be-bankrupt financial institutions, while flagging as dire risks the economies of countries that would eventually emerge unscathed from the New-York-London-made mess.

Today, ten years after, the pendulum swinged back fully, as the media once more adopts the financiers’ outdated algorithm as the yardstick for everything under the sun: next quarter’s profits. That is the thinking behind yet another sobriquet given early on by the DW piece to the Kenyan railway, to wit, that of a “money-losing” initiative. The concept that an infrastructure project implemented by two sovereign governments under the aegis of a G-to-G agreement can have any other nature than that of a “money-making” venture is entirely alien to this logic. Long-term and strategic considerations are seldom, if ever, factored in; and, clearly, real-world impacts and legacies have no place in the model. Outside of this slanted and narrow analytical perspective, the selective blindness concerning the transformative impacts that US$ 145 billion in roads, power transmission lines, railways, hospitals and power generation plants will have in an impoverished continent such as Africa simply cannot be accounted for.

Of course, the relationship between creditors and debtors in international finance is never a one-dimensional one, and can be potentially “crippling”. What happened in Argentina in recent years provides us with just such an example. Having struggled for a long time before finally managing to repay the IMF in 2005, Argentina saw its foreign debt explode to a record level – even in emerging economies’ terms – in the wake of the election of Mauricio Macri as the country’s president in late 2015.

The new government quickly introduced strong exchange deregulation policies, whose immediate effect was an increase in capital flight, allowing wealthy Argentineans and financial institutions operating in the South American country to transfer increasingly large funds abroad. As international conditions deteriorated, the carry trade circuit that was bringing speculative capital inflows to Argentina was disrupted, giving rise to a steep balance-of-payments crisis that would only be partially abated in June 2018, when the IMF agreed to extend the country a US$ 50 billion stand-by loan – the largest one in the institution’s history.

The policies adopted by the Macri government and the consequent return of his country to IMF dependency become all the more egregious when one considers the strong political rejection of the Fund’s oversight of their economy on the part of public opinion. Yet, no outcry over this toxic surge in Argentinean indebtedness – or over the government measures that were directly responsible for it – arose in the international media back then. One is led to wonder whether this would have been the case if Argentina’s creditor was China.

It is worth noting, however, that the reason Argentina was effectively “crippled” by its foreign debt is twofold. First, the political leadership decided of their own accord to enable financial speculators to move assets freely out of the country when official international reserves were at historically low levels. Second, after Argentina “stormed back to the international capital markets” – as ‘Euromoney’ glowingly reported at the time – there was no addition the country’s productive capacity nor to its infrastructure to show for all the voluminous new debt.

One would be hard-pressed to draw any meaningful parallels between the Argentinean situation and that of Africa’s debt to China. To begin with, BRI projects in Africa are being carried out under diverse circumstances in a number of different countries. As a result, the sort of wholesale criticism often found in Western media concerning those projects tend to make use of sweeping generalisations that bear little relation to actual facts. Indeed, given that the exact terms of financial contracts with the Chinese are seldom disclosed, in almost every case inferences surmising that those conditions must be “crippling” and unfavourable ones say more about the bias of their authors than about the reality of the situation in Africa.

From a strictly financial point of view, both the present availability of foreign exchange reserves and the prospect of future export growth differ considerably among the African countries involved. Also – and crucially – BRI loans are of a fundamentally different nature from Argentina’s mainly short-term debt, since the former typically have considerable grace periods and very long maturities. Last but not least, all debt associated with BRI projects will, by definition, produce permanent legacies in terms of adding to the infrastructure of the countries. This means that, given the nature of the projects being carried out on the ground in Africa through the partnership with China, in future Africans will find themselves, unlike Argentina at the end of its debt cycle, in possession of at least US$ 145 billion worth of fundamental infrastructure they previously lacked.

The analysis of the Argentinean case suggests that any lasting harmful effects to African countries will greatly depend on the extent to which present-day and future African leaders decide to accept detrimental terms in their dealings with China, on the one hand; and whether China’s leaders will seek to use their power as creditors to chew up and spit out their BRI partners in pursuit of immediate profit, leaving them to cope with long-term, structural crises as they move on to greener pastures.

