Two days after publishing his manifesto, Zuckerberg and his wife, Priscilla Chan, showed up unannounced at a cocktail bar called the Haberdasher in Mobile, Alabama. The bar’s owner offered to run interference with the Saturday-night, pre–Mardi Gras crowd, but Zuckerberg waved her off. “We’re in the people business,” he said. “This is perfectly fine.” They chatted with fellow patrons over drinks — a stout for Zuckerberg and a mocktail for Chan, who would announce her pregnancy two weeks later — and Zuckerberg gamely took a shot of Alabama whiskey with the bar owners (“Anything but tequila,” he pleaded when offered). Around midnight, they left — they had to be up early the next morning for church.
In nearly every state he’s visited, Zuckerberg has attended religious services or met with religious leaders. In Texas, he drank coffee with pastors; in Minnesota, he ate Iftar dinner with Somalian refugees; in Charleston, he ate dinner with the entire cast of a walk-into-a-bar joke: “The reverend, rabbi, police chief, mayors, and heads of local nonprofits.” The next day, he visited Mother Emanuel AME, where white supremacist Dylann Roof killed eight parishioners and the church’s pastor in 2015.
Asked by a Facebook commenter last year if he was an atheist, Zuckerberg replied, “No. I was raised Jewish and then I went through a period where I questioned things, but now I believe religion is very important.” It was a telling way to put it. Publicly, at least, his interest in religion seems to be more sociological than existential. After attending services at Aimwell Baptist Church, in Mobile, he wrote on Facebook about “how the church provides an important social structure for the community.”
This has, generally, been the theme for the trip: How does this whole “community” thing work? And if you’re looking for an example of a powerful and enduring community that supersedes geographical territory, ethnic heritage, or class interest, religion offers a particularly fascinating case study. The Muslim Ummah united Arab tribes and non-Arabs in a universal community of believers. The Catholic Church was both a rival and a complement to state power, providing essential services and legitimizing the governance of kings and emperors, almost entirely through the force of shared values.
What shared values might Facebook enforce? Zuckerberg’s own personal values, such as his admirable commitment to immigration activism, tend to align with what’s good for Facebook. It would be difficult to think of a better real-life representative of the “globalists” bemoaned by Breitbart and other hypernationalist outlets than Zuckerberg, but his platform has also been those publications’ greatest asset in distributing their message. Zuckerberg’s commitment to liberalism — and to not alienating wide swaths of his user base — is deep enough that when Facebook was accused of “suppressing” conservative news, he met in person with conservative media figures to assure them Facebook was committed to giving them a voice.
Which may explain why in “Building Global Community,” Zuckerberg hesitates when he tries to lay out a foundational value system for the community he’s hoping to build. “The guiding principles,” he writes, “are that the Community Standards should reflect the cultural norms of our community, that each person should see as little objectionable content as possible, and each person should be able to share what they want while being told they cannot share something as little as possible.” That is: The guiding principles should be whatever encourages people to post more. Facebook’s actual value system seems less positive than recursive. Facebook is good because it creates community; community is good because it enables Facebook. The values of Facebook are Facebook.
April 27: Dearborn, Michigan.
In late September, Zuckerberg apologized for being initially “dismissive” about the problem of misinformation but insisted Facebook’s “broader impact” on politics was more important. He’s probably right, but I’m not sure he should want to be. What happens to politics when what he calls our “social infrastructure” is refashioned by Facebook? The last election gives us a hint. In February 2016, the media theorist
Clay Shirky wrote about Facebook’s effect: “Reaching and persuading even a fraction of the electorate used to be so daunting that only two national orgs” — the two major national political parties — “could do it. Now dozens can.” It used to be if you wanted to reach hundreds of millions of voters on the right, you needed to go through the GOP Establishment. But in 2016, the number of registered Republicans was a fraction of the number of daily American Facebook users, and the cost of reaching them directly was negligible. Trump was able to create a political coalition of disaffected Democrats and rabid right-wing Republicans because the parallel civic infrastructure of social media — and Facebook in particular — meant he had no obligation to Republican orthodoxy.
Or take the reorganized civic infrastructure of political advertising, suddenly brought to light by the announcement that Russian-government-linked accounts and pages had purchased $100,000 worth of ads, reportedly highlighting divisive issues and promoting spoiler candidates like Jill Stein. What effect that money might have had on last year’s election remains totally unclear. The amount spent, and the number of ads sold (“Roughly 3,000”), could indicate a potential audience anywhere from a few hundred thousand to scores of millions. The best-case scenario is that it was a largely frivolous experiment — a way for the infamous Kremlin-connected “troll farm,” the Internet Research Agency, to quietly test the effects of paid placement. The nightmare possibility is that the money was spent strategically in an effort to selectively target swing voters with specific interests in important electoral districts — white working-class Obama voters in Michigan who’d joined anti-immigrant Facebook groups, say — pushing divisive issues that encouraged or discouraged certain voting patterns.
