How will Joe Biden GOVERN? General Biden Administration F**kery Thread
- Thread starter FAH1223
- Start date
Bill Maher dedicated a portion of his monologue tonight to mocking Hunter Biden.
This shyt is a bigger story than you think.
Dont say you weren't warned.
AquaCityBoy
Veteran
Piff Perkins
Veteran
But they aren’t doing a great job. People are struggling. Biden let these dudes spend weeks working on an infrastructure bill, which is fine considering it worked but…nothing else has been done. I don’t want to hear about Covid relief, that was months ago. Prices are up, wages are meh for many, and others are at risk of eviction. And these are the people you think will vote for you next year lol?
An infrastructure bill passed the senate with heavy republican support and it can’t become law because of House infighting. With a 5 seat majority. This is madness.
This was gonna happen regardless. Better to pull the band-aid off now instead of later in Biden's administration will help his reelection.
You dont want to go into 2024 with this looming.
You dont want to go into 2024 with this looming.
mastermind
Rest In Power Kobe
Infrastructure bill would create new agency without job protections, angering federal unions still smarting from fights with Trump
A little-noticed provision of the $1 trillion infrastructure bill the Senate passed this week would create a new Transportation Department research agency that would operate outside the civil service system.
The move has angered the federal employee unions the Biden administration counts as powerful allies, leading to charges that the White House is embracing an approach to hiring and firing government employees put in place by President Donald Trump, who was hostile toward the federal workforce. Adding to the anger and confusion among union officials is that while President Biden moved in his first days in office to repeal a Trump-era order, known as Schedule F, that sought to remove civil service protections from a large class of federal employees, his administration now appears to be trying to use the same policy selectively.
“President Biden may have rescinded Schedule F, but the reintroduction of this governance model in an infrastructure bill is gratuitous and unnecessary . . . and represents an attack on the underpinnings of an apolitical civil service,” American Federation of Government Employees National President Everett Kelley wrote in a letter to lawmakers last week.
The Advanced Research Projects Agency for Infrastructure (ARPA-I) would operate as a high-visibility think tank of sorts, filled with engineers and scientists working with state and local governments and universities to improve the government’s capabilities in transportation projects the bill would invest in. The idea, modeled after a similar department created in 2007 during the George W. Bush administration to spur innovation at the Energy Department, was endorsed by Secretary Pete Buttigieg and his staff, who asked that it be included in the infrastructure bill moving through Congress, according to government officials who, like others, spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe the negotiations.
The goal is to quickly stand up a premier arm of one of the president’s signature legislative programs. But employees of the new agency will lack civil service protections enjoyed by the vast majority of federal employees. The Transportation Department does not need to open the jobs to competition, but can use private head hunters to hire staff members. The employees will have few protections against retaliation for whistleblowing. And they could be fired without appeal rights or other due process protections in cases of discipline or removal that are pillars of the civil service system.
Biden officials intend to use the template elsewhere. They’ve proposed a similar agency at Health and Human Services called ARPA-H, which would set up an entity at the National Institutes of Health to find breakthroughs in the fight against cancer and other illnesses.
The proposed agencies at Transportation and HHS reflect growing bipartisan frustration with a sluggish federal employment process that has changed little since the 1970s and, lawmakers argue, often fails to draw the most talented people to government and makes it difficult to dismiss poor performers.
But the workforce and the unions that represent about 1.3 million federal employees are still smarting from the Trump administration’s attempt to overhaul the federal bureaucracy it viewed as a “deep state” that fought its policies. The effort culminated at the end of Trump’s term with a last-ditch effort to remove civil service protections from tens of thousands of career federal employees.
Biden quickly overturned Schedule F after the outgoing administration had moved to reclassify the vast majority of staff in the White House budget office.
Officials at AFGE, the largest federal employee union with more than 700,000 members at 70 agencies — including Transportation — flagged the infrastructure agency to the White House last week. The union was puzzled that it knew nothing about the infrastructure agency until days before the Senate vote on the bill, according to congressional aides and other people familiar with their conversations.
The union then wrote a letter to every senator asking them to strike the language creating ARPA-I “without regard to the civil service laws.”
This “would effectively adopt the completely discredited Schedule F hiring and firing procedures that were rescinded by President Biden immediately after he took office,” Kelley wrote in his letter to lawmakers.
Sen. Chris Van Hollen (D-Md.) proposed a last-minute legislative fix that would allow the new entity to hire without competition but ensure the staff’s rights as federal employees.
“Civil service protections across our government are key to ensuring a strong federal workforce that puts the needs of the American people first,” the senator, whose district includes tens of thousands of federal employees, said in an email. He called his proposal a guarantee that the agency “will provide critical protections to support whistleblowers and prevent undue political influence in the treatment of their workforce.”
But the broad infrastructure bill passed the Senate on Tuesday without Van Hollen’s proposal. It’s unclear whether House Democrats will try or be able to change the language when that chamber takes up the bill this fall.
Spokespeople for the Transportation Department and the White House Office of Management and Budget said the administration supports Van Hollen’s amendment.
The Biden administration is counting on AFGE and other unions as key allies in the fight against the coronavirus, seeking support for a new vaccine policy that requires federal employees to attest that they have been inoculated or face restrictions in the workplace. Union support is also crucial to White House plans to return government workers to the office to restart key services for the public that have languished during the pandemic.
The administration has offered few details about the new agency or its employment provisions, which were approved by the Senate Commerce Committee in June at the Transportation Department’s request as part of a surface transportation bill that was rolled into the larger infrastructure package, Senate aides said.
The new agency’s funding would be subject to future appropriation efforts, so it is unclear what its budget and staffing would entail. The legislative language setting it up calls for a Senate-confirmed leader reporting to the secretary, with top officials serving three-year, renewable terms. Pay would be set higher than the general schedule for other federal employees.
The new agency is not without precedent. The Energy Department version, created under Bush but first funded in the Obama administration’s 2009 economic stimulus bill, provides money for cutting-edge research that partners with government labs, private industry, and universities. The Trump administration had proposed eliminating ARPA-E, saying it duplicated other programs.
The Defense Department has operated a similar agency for 60 years — the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) — designed to invest in breakthrough national security technologies. But where the defense agency is authorized to recruit outside the competitive hiring system, it must provide job protections. Energy’s research agency does not.
