I'm not sure we agree on what "soft" means
Greece financial crisis | Latest : Deal reached with even tougher conditions for Greece.
bwwwwwwwwwwwahahahahahahahahaah
We send faxes of receipts for services rendered with attachments of RQ-1 picsI'm not sure we agree on what "soft" means
88m3
Fast Money & Foreign Objects
Did Greece Have a Better Deal Before the Referendum?
4:30 AM EDT
July 13, 2015
UBS Senior FX Strategist Geoffrey Yu and BlackRock Investment Strategist Stephen Cohen discuss the politics behind the deal between Greece and its creditors, and if a better deal was on the table before the referendum in the country. They speak with Jonathan Ferro on Bloomberg Television’s “On The Move.” (Source: Bloomberg)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-07-13/did-greece-have-a-better-deal-before-the-referendum-
video in link
4:30 AM EDT
July 13, 2015
UBS Senior FX Strategist Geoffrey Yu and BlackRock Investment Strategist Stephen Cohen discuss the politics behind the deal between Greece and its creditors, and if a better deal was on the table before the referendum in the country. They speak with Jonathan Ferro on Bloomberg Television’s “On The Move.” (Source: Bloomberg)
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/videos/2015-07-13/did-greece-have-a-better-deal-before-the-referendum-
video in link
88m3
Fast Money & Foreign Objects
Six lessons to meditate to the Greek crisis serve some
© AFP | Greek Prime Minister and German Chancellor, on 7 July in Brussels
Text by Sylvain ATTAL
Last Updated: 07/13/2015
The worst was-apparently avoided with the compromise ripped Monday morning. For that this is not an umpteenth lame compromise, so try to hold some lessons from this new psychodrama that was nearly fatal to the euro.
First lesson: the crisis is not over
The agreement reached in extremis Monday morning is intended to prevent market panic at the prospect of a "Grexit" [Greek exit from the euro zone] openly planned (hoped?) By the German government. But this is a minimum agreement which aims to open new negotiations for a new aid package of just over 80 billion euros to Greece, completely asphyxiated. It must be subject to a number of national parliaments vote, in Greece, but also in countries who would like to push it out.
Second lesson: Greece and the euro area, United for better and for worse
No possible divorce between Greece and the euro area. The line that has painfully away is that of those who believe that the output of a eurozone countries would not only be final but could irreparably noted that the Euro is a precarious construction and that in the future a country that experiences difficulties or which fails to accept austerity measures in its population would follow the same path.While a building dating from the Maastricht Treaty could collapse like a house of cards.
Third lesson: this crisis is not only that of Greece
This crisis is also that of the European currency. Without economic governance and new waivers of sovereignty, especially in tax matters, the euro will remain fragile. Without economic union, monetary union can not. Hopefully this time the Europeans decide to move to a new step towards a federal Europe. This agreement may be just another band-aid. But if Greece were to find itself in the same situation in six months or a year, there is a safe bet that the euro would not survive. Lesson Four:Alexis Tsipras and Syriza will have to pay the bill
Thanks to the work of the Conservative government of Antonis Samaras, Greece had returned to a primary fiscal balance (before debt service). Tsipras led to believe the Greeks flushed by the austerity that the time had come largesse leaving leave public spending on the rise, as if the country was not in debt up to my neck! Then with a "No" in the referendum Greek, the other 18 countries in the euro zone were to bow before the great Greek democracy. It was forgotten that they are also democracies. After this last wet cartridge, Tsipras was faced with the inevitable bankruptcy of his country. He had to give in this tussle part face stronger than him and will now have to answer these zigzags before his people.Not sure that this happens smoothly.
Lesson Five: The policy engine France
Virtually alone, France had decided to maintain at any cost (but not without reorientation of the Greek government) Greece in the euro area. As usual, she had the economic argument against it, but the political rationale for it. And like every great moment, she finally managed to get Germany to accept its arguments: firstly, it was necessary to give a sign of the political will of the Europeans to maintain their monetary union. The second time, that of setting economic coherence might come next. While it is urgent to put it (see Lesson 3) Sixth lesson: there is no "Club Med" in Europe.
