Russia's Invasion of Ukraine (Official Thread)

[☑︎#VoteDemocrat]

Thread by @Joanna_Szostek on Thread Reader App

The infamous "ideologist of the Russian World" Aleksandr Dugin has given a long interview to the Russian tabloid MK.
If anyone in Russia has given up on capturing Kyiv, it is definitely not Dugin.
A , if you can stomach it.
He says: Russia has been battling for Kyiv since the middle ages in a "conflict between Great Russians and the Galicians", so "Kyiv will be ours".
He says: "The siege of Kyiv is a battle for the unity of Eastern Slavs and the creation of a sovereign civilization of the Russian World, which is directed against the West."
He says: "We are waging an eschatological military operation, a special operation between Light and Darkness in the sitution of the end of times..."
He says: "Truth and God are on our side. We are fighting the absolute evil, embodied in Western civilization, its liberal-totalitarian hegemony, in Ukrainian Nazism..."
Asked about nuclear weapons, he says: "We are always balancing on a tightrope. Any weapon is created to be fired... nuclear weapons in certain circumstances, if it's a clash of civilizations, can become offensive weapons. Of course, Russia will never fire first."
He says Russia is "an empire in a sense, which absorbed everything... it won't be complete until we have united all Eastern Slavs and all Eurasian brothers into a common big space."
Asked "how to explain to Russian mothers from Mariupol that it's all a blessing", he says explanations will follow "as soon as the flag of East Ukraine, Russia, freedom and independence is raised over Kherson and Novorossiya" and republics are created in other Ukrainian regions.
Asked if Putin reads his work, he says: "I think we read the same letters written in gold in the sky of Russian history".
Now would be a good time for someone to reassure us all that Dugin is not as influential as his reputation suggests. Please?
For several thousand more words of this toxic, terrifying BS, see
Александр Дугин: «солнечный» Путин победил «лунного»
Это его портретами в 2014-м были увешаны улицы Харькова. Его последователи Стрелков и Бородай первыми возглавили отколовшуюся от Украины ДНР. С его цитатами в головах ехали на Донбасс русские добровол…
Александр Дугин: «солнечный» Путин победил «лунного»

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[☑︎#VoteDemocrat]

One Of Russia’s Newest Air Defense Systems Has Been Captured In Ukraine

 

[☑︎#VoteDemocrat]

 

[TheDarceKnight]

Russia invades Ukraine..America gives Ukraine a ton of top notch equipment...

Then Ukraine form an alliance w Russia and use said equipment and tactics learned against America?

definitely not going to happen

 

[Hood Critic]

One Of Russia’s Newest Air Defense Systems Has Been Captured In Ukraine

Throw the whole military leadership away.

 

[☑︎#VoteDemocrat]

intelnews.org
Analysis: American Intelligence and the Russian Invasion of Ukraine
by Joseph Fitsanakis
6-7 minutes

Volodymyr Zelensky

AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES ASSESSED Russia’s intentions in Ukraine with remarkable precision. Moreover, Washington’s picture of the Russian military’s physical strength has proven highly accurate. On the other hand, American intelligence agencies appear to have over-estimated Russia’s conceptual military power —that is, Moscow’s ability to utilize its physical military strength efficiently. This, combined with a tendency to underrate the willingness of the Ukrainian population to resist the Russian invasion, appears to have led Washington to over-estimate Russia’s chances of a swift military victory in Ukraine.

American estimates of Russia’s military power potential before the invasion of Ukraine were largely accurate. United States intelligence agencies —primarily the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency— had formed a relatively precise picture of the Russian military power potential, in terms of its physical power. This means that, long before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Washington was well-versed on the strength of the Russian military in terms of its size, hardware and firepower. Moreover, American Q Quoteintelligence interpreted Russian intentions on Ukraine with remarkable accuracy. It should be noted that, with the help of its intelligence advisors, the White House was able to estimate the precise date and time of the invasion of Ukraine.

However, America’s understanding of Russian conceptual power —namely the ability of the Russian military to utilize its physical resources effectively— was far more limited. Washington over-estimated the logistical and organizational capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces. In other words, American intelligence had a largely accurate picture of the material capabilities of the Russian military. It had a far less accurate picture of the Russian military’s ability to use these capabilities effectively. It follows that the unimpressive performance of the Russian military in Ukraine has surprised American observers, and has prompted a re-evaluation of Russian military capability estimates in the American intelligence community.

In terms of the Ukrainian military, the United States has had a very accurate understanding of Kyiv’s capabilities for quite some time, given that American forces have been training core elements of the Ukrainian military for nearly a decade. American intelligence understood well that the correlation of military forces overwhelmingly favors Russia. However, American intelligence estimates undervalued the ability of Ukrainians to coalesce against a common enemy. It is notable that, in the hours following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Washington offered political asylum to senior members of the Volodymyr Zelenskyy administration. This illustrates the degree to which the United States underestimated the Q Quotecollective will of the Ukrainian population to fight against the invader.