Administrations in both parties have sought workarounds to ease hiring in recent years, getting permission from Congress and the Office of Personnel Management to forgo the competitive merit system. A spokeswoman for the personnel agency declined to comment on the new infrastructure agency.
“If I were running the DOT, I would not want to spend the next year trying to hire people with what we know is an outdated, ineffective hiring process,” said Jeff Neal, a retired Department of Homeland Security personnel manager who writes a blog on the management of government. Neal added, though, that “providing due process is important.”
James Sherk, Trump’s top adviser on labor relations and civil service issues and the author of the proposed Schedule F system, said the infrastructure agency’s personnel system sounds “very similar.”
“If you want the government to do things, you have to change the system that works so well for the unions,” said Sherk, who now directs the Center for American Freedom at America First Policy Institute, a think tank formed to promote Trump’s policies. (Why is this guy being interviewed)
“You want a high level of accountability from the staff,” Sherk said, “So if an employee is not doing a great job, the agency has the ability to replace them with someone who will do a much better job.”
A federal personnel expert who is close to the administration and who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss what has become a sensitive issue said the Transportation Department agency and the one proposed at Health and Human Services create a caste system in the government that will make it harder to recruit for hard-to fill jobs elsewhere in the government.
“The barn door is open,” this person said, calling the new agencies “skunkwork operations that are corrupting the civil service.”
This is a massive fukk you to the Chinese lowkey 
Opinion | The Taliban’s Afghan Advance Spells Trouble for Pakistan and China
The Taliban’s Afghan Advance Spells Trouble for Pakistan and China
Instability threatens the government in Islamabad and Beijing’s economic program in Central Asia.
By Kamran Bokhari
Aug. 13, 2021 2:53 pm ET
Taliban fighters in Kandahar, Afghanistan, Aug. 13.
Photo: -/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The Taliban are taking over city after city in Afghanistan at a stunning speed. But as the U.S. found in 2001, it’s one thing to topple a regime, another to set up a stable new one. Even if the Taliban can negotiate a formal return to power, the country will remain chaotic for a long time, with serious implications for the region, especially for Pakistan and China—in different but geopolitically significant ways.
The impact will be most immediate for Pakistan, which is already feeling it. In the past two decades the Taliban have gone from being a proxy of Islamabad to a threat. When Washington toppled the Taliban in late 2001, Pakistan saw it as a major foreign-policy loss even though it cooperated with the U.S. Islamabad continued to view the Afghan jihadist movement as an ally even in 2007-14, when it faced a major insurgency on its own soil from the Pakistani Taliban rebels. For more than a decade the “good vs. bad Taliban” narrative dominated the national conversation, distinguishing between those who fought in Afghanistan and those who sought to topple the Pakistani state.
It wasn’t until early last month that the country’s top two generals—the army chief and the head of Inter-Services Intelligence—acknowledged, in a rare briefing to opposition members of Parliament, that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban were “two faces of the same coin.” These remarks underscore that the Pakistani elite now fears its erstwhile proxies because their own country has been deeply penetrated by the Taliban ideology.
The Taliban comeback in Afghanistan will galvanize many Islamist actors in Pakistan to emulate the Afghan jihadist movement. It will be a huge challenge for a terribly weakened Islamic Republic of Pakistan to sustain itself with an Islamic emirate next door. Only a few years ago, and at great cost in blood and treasure, was Islamabad able to take back large swathes of its territory near the Afghan border from Taliban rebels. Those gains are at risk of being lost again.
Since the end of major military operations against Taliban insurgents in 2015, Pakistan has been increasingly dependent on China for its economic recovery. The biggest project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, in which Beijing has invested tens of billions of dollars. The fate of CPEC has increasingly come into question, especially in recent weeks with growing attacks, likely by Pakistani Taliban, targeting Chinese workers in the country. From Beijing’s point of view, a spillover of insecurity from Afghanistan will undermine its investments in Pakistan.
But a post-American Afghanistan also threatens Chinese interests outside Pakistan. For many years Beijing benefited from the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. China pushed ahead with its Belt and Road plans in Central Asia because the U.S. was ensuring that violence was contained within Afghanistan. In March Beijing announced that it would invest as much as $400 billion in Iran over 25 years in anticipation that a new nuclear deal would open Iran for business.
The U.S. decision to withdraw from Afghanistan has plunged China’s business plans in the region into uncertainty. Each of these Chinese projects is at risk of the violence radiating out of Afghanistan. And China isn’t alone in scrambling for solutions. This week Russian troops conducted joint exercises with forces from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on their borders with Afghanistan. But China has far more at stake than Russia, and unlike the Kremlin the People’s Liberation Army has never deployed a multidivisional force to maintain security beyond its borders.
China doesn’t have good options. It will work with Pakistan, Iran, Russia and the Central Asian nations to limit the disruption of its economic interests by the Afghan chaos. But each of these nations will be struggling to protect its own interests. This is why we see the Chinese enhancing their diplomatic ties with the Taliban. On Thursday U.S. News reported that China is prepared to recognize a Taliban regime even if it takes the country over militarily. This is in sharp contrast with the position of most other international and regional players, which have made clear that they would recognize a Taliban-dominated government only if it is formed as part of a negotiated settlement.
As we have seen in so many situations during the past two decades in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, regime change is a terribly messy process. Weak regimes can be toppled; replacing them is the hard part. It is only a matter of time before the Afghan state collapses, unleashing chaos that will spill beyond its borders. All of Afghanistan’s neighbors will be affected to varying degrees, but Pakistan and China have the most to lose.
Mr. Bokhari is director of analytical development at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy and a national-security and foreign-policy specialist at the University of Ottawa’s Professional Development Institute.
Opinion | The Taliban’s Afghan Advance Spells Trouble for Pakistan and China
The Taliban’s Afghan Advance Spells Trouble for Pakistan and China
Instability threatens the government in Islamabad and Beijing’s economic program in Central Asia.
By Kamran Bokhari
Aug. 13, 2021 2:53 pm ET
Taliban fighters in Kandahar, Afghanistan, Aug. 13.
