I'm gonna highlight the bolded just to point out that you do not know what justification from a command perspective entails - and also that same 'justification' is an issue regarding these post-action investigations because the battlefield picture and associated factors often do not reach an endpoint that allows these clean cut conclusions. And that is good *and* bad for a lot of reasons. What risk a commander is entitled to assume does not translate to what orders a weaponeer is allowed to follow or not follow either.
I am speaking very narrowly to the justifications that Talon Anvil were allowed to use to call in strikes in that specific war. I've read the entire DOD report on the engagement as well as numerous 3rd-party reports of it as well as broader reports on Talon Anvil in general and NONE of them give the justification he did. His argument would have required pre-approval for the strikes, which they did not have.
What that was, was a mess. And there is so such thing as a clean war. Ever. However, the way you go about fighting your war is far more deliberate. If your strategy is to beat a population into submission by targeting civilians directly, using them as body shields, destroying infrastructure, purposeful desecration of historical and cultural sites, organizing efforts to destroy human dignity past anything that is reasonable or ethical, etc - then you're fighting a war outside of what should guide laws of land warfare from the start.
So yes, its worth noting that the 'intent' is a factor and should be brought up with trying to quantify these things.
I'll use your own terminology here then. "Not caring", being dismissive of civilian casualties, prioritizing that harm lower than your own personnel or mission is still VERY far away from dodging fights against a standing, uniformed force altogether to choose a much more vulnerable target like a playground, vulnerable peoples, nowhere near the action, etc.
It seems like 90% of the work being done here is built around the suggestion that Russia has some sort of systematic policy of targeting playgrounds. The only evidence I've seen behind that claim was damage at one playground, which as easily could have been from a shot-down missile or off-target missile (since over half the missiles they shot got shot down or were off target) as opposed to Moscow choosing to waste an entire multi-million dollar cruise missile on an empty playground, an action which on its face would seem to have FAR more propaganda value for Kiev than for Moscow (which, of course, is why Ukrainian officials immediately made a big deal of it and broadcast it around....while the suggestion is that Russian officials are happy about it being broadcast and it helps them somehow?). To jump from "there was damage at a playground" to "Russia is purposely choosing to target playgrounds as some greater war objective" is a stretch to the point verging on propaganda.
Now, the fact that at least part of a Russian missile hit a playground is GOOD evidence for how sick it is to shoot cruise missiles into cities. But that is much more in line with my initial point that these targeting teams don't care enough about collaterol damage.
If the argument is instead that it's a horrible thing to attack civilian infrastructure a long ways away from the battlefield, then we wouldn't have seen so much gloating over the Crimean bridge attack, or days upon days of US media glorifing of the "shock and awe" destruction of Iraqi civilian power distribution infrastructure (among many other targets) before our troops were even on the ground.
Furthermore in asymmetrical warfare where the primary belligerents actively used civilians and civilian property as barriers against a better armed foe? Yes, its going to be ugly. You can spell out the harm against individuals here over and over again - but I'd like to emphasize that you're not speaking to an audience that's wholly removed from that kind of thing. Many of us have provided direct aid to the same folks in these situations you're trying to say we don't care about. The reality is, against an enemy willing to kill the same people they're using as a meat shield, you quickly reach a disgusting ground where killing some to save many becomes a reality of the decision making in far too many engagements. And in that sense, encountering people who are vocally towards an 'end the fight decisively and quickly' shouldn't be a surprise either.
I'm not for shutting down discussion. I'm just saying that you're not dumb, so you can realize that what you're saying with some of these guys isn't clicking - at the same time, there's reasons why many feel the way they do and its because they're stupid either.
and with that im done
especially as I agree with both of yal and wish you'd see that you're not saying vastly points like you think you are
I respect that, and I agree with more of what you're saying than is coming out in this particular discussion, while also disagreeing with a couple particular points there which to address would drag it even further afield.
The main regret I have is that there is so much emotional baggage (as obvious over the last few pages) that keeps any single point from just being a point, and someone can't criticize any specific team with a particular modus operandi without having to take on the entire US military and all its defenders.
I think the desire of the US military to follow ethical rules of combat in 2022 is stronger than the desire of the Russian military to follow ethical rules of combat in 2022. I think that generalization is true from the commander in chief down through the generals all the way to the boots on the ground, though I don't believe it is true for every individual and I'm sure there are plenty of exceptions of moral Russian soldiers and dastardly Americans. But my general view that the US tries to be more ethical is engagement than Russia does not preclude that any particular team within the US military could be fukking up for similar reasons as a team in Russia is fukking up.