This idea that Italy, Spain, or France would defend a model of governance impecunious lived. Paris defended a political ideal. Rome and Madrid have been as severe as Berlin towards procrastination of Athens. The Spaniards and Italians who have made many sacrifices would not have understood preferential treatment for Greece that also nobody was willing to give him. There was no question of encouraging populist movements Podemos type whose Tsipras became the hero. Only when it appeared that a number of North countries, after Germany sought to make an example of Greece they moved closer to the French position. They only sought to save the euro is irreversible construction, for fear that sooner or later we will show them to them as the output. While the Greeks meaning they would not accept a new bottomless pit.
http://www.france24.com/fr/20150713..._ref=partage_aef&aef_campaign_date=2015-07-13
© AFP | Greek Prime Minister and German Chancellor, on 7 July in Brussels
Text by Sylvain ATTAL
Last Updated: 07/13/2015
The worst was-apparently avoided with the compromise ripped Monday morning. For that this is not an umpteenth lame compromise, so try to hold some lessons from this new psychodrama that was nearly fatal to the euro.
First lesson: the crisis is not over
The agreement reached in extremis Monday morning is intended to prevent market panic at the prospect of a "Grexit" [Greek exit from the euro zone] openly planned (hoped?) By the German government. But this is a minimum agreement which aims to open new negotiations for a new aid package of just over 80 billion euros to Greece, completely asphyxiated. It must be subject to a number of national parliaments vote, in Greece, but also in countries who would like to push it out.
Second lesson: Greece and the euro area, United for better and for worse
No possible divorce between Greece and the euro area. The line that has painfully away is that of those who believe that the output of a eurozone countries would not only be final but could irreparably noted that the Euro is a precarious construction and that in the future a country that experiences difficulties or which fails to accept austerity measures in its population would follow the same path.While a building dating from the Maastricht Treaty could collapse like a house of cards.
Third lesson: this crisis is not only that of Greece
This crisis is also that of the European currency. Without economic governance and new waivers of sovereignty, especially in tax matters, the euro will remain fragile. Without economic union, monetary union can not. Hopefully this time the Europeans decide to move to a new step towards a federal Europe. This agreement may be just another band-aid. But if Greece were to find itself in the same situation in six months or a year, there is a safe bet that the euro would not survive. Lesson Four:Alexis Tsipras and Syriza will have to pay the bill
Thanks to the work of the Conservative government of Antonis Samaras, Greece had returned to a primary fiscal balance (before debt service). Tsipras led to believe the Greeks flushed by the austerity that the time had come largesse leaving leave public spending on the rise, as if the country was not in debt up to my neck! Then with a "No" in the referendum Greek, the other 18 countries in the euro zone were to bow before the great Greek democracy. It was forgotten that they are also democracies. After this last wet cartridge, Tsipras was faced with the inevitable bankruptcy of his country. He had to give in this tussle part face stronger than him and will now have to answer these zigzags before his people.Not sure that this happens smoothly.
Lesson Five: The policy engine France
Virtually alone, France had decided to maintain at any cost (but not without reorientation of the Greek government) Greece in the euro area. As usual, she had the economic argument against it, but the political rationale for it. And like every great moment, she finally managed to get Germany to accept its arguments: firstly, it was necessary to give a sign of the political will of the Europeans to maintain their monetary union. The second time, that of setting economic coherence might come next. While it is urgent to put it (see Lesson 3) Sixth lesson: there is no "Club Med" in Europe.
This idea that Italy, Spain, or France would defend a model of governance impecunious lived. Paris defended a political ideal. Rome and Madrid have been as severe as Berlin towards procrastination of Athens. The Spaniards and Italians who have made many sacrifices would not have understood preferential treatment for Greece that also nobody was willing to give him. There was no question of encouraging populist movements Podemos type whose Tsipras became the hero. Only when it appeared that a number of North countries, after Germany sought to make an example of Greece they moved closer to the French position. They only sought to save the euro is irreversible construction, for fear that sooner or later we will show them to them as the output. While the Greeks meaning they would not accept a new bottomless pit.