Photo: -/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The Taliban are taking over city after city in Afghanistan at a stunning speed. But as the U.S. found in 2001, it’s one thing to topple a regime, another to set up a stable new one. Even if the Taliban can negotiate a formal return to power, the country will remain chaotic for a long time, with serious implications for the region, especially for Pakistan and China—in different but geopolitically significant ways.
The impact will be most immediate for Pakistan, which is already feeling it. In the past two decades the Taliban have gone from being a proxy of Islamabad to a threat. When Washington toppled the Taliban in late 2001, Pakistan saw it as a major foreign-policy loss even though it cooperated with the U.S. Islamabad continued to view the Afghan jihadist movement as an ally even in 2007-14, when it faced a major insurgency on its own soil from the Pakistani Taliban rebels. For more than a decade the “good vs. bad Taliban” narrative dominated the national conversation, distinguishing between those who fought in Afghanistan and those who sought to topple the Pakistani state.
It wasn’t until early last month that the country’s top two generals—the army chief and the head of Inter-Services Intelligence—acknowledged, in a rare briefing to opposition members of Parliament, that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban were “two faces of the same coin.” These remarks underscore that the Pakistani elite now fears its erstwhile proxies because their own country has been deeply penetrated by the Taliban ideology.
The Taliban comeback in Afghanistan will galvanize many Islamist actors in Pakistan to emulate the Afghan jihadist movement. It will be a huge challenge for a terribly weakened Islamic Republic of Pakistan to sustain itself with an Islamic emirate next door. Only a few years ago, and at great cost in blood and treasure, was Islamabad able to take back large swathes of its territory near the Afghan border from Taliban rebels. Those gains are at risk of being lost again.
Since the end of major military operations against Taliban insurgents in 2015, Pakistan has been increasingly dependent on China for its economic recovery. The biggest project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, in which Beijing has invested tens of billions of dollars. The fate of CPEC has increasingly come into question, especially in recent weeks with growing attacks, likely by Pakistani Taliban, targeting Chinese workers in the country. From Beijing’s point of view, a spillover of insecurity from Afghanistan will undermine its investments in Pakistan.
But a post-American Afghanistan also threatens Chinese interests outside Pakistan. For many years Beijing benefited from the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. China pushed ahead with its Belt and Road plans in Central Asia because the U.S. was ensuring that violence was contained within Afghanistan. In March Beijing announced that it would invest as much as $400 billion in Iran over 25 years in anticipation that a new nuclear deal would open Iran for business.
The U.S. decision to withdraw from Afghanistan has plunged China’s business plans in the region into uncertainty. Each of these Chinese projects is at risk of the violence radiating out of Afghanistan. And China isn’t alone in scrambling for solutions. This week Russian troops conducted joint exercises with forces from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on their borders with Afghanistan. But China has far more at stake than Russia, and unlike the Kremlin the People’s Liberation Army has never deployed a multidivisional force to maintain security beyond its borders.
China doesn’t have good options. It will work with Pakistan, Iran, Russia and the Central Asian nations to limit the disruption of its economic interests by the Afghan chaos. But each of these nations will be struggling to protect its own interests. This is why we see the Chinese enhancing their diplomatic ties with the Taliban. On Thursday U.S. News reported that China is prepared to recognize a Taliban regime even if it takes the country over militarily. This is in sharp contrast with the position of most other international and regional players, which have made clear that they would recognize a Taliban-dominated government only if it is formed as part of a negotiated settlement.
As we have seen in so many situations during the past two decades in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, regime change is a terribly messy process. Weak regimes can be toppled; replacing them is the hard part. It is only a matter of time before the Afghan state collapses, unleashing chaos that will spill beyond its borders. All of Afghanistan’s neighbors will be affected to varying degrees, but Pakistan and China have the most to lose.
Mr. Bokhari is director of analytical development at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy and a national-security and foreign-policy specialist at the University of Ottawa’s Professional Development Institute.
Let things settle... the USA just outflanked China 
For China, Afghanistan is more of a problem than an opportunity
Beijing’s preeminent concern is unrest in neighbouring Afghanistan could have a detrimental impact on its economic interests in the region.
In July, Taliban representatives met Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin. This meeting, the most public and high-level between the two sides so far, seemed to show that Beijing was increasing its role in Afghanistan. Indeed, it has been suggested that China is planning to capitalise on the US withdrawal by flooding Afghanistan with investment and expanding its influence there.
But this is unlikely. For Beijing, Afghanistan is a problem to manage, not an opportunity to exploit. Far from relishing the NATO pullout, China is concerned by the prospect of heightened instability on its doorstep. While long uncomfortable with the presence of US troops nearby, Beijing is clearly unhappy with the pace of America’s departure, repeatedly criticising Washington’s “hasty withdrawal”.
And well it might be. China has little to gain, and potentially much to lose, from a chaotic Afghanistan. Substantial investment is all but impossible in a poor, wartorn country with minimal infrastructure, desperately low levels of human development, and an uncertain political future. China’s immediate concern will be working to improve the security situation and suppress any militant threats.
Violence is rising dramatically as the US completes its withdrawal. The Taliban has launched a lightning offensive, seizing multiple provincial centres in the last week alone, including the capital of Badakhshan on China’s border.
“After witnessing the quagmire [the] US got into in the past twenty years, China's near-term strategy will be about how to prevent the spillover effect of the potential security crisis in the country,” said Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center.
Minimal economic engagement
China’s economic engagement with Afghanistan is limited: it trades more with Pakistan and the Central Asian states. “Overall, China’s economic investments in Afghanistan remain small and well below their potential,” according to a 2020 report by the Brookings Institution.
The “immense insecurity” in Afghanistan is “not conducive to any investment”, said Vanda Felbab-Brown, director of the Initiative on Non-state Armed Actors at the Brookings Institution and author of the report.
The country is not part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which bypasses Afghanistan and moves through neighbouring countries. A 2016 memorandum of understanding (MoU) of BRI cooperation and a small pledge of funding from Beijing went nowhere.
Moreover, the BRI has been slowing worldwide as China confronts the coronavirus pandemic and other problems. Levels of investment are falling, making it even less likely that Beijing would pump money into a high-risk conflict environment.
