Disputed 1619 project was CORRECT, Slavery WAS key to US Revolution; Gerald Horne proved in 2014

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https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/06/10/myth-alamo-gets-history-all-wrong/

The myth of Alamo gets the history all wrong
Instead of a heroic stance for freedom, Texans fought to be able to enslave people
The Alamo is best known as the site of a legendary 1836 battle, but the popular understanding of the history of that battle gets the causes wrong. (Eric Gay/AP)
By Bryan Burrough
and
Jason Stanford

June 10, 2021 at 6:00 a.m. EDT
The 1836 battle for the Alamo is remembered as a David vs. Goliath story. A band of badly outnumbered Texans fought against oppression by the Mexican dictator Santa Anna, holding off the siege long enough for Sam Houston to move the main rebel force east and providing them a rallying cry at the Battle of San Jacinto. As almost any Texan will tell you, their heroic sacrifice turned the Alamo into the cradle of Texas liberty.

American presidents have even invoked the Alamo myth to inspire their citizens in battles of all kinds, from Lyndon B. Johnson during the Vietnam War to then-candidate George W. Bush, who read William Travis’s iconic “Victory or Death!” letter to inspire the U.S. team to win the 1999 Ryder Cup. And in his last State of the Union address, Donald Trump, perhaps inspiring Americans to an internal battle, referenced “Texas patriots [who] made their last stand at the Alamo. The beautiful, beautiful Alamo.”

Yet, the legend of the Alamo is a Texas tall tale run amok. The actual story is one of White American immigrants to Texas revolting in large part over Mexican attempts to end slavery. Far from heroically fighting for a noble cause, they fought to defend the most odious of practices. Our newfound understanding of this history presents Americans with a long-overlooked opportunity to correct a racist myth surrounding this monument.

Anglo settlers began arriving in Texas from the United States in the 1820s, when it was part of Spanish Mexico. The Spanish government wanted them as a bulwark against the Comanche, but these new Texans had another agenda. They wanted to take advantage of thousands of acres of land in the Brazos River Valley that was available cheap for White settlers, some of which was used to cultivate cotton.

When these dichotomous visions became clear in 1822, a newly independent Mexican government in Mexico City paused further settlement. The problem, according to Stephen F. Austin, known as the “Father of Texas,” was that the new government, which took power on a racial equality agenda, would not abide slavery.

The Mexican government’s efforts to write a new federal constitution got bogged down. One of the sticking points was the question of slavery. The new government wanted slavery gone, but ending the practice would ruin the settlers. Austin, “talked to each individual member of the junta of the necessity which existed in Texas … for the new colonists to bring their slaves.”

And the Mexican government couldn’t just ignore their whims. The Anglo settlers were increasingly taking over the place and could, if their numbers increased sufficiently, break Texas off from Mexico and join the United States, which, of course, eventually happened.

So the Mexican government struck a deal with Austin. The deal allowed settlers to keep their enslaved people but banned any further trade. Enslavement took root, and in 1823, Austin received permission to increase immigration from the United States.

But constant turnover and instability in Mexico City proved problematic for the Texans. In 1824, a new government proposed measures to undo the understanding over slavery. One bill outlawed “commerce and traffic in slaves” and stated that any enslaved person brought into Mexico would be deemed free by “the mere act of treading Mexican soil.”

Potential settlers noticed. One prospective settler from Mississippi noted that the only thing preventing “wealthy planters from emigrating immediately to the province of Texas,” was the “uncertainty now prevailing” over slavery. And from Alabama came a similar message: “Our most valuable inhabitants here own negroes. … Our planters are not willing to remove without they can first be assured of their being secured to them by the laws of your Govt.” Economic opportunity made Texas alluring for cotton growers, but the political uncertainty made them hesitate. Their hesitation, in turn, increased pressure on Mexican lawmakers, who wanted to maintain control of Texas, and on Austin, whose livelihood depended on getting more people to immigrate.

Finally, in 1824, a new Mexican constitution seemed to settle the issue by leaving the slavery question to the states. The locus of Austin’s anxiety shifted to Saltillo, the capital of the Mexican state of Coahuila, to which the Texas territory belonged. The state constitution of 1827 allowed settlers to import enslaved people for six more months. That September, however, yet another new government in Mexico City passed a flurry of laws curbing slavery.

By 1828, Texans had settled on an unsustainable practice: They would ignore anti-slavery laws passed in Mexico City.

Discussion that the government might actually enforce the 1827 laws, though, brought talk of war. “Many have announced to me that there will be a revolution if the law takes effect,” a Mexican military commander in East Texas wrote a superior. “Austin’s colony would be the first to think along these lines. It was formed for slavery, and without it her inhabitants would be nothing.”

This talk of secession brought crackdowns from the Mexican government, including taxes on cotton to pay for military installations in Texas and an order to close the border with the United States. Austin sunk into a depression. Mexico was threatening the foundation of Texans’ economy. “Nothing is wanted but money,” Austin wrote in one letter, adding in another, “and negros are necessary to make it.”

Cotton was booming, though, which boosted illegal immigration into Texas. Americans, though still a minority, were fast on their way to becoming a majority. This demographic shift increased Mexico’s efforts to directly control Texas, including newfound enforcement of laws. Texans, accustomed to a la carte obedience to Mexican law, took this affront as tyranny.

In April 1832, the Mexican government closed a loophole allowing settlers to reclassify their human chattel as indentured servants. This finally outlawed slavery, full stop. For Austin, this was the last straw. “Texas must be a slave country,” he wrote a friend, “circumstances and unavoidable necessity compels it.”

He saw only two options: a separate Mexican statehood for Texas with legal slavery or rebellion. “No middle course left,” he wrote.

When the Mexican government granted Santa Anna dictatorial powers in 1834, Mexican states revolted, first Zacatecas, then Coahuila, which included Texas. The Mexican army marched north to put down the rebellions. In Matagorda, a group of Anglo settlers declared that “merciless soldiery” was coming “to give liberty to our slaves, and to make slaves of ourselves.”

The Texas leadership justified the war as a fight to preserve their “natural rights” and — that word again — their “property,” meaning their enslaved laborers.