Few people know how the money was used, or where, because Facebook has declined so far to identify the “inauthentic accounts” or Facebook pages or to say whom they targeted. Until Zuckerberg’s September announcement, the company had insisted that sharing further data with Congress, or the public, could violate U.S. privacy laws. (Facebook did, after reportedly receiving a search warrant, share the data with federal investigators looking into collusion between the Trump campaign and the Russian government.)
The policy changes announced by Zuckerberg in September represent an effort at self-regulation — Facebook’s way of saying “Trust us, we can handle ourselves.” But this isn’t a particularly appealing pitch. Facebook has been wrong, often: It spent most of the year insisting that it had sold no political ads to Russian actors. Twice in the past year, it’s admitted misreporting metrics to advertisers. Earlier in September, P
roPublica discovered that it was possible to purchase ads targeted at self-described “Jew-haters.” Maybe more important, it’s not clear why we’d imagine that Facebook’s interests are the same as the U.S. government’s.
This was what felt so unnerving about Zuckerberg’s September announcement. As with all things Facebook, it opened itself up to multiple interpretations, depending on the angle from which you caught it: Rotate one way and it’s an admirable and much-needed statement of commitment and responsibility from a powerful but ultimately positive corporation. Rotate another and it’s an assurance to state leaders of Facebook’s continuing commitment to the sovereignty of nation-states, no matter how global its actual network is. (“Now, now, Mr. Prime Minister, we understand your little borders are very important to you.”)
Rotate further and it’s a declaration that Facebook is assuming a level of power at once of the state and beyond it, as a sovereign, self-regulating, suprastate entity within which states themselves operate. Planetary technical systems like Facebook, David Banks, a SUNY Albany professor who studies large technical systems, told me, “don’t want to be in an environment” — natural, legal, political, social — “they want to
be the environment.” Facebook, this announcement seemed to imply, was an environment in which democracy takes place; a “natural” force not unlike democracy itself.
It’s not that there are no possible outside checks on Facebook’s power. The problem posed by Russian ads has an easy and direct regulatory fix. “It should be illegal for foreign governments to buy political ads,” said Tim Wu, the Columbia Law School professor and author of
The Attention Merchants. “Facebook should be required to screen and disclose what their advertising practices are, how much people are paying, whether people get the same rates.” Congressional Democrats have recently been pushing to regulate online political ads under the FEC.
The size of companies like Facebook has renewed interest in antitrust, though Facebook itself has, so far, avoided the kind of attention and suspicion that Google has garnered, in part because the case is harder to make, particularly in the context of American antitrust law, which (at least in recent history) is designed to protect consumers rather than competition. Moreover, for antitrust action to have a meaningful effect, it would need to present an actual threat to Facebook — and with its market capitalization of $500 billion, even fines in the tens of billions are minor headaches. No proposals have been floated to break up the company, no doubt in part because we still have trouble sizing it up.
Wu compared Facebook to NBC and CBS and ABC in the 1950s, whose status as the sole TV networks meant they commanded nightly audiences in the tens of millions. But those networks operated under a strict regulatory environment from the get-go. Facebook has essentially gotten away with expanding into every corner of our lives without government interference by claiming to be a mere middleman for information passed between others. “Facebook has the same kind of attentional power, but there is not a sense of responsibility,” he said. “No constraints. No regulation. No oversight. Nothing. A bunch of algorithms, basically, designed to give people what they want to hear.”
Which is really the government’s larger problem. From one angle, the Facebook hypercube terrifies me; from another, it’s a tool with which I have a tremendous and affectionate intimate bond. I have 13 years of memories stored on Facebook; the first photo ever taken of me and my partner together is there, somewhere deep in an album posted by someone I haven’t talked to in years. It gives me what I want, both in the hamster-wheel–food-pellet sense, and in a deeper and more meaningful one.
And if we come to feel that a life structured by Facebook is miserable and regressive? “My answer there,” Banks said, “is storm the data centers.” He gives the example of the financier Charles Tyson Yerkes, who in 1897 attempted to secure his already extensive control of Chicago’s streetcar lines by bribing lawmakers to give him a 50-year franchise. A middle-class mob carrying nooses arrived at City Hall and, hollering “Hang him” at corrupt aldermen, ultimately ran Yerkes out of town. “Advocating for that sort of violent overthrow isn’t necessary,” Banks admitted. “But you do have to start learning how to make demands of a large system, which I think is a practice largely falling out of use.”
It tends to get forgotten, but Facebook briefly ran itself in part as a democracy: Between 2009 and 2012, users were given the opportunity to vote on changes to the site’s policy. But voter participation was minuscule, and Facebook felt the scheme “incentivized the quantity of comments over their quality.” In December 2012, that mechanism was abandoned “in favor of a system that leads to more meaningful feedback and engagement.” Facebook had grown too big, and its users too complacent, for democracy.
*This article appears in the October 2, 2017, issue of New York
Magazine.
@DonKnock @SJUGrad13 @88m3 @Menelik II @wire28 @smitty22 @Reality @fact @Hood Critic @ExodusNirvana @Blessed Is the Man @THE MACHINE @OneManGang @dtownreppin214 @JKFrazier @tmonster @blotter @BigMoneyGrip @Soymuscle Mike @Grano-Grano @.r.