While, in theory, Afghanistan could serve as a land bridge between regions, the security situation has prohibited the construction of transport routes across the country and violence is now escalating, reducing the feasibility of such projects further still.
China has a very short, almost impassable land border in Afghanistan’s eastern Wakhan Corridor, and the government is reportedly building a road that could eventually reach the frontier and, according to media reports, enable the country’s integration into the BRI.
But Beijing likely does not want a cross-border trade route that could ease militant infiltration, according to Afghanistan-based journalist Franz J Marty. A former Chinese ambassador said that a route to China through Wakhan was “not an attractive option”.
Moreover, Beijing has ordered Chinese citizens to evacuate from Afghanistan, hardly a sign of an impending investment bonanza. “It is hard to imagine how China will ‘fill the vacuum’ with its people gone,” Yun Sun told TRT World.
Afghanistan national security adviser Hamdullah Mohib, left, shakes hands with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi before proceeding to their meeting at the Zhongnanhai Leadership Compound in Beijing, January 2019.Although China is investing billions into neighbouring Pakistan, for now it doesn't appear willing to do the same in Afghanistan. (Andy Wong / AP)
China has repeatedly vowed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan, but has done little to that effect. A cross-border highwayis being financed by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Pakistani government, not Beijing.
It has also been suggested that China will try to snap up Afghanistan’s cornucopia of natural resources. Chinese companies already won concessions for the Amu Darya oil basin and Mes Aynak copper mine, although both projects have largely flopped.
According to Javed Noorani, a researcher and analyst on Afghanistan’s mining sector, there will be no progress at Mes Aynak until the security and political situation stabilises, which might take years.
Beijing could also face competition from other countries. India has shown interest in Afghan iron ore. An Australian company was recently granted broad access to Afghanistan’s minerals via a sweeping MoU.
However, a source with knowledge of Afghanistan’s mining sector told TRT World that the Taliban had informed him it intended to “cancel all mining contracts with foreigners, except with the Chinese” if it entered government.
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid would not confirm that the group planned to give China priority treatment, telling TRT World that “these issues will be considered later, so it is too early to say.”
China still holds the rights for Mes Aynak and could resume work at a later stage if conditions improve. The Afghan government is unlikely to abrogate the contract and re-tender the project, according to Noorani. “It doesn’t have the political will,” he told TRT World.
While China’s economic role in Afghanistan has so far been minimal, there is clearly an appetite for progress in the future. Peace and a stable political order could pave the way for greater trade and investment.
Neither the Chinese nor Afghan governments responded to TRT World’s requests for comment.
Managing security threats
For now, Beijing’s principal concern will be working to contain any security threats emanating from Afghanistan. The main problem is ethnic Uighur militant groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) or Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP).
Although there have not been many Uighurs in Afghanistan in recent years, the UN recently reported that there were “several hundred” ETIM members in the country and that the group had set up corridors to move fighters from Syria, where there have apparently been thousands.
At the meeting in Tianjin, China asked the Taliban to rein in the threat posed by these militants. “We hope the Afghan Taliban will make a clean break with all terrorist organisations including the ETIM,” said the Chinese foreign ministry’s statement.
In return for the Taliban’s security cooperation, Beijing can offer substantial economic rewards. The statement said the Taliban will “make its own efforts toward fostering an enabling investment environment.”
The Taliban, an Islamic movement with a rigid and strict interpretation of the religion, might be expected to object to China’s alleged mistreatment of its Muslim Uighur community. But when asked by TRT World to comment on China’s Uighur policies, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid declined to respond.
The Taliban’s silence on this matter is shared by numerous Muslim-majority states, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, who resist criticism of a country that has become an increasingly important economic and security partner.
This is not the first time China has urged the Taliban to rein in militant groups. In the late 1990s, the Taliban regime was asked to suppress Uighur militancy in Afghanistan in exchange for closer economic ties and diplomatic recognition.
While the Taliban did not expel the Uighur fighters, they apparently managed to stop them from targeting China. There were no major attacks in Xinjiang province launched from Afghanistan at this time.
However, the terror threat is arguably greater now. Beijing’s treatment of ethnic Uighurs has galvanised militant groups, including ETIM, but also Al Qaeda, which mentions China in its propaganda.
This is a far cry from the 1990s, when Osama Bin Laden refrained from criticising China and even hinted at an anti-American alliance with Beijing. The US was seen as the main enemy, the patron of dictatorships in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. To weaken those regimes, it was necessary to cut off “the head of the snake” and target America directly.
Now, a similar logic applies to China. As Beijing’s influence has expanded globally, it has become “the big bogey-man in much the same way,” said Raffaello Pantucci, senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
In Pakistan, groups such as Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatist organisations primarily oppose the Pakistani state, but they also target China because of its backing for Islamabad, Pantucci noted.
Nine Chinese nationals were killed in a Pakistan bus blast in July, believed to be carried out by domestic separatist groups against the Pakistani state and its collaboration with China. Beijing believes groups in Afghanistan are likely pose more of a threat to Chinese interests in neighbouring countries like Pakistan or in Central Asia where China has significant investments. (EPA)
There has been a burst of anti-China terrorist violence in Pakistan recently. In July, nine Chinese engineers were killed in a bombing in Dasu. Beijing reportedly believes TTP and ETIM were responsible. Soon after, two Chinese workers were attacked in Karachi by the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF).
Although TTP and the Afghan Taliban are distinct organisations, the former has pledged allegiance to the Taliban emir and they cooperate in some ways. China is no doubt hoping that the Afghan group will use its influence to prevent TTP attacks in Pakistan. But the Taliban has not restrained TTP much so far.
Groups in Afghanistan likely pose more of a threat to Chinese interests in neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan or Central Asian nations where China has significant investments, than to the Chinese mainland itself. The Afghan-Chinese border is too small, remote, and heavily-secured to serve as a militant gateway.
However, according to Pantucci, it would be “difficult, but not impossible” for terrorists to enter China by diverting through the long and porous border with Tajikistan or via Pakistan.
But Beijing has worked to strengthen the frontier, supporting Pakistani and Tajik guard forces and building a small base on China’s border with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, while conducting patrols in the Afghan province of Badakhshan.