Even in Washington it was clear what drove the Texans. Abolitionists denounced their insurgency as the world’s first proslavery rebellion. “The war now raging in Texas,” charged former president and Rep. John Quincy Adams (Mass.), was “a war for the reestablishment of Slavery where it was abolished. It is not a servile war, but a war between Slavery and Emancipation, and every possible effort has been made to drive us into this war, on the side of slavery.”

The Texas Revolt may have been precipitated by ham-handed Mexican attempts to exercise control over its territory, but the underlying cause, was the one thing American immigrants and the Mexican government had disagreed on since the beginning: the preservation of slavery.

Given that its defenders were fighting to form what became the single most militant slave nation in history, that men who fought at the Alamo like Jim Bowie and William Travis traded enslaved people, and Austin, the “Father of Texas,” spent years fighting to preserve slavery from the attacks of Mexican abolitionists, it is clear that rather than a courageous stand for liberty, the White men fighting at the Alamo were battling to own people of color.

To many in Texas, the Alamo is a secular shrine to conservative values on par with a Confederate monument, a metaphor made literal in 2019 when the Texas Senate specifically included the Alamo in legislation to protect Confederate monuments from removal. The debate over the history of White supremacy has only expanded since then, most recently in debates over teaching critical race theory and with the first national reckoning over the Tulsa Massacre. With the debate over our past increasingly fraught, reexamining the Alamo’s history shines a spotlight on how slavery played a role in the formation of the Southwest and how its impact has lingered, fueling an ethos at the core of Texas identity and, as Trump’s last State of the Union shows, that continues to animate conservative ideology.
 

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Conservatives can't win the history wars
Nitpicking and political muscle won't prevail in the end


Matthew Yglesias
12 hr ago 359
(TIMOTHY A. CLARY/AFP via Getty Images)
Part of the extremely confusing and confused debate about “critical race theory” (scare quotes very intentional) in American education is actually about something entirely different — the content of history curricula.


On the history front, the conservative backlash really started well before the “critical race theory” kick got going. It dates back to The New York Times’ publication of the 1619 Project and the announcement that the Pulitzer Center was developing school curriculum units based on the project. Conservatives immediately lost their shyt over this, and progressives countermobilized. History is now, I would say, one front in a multi-front battle composed of things that are only loosely related.

And on the history front, I think that at times liberals protest too much, acting as if nobody had ever taught about slavery in a social studies class pre-1619 or as if all of public education was still stuck in Dunning School propaganda as of five years ago. The whole point of the 1619 Project was to be provocative and not just to repeat the most common, basically known facts about slavery in American history. There is nothing wrong with adopting a provocative framing conceit for a special issue of a magazine. Good journalism should aim, at times, to provoke. But a provocateur can’t then turn around and act outraged that an act of deliberate provocation was not met with immediate acclaim across the political system.

I thought that was really all I had to say about this until I read Ross Douthat’s column on the history wars which made me think that conservatives don’t even really understand what they’re mad about here. He thinks conservatives are trying to rescue the good name of The United States of America from leftists who want to drag it through the gutter. But I think the core issue here is a new line of historiography that says not that America is bad but that the American conservative movement is bad. And what’s threatening about that line isn’t its worst excesses, but the fact that large swathes of it are perfectly plausible.

Douthat’s view of the debate
Douthat conceptualized the new historiography as advancing three lines of argument:

One: It seeks to expurgate elements of the old, racist historiography. When my wife was a kid in Texas she was taught “the war of northern aggression.” That kind of stuff has been marginalized since then, but it’s not completely gone.

Two: It seeks to publicize things like the sheer brutality of slavery, the violence of redemption, and the scope of ongoing theft that was part and parcel of the Jim Crow system.

Three: Douthat refers to “a more radical narrative of U.S. history as a whole — one that casts a colder eye on the founders and Lincoln’s halting path to abolition, depicts slavery as the foundation of white American prosperity and portrays the Republic’s ideals as just prettying up systems of racist and settler-colonialist oppression.”

Douthat’s view is that the problematic thing here is argument three — the anti-patriotic element — and that “the biggest zone of controversy lies where the second project, the recovery of memory, blurs into the third one, the radical critique — where the impulse to memorialize Tulsa gives way to the impulse to take Lincoln’s name off a San Francisco school, where the indictment of slave owning gives way to an indictment of the American Revolution.”

I really do not think that this is correct.

The Lincoln-cancellers are being dumb, and conservatives like to talk about them because highlighting dumb left-wing people is instrumentally useful politics. By the same token, it is true that Nikole Hannah-Jones’ lead essay for the project contained a factually dubious assertion about slavery as a motivator for the American Revolution. That was an error on the part of the editors who should have been more careful about that line because when you say something sloppy in a controversial essay, your critics will seize on your weak point. But her critics didn’t criticize her because of that line — that line is not the point of the essay. The point of the essay is to center Black Americans as the hero of the fight for American freedom, and thus cast their political adversaries as the villains.

And the project as a whole ties together in popularized form a lot of strands of newer history that, broadly speaking, cast racial conflict as the central through-line of American history and does so in a way that’s devastating to conservatism.

The old progressive historiography
I think a useful way to think about this is in the context of a much more longstanding debate about how to understand American history. If you go back to the beginning of the twentieth century, the biggest names in history were the folks who Richard Hofstadter labeled “the progressive historians” — namely Charles and Mary Beard, Frederick Turner, and V.L. Parrington.

I cannot claim to be an expert on these guys, but I have read some of the Beards’ work, and I read Hofstadter’s critique of them.

These guys thought of themselves as being on the left. But it was a very old-fashioned kind of left, and the conclusion it led them to was very different from the conclusions of the contemporary left. Beard’s view, in particular, was that class conflict is the overriding theme in American history. The creation of the Constitution, on this view, is a kind of counterrevolution undertaken on behalf of rich bondholders. Then Thomas Jefferson puts forward an economic agenda on behalf of farmers to counter the finance/trade/manufacturing interests of Alexander Hamilton and the Federalists.

Beard remarks upon Jefferson’s slave-owning, but not in a particularly condemnatory way, and mostly with a view to casting him as an anti-capitalist.