This scenario is undoubtedly reminiscent of what Western creditors did in developing countries, repeatedly, over the past fifty years. So much so, in fact, that having Western media now ascribe this conduct to China looks suspiciously like a case of projecting one’s own faults onto others. So far, however, the Chinese have not given any indication that they might leave unfinished the crucial projects they are engaged in internationally on account of financial difficulties. Neither seem they likely to seek to impose IMF-like conditionalities leading to “austerity” and stagnation in debtor countries.

After considering China’s long-term approach to economic and social development, even the most ungenerous critics of the Asian country’s international partnerships strategy will probably concede that the idea that, in case of loan defaults, they would compromise the credibility of the Belt and Road Initiative around the world through depriving Africa of the expressways, public buildings and hydropower plants they are helping to put up, is more than a little far-fetched. And stark warnings about the negative consequences of some fifty countries underwriting a grand total of US$ 145 billion in long-term debt for infrastructure investment, ring particularly hollow when coming from those who, not five years ago, could not praise highly enough the policies that drove a single country to increase its foreign debt by more than US$ 110 billion in exchange for, precisely, nothing at all.

The Elephant in the Chinese Room
 

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Tanzania inks $1.3bln railway deal with Chinese firms

January 9, 2021

President John Magufuli and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi oversaw the signing of the contract at an event broadcast live on state television.

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Transit trucks queue for customs processing are pictured at the border crossing point between Kenya and Tanzania in Namanga, Tanzania July 19, 2019. (Reuters)

Tanzania has signed a $1.3-billion (1-billion-euro) deal with two Chinese companies for building a section of a railway aimed at linking its main port to neighbouring countries.

President John Magufuli and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi oversaw the signing of the contract at an event broadcast live on state television.

The deal involves the fifth section in a 2,561-kilometre (1,600-mile) railway whose construction began in 2017.

The overall plan is to link the Indian Ocean port of Dar es Salaam to Mwanza on Lake Victoria, with eventual spurs to Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rwanda and Uganda.

The Chinese firms will build a 341-kilometre section between the port city of Mwanza on Lake Victoria and Isaka in the northwest, according to Tanzanian Transport Minister Leonard Chamuriho.

"This signing is a clear testimony of the friendship between Tanzania and China," Chamuriho said at the event.

The builders will be China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and China Railway Construction Limited.

Chamuriho invited Chinese companies to bid for the final two phases of the railway and also urged the country to assist in financing the project, currently being paid for by the Tanzanian government.

'Interest of Tanzania first'

Turkish company Yapi Merkezi is already constructing the first two phases involving over 700 kilometres from Dar es Salaam.

The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi, who is on a two-day visit to Tanzania, said ties were strengthening between the two nations.

Chinese companies have built several major infrastructure projects in Tanzania worth about $10 billion.

"I ask Chinese companies to make sure they implement projects with required standards. They should actually put the interest of Tanzania first," said Wang.

"Tanzania is on the right track with projects it's implementing because you cannot develop without good infrastructure," he said.

After the signing ceremony Magufuli said he had asked China to support the financing of the construction of a controversal hydropower plant in the Selous Game Reserve.

"I have also asked China to consider waiving some debts and I believe they will work on that through their concessions," he said.

China is the biggest investor in Africa, pumping about $148 billion in railroads, ports and airports in exchange for securing oil and commodity supplies such as copper and cobalt, according to data from the China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) at Johns Hopkins University.

These infrastructure projects are built through vast loans issued by China, but Beijing has been criticised for lending too much to poor countries, without scrutinising their ability to repay.

Tanzania inks $1.3bln railway deal with Chinese firms
Didn’t see that coming
 

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KenyaFTA-1024x683.jpg

26 January 2021

The US-Kenya Bilateral Free Trade Agreement. Garbage In, Garbage Out
By Asad Ismi

Washington hopes a free trade pact with Kenya will give it a beachhead in its hot war with Al-Shabab and cold war with China—and an African dumping ground for GMOs and plastic waste. What Kenya gets in exchange is not at all clear.