It has also increased its diplomatic engagement with an array of political actors inside Afghanistan, including the government and the Taliban, and participated in various multilateral formats with regional countries and the US. Beijing has also tried to activate the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to address the Afghan situation, but with little success.
Given the Taliban’s ties to Al Qaeda, ETIM and other organizations, Beijing is likely wary of the group and suspicious it will make good on its counter-terrorist commitments. The Chinese are “clear-eyed” about the Taliban, Pantucci said, but they are also “realists” who understand that the militants will likely attain some degree of power in Afghanistan and must be engaged with.
Dealings between China and the Taliban are therefore pragmatic, not the sign of a budding “special relationship”. Beijing is hedging in Afghanistan, talking to different actors across the Afghan political divide without picking sides. The Taliban is “one of many cards” that China is playing, Pantucci said.
Afghanistan is not a golden land of opportunity for Beijing, but a complex and hazardous environment that threatens China’s interests.
For China, Afghanistan is more of a problem than an opportunity
Beijing’s preeminent concern is unrest in neighbouring Afghanistan could have a detrimental impact on its economic interests in the region.
In July, Taliban representatives met Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin. This meeting, the most public and high-level between the two sides so far, seemed to show that Beijing was increasing its role in Afghanistan. Indeed, it has been suggested that China is planning to capitalise on the US withdrawal by flooding Afghanistan with investment and expanding its influence there.
But this is unlikely. For Beijing, Afghanistan is a problem to manage, not an opportunity to exploit. Far from relishing the NATO pullout, China is concerned by the prospect of heightened instability on its doorstep. While long uncomfortable with the presence of US troops nearby, Beijing is clearly unhappy with the pace of America’s departure, repeatedly criticising Washington’s “hasty withdrawal”.
And well it might be. China has little to gain, and potentially much to lose, from a chaotic Afghanistan. Substantial investment is all but impossible in a poor, wartorn country with minimal infrastructure, desperately low levels of human development, and an uncertain political future. China’s immediate concern will be working to improve the security situation and suppress any militant threats.
Violence is rising dramatically as the US completes its withdrawal. The Taliban has launched a lightning offensive, seizing multiple provincial centres in the last week alone, including the capital of Badakhshan on China’s border.
“After witnessing the quagmire [the] US got into in the past twenty years, China's near-term strategy will be about how to prevent the spillover effect of the potential security crisis in the country,” said Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center.
Minimal economic engagement
China’s economic engagement with Afghanistan is limited: it trades more with Pakistan and the Central Asian states. “Overall, China’s economic investments in Afghanistan remain small and well below their potential,” according to a 2020 report by the Brookings Institution.
The “immense insecurity” in Afghanistan is “not conducive to any investment”, said Vanda Felbab-Brown, director of the Initiative on Non-state Armed Actors at the Brookings Institution and author of the report.
The country is not part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which bypasses Afghanistan and moves through neighbouring countries. A 2016 memorandum of understanding (MoU) of BRI cooperation and a small pledge of funding from Beijing went nowhere.
Moreover, the BRI has been slowing worldwide as China confronts the coronavirus pandemic and other problems. Levels of investment are falling, making it even less likely that Beijing would pump money into a high-risk conflict environment.
While, in theory, Afghanistan could serve as a land bridge between regions, the security situation has prohibited the construction of transport routes across the country and violence is now escalating, reducing the feasibility of such projects further still.
China has a very short, almost impassable land border in Afghanistan’s eastern Wakhan Corridor, and the government is reportedly building a road that could eventually reach the frontier and, according to media reports, enable the country’s integration into the BRI.
But Beijing likely does not want a cross-border trade route that could ease militant infiltration, according to Afghanistan-based journalist Franz J Marty. A former Chinese ambassador said that a route to China through Wakhan was “not an attractive option”.
Moreover, Beijing has ordered Chinese citizens to evacuate from Afghanistan, hardly a sign of an impending investment bonanza. “It is hard to imagine how China will ‘fill the vacuum’ with its people gone,” Yun Sun told TRT World.
Afghanistan national security adviser Hamdullah Mohib, left, shakes hands with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi before proceeding to their meeting at the Zhongnanhai Leadership Compound in Beijing, January 2019.Although China is investing billions into neighbouring Pakistan, for now it doesn't appear willing to do the same in Afghanistan. (Andy Wong / AP)
China has repeatedly vowed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan, but has done little to that effect. A cross-border highwayis being financed by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Pakistani government, not Beijing.
It has also been suggested that China will try to snap up Afghanistan’s cornucopia of natural resources. Chinese companies already won concessions for the Amu Darya oil basin and Mes Aynak copper mine, although both projects have largely flopped.
According to Javed Noorani, a researcher and analyst on Afghanistan’s mining sector, there will be no progress at Mes Aynak until the security and political situation stabilises, which might take years.
Beijing could also face competition from other countries. India has shown interest in Afghan iron ore. An Australian company was recently granted broad access to Afghanistan’s minerals via a sweeping MoU.
However, a source with knowledge of Afghanistan’s mining sector told TRT World that the Taliban had informed him it intended to “cancel all mining contracts with foreigners, except with the Chinese” if it entered government.
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid would not confirm that the group planned to give China priority treatment, telling TRT World that “these issues will be considered later, so it is too early to say.”
China still holds the rights for Mes Aynak and could resume work at a later stage if conditions improve. The Afghan government is unlikely to abrogate the contract and re-tender the project, according to Noorani. “It doesn’t have the political will,” he told TRT World.
While China’s economic role in Afghanistan has so far been minimal, there is clearly an appetite for progress in the future. Peace and a stable political order could pave the way for greater trade and investment.
Neither the Chinese nor Afghan governments responded to TRT World’s requests for comment.
Managing security threats
For now, Beijing’s principal concern will be working to contain any security threats emanating from Afghanistan. The main problem is ethnic Uighur militant groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) or Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP).
Although there have not been many Uighurs in Afghanistan in recent years, the UN recently reported that there were “several hundred” ETIM members in the country and that the group had set up corridors to move fighters from Syria, where there have apparently been thousands.
At the meeting in Tianjin, China asked the Taliban to rein in the threat posed by these militants. “We hope the Afghan Taliban will make a clean break with all terrorist organisations including the ETIM,” said the Chinese foreign ministry’s statement.