This sets Beard up to put forward a kind of Marx-inspired view of the American Civil War. Much as the French bourgeoisie overthrew the feudal system in 1789 to usher in capitalist modernity, Lincoln and the Republicans overthrow the planter aristocracy, not in order to liberate enslaved people but to advance a capitalist development program centered on railroad construction and protective tariffs.



The whole view just doesn’t really take racial conflict seriously. It doesn’t endorse the pro-slavery politics of Jefferson and Andrew Jackson but doesn’t condemn them either. And because it doesn’t take racial issues seriously, it doesn’t even really see them as “pro-slavery politics” — these are the politics of agrarian interests counterposed to financial and industrial interests. Reconstruction is an effort to impose a kind of northern colonial rule on the South, and Redemption is the inevitable pushback against that. Abolitionists, Radical Republicans, and Black people themselves are just not seen as major actors.


And the point of all this — and the reason they got the label Progressive Historians — was to provide ammunition to the Progressive political faction in the then-present. The Progressives wanted to overthrow Gilded Age Classical Liberalism and impose a kind of technocratic reform program on politics and economics. The Progressives were often very racist (like Woodrow Wilson) but most of all were not interested in waging a big fight about racial justice, so the Progressive historiography insisted that past fights about racial justice were basically fake.


Consensus and collapse

After World War II, I think people were feeling less cynical about things and the Cold War context made this Marx-esque view of history that centered class conflict pretty dicey stuff.


Enter Hofstadter himself was feeling this way, along with guys like Louis Hartz and Daniel J. Boorstin, whose adversaries eventually labeled them the “consensus school” of American history. The big idea here is that American politics is mostly not that ideological. You have a lot of picayune fights about stuff like tariff schedules that are driven by idiosyncratic interests, and you have various reform efforts, but mostly you have a national ideology and a national project. Americans are individualistic, they believe in liberalism, they are skeptical of the state, and they are into conquering western lands and expanding the scope of opportunities.


The Consensus School would note that America stands out in not having a mass socialist political party, so while obviously class conflict has occurred, it’s an odd theme to emphasize in American history when it seems like we have less of it than other countries.


This is a worldview well-suited to the disorganized and non-ideological partisan politics of the 1950s, and it also kind of fits with the very American tradition of generically celebrating “founding fathers” rather than paying attention to the fact that the founders argued viciously with each other.


Consensus history ends up getting challenged by the New Left across manydimensions, but the one that’s had the most influence in mass culture is the critiques stemming pretty directly from the Civil Rights Movement. Eric Foner argues that we should take abolitionists, Reconstruction, and free soil ideology seriously. Du Bois’ old book “Black Reconstruction in America” enjoys a revival of interest. You start getting books like “What Hath God Wrought” that cast the Whig Party as heroes and Jackson as the villain. Jonathan Chait makes the subtext text here with a 2014 article casting Barack Obama as a kind of modern-day Henry Clay fighting Jacksonian tea partiers. And then Trump becomes president and starts explicitly affiliating with Jackson!
 

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This contemporary progressive view in which we make musicals celebrating Alexander Hamilton, read Ta-Nehisi Coates’ meditations on Ulysses Grant, and take Woodrow Wilson’s name off the policy school at Princeton is in some ways the complete opposite of the old Progressive School. But I do think it’s important to understand that the Old Progressive History was supposed to be left-wing! It’s just that we pirouetted between a left view that centered class conflict arguing with a more conservative view that centered consensus, to an argument between consensus and a left view that centers race. But from an actual conservative viewpoint, neither conflict-oriented interpretation of American history is viable because they are both saying that conservatives are bad.

What matters in the 1619 Project
The most important 1619 essays, really, are the ones conservatives don’t even want to talk about.

Jamelle Bouie argued, for example, that we should see America’s idiosyncratic political institutions as a legacy of slavery and especially of slaveholders’ interests. Matthew Desmond’s article arguing that we should see America’s relatively libertarian approach to capitalism as a legacy of slavery is less persuasive in my view, largely because Bouie’s argument is so correct. Once you understand that American political institutions are designed to protect the interests of property owners, you don’t really need to reach for further explanations. Jeneen Interlandi argues that racial conflict is important to understanding why America doesn’t have universal healthcare. Kevin Kruse writes about how segregation influenced American urban planning for the worse.

The point of all these pieces is more forceful than Douthat’s “recovery of memory” but less stupid than canceling Lincoln — it’s to argue that the conservative movement in America is heir to the political legacy of America’s bad guys.

And this is not a matter of hazy reconstructions either. Bouie traces contemporary conservative enthusiasm for undemocratic political institutions to John C. Calhoun’s pro-slavery advocacy. But conservatives themselves hail William F. Buckley Jr. as a key intellectual architect of their movement and Barry Goldwater’s 1964 presidential campaign as a major breakthrough for their movement in electoral politics. But Buckley straightforwardly opposed enfranchising Black people, and Goldwater ran in ‘64 as an opponent of the Civil Rights Act.

Today’s conservatives often like to quote Martin Luther King Jr. as an apostle of “colorblind” policy as an aspirational goal. But King was a socialist who argued for a radical redistribution of material resources. Goldwater not only opposed that, but he also opposed the simple non-discrimination provisions of the Civil Rights Act as philosophically incompatible with the overall conservative view of how regulation of the economy should work (or more precisely, not work). Because of course the same people who don’t like minimum wage rules or mandatory parental leave also don’t like mandatory non-discrimination rules.

Conservatives don’t agree with anti-patriotic radicalism, but they have no reason to fear it — it’s just a political millstone. But Hannah-Jones wasn’t making a case against patriotism, she was lighting a path for herself to find her way back to her father’s patriotism. What’s left out of the 1619 narrative isn’t ra-ra-ra-Americana, it’s conservatives and their view that their movement is good rather than bad.

Public schools are public
My basic view is that all tellings of history reflect contemporary concerns, and it’s a little bit reductive and naive to think we can really debate which of these perspectives is “true.”