The United States and Kenya have been negotiating a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) since March 2020, sparking concerns about further neocolonization of the East African state by Washington, whose economy is 224 times the size of Kenya’s. Given its “America First” policy, it is not surprising the Trump administration would aim to subjugate Kenya economically through this FTA, as a template for the rest of Africa.

Somewhat more puzzling is why the Kenyan government of President Uhuru Kenyatta would go along with it, and what Trump’s successors in the Biden administration will do with the negotiations now. I spoke to Kenyan and U.S. trade experts about the domestic and geo-politics behind the FTA.

“The Trump administration wanted to move away from preferential trade programs towards more ‘reciprocal’ trade in which developing countries must make new concessions to keep the trade benefits they have now,” says Karen Hansen-Kuhn, program director at the Washington-based Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy (IATP). “This agreement would be based on the model established under the new NAFTA [known as USMCA], which sets new limits on governments’ abilities to set rules on things like pesticides and GMOs or other public interest rules. In general, it would serve to cement these new limits on public policy in both the U.S. and Kenya against more progressive rules in the future.”

As a major participant in the U.S. Africa Command’s (AFRICOM) security operations on the continent, especially in Somalia, Kenya is already a leading U.S. client state, accepting $824 million in military and economic aid from Washington in 2018. Since 2010, Kenya has received $400 million in counterterrorism funding from the Pentagon and has become the U.S. military’s main foreign conduit for opposing Al-Shabab, the insurgent group that is fighting the U.S. in Somalia for control of the Horn of Africa. Al Shabab also carries out attacks in Kenya, including strikes last January on a U.S. military base and two schools near the Somali border.

As in Brazil, the United States sees strong military co-ordination with Kenya in combination with a preferential free trade pact—the U.S. government’s first with a sub-Saharan country—as a way to shore up Nairobi as a dependable military and economic conduit for U.S. interests on the continent.

Another major factor for Washington in seeking the FTA is countering Chinese influence in Africa, which has grown dramatically in economic terms. In fact, this may be “foremost among Washington’s concerns,” according to the U.S. establishment think-tank the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). China–Africa trade has “soared” since 2008 while trade between the continent and the U.S. has declined, notes CFR. China is also the top investor in Africa. Kenya’s imports from China were worth $3.79 billion in 2017, making Beijing its leading trade partner whereas imports from the U.S. in 2019 were $401 million and exports to the U.S. were $667 million.

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A main objective for the U.S. in the Kenyan FTA negotiations is gaining tariff-free access for its dominant agricultural sector, which could potentially destroy Kenya’s domestic food systems. This is one reason why Public Citizen, the U.S. consumer advocacy organization, calls the FTA “a terrible idea.” Melissa Omino, research manager at the Center for Intellectual Property and Information Technology Law (part of Swarthmore University in Nairobi, Kenya), agrees there would be “dire consequences” for Kenya stemming from the FTA, particularly concerning food security.

“The U.S. heavily subsidizes its own domestic producers thus allowing them to overproduce. When such goods are exported out of the U.S. at low prices together with removed tariffs, it results in the flooding of such U.S. agricultural exports leading to the destruction of the domestic market of Kenya,” says Omino. The U.S. also wants Kenya to import its GMO corn and maize, but GMO products are banned in Kenya currently.




According to Omino, the effect of the FTA would become devastating when world food prices go up, since Kenyans would neither be able to afford to buy food imports nor would they have local production to rely on.

“An example of this is the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA, now USMCA), which affected Mexico such that [two million] corn farmers lost their income due to flooding of corn from the U.S.,” she tells me. “So far Kenya has been protected by the tariffs of the East African Community [EAC—a regional trade agreement Kenya is part of along with five other countries] and has been able to manage food security well. Once these are removed the case changes drastically.”

Melanie Foley, international campaigns director of Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch, pointed out to me that in the proposed FTA, the U.S. is also targeting Kenya’s “strong laws” banning certain GMO foods, protecting consumers’ privacy online, and the country’s progressive environmental policies such as its ban on plastic bags. Kenya is a leader in the area of plastic waste bans and management, according to Omino.