In return for the Taliban’s security cooperation, Beijing can offer substantial economic rewards. The statement said the Taliban will “make its own efforts toward fostering an enabling investment environment.”
The Taliban, an Islamic movement with a rigid and strict interpretation of the religion, might be expected to object to China’s alleged mistreatment of its Muslim Uighur community. But when asked by TRT World to comment on China’s Uighur policies, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid declined to respond.
The Taliban’s silence on this matter is shared by numerous Muslim-majority states, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, who resist criticism of a country that has become an increasingly important economic and security partner.
This is not the first time China has urged the Taliban to rein in militant groups. In the late 1990s, the Taliban regime was asked to suppress Uighur militancy in Afghanistan in exchange for closer economic ties and diplomatic recognition.
While the Taliban did not expel the Uighur fighters, they apparently managed to stop them from targeting China. There were no major attacks in Xinjiang province launched from Afghanistan at this time.
However, the terror threat is arguably greater now. Beijing’s treatment of ethnic Uighurs has galvanised militant groups, including ETIM, but also Al Qaeda, which mentions China in its propaganda.
This is a far cry from the 1990s, when Osama Bin Laden refrained from criticising China and even hinted at an anti-American alliance with Beijing. The US was seen as the main enemy, the patron of dictatorships in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. To weaken those regimes, it was necessary to cut off “the head of the snake” and target America directly.
Now, a similar logic applies to China. As Beijing’s influence has expanded globally, it has become “the big bogey-man in much the same way,” said Raffaello Pantucci, senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
In Pakistan, groups such as Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatist organisations primarily oppose the Pakistani state, but they also target China because of its backing for Islamabad, Pantucci noted.
Nine Chinese nationals were killed in a Pakistan bus blast in July, believed to be carried out by domestic separatist groups against the Pakistani state and its collaboration with China. Beijing believes groups in Afghanistan are likely pose more of a threat to Chinese interests in neighbouring countries like Pakistan or in Central Asia where China has significant investments. (EPA)
There has been a burst of anti-China terrorist violence in Pakistan recently. In July, nine Chinese engineers were killed in a bombing in Dasu. Beijing reportedly believes TTP and ETIM were responsible. Soon after, two Chinese workers were attacked in Karachi by the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF).
Although TTP and the Afghan Taliban are distinct organisations, the former has pledged allegiance to the Taliban emir and they cooperate in some ways. China is no doubt hoping that the Afghan group will use its influence to prevent TTP attacks in Pakistan. But the Taliban has not restrained TTP much so far.
Groups in Afghanistan likely pose more of a threat to Chinese interests in neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan or Central Asian nations where China has significant investments, than to the Chinese mainland itself. The Afghan-Chinese border is too small, remote, and heavily-secured to serve as a militant gateway.
However, according to Pantucci, it would be “difficult, but not impossible” for terrorists to enter China by diverting through the long and porous border with Tajikistan or via Pakistan.
But Beijing has worked to strengthen the frontier, supporting Pakistani and Tajik guard forces and building a small base on China’s border with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, while conducting patrols in the Afghan province of Badakhshan.
It has also increased its diplomatic engagement with an array of political actors inside Afghanistan, including the government and the Taliban, and participated in various multilateral formats with regional countries and the US. Beijing has also tried to activate the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to address the Afghan situation, but with little success.
Given the Taliban’s ties to Al Qaeda, ETIM and other organizations, Beijing is likely wary of the group and suspicious it will make good on its counter-terrorist commitments. The Chinese are “clear-eyed” about the Taliban, Pantucci said, but they are also “realists” who understand that the militants will likely attain some degree of power in Afghanistan and must be engaged with.
Dealings between China and the Taliban are therefore pragmatic, not the sign of a budding “special relationship”. Beijing is hedging in Afghanistan, talking to different actors across the Afghan political divide without picking sides. The Taliban is “one of many cards” that China is playing, Pantucci said.
Afghanistan is not a golden land of opportunity for Beijing, but a complex and hazardous environment that threatens China’s interests.
Let things settle... the USA just outflanked China
For China, Afghanistan is more of a problem than an opportunity
Beijing’s preeminent concern is unrest in neighbouring Afghanistan could have a detrimental impact on its economic interests in the region.
In July, Taliban representatives met Wang Yi, China’s foreign minister, in the northern Chinese city of Tianjin. This meeting, the most public and high-level between the two sides so far, seemed to show that Beijing was increasing its role in Afghanistan. Indeed, it has been suggested that China is planning to capitalise on the US withdrawal by flooding Afghanistan with investment and expanding its influence there.
But this is unlikely. For Beijing, Afghanistan is a problem to manage, not an opportunity to exploit. Far from relishing the NATO pullout, China is concerned by the prospect of heightened instability on its doorstep. While long uncomfortable with the presence of US troops nearby, Beijing is clearly unhappy with the pace of America’s departure, repeatedly criticising Washington’s “hasty withdrawal”.
And well it might be. China has little to gain, and potentially much to lose, from a chaotic Afghanistan. Substantial investment is all but impossible in a poor, wartorn country with minimal infrastructure, desperately low levels of human development, and an uncertain political future. China’s immediate concern will be working to improve the security situation and suppress any militant threats.
Violence is rising dramatically as the US completes its withdrawal. The Taliban has launched a lightning offensive, seizing multiple provincial centres in the last week alone, including the capital of Badakhshan on China’s border.
“After witnessing the quagmire [the] US got into in the past twenty years, China's near-term strategy will be about how to prevent the spillover effect of the potential security crisis in the country,” said Yun Sun, director of the China Program at the Stimson Center.
Minimal economic engagement
China’s economic engagement with Afghanistan is limited: it trades more with Pakistan and the Central Asian states. “Overall, China’s economic investments in Afghanistan remain small and well below their potential,” according to a 2020 report by the Brookings Institution.
The “immense insecurity” in Afghanistan is “not conducive to any investment”, said Vanda Felbab-Brown, director of the Initiative on Non-state Armed Actors at the Brookings Institution and author of the report.
The country is not part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which bypasses Afghanistan and moves through neighbouring countries. A 2016 memorandum of understanding (MoU) of BRI cooperation and a small pledge of funding from Beijing went nowhere.