The old progressive historiography captures something real about America, but at the cost of completely leaving out Black people and proferring a nonsensical account of the origins of the Civil War. The race-centric historiography is much more inclusive and handles key episodes of our history much more reasonably. But the Progressive Era itself was actually a really important time in American political history, and the newer historiography struggles to make sense of it. All the bad things people say about Woodrow Wilson are true, but there’s also a reason that all the New Dealers and postwar liberals saw him as their progenitor.

And the thing about the Consensus School is that it’s well-suited to the task of being assigned in public schools in a large and diverse electoral democracy.

If you’re writing a book, you can absolutely just say that the lesson of American history is that conservatives are bad. You can say that on your Substack, you can Tweet it, and you can write it in a special issue of a magazine. But you can’t teach it in public schools in Indiana because Indiana is full of conservatives.


If your passion in life is to deploy bracing truths that are rejected by a majority of the population, then teaching eighth grade is probably not the right career for you.



Some people, of course, think we shouldn’t have public schools at all. They think all families should get a voucher and go do whatever, maybe backstopped by some kind of state assessments. Progressives could send their kids to progressive schools and conservatives to conservative schools. But since most teachers are progressive and most parents probably just aren’t super-political, the balance of market forces would favor schools with a progressive slant.


But if you do have a public school system then, by definition, you need a curriculum that’s acceptable to the state legislature. Truth is important. But public schools are public. And public institutions are subject to politics. And even though the new race-centric historiography says many important truths, it’s hardly the only set of true things you could teach to kids. Ron DeSantis is striking back with a requirement that Florida schools teach more about communism, a subject that makes the conservative movement’s track-record look better and the progressive movement’s look worse. But you could probably comply with the letter of the mandate and work in stuff about how as real as the sins of communism were, anti-communism was also routinely used as a pretext to attack the Civil Rights Movement and to bolster apartheid in South Africa. History!

1776 is good enough
I think the 1619 Project was a tremendous magazine issue. The Desmond article I have some serious problems with (a story for another day), but one bad article in a whole issue of a magazine is a good hit rate. The sheer volume of criticism that’s heaped just on a couple of lines from Hannah-Jones’ essay shows the extent to which conservatives are mad about the project (because they rightly perceive it as bad for the right) but don’t really have the goods to debunk it.

But I think teach the 1619 Project in public schools is just an overreach. I don’t expect they’ll teach Slow Boring posts in many schools either. That’s life.

What I do think is noteworthy is the extent to which being mad at the 1619 Project has induced conservatives to pound the table in favor of 1776 as America’s true founding, because historically that has always been the argument specifically of the anti-racist faction in American politics.

Lincoln, dating the founding of the country to 1776 rather than 1790, famously describes it as “dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.” That idea doesn’t appear in the U.S. Constitution, which not only endorses slavery but entrenched a profoundly undemocratic political system that we still have today. This is precisely the struggle that Buckley was on the wrong side of and that is being pressed today when progressives argue for creating new states and instituting tough curbs on gerrymandering.

This is why it’s Joe Biden who likes to say “America is an idea” because the good idea behind America is a progressive egalitarian one. Rich Lowry, Buckley’s successor at National Review, knows that the spirit of 1776 isn’t actually workable for the conservative project — that they need to insist that America is somehow a blood-and-soil nation out of German Romanticism.

But that’s dumb. Words are just words, but again, it’s Lincoln who says we’re not just “a nation” but rather a nation dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal — i.e., an idea. Portugal isn’t dedicated to anything. It’s the Iberian kingdom that didn’t get amalgamated with Castille and Leon, and so its local dialect entered the era of mass education and mass media with the legal status of an official language, and so now they’re a “nation.” America’s not like that.
 

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The 1619 Project Revisited
The 1619 Project Revisited
The Anglo-Saxon Roots of Critical Race Theory

John Ganz

Jun 27
3


In the light of the ongoing controversy over Critical Race Theory, I thought it might be interesting to revisit the earlier controversy over the 1619 Project. While the 1619 Project is not really an instance of CRT, it definitely is an instance of “CRT” according to the discourse has been formulated by right-wing ideologues. For some reason, I sort of wasn’t that interested in the 1619 Project controversy when it broke out, but now it seems to have only been an opening salvo in the ongoing ideological spat about the national character and “the basic symbols of the American political tradition,” to borrow from the title of Wilmoore Kendall and George Carey’s book.

Just to recall briefly, the 1619 Project was a series of essays in the New York Times Magazine about the legacy of anti-black racism in the United States. The leading conceit of the initiative was that the founding date was 1619, the year the first enslaved Africans were brought to the colonies, rather than 1776. The biggest part of the controversy erupted over Nikole Hannah-Jones keynote essay, and was ostensibly focused on the empirical claim that colonists had declared independence mostly to preserve slavery. This claim was eventually amended by the paper. But I think everyone knows that the controversy is really about the ideological and symbolic foundation point of the nation rather than the factual details

One objection to the 1619 Project and Hannah-Jones’s essay in particular among liberals was that it undermined belief in the American national project of progress toward ever greater quality and liberty. The thinking there is roughly something like, “If there wasn’t a germ of truth in the Founding, then the entirety of the nation’s history was just force and fraud.” The thinking was the basis for shared purpose and the continuation of the American experiment would be threatened if racism infected every inch of the nation’s history. Defenders of the project pointed to the strongly stated commitment of Nikole Hannah-Jones to the American ideals of freedom and equality and in ways her essay does often sound like a standard invocation of the American creed. It is, in fact, a deeply nationalist essay—Hannah-Jones begins with a meditation on her father’s patriotic dedication to flying the flag and arrives at the ultimate correctness of this gesture—but the character of its particular kind of American nationalism is worth investigating.

In his recent book, After Nationalism, Samuel Goldman describes three types of American nationalism, each with its own characteristic symbol. They have all existed in some form throughout American history, but have a roughly chronological succession as the dominant ideological underpinning of national unity. The first of these symbols is the Covenant, the idea that the United States is a kind of chosen people on the model of the Biblical Israelites, the second is the Crucible, the notion that the United States is a melting pot where a new people is being forged out of diverse sources, and the last is the Creed, where the United States is bound by its adherence to democratic-republican principles of liberty and equality embodied in the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. Logically speaking these ideas may have mutually exclusive premises, but in practice politicians often mingle the metaphors and the popular imagination shifts between these.