Foley quotes a New York Times exposé, according to which, she says,

“the [American] petrochemical lobby is pushing the U.S. government to use these talks to challenge Kenya’s strong plastics laws and expand the plastics industry’s footprint across Kenya and the continent. If the industry has its way, Kenya’s strong plastic bag ban and proposed limits on imports of plastic garbage could be under threat.”

James Gathii, professor of law at Loyola University Chicago School of Law, tells me that the flooding of the Kenyan market with U.S. GMO corn and maize will not only devastate Kenyan agriculture but also its industry.

“Heavily subsidized farm products from the U.S. flooding the Kenyan market would enhance access to Kenya for U.S. companies in a way that would undermine Kenya’s industrialization plans, especially in agro-manufacturing.”

Gathii, a leading Kenyan academic and an expert in international trade law, says he is also concerned that Washington “is aiming for enhanced intellectual property protections” in the Kenya FTA, which could inhibit access to essential medicines and likely “undermine the fledgling health care systems in Kenya’s regional governments.” It is common United States Trade Representative practice to use trade negotiations to solidify and extend monopoly patent and other intellectual property protections for Big Pharma, Hollywood and Silicon Valley.

“Counties have made a lot of progress in bringing health care closer to the people at the grassroot level for the first time since Kenya’s independence in 1963,” continues Gathii. “That progress will be upended by the U.S.–Kenya FTA that would make it difficult if not impossible to preserve and enhance the work these counties have been able to do with provision of essential drugs and health care systems that would face higher drug and medical costs as a result of the FTA.”

*

Sharon Treat, senior attorney at IATP, emphasizes the degradation of standards Kenya faces under an FTA with the U.S. Currently Kenya has a trading relationship with the European Union and “must align its food standards to be consistent with EU standards in order to export there,” she explains.

“EU food standards in many respects are more protective of human health or the environment than U.S. standards, for example, allowable levels of pesticide residues on produce, approvals of genetically modified food for human consumption, and use of chemical additives and growth promoters such as ractopamine and hormones in livestock production.” Treat warns that a trade deal with the U.S. “could lead Kenya to adopt policies that reduce, rather than increase environmental and other protections.”

The Kenyan government argues that it needs the FTA to safeguard against possible U.S. cancellation of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which currently provides considerable U.S. market access for Kenya and other African countries and has to be renewed by the U.S. Congress in 2025. But as Foley points out, the AGOA is unlikely to be terminated in 2025 as it “is extremely popular in Congress” with both Democrats and Republicans.

“AGOA has been renewed twice with overwhelming bipartisan support,” she says. “[T]here is simply no reason to believe that Congress would not renew this popular program again before it expires in 2025.”

Given all the disadvantages of finalizing an FTA with the U.S. as opposed to staying with the AGOA, which requires no concessions from Kenya, the Kenyatta government’s devotion to the FTA talks is difficult to understand, says Omino.

“What makes it even more difficult to understand is that such negotiations take place in secrecy and the text is only released to the public after the parties have agreed and signed the same,” she adds. “This means that citizens of the affected countries…are not really in the know of motivations for and actual machinations within these negotiations.”

Gathii says it seems Kenya’s elite are “pegging their hopes on a trade and investment deal that will propel Kenya’s economy.” He adds,

“There is simply no empirical evidence that merely entering into a trade and investment agreement along the lines that the U.S. and Kenya are entering into can result in the kinds of economic gains that the Kenyan government hopes to garner.”

Incoming U.S. President Joe Biden will announce his administration’s trade policy at the end of January. On the one hand, he is widely expected to put a hold on new trade initiatives while focusing attention on domestic affairs including the still worsening COVID-19 outbreak as well as economic renewal projects, some of them tied to a climate transition.