Moreover, the BRI has been slowing worldwide as China confronts the coronavirus pandemic and other problems. Levels of investment are falling, making it even less likely that Beijing would pump money into a high-risk conflict environment.
While, in theory, Afghanistan could serve as a land bridge between regions, the security situation has prohibited the construction of transport routes across the country and violence is now escalating, reducing the feasibility of such projects further still.
China has a very short, almost impassable land border in Afghanistan’s eastern Wakhan Corridor, and the government is reportedly building a road that could eventually reach the frontier and, according to media reports, enable the country’s integration into the BRI.
But Beijing likely does not want a cross-border trade route that could ease militant infiltration, according to Afghanistan-based journalist Franz J Marty. A former Chinese ambassador said that a route to China through Wakhan was “not an attractive option”.
Moreover, Beijing has ordered Chinese citizens to evacuate from Afghanistan, hardly a sign of an impending investment bonanza. “It is hard to imagine how China will ‘fill the vacuum’ with its people gone,” Yun Sun told TRT World.
Afghanistan national security adviser Hamdullah Mohib, left, shakes hands with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi before proceeding to their meeting at the Zhongnanhai Leadership Compound in Beijing, January 2019.Although China is investing billions into neighbouring Pakistan, for now it doesn't appear willing to do the same in Afghanistan. (Andy Wong / AP)
China has repeatedly vowed to extend the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to Afghanistan, but has done little to that effect. A cross-border highwayis being financed by the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and Pakistani government, not Beijing.
It has also been suggested that China will try to snap up Afghanistan’s cornucopia of natural resources. Chinese companies already won concessions for the Amu Darya oil basin and Mes Aynak copper mine, although both projects have largely flopped.
According to Javed Noorani, a researcher and analyst on Afghanistan’s mining sector, there will be no progress at Mes Aynak until the security and political situation stabilises, which might take years.
Beijing could also face competition from other countries. India has shown interest in Afghan iron ore. An Australian company was recently granted broad access to Afghanistan’s minerals via a sweeping MoU.
However, a source with knowledge of Afghanistan’s mining sector told TRT World that the Taliban had informed him it intended to “cancel all mining contracts with foreigners, except with the Chinese” if it entered government.
Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid would not confirm that the group planned to give China priority treatment, telling TRT World that “these issues will be considered later, so it is too early to say.”
China still holds the rights for Mes Aynak and could resume work at a later stage if conditions improve. The Afghan government is unlikely to abrogate the contract and re-tender the project, according to Noorani. “It doesn’t have the political will,” he told TRT World.
While China’s economic role in Afghanistan has so far been minimal, there is clearly an appetite for progress in the future. Peace and a stable political order could pave the way for greater trade and investment.
Neither the Chinese nor Afghan governments responded to TRT World’s requests for comment.
Managing security threats
For now, Beijing’s principal concern will be working to contain any security threats emanating from Afghanistan. The main problem is ethnic Uighur militant groups such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) or Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP).
Although there have not been many Uighurs in Afghanistan in recent years, the UN recently reported that there were “several hundred” ETIM members in the country and that the group had set up corridors to move fighters from Syria, where there have apparently been thousands.
At the meeting in Tianjin, China asked the Taliban to rein in the threat posed by these militants. “We hope the Afghan Taliban will make a clean break with all terrorist organisations including the ETIM,” said the Chinese foreign ministry’s statement.
In return for the Taliban’s security cooperation, Beijing can offer substantial economic rewards. The statement said the Taliban will “make its own efforts toward fostering an enabling investment environment.”
The Taliban, an Islamic movement with a rigid and strict interpretation of the religion, might be expected to object to China’s alleged mistreatment of its Muslim Uighur community. But when asked by TRT World to comment on China’s Uighur policies, Taliban spokesman Zabihullah Mujahid declined to respond.
The Taliban’s silence on this matter is shared by numerous Muslim-majority states, including Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, who resist criticism of a country that has become an increasingly important economic and security partner.
This is not the first time China has urged the Taliban to rein in militant groups. In the late 1990s, the Taliban regime was asked to suppress Uighur militancy in Afghanistan in exchange for closer economic ties and diplomatic recognition.
While the Taliban did not expel the Uighur fighters, they apparently managed to stop them from targeting China. There were no major attacks in Xinjiang province launched from Afghanistan at this time.
However, the terror threat is arguably greater now. Beijing’s treatment of ethnic Uighurs has galvanised militant groups, including ETIM, but also Al Qaeda, which mentions China in its propaganda.
This is a far cry from the 1990s, when Osama Bin Laden refrained from criticising China and even hinted at an anti-American alliance with Beijing. The US was seen as the main enemy, the patron of dictatorships in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere. To weaken those regimes, it was necessary to cut off “the head of the snake” and target America directly.
Now, a similar logic applies to China. As Beijing’s influence has expanded globally, it has become “the big bogey-man in much the same way,” said Raffaello Pantucci, senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
In Pakistan, groups such as Tehreek e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Baloch separatist organisations primarily oppose the Pakistani state, but they also target China because of its backing for Islamabad, Pantucci noted.
Nine Chinese nationals were killed in a Pakistan bus blast in July, believed to be carried out by domestic separatist groups against the Pakistani state and its collaboration with China. Beijing believes groups in Afghanistan are likely pose more of a threat to Chinese interests in neighbouring countries like Pakistan or in Central Asia where China has significant investments. (EPA)
There has been a burst of anti-China terrorist violence in Pakistan recently. In July, nine Chinese engineers were killed in a bombing in Dasu. Beijing reportedly believes TTP and ETIM were responsible. Soon after, two Chinese workers were attacked in Karachi by the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF).
Although TTP and the Afghan Taliban are distinct organisations, the former has pledged allegiance to the Taliban emir and they cooperate in some ways. China is no doubt hoping that the Afghan group will use its influence to prevent TTP attacks in Pakistan. But the Taliban has not restrained TTP much so far.
Groups in Afghanistan likely pose more of a threat to Chinese interests in neighbouring countries, such as Pakistan or Central Asian nations where China has significant investments, than to the Chinese mainland itself. The Afghan-Chinese border is too small, remote, and heavily-secured to serve as a militant gateway.