Covenant nationalism comes from the self-consciousness of the Northeastern Calvinists: “Emerging from New England, it ultimately sought to constitute all of America as an offshoot of the Puritan experience. Elements of this project survive in the celebration of Thanksgiving as a national holiday. When we commemorate the survival of the Mayflower passengers, we symbolically place ourselves in that lineage.” This required a shared ethnic and religious identity—an Elect group—that was difficult to sustain in the expanding, diverse Republic and it was put aside, or rather complemented, with other sources of national identity. Its belief in the virtuousness of a certain ethnic group—namely the WASPs or proto-WASPs—eventually made Covenant thinking as much a source of snobbery and even bigotry as comity. But its legacy lives on in various ways, sometimes as a mere rhetorical trope, sometimes as something a bit more substantive: Russel Kirk spoke of our British patrimony, the aforementioned Kendall made the Mayflower Compact—the virtuous people deliberating before God—the original symbol of American democracy, and the sociologist Samuel Huntington thought America required “Anglo-Protestant” values. There is a kind of paternalistic version of this story that reconciles it with American diversity: the godly Elect were a light unto the goyim of immigrants, teaching the swarthy masses how to do democracy.

What I find so interesting about the Hannah-Jones essay, and why I think it was so upsetting to many, was its implicit participation and reversal of this Covenant tradition of American nationalism. First of all, the arrival of the slave ship in 1619, the leading image of the entire project is obviously meant to displace the Mayflower’s arrival in 1620. But both posit a “Founding before the Founding.” Instead with the end of the Exodus and the entrance into the land of Canaan, Hannah-Jones’s narrative begins with the Israelites in Babylonian or Egyptian captivity. It is well known how the Biblical story of the Israelites is a very old source of symbolic inspiration to black Americans. But here Hannah-Jones replaces the Puritan WASPs as the original Americans, keeping the Covenant when others did not. Instead of the Mayflower Compact, the Covenant is the faith shown by black Americans in the nation. Let’s look at some examples in the text:


But it would be historically inaccurate to reduce the contributions of black people to the vast material wealth created by our bondage. Black Americans have also been, and continue to be, foundational to the idea of American freedom. More than any other group in this country’s history, we have served, generation after generation, in an overlooked but vital role: It is we who have been the perfecters of this democracy.

Suffice it to say, role of the guardians or custodians of American democracy was traditionally given to the WASP elite.

The truth is that as much democracy as this nation has today, it has been borne on the backs of black resistance. Our founding fathers may not have actually believed in the ideals they espoused, but black people did. As one scholar, Joe R. Feagin, put it, “Enslaved African-Americans have been among the foremost freedom-fighters this country has produced.” For generations, we have believed in this country with a faith it did not deserve. Black people have seen the worst of America, yet, somehow, we still believe in its best.

And this quote is perhaps the most striking appropriation of WASPdom—emphasis mine:

I wish, now, that I could go back to the younger me and tell her that her people’s ancestry started here, on these lands, and to boldly, proudly, draw the stars and those stripes of the American flag.

We were told once, by virtue of our bondage, that we could never be American. But it was by virtue of our bondage that we became the most American of all.


Before I consider the meaning of this extraordinary statement, I want to point out how Hannah-Jones’s essay, the 1619 Project and shares characteristics with another old tradition of “Anglo-Saxon” thought, one that also dates back to the 17th century. In fact, I think elucidating this strain of thought might help recast the entire controversy over “CRT” in a more constructive direction.

In his 1975-1976 Lectures at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault identifies what he rather provocatively calls a “discourse of race struggle” emerging in the 17th century England. This was mentality of the lawyers and parliamentarians struggling against the Stuart regime, either legally, or later in the English Civil War. This discourse of race struggle opposed the “discourse of sovereignty,” which basically said the monarchy was a legitimate regime and the peace it imposed was the foundation of justice, etc. According to Foucault, this discourse of race struggle attacked the legitimacy of the constitutional order by emphasizing the fact of the Norman conquest: there was no actual peace, there was just the perpetual extension of war upon and enslavement of the Saxons by the Normans. There was a great deal of historical and legal scholarship—17th-century critical race theory—that sought to establish the ancient rights of the English people that had been usurped by the monarchy:

Henceforth, in this new type of discourse and historical practice, sovereignty no longer binds everything together into a unity—which is of course the unity of the city, the nation, or the State. Sovereignty has a specific (unction. It does not bind; it enslaves. The postulate that the history of great men contains, a fortiori, the history of lesser men, or that the history of the strong is also the history of the weak, is replaced by a principle of heterogeneity: The history of some is not the history of others. It will be discovered, or at least asserted, that the history of the Saxons after their defeat at the Battle of Hastings is not the same as the history of the Normans who were the victors in that same battle…What looks like right, law, or obligation from the point of view of power looks like the abuse of power, violence, and exaction when it is seen from the viewpoint of the new discourse, just as it does when we go over to the other side.

Significantly, Foucault immediately connects this new consciousness to the Biblical history of the Israelites:

This way of speaking related this type of dis course not so much to the search for the great uninterrupted jurisprudence of a long-established power, as to a sort of prophetic rupture. This also means that this new discourse is similar to a certain number of epic, religious, or mythical forms which, rather than telling of the untarnished and uneclipsed glory of the sovereign, endeavor to formulate the misfortune of ancestors, exiles, and servitude. It will enumerate not so much victories, as the defeats to which we have to submit during our long wait for the promised land and the fulfillment of the old promises that will of course reestablish both the rights of old and the glory that has been lost.

With this new discourse of race struggle, we see the emergence of something that, basically, is much closer to the mythico-religious discourse of the Jews than to the politico-legendary history of the Romans.
 