At the same time, Biden is on record calling for “a united front of friends and partners to challenge China’s abusive behavior.” Going along with Trump’s FTA negotiations with Kenya, as Biden is expected to do with a proposed U.S.–U.K. FTA, could provide him with an easy bi-partisan win while appeasing establishment hawks, business Democrats and big business lobbyists in D.C. What is the livelihood of a million Kenyan farmers and food vendors next to that?

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A LEGACY OF BLOOD

America’s Half a Century of War in Somalia Comes to an End. Sort Of


Despite Trump’s decision to remove troops from Somalia, ramped-up airstrikes and record death tolls prove that America’s bloody legacy in the region is not over.




Jan. 29 2021
Like so many of the conflicts around the world today, the ongoing war in Somalia dates back to the proxy wars between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. With the latter now a historical relic, American involvement in the East African nation has continued under the guise of the “war on terror,” in order to maintain a geopolitical edge in the Horn of Africa.

In December of 2020, the Trump administration announced the decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia, sparking concerns from factions within the Somali military that have grown to rely on American troops and training in the country’s endless civil war.

The move has come under intense criticism from pro-interventionist media like Foreign Affairs magazine, who urgedthe Biden administration to “recommit” to fighting al-Shabaab militant force, which has emerged as the main focus of resistance after decades of foreign interference in the African nation. Listed as a terrorist organization by the State Department since 2008, al-Shabaab is part of a broader coalition of interests fighting for regional independence that includes factions within the Somali government and national security forces.


Far from a capitulation, the pull out of U.S. troops from Somalia is little more than a part of a redeployment operation to move American forces to other parts of East Africa. AFRICOM spokesman Air Force Col. Chris Karns admitted that a “limited force presence will remain” in the country and, as evidenced by the continued U.S. airstrikes conducted after the withdrawal of 700 to 800 troops – on pace to exceedthose of previous years – any illusions that the United States has any intention of retreating should be put to rest.



A cold beginning
The Federal Republic of Somalia is one of four countries located in what is generally referred to as the Horn of Africa, a vital artery for global commerce since the nineteenth century. As the source of the Nile river, its proximity to Middle East oil fields, and Indian Ocean trade routes, the Horn of Africa has long been the target of colonial powers Britain and France, as well as fascist Italy during World War II.

American involvement didn’t begin in earnest until well after the war when Somali independence in the 1960s brought British Somaliland and Italian Somaliland under one flag and arbitrary territorial demarcations left large swaths of ethnic Somalis dispersed on the edges of the new country, fueling a tug of war between Soviet-led Eastern bloc countries and the U.S. to bring these groups under their influence. The Somali-Soviet arms deal of 1963 cemented the Russian’s advantage. The Soviets seemed to gain an even greater hold on the burgeoning African nation after the military coup of 1969 executed by far-left nationalists led by General Siad Barre, spurring major U.S. military aid to neighboring Ethiopia resulting in regular armed clashes between the two.

Matters deteriorated for American interests in 1975 when a military coup in Ethiopia installed a Marxist group known as DERGUE to power, deposing the U.S.-backed regime of Emperor Haile Selassie and further opening the door to Soviet influence in the region. This turn of eventswould become a watershed moment for U.S. policy in the region as it began providing military and economic assistance to Said Barre’s socialist government.

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Somali children run alongside a U.S. M-1 Abrams during an armored patrol in north Mogadishu, Jan. 26, 1993. Mark Duncan | AP

The so-called Ogaden War between Ethiopia and Somalia, launched by Barre in 1977, broke relations between the Somali regime and the Soviet Union, which struck a deal with Fidel Castro to bring in 5,000 Cuban troops to back their Ethiopian ally, resulting in the defeat of Said Barre’s army and the beginning of the end of détentebetween the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

In 1979, the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan would set the stage for Operation Cyclone; a CIA program initiated by President Jimmy Carter to finance Afghan resistance groups known as mujahedeen. The longest-running covert operation in American history has funneled over $20 Billion over the years to arm and train these groups and, despite its widely-recognized success in defeating the Soviet incursion, its aftermath has created a “Frankenstein” that continues to dominate U.S. policy in the Near East and which plays a central role in the Somalian civil war, which has devolved into a full-fledged regional conflict.