Since the invasion, American intelligence agencies have focused on the situation in Ukraine with an intensity that can only be compared to the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. This intensity has been paying off, as American intelligence continues to play an increasingly central role in the war. It should be noted that the Ukrainian Spetsnaz —i.e. the special forces of Ukraine— are primarily responsible for the setbacks suffered by the Russian military during the past several weeks. It was these special forces units that managed to beat back a large-scale Russian heliborne assault on the Antonov Airport in Hostomel, northwest of Kyiv, which took place during the opening hours of the invasion. Facing fierce Ukrainian resistance, the Russians sent in their 11th and 31st Guards Air Assault Brigades —roughly equivalent to the United States’ 82nd Airborne Division— but still failed to secure the airfield. The latter continues to be contested, as the Ukrainians launch regular counter-offensives in the wider vicinity. The failure to secure the Antonov Airport in Hostomel was nothing short of disastrous for Russian war planners. It meant that Russian forces were unable to quickly fly in troops and vehicles, which in turn prevented them from realizing their original goal —namely having their forces in downtown Kyiv by the afternoon of February 25. That crucial delay gave the Ukrainians time to prepare their defenses and barricade themselves around numerous zones in Kyiv. The Ukrainian special forces units that practically stopped Russia from winning the war before it had even begun, had been trained by the United States Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of Defense for the past decade.

Additionally, the deep knowledge by American intelligence of the military capabilities of the Russian forces has allowed Washington and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies to supply the Ukrainians with the precise types of weapons needed to combat advancing Russian armored units, especially in an urban/suburban warfare setting. Versatile weaponry, such as Javelin man-portable surface-to-air missiles, or NLAW anti-tank weapons, have proven instrumental in preventing Russian troops from encircling most of Ukraine’s large cities. The intelligence operation to supply the Ukrainians with such weapons has been so successful, that the country’s territorial forces have practically used them all, and now need reinforcements, //prompting// Western allies to ramp up production of such weaponry.

► Author: Joseph Fitsanakis | Date: 31 March 2022 | Permalink

 

[☑︎#VoteDemocrat]

Ukrainian Hackers Take Aim at Russian Artillery, Navigation Signals


Ukrainian Hackers Take Aim at Russian Artillery, Navigation Signals
Group says it has found several ways to keep lost units lost.





By Patrick Tucker
Technology Editor
March 30, 2022 09:09 PM ET

• 
  
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• Russia
• Ukraine
• Missiles

A group of Ukrainian hackers says it has found ways to disrupt Russian military units’ navigation and is working on ways to disrupt artillery fire as well.

The nearly two dozen volunteers of the CyberPan Ukraine group work with the Ukrainian military and get funds from sources in Israel and the United States, group members told Defense One.

In the weeks since Russia invaded Ukraine, one member said, the group has found ways to keep some field units from receiving signals from the GLONASS system, Russia’s version of the U.S. GPS satellite navigation constellation. Lost Russian forces are easier to find and target than ones that know where they are going.

Currently, the group is looking for ways to disrupt artillery fire, at least from systems that employ precision guidance systems. The member said the group has identified several computer servers linked to Russian rockets.

“We found many mistakes inside the system,” he said.

Poor communications tech has hobbled the Russian war effort. Its Era secure cellphones aren’t working, in part because the invading forces destroyed many of the system’s cell towers, Bellingcat investigator Cristo Grovez said on March 7. This has forced many Russian units to use unencrypted phones, whose calls have been picked up by Ukrainian forces, foreign journalists, and others.

Russia does have better communication equipment, like software-defined radios such as the R-187P1 Azart and R-168-5UN-2.

“The impression provided by the Russian Ministry of Defence (MoD) over the years has been that this equipment was widespread and that the majority of the Russian Armed Forces (RuAF) were operating digital radios and systems designed to facilitate planning and decision-making,” Sam Cranny-Evans and Thomas Withington wrote in a March 9 article for the Royal United Services Institute.” But that clearly isn’t the case, the authors note.



Meanwhile, Russian state media have reported that the government is investigating corruption allegations against some Russian makers of communications equipment.

Some of the communications problems are likely due to poor preparation of the invasion force, said Samuel Bendett, an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and an adviser at the CNA Corporation.

“Some were not fully aware they were going into an actual war [but] thinking they were part of a military drill,” Bendett said. “Perhaps they did not fully combat-proof their comms equipment as a result, and that is how Ukrainians are able to intercept.”

Bendett also pointed out that the United States and other allies were training and equipping Ukraine, which has had years to prepare for this invasion.

“The Ukrainian military knows what technology the Russian military uses and this preparation gave them the opportunity to learn how to disrupt Russian comms,” he said.

 

[☑︎#VoteDemocrat]

 

[newarkhiphop]

 

[Leasy]

Putin lost brehs shyt ain’t happened.

 

[☑︎#VoteDemocrat]

 

[☑︎#VoteDemocrat]

one

step

ahead

 

[☑︎#VoteDemocrat]

jesus fukkin christ

here we go again

 

[88m3]

Throw the whole military leadership away.

I don't understand why they don't destroy their equipment but I'm not complaining

 

[Liu Kang]

I just an article about this. Basically they thought that Russia could attack and had the means to do so but that they wouldn't do it because it was too costly and risky and there were better ways to destabilize Ukraine.

His mistake (among others most likely) was to think that Putin would have assessed the situation logically