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These Critical Race Theoreticians of the 17th century came up with different formulations to ground their claims and different ways to deal with the fact of the Norma Conquest. For instance, the notion that the Norman conquest was not a conquest at all, but a legitimate transfer of power which made the pre-Norman laws and rights still in force. J.G.A Pocock writes in The Ancient Constitution and the Feudal Law: A Study of English Historical Thought in the Seventeenth Century:


In a certain way, we can see something similar going on here to the standard liberal “compromise” story of the American founding: “Yes, we know the Founders enslaved people etc. but ultimately the principles enshrined in the Constitution remain intact and untainted by this fact. And even if they messed up, it was all put right after the Civil War with the Reconstruction amendments.”

There were also more radical interpretations of the Norman Conquest and its relationship to the Constitution that emerged after the English Civil War from groups like the Levellers and Diggers affirming the conquest and denouncing the entire ensuing legal order as a result:

What the Levellers will say is this: "The monarchy is perfectly right to say that the invasion, defeat, and Conquest did take place. It's true, the Conquest did take place, and that has to be our starting point. But the absolute monarchy interprets the fact that the Conquest took place as providing a legitimate basis for its right. We, on the other hand, interpret the fact that the Conquest did take place, and that the Saxons really were defeated by the Normans, as meaning that the defeat marked, not the beginnings of right—absolute right— but of a state of nonright that invalidates all the laws and social differences that distinguish the aristocracy, the property regime, and so on." All the laws that function in England must be regarded as tricks, traps, and wickedness—this is John Warr's text The Corruption and Deficiency of the Laws of England. The laws are traps: they do nothing at all to restrict power. They are the instruments of power. They are not means of guaranteeing the reign of justice, but ways of promoting vested interests. The first objective of the revolution must therefore be the suppression of all post-Norman laws to the extent that, either directly or indirectly, they impose the “Norman yoke.” Laws, said Lilburne, are made by conquerors. The entire legal apparatus must therefore be done away with.

This is something like the perspective attributed to “CRT” by Conservatives today: they are saying, “Slavery and racism infects and invalidates the entirety of the social and legal order and it all must be ripped up.” It is true that many CRT texts, meaning from the actual legal movement, seem to incorporate the “Leveller” belief that the laws are the products of usurpation by the powerful, but more often than not seem to settle on the Common Lawyers’ insistence on the discourse of rights as fundamentally untainted by the “Norman yoke.” But much of the discomfort with the discourse of the 1619 Project and “CRT” is definitely about the way it introduces conflict—slavery, conquest, and exploitation—into the story of America rather than agreement and consensus. That may be so, but in doing this it paradoxically confirms rather than displaces very old sources of American political thought. After all, many of the Critical Race Theorists of the 17th-century—rebels against the Stuart regime—became some of the earliest settlers to New England.

To return to 1619 Project and Nikole Hannah-Jones’s essay for a moment, I think the issue for so many people is that it cleaves so closely the sources of American political imagination but just inverts them. In fact, it interweaves the symbols of creed, crucible with the original covenant: the crucible is here not the melting-pot, but the struggle against slavery and racism that forged black American identity, an identity with a particular insistence on the American creed. Some of the issue people have with 1619 is clearly simple racism: it is just very upsetting and alienating for many white Americans to have to imagine black people—not to mention enslaved black people—as our Founders. Then there is the other, more ideological form of racism motivating the hysteria about “CRT:” that which takes the presence of certain groups as disturbing, heterogenous elements disrupting the integrity of the national body.

For my own part, I find neither narrative of American history—that of WASPs or blacks to be “original Americans” or “most American”—to be that offensive or even particularly incompatible: I’m happy to grant New England Puritans a formative role as well as the black freedom struggle. As a the descendant of immigrants, I am willing to be tolerant of a little ethnic pride or even a touch of chauvinism from time to time. But I purposely say “ethnic” and not “racial.” I think Hannah-Jones’s project can succeed so long as it presents African-Americans as a people, an ethnicity, with a particularly important history in our shared country, not as a race, which smacks of a certain biological fixity. Ethnic and ethos have the same root and I think it’s not wrong to say there’s a Puritan ethos and a black ethos, presented in the freedom struggle, and they both contribute to make the country what it is. And there are of course other ethnicities and ethos as well.

But I do think ultimately Americans of all backgrounds should give up on being a nation and stop looking for a source of specifically national unity, because we are not really a nation: we are not in the end bound by a single ethnic background or historical memory. History is never going to provide a single, stable source of unity for the American people. We just have to accept that pluralism and even a certain degree of conflict are the inevitable price of living in our democratic society. With that in mind I want to close with Hannah Arendt’s rejoinder to the anti-communists of the 1950s, to which I’ve compared the opponents of “CRT”:


Your aim, to make of democracy a "cause" in the strict ideological sense, contradicts the rules and laws by which we live and let live.

America, this republic, the democracy in which we live, is a living thing which cannot be contemplated and categorized, like the image of a thing which I can make; it cannot be fabricated. It is not and never will be perfect because the standard of perfection does not apply here. Dissent belongs to this living matter as much as consent does. The limitations of dissent lie in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights and nowhere else. If you try to "make America more American" or a model of democracy according to any preconceived idea, you can only destroy it. Your methods, finally, are the justified methods of the police, and only of the police.
 

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How was this ever disputed?

They gonna respect this woman :wow:



https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2021/07/02/fourth-july-african-americans-declaration/

The Declaration of Independence’s debt to Black America
When African Americans allied themselves with the British, the Patriots were enraged, and they acted.
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"Head of a Negro" (1777 or 1778), by John Singleton Copley (Founders Society Purchase, Gibbs-Williams Fund/Detroit Institute of Arts)

By Woody Holton
Woody Holton, the McCausland professor of history at the University of South Carolina, is the author of “Abigail Adams,” which won the Bancroft Prize, and "Liberty Is Sweet: The Hidden History of the American Revolution,” due out in October.