Box office hit
Thanks to Hollywood, many Americans are familiar with snippets of one of the United States’ biggest failures in Somalia since it started redoubling its efforts to impose its will in the region after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In a movie titled “Black Hawk Down,” the story of how 18 American troops were shot out of the sky by Somali warlords omits most of the relevant details

Under an initiative called Operation Restore Hope, the administration of George H.W. Bush and the United Nations in an ostensibly humanitarian mission sent 30,000 Belgian troops to Somalia in order to create a “secure environment for eventual political reconciliation” in the wake of a war-induced famine that had claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of people.

The mission quickly flipped into a military operation that fomented the rise of Somali warlords as the “peacekeeping” troops began persecuting local clan leaders and exacerbating tensions. Bush’s successor, Bill Clinton, expanded the “mission” and escalated the conflict in the civil war that overthrew the exiled government of Said Barre.

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A US Marine confronts a Somali trying to enter the port of Mogadishu without ID, Jan. 21, 1993. Dave Caulkin | AP

General Mohamed Farah Aideed, a popular opposition leader and chairman of the United Somali Congress, was targeted by the U.S.-led foreign interventionists by enabling rival warlords to capture towns controlled by the General’s allies and ordering his arrest. This action turned the U.N.’s peacekeeping force into a common enemy, leading to their withdrawal from the country as Aideed’s men went on the attack. In response, Clinton deployed American soldiers to capture Aideed and his lieutenants. The infamous operation that led to the death of 18 U.S. troops and hundreds of Somalis memorialized in the aforementioned film, was a “snatch-and-grab” mission to capture two of Aideed’s lieutenants in the capital city of Mogadishu.

The operation involved 160 troops altogether, along with 19 aircraft and 12 vehicles. Known since as the Battle of Mogadishu, local militias trapped the invaders in an 18-hour firefight and downed two American Black Hawk helicopters, with international news outlets carrying images of dead American soldiers being dragged through the streets. Faced with such a public humiliation, Clinton stopped the mission and pulled U.S. forces out in March 1994.

After this debacle, the U.S. opted to keep a low profile in Somalia and in 2001 began extensive covert operations in the African nation. The Pentagon’s Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) took the lead in surveillance, reconnaissance, assault, and capture operations, which continued until 2016 and has resulted in the killing of hundreds of al-Shabaab militants, the main target of the operations.

In 2011, President Obama began deploying Reaper drones to the region, which have become a staple in America’s imperial wars, adding to the massive inventory of bombs and bullets that are still killing thousands of innocent civilians without a shred of accountability.



A legacy of blood
A case can be made that what has been called the civil war in Somalia has only ever been a relentless campaign by foreign countries to control a geographical area, that is vital to the functioning of their global commercial interests. The exploitation of any vague national sentiment their agents can muster by throwing money and guns at one faction or another is only a means to an end and.

As proven by the U.S.’ decades-long backing of a declared socialist like Said Barre and the current crusade against the “Islamic terrorist” militant groups they created in the 1970s, the ideological justifications driving much of the political rhetoric is as empty as an exploded mortar shell.

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A vehicle destroyed by US airstrike in Jamaame, Somalia, January 20th, 2021. Morad News via Airwars

Last Friday, January 22, barely one week after the withdrawal of American troops, 189 al-Shabaab fighters were massacred by the U.S.-backed Uganda People’s Defense Forces (UPDF). The strike was coordinated with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which partners with CIA agents that “operate unilaterally in the country” as part of the spy agency’s counterterrorism program in Somalia.

Despite Joe Biden’s campaign promise to “end forever wars,” the incoming U.S. administration is unlikely to modify its policy towards Somalia. In fact, some are already calling for the president to reverse Trump’s decision to remove troops, which further reveals the withdrawal to be not much more than a political parlor trick, as even arch-neocon policy wonks at the American Enterprise Institute understandthat enough of the groundwork has been laid to continue the U.S.’ bloody legacy in the region, take or leave a few boots on the ground.

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America's Half a Century of War in Somalia Comes to an End. Sort Of
 
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