However, according to Pantucci, it would be “difficult, but not impossible” for terrorists to enter China by diverting through the long and porous border with Tajikistan or via Pakistan.
But Beijing has worked to strengthen the frontier, supporting Pakistani and Tajik guard forces and building a small base on China’s border with Tajikistan and Afghanistan, while conducting patrols in the Afghan province of Badakhshan.
It has also increased its diplomatic engagement with an array of political actors inside Afghanistan, including the government and the Taliban, and participated in various multilateral formats with regional countries and the US. Beijing has also tried to activate the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to address the Afghan situation, but with little success.
Given the Taliban’s ties to Al Qaeda, ETIM and other organizations, Beijing is likely wary of the group and suspicious it will make good on its counter-terrorist commitments. The Chinese are “clear-eyed” about the Taliban, Pantucci said, but they are also “realists” who understand that the militants will likely attain some degree of power in Afghanistan and must be engaged with.
Dealings between China and the Taliban are therefore pragmatic, not the sign of a budding “special relationship”. Beijing is hedging in Afghanistan, talking to different actors across the Afghan political divide without picking sides. The Taliban is “one of many cards” that China is playing, Pantucci said.
Afghanistan is not a golden land of opportunity for Beijing, but a complex and hazardous environment that threatens China’s interests.
Jesus christ man you've posted this in like 5 different threads
Voice of Reason
Veteran
This is a massive fukk you to the Chinese lowkey
Opinion | The Taliban’s Afghan Advance Spells Trouble for Pakistan and China
The Taliban’s Afghan Advance Spells Trouble for Pakistan and China
Instability threatens the government in Islamabad and Beijing’s economic program in Central Asia.
By Kamran Bokhari
Aug. 13, 2021 2:53 pm ET
Taliban fighters in Kandahar, Afghanistan, Aug. 13.
Photo: -/Agence France-Presse/Getty Images
The Taliban are taking over city after city in Afghanistan at a stunning speed. But as the U.S. found in 2001, it’s one thing to topple a regime, another to set up a stable new one. Even if the Taliban can negotiate a formal return to power, the country will remain chaotic for a long time, with serious implications for the region, especially for Pakistan and China—in different but geopolitically significant ways.
The impact will be most immediate for Pakistan, which is already feeling it. In the past two decades the Taliban have gone from being a proxy of Islamabad to a threat. When Washington toppled the Taliban in late 2001, Pakistan saw it as a major foreign-policy loss even though it cooperated with the U.S. Islamabad continued to view the Afghan jihadist movement as an ally even in 2007-14, when it faced a major insurgency on its own soil from the Pakistani Taliban rebels. For more than a decade the “good vs. bad Taliban” narrative dominated the national conversation, distinguishing between those who fought in Afghanistan and those who sought to topple the Pakistani state.
It wasn’t until early last month that the country’s top two generals—the army chief and the head of Inter-Services Intelligence—acknowledged, in a rare briefing to opposition members of Parliament, that the Afghan and Pakistani Taliban were “two faces of the same coin.” These remarks underscore that the Pakistani elite now fears its erstwhile proxies because their own country has been deeply penetrated by the Taliban ideology.
The Taliban comeback in Afghanistan will galvanize many Islamist actors in Pakistan to emulate the Afghan jihadist movement. It will be a huge challenge for a terribly weakened Islamic Republic of Pakistan to sustain itself with an Islamic emirate next door. Only a few years ago, and at great cost in blood and treasure, was Islamabad able to take back large swathes of its territory near the Afghan border from Taliban rebels. Those gains are at risk of being lost again.
Since the end of major military operations against Taliban insurgents in 2015, Pakistan has been increasingly dependent on China for its economic recovery. The biggest project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, in which Beijing has invested tens of billions of dollars. The fate of CPEC has increasingly come into question, especially in recent weeks with growing attacks, likely by Pakistani Taliban, targeting Chinese workers in the country. From Beijing’s point of view, a spillover of insecurity from Afghanistan will undermine its investments in Pakistan.
But a post-American Afghanistan also threatens Chinese interests outside Pakistan. For many years Beijing benefited from the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan. China pushed ahead with its Belt and Road plans in Central Asia because the U.S. was ensuring that violence was contained within Afghanistan. In March Beijing announced that it would invest as much as $400 billion in Iran over 25 years in anticipation that a new nuclear deal would open Iran for business.
The U.S. decision to withdraw from Afghanistan has plunged China’s business plans in the region into uncertainty. Each of these Chinese projects is at risk of the violence radiating out of Afghanistan. And China isn’t alone in scrambling for solutions. This week Russian troops conducted joint exercises with forces from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on their borders with Afghanistan. But China has far more at stake than Russia, and unlike the Kremlin the People’s Liberation Army has never deployed a multidivisional force to maintain security beyond its borders.
China doesn’t have good options. It will work with Pakistan, Iran, Russia and the Central Asian nations to limit the disruption of its economic interests by the Afghan chaos. But each of these nations will be struggling to protect its own interests. This is why we see the Chinese enhancing their diplomatic ties with the Taliban. On Thursday U.S. News reported that China is prepared to recognize a Taliban regime even if it takes the country over militarily. This is in sharp contrast with the position of most other international and regional players, which have made clear that they would recognize a Taliban-dominated government only if it is formed as part of a negotiated settlement.
As we have seen in so many situations during the past two decades in places like Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen and Libya, regime change is a terribly messy process. Weak regimes can be toppled; replacing them is the hard part. It is only a matter of time before the Afghan state collapses, unleashing chaos that will spill beyond its borders. All of Afghanistan’s neighbors will be affected to varying degrees, but Pakistan and China have the most to lose.
Mr. Bokhari is director of analytical development at the Newlines Institute for Strategy and Policy and a national-security and foreign-policy specialist at the University of Ottawa’s Professional Development Institute.
Bullshyt spin.
The Chinese are looking to work with the Taliban
ADevilYouKhow
Rhyme Reason
Biden administration approves largest increase to food assistance benefits in SNAP program history — The Washington Post
Nice but pretty tacky to unveil this today
Nice but pretty tacky to unveil this today
no, its amazing to announce this today.
Remind people that he's taking care of home.