July 2, 2021 at 1:13 p.m. UTC

In his famous Independence Day oration of 1852, Frederick Douglass asked, “What to the American slave is your Fourth of July?” If we turn that around and ask, “What to the Fourth of July were African Americans?,” we can only answer: “A lot.”
African Americans played a crucial, if often overlooked, role in their White owners’ and neighbors’ decision to declare independence from Britain.
Starting in November 1774 — five months before the Battles of Lexington and Concord — Blacks in the Virginia Piedmont gathered to assess how to use the impending conflict between colonists and crown to gain their own freedom. Over the next 12 months, African Americans all over the South made essentially this pitch to beleaguered royal officials: You are outnumbered, you need us — and we will fight for you if you will free us. At first the British refused, but eventually Lord Dunmore, the last royal governor of Virginia, began quietly welcoming African Americans to what he called his “Ethiopian Regiment.” On Nov. 15, 1775, Dunmore’s Black troops defeated a Patriot militia force, with the Patriot commander being captured by one of his own former enslaved men. Later that day, the governor issued an emancipation proclamation, promising freedom to rebels’ enslaved people who served in his army. With less fanfare, other colonial officials, especially Royal Navy captains, also accepted Black volunteers.
Until 1775, most White Americans had resisted parliamentary innovations like the Stamp Act and the tea tax but had shown little interest in independence. Yet when they heard that Blacks had forged an informal alliance with the British, Whites were furious. John H. Norton of Virginia denounced Dunmore’s “Damned, infernal, Diabolical proclamation declaring Freedom to all our Slaves who will join him.” Thomas Paine pronounced the Anglo-African alliance “hellish.” “Our Devil of a Governor goes on at a Devil of a rate indeed,” wrote Virginian Benjamin Harrison, who would later sign the Declaration of Independence.
Whites’ fury at the British for casting their lot with enslaved people drove many to the fateful step of endorsing independence. In his rough draft of the Declaration, Thomas Jefferson listed 25 grievances against George III but devoted three times as many words to one of those grievances as to any other. This was his claim that the king had first imposed enslaved Africans on White Americans and was now encouraging those same enslaved people “to purchase that liberty of which he has deprived them, by murdering the people upon whom he also obtruded them.”
Soon after the adoption of the Declaration, Black freedom fighters set about transforming its meaning.
The Second Continental Congress’s most urgent motivation for declaring independence was to pave the way for a military alliance with France. That explains why the Declaration briefly mentions human rights but focuses on states’ (nations’) rights, specifically the right of entities like the 13 colonies to break away from their mother countries. And in the Declaration’s early years, as the literary scholar Eric Slauter has discovered, most Whites who quoted it went straight to its secessionist clauses, especially Congress’s pronouncement that “these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States.”
Some who discussed the Declaration drew attention to a different section, as Slauter also notes: the part where Jefferson insists upon human equality and unalienable rights. These clauses proved useful to Congress’s critics as proof of the hypocrisy of Sons of Liberty who were also enslavers.
But other Americans drew inspiration from these same passages. Only a few months after July 4, 1776, Lemuel Haynes, a free Black soldier serving in the Continental Army, wrote an essay he called “Liberty Further Extended.” He opened it by quoting Jefferson’s insistence that “all men are created equal” and possess “certain unalienable rights.”
Soon, other abolitionists were spotlighting the Declaration’s equality and rights clauses. These passages also drew attention from 19th-century women’s rights advocates. The South Carolina-born abolitionist and feminist Sarah Grimké insisted in an 1837 essay that “Men and women were CREATED EQUAL.” And Elizabeth Cady Stanton patterned her Seneca Falls “Declaration of Sentiments” on the Declaration of Independence.
Congress’s Declaration did not achieve its goal of a military alliance with France. It would be nearly two more years before the first French battleships sailed into American waters. But by shifting the focus of the Declaration of Independence from states’ rights to human rights, abolitionists and feminists made it one of the most successful freedom documents ever composed.
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“Death of Major Peirson, 6 January 1781” (1783), by John Singleton Copley (UniversalImagesGroup/Getty Images)
Fighting alongside the British
By the time the Second Continental Congress adopted the Declaration of Independence, hundreds of enslaved Americans had escaped to the British army, and thousands more would follow. This John Singleton Copley painting depicts an actual event: a British officer’s servant fighting the French in the January 1781 Battle of Jersey, just off the French coast.
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“John Murray, 4th Earl of Dunmore” (1765), by Sir Joshua Reynolds (National Galleries of Scotland/Getty Images)
Lord Dunmore, object of hope or villainy
Dunmore’s emancipation proclamation enraged Whites. “Men of all ranks resent the pointing a dagger to their Throats thru the hands of their Slaves,” wrote Archibald Cary, a member of Virginia’s House of Burgesses. The proclamation would tend “more effectually to work an eternal separation between Great Britain and the Colonies,— than any other expedient, which could possibly have been thought of,” said Edward Rutledge of South Carolina, who became the Declaration’s youngest signer. On the other hand, a Black Philadelphian was accused of telling a White woman who wanted him to take the street side of the sidewalk: “Stay you d----d White bytch, till lord Dunmore and his Black regiment come, and then we will see who is to take the wall.”
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Portrait of Dido Elizabeth Belle Lindsay and her cousin Lady Elizabeth Murray (about 1779), by David Martin (Courtesy of Scone Palace and Lord Mansfield)
Family ties and the end of slavery in Britain
One of White Americans’ many grievances against Britain was Lord Mansfield’s Somerset decision of 1772, widely interpreted as abolishing slavery in the mother country. Enslavers in North America and the Caribbean worried that their human property would steal off and stow away aboard ships sailing for England, where they could claim their freedom. A scholar found references to Somerset in six Southern newspapers. Enslavers denounced Mansfield’s decision, both privately and in print. The Black Britons benefiting from Somerset included Dido Elizabeth, Mansfield’s grandniece, adoptive daughter and frequent amanuensis. Having a beloved Black child in his household may have influenced Mansfield in enslaved people’s favor.
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"A black wood cutter at Shelburne, Nova Scotia" (1788), by William Booth (Nova Scotia Archives, National Archives of Canada)
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"Rose Fortune" (ca. 1774-1864), anonymous (Nova Scotia Archives, Documentary Art Collection)
Free and resettled in Nova Scotia
British officers kept their promise to free African Americans who escaped to their lines during the Revolutionary War. Starting in 1783, the year of the Anglo-American peace treaty, more than 3,000 formerly enslaved Blacks — including Rose Fortune, depicted here — resettled in Nova Scotia. Many of the freed people found work in the province’s thriving logging industry, but they suffered continuous abuse from Whites, and in 1792, more than 1,200 of them accepted a British offer to resettle once again, this time in the new British colony of Sierra Leone on the West African coast.
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“Benjamin Banneker: Surveyor-Inventor-Astronomer,” by Maxime Seelbinder (Carol M. Highsmith/Library of Congress Prints and Photographs Division )
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“Sketches of the Life and Character of the Rev. Lemuel Haynes” (1837), by Timothy Mather Cooley (frontispiece) (Interim Archives/Getty Images)
Black abolitionists’ influence
The Declaration focused on justifying the 13 colonies’ secession from Britain. But before the year 1776 was out, Lemuel Haynes, who later became the first Black man in the United States ordained a minister by a mainstream U.S. denomination, had written an essay that opened with Jefferson’s insistence that “all men are created equal” and “endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights.” Haynes thus set in motion a shift in the essential focus of the Declaration: from states’ rights to human rights. Other abolitionists, Black and White, carried on his campaign to highlight the Declaration’s insistence upon equality and rights. In a 1791 letter to Thomas Jefferson, who was then secretary of state, Benjamin Banneker reminded him what he had said in 1776. “This Sir, was a time in which you clearly saw into the injustice of a State of Slavery,” Banneker told Jefferson, before upbraiding him for “detaining by fraud and violence so numerous a part of my brethren under groaning captivity and cruel oppression.” In the 19th century, feminists as well as abolitionists would focus the nation’s attention on the Declaration’s allusions to equality and unalienable rights.