http://www.france24.com/fr/20150713..._ref=partage_aef&aef_campaign_date=2015-07-13
88m3
Fast Money & Foreign Objects
A tragic cover star
Jul 9th 2015, 17:00 BY THE DATA TEAM
FOR a relatively small country it is a rare distinction (or misfortune) to make the cover ofThe Economist. Greece, however, has managed the feat no less than nine times over the past five years. It first made the grade in May 2010 as its sovereign-debt crisis spiralled out of control. Frequent trips back to the brink of disaster have been responsible for repeat cover performances, as has the occasional bail-out or election. One suspects there may be more covers to come, though not too many, we hope; our stock of available metaphors is looking as depleted as Greek bank vaults.
May 1st 2010: “The Greek debt crisis is spreading. Europe needs a bolder, broader solution—and quickly”
June 25th 2011: “The opportunity for Europe’s leaders to avoid disaster is shrinking fast”
November 5th 2011: “The markets are not the euro’s only threat. Voters may be too”
May 12th 2012: “Amid growing risk of a Greek exit, the euro zone has yet to face up to the task of saving the single currency”
May 19th 2012: “It is not a good idea for Greece to leave the euro. But it is time to prepare for its departure”
January 31st 2015: "Syriza’s win could lead to Grexit, but it should lead to a better future for the euro”
June 20th 2015: “Greece and the euro zone are stuck in an abusive relationship”
July 4th 2015: “Whatever its outcome, the Greek crisis will change the EU for ever”
July 11th 2015: "If there has to be a Grexit, here is how to do it"
http://www.economist.com/blogs/grap...-covers?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/atragiccoverstar
Jul 9th 2015, 17:00 BY THE DATA TEAM
FOR a relatively small country it is a rare distinction (or misfortune) to make the cover ofThe Economist. Greece, however, has managed the feat no less than nine times over the past five years. It first made the grade in May 2010 as its sovereign-debt crisis spiralled out of control. Frequent trips back to the brink of disaster have been responsible for repeat cover performances, as has the occasional bail-out or election. One suspects there may be more covers to come, though not too many, we hope; our stock of available metaphors is looking as depleted as Greek bank vaults.
May 1st 2010: “The Greek debt crisis is spreading. Europe needs a bolder, broader solution—and quickly”
June 25th 2011: “The opportunity for Europe’s leaders to avoid disaster is shrinking fast”
November 5th 2011: “The markets are not the euro’s only threat. Voters may be too”
May 12th 2012: “Amid growing risk of a Greek exit, the euro zone has yet to face up to the task of saving the single currency”
May 19th 2012: “It is not a good idea for Greece to leave the euro. But it is time to prepare for its departure”
January 31st 2015: "Syriza’s win could lead to Grexit, but it should lead to a better future for the euro”
June 20th 2015: “Greece and the euro zone are stuck in an abusive relationship”
July 4th 2015: “Whatever its outcome, the Greek crisis will change the EU for ever”
July 11th 2015: "If there has to be a Grexit, here is how to do it"
http://www.economist.com/blogs/grap...-covers?fsrc=scn/fb/te/bl/ed/atragiccoverstar
What is soft power? Drone strikes instead of nuclear warheads? Our foreign policy over the last 50 years has been "shoot first, feign ignorance as to why people we shot hate us later"
This is untrue.
We've flexed our muscle using soft power all the time
This is why you need to stay off of Infowars and read more of The Economist, Bloomberg, or read whats going on with the State Department.
88m3
Fast Money & Foreign Objects
I'm not sure if that's entirely fair..
88m3
Fast Money & Foreign Objects
July 13, 2015 12:41 pm
Greece talks: ‘Sorry, but there is no way you are leaving this room’
Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Alex Barker and Duncan Robinson — Brussels
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f908e534-2942-11e5-8db8-c033edba8a6e.html#axzz3fn1IXWak
free to read
Greece talks: ‘Sorry, but there is no way you are leaving this room’
Anne-Sylvaine Chassany, Alex Barker and Duncan Robinson — Brussels
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/f908e534-2942-11e5-8db8-c033edba8a6e.html#axzz3fn1IXWak
free to read