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You Can't Tell the Story of 1776 Without Talking About Race and Slavery

You Can't Tell the Story of 1776 Without Talking About Race and Slavery
1776-racism.jpeg

Culture Club/Getty Images
Slavery and arguments about race were not only at the heart of the American founding; it was what united the states in the first place. We have been reluctant to admit just how thoroughly the Founding Fathers thought about, talked about, and wrote about race at the moment of American independence.

Part of the reason why we haven’t fully realized this is because of John Adams. More than forty years after 1776, an 83-year-old John Adams wanted Americans to know just how astounding it was that America declared independence. Getting all thirteen colonies to reach this same, momentous decision, Adams remembered, was “certainly a very difficult enterprise” and “perhaps a singular example in the history of mankind.” Colonists really didn’t know or particularly like one another. They fought with each other all the time. But something phenomenal happened in 1776. “Thirteen clocks were made to strike together—a perfection of mechanism which no artist had ever before effected.” Adams was, of course, bragging, subtly suggesting that the work he, Jefferson, Franklin, and the Continental Congress did was pretty much a miracle. This magical way of thinking is compelling. It created an attractive, exceptional origin story for the United States. But it covered up the work that Adams and his colleagues undertook at the time. That work was about publicizing stories to make Americans afraid of British-sponsored slave “insurrections” and Native “massacres.” He was hiding just how important race was to the founding.

Recently, a controversy over “critical race theory” has ignited public debate about the centrality of race to American history. As a part of that debate, which has been ongoing since the publication of the 1619 Project, the nation’s founding has come under the most scrutiny. How much did 1776 have to do with race and slavery? The answer is: you can’t tell the story without it. We have given the founding fathers passes when it comes to race. Although we have sometimes condemned an individual founder like Jefferson as a hypocrite, we have explained it away, either by citing the language in the opening paragraphs of the Declaration, or the emancipation efforts of some northern states, or by saying, well, it was the eighteenth century, what can you expect? Yet you only have to look at the very moment of Revolution to see how deeply race was embedded in the patriot cause.

Once the shooting started, patriot leaders started talking about race in very different ways than they had before. As soon as the news of Lexington and Concord spread throughout North America, colonists began to think, talk, and worry a lot about what role enslaved people might play in this new world of war with Great Britain. For the next fifteen months, between April 1775 and July 1776, they would read about British agents trying to incite slave rebellions all over the South. Patriot leaders broadcast news of royal officials throughout America plotting with slaves to put down the rebellion. In November 1775, Virginia Governor Lord Dunmore famously issued an emancipation proclamation, but he was not the only royal governor accused of embracing such tactics. Adams, Jefferson, Franklin, Washington, and their colleagues worked diligently in those fifteen months to alert as many colonists as they could about such British “treachery.” One of those British officials who had been chased from Charleston, South Carolina wrote that “massacres and instigated insurrections were Words in the mouth of every child.”

The patriots’ efforts to get stories about “instigated insurrections” into the mouths of American children culminated in the Declaration of Independence. In fact, it comes at the climax of the document. The Continental Congress accused King George of twenty-seven crimes. These were the “facts to be submitted to a candid world” that led the colonies to the necessity of declaring independence. The very last one was about enslaved and Native peoples potentially joining the King to destroy American liberty.

Jefferson had written a moving passage that referred to the African slave trade as an “assemblage of horrors” and a “cruel war against human nature itself.” Tragically, Congress cut nearly the whole thing—but not all of it. They kept the bit that was in the mouth of every American child, referring to slaves with the albeit veiled with common 18th century way of referring to slaves as “domestics.” The final grievance against King George, the ultimate deal-breaker, reads: “He has excited domestic insurrections amongst us, and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers, the merciless Indian Savages, whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.” After leveling that charge, the Declaration pivoted to say what American independence would look like
. Because patriots had rejected these efforts to recruit enslaved and Native fighters, Americans were now to act as free and independent states and “do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do.” This talk that was intended to generate racial fear was a key factor in the march toward independence.

That the Continental Congress felt like Jefferson’s antislavery sentiments were too controversial, but the accusation of “instigated insurrections” was not, suggests just how successful their campaign had been. Patriot leaders found one thing that white colonists shared: racism. The founders embraced and mobilized colonial prejudices about potentially dangerous African Americans and used those fears to unite the colonists in one “common cause.” For too long we have taken an elderly John Adams at his word about what brought the thirteen colonies together. He had forgotten—purposefully—how four decades earlier he had mobilized American prejudices about Black people (what today we would call racism) to get the colonies to come together as one union. That effort made America independent, but it also buried race deep in the cornerstone of the American republic that was born on July 4, 1776.
 
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