Here we can spot the difference between bogus
‘Africa Rising’ rhetoric as GDP increases thanks to raw materials exports, and
Africa crashing in terms of fast-shrinking wealth, especially in resource-cursed countries like Nigeria and South Africa. To fail to acknowledge the distinction is to import from malevolent Northern economists what University of Pretoria political economist Lorenzo Fioramonti calls a
Gross Domestic Problem.
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Nigeria shrinks because natural capital is being stripped out of the Niger Delta by foreign oil companies.”
It means ignoring women’s unpaid labor, pollution, social ills and a variety of other variables that should be measured as losses from net income. The biggest of these GDP-blind factors in Africa is the depletion of natural resources, which when mined or drilled out are only counted as GDP credits on the income accounts, but not as debits, as they should be since a source of future income is now gone.
It’s as if you have several generations’ worth of your family jewels locked away but your drunkard nephew steals the key, sells the jewels for a song, and boozes away the proceeds. Like Pretoria (or Washington for that matter), Abuja has seen lots of drunkard-nephew types exercising power, aided and abetted by multinational corporations like
Shell Oil which infiltrate and underhandedly manipulate critical parts of the state.
Nigeria shrinks because natural capital is being stripped out of the Niger Delta by foreign oil companies without the kind of compensating investments that resource-rich Norway, Canada and Australia can brag, because their mining and oil companies are headquartered at home there.
The Bank’s 2011 book,
The Changing Wealth of Nations, provides the latest available comparative data: in the year 2005 (when oil averaged $50/barrel), the average Nigerian lost $280 – or in sum, 140 million Nigerians lost a net $39 billion – because the depletion of natural resources far outstripped the income gains from exploiting petroleum. (In 2005, each South African lost $245 of wealth on average, and four other oil-stained African countries had higher per capita – albeit lower absolute – wealth shrinkage than Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea, Angola, Chad and Mauritania.)
This was not a one-year fluke, it amplified a trend the Bank observed for at least a decade earlier: “wealth in Nigeria declined by 15 per cent.” During the 14 years prior to 2008, say Changing Wealth of Nations authors, “clear trends emerge, with Adjusted Net Savings (ANS) as well as per capita wealth increasing in Asia and ANS declining in Sub-Saharan Africa. In both instances, a few countries dominate the trend: the stellar performance of China and, more recently, India drives the positive trends in Asia, and the poor performance of Nigeria and a handful of other countries outweighs the positive performance of many other African countries.
Accurate updates are not available, but as oil prices rose to $145 per barrel through mid-2008, crashed to $32 for a short while later that year, and then rose to the $80-100 range since 2010, Nigeria’s wealth shrinkage became even worse. If all other factors remained roughly constant, 175 million Nigerians would have lost around $80 billion net, last year. Rebase that, Abuja.
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Justice would demand that in compensation, the North pay a climate debt to ordinary Nigerians, not venal politicians running the state.”
What can be done? There is an obvious case from the standpoint of climate change to
‘leave the oil in the soil’, so as to avoid not only the looting and all that goes with it in political, economic, ecological and public health degradation, as Nnimmo Bassey explains in the 2011 book,
To Cook a Continent – but justice would demand that in compensation, the North pay a climate debt to
ordinary Nigerians, not venal politicians running the state. The superb Benin City-based advocacy group
Environmental Rights Action makes this case.
The outflow of wealth was slowed decisively on one occasion, five years ago, when activists of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) sabotaged pipelines so often that by the end of 2008 oil production was cut to half the prior year’s level. This followed a period of turmoil after Ken Saro-Wiwa’s non-violent fight against pollution and underdevelopment a quarter century ago ended in his execution in December 1995, even though Nelson Mandela had personally intervened against the then dictator Sani Abacha.
I was asked to write the Foreword to a brilliant 2013 book about MEND, Temitope Oriola’s
Criminal Resistance, which uses social psychology as well as political economy to unearth why oil generates such intense resistance. By all accounts, forces posing as MEND more recently degenerated into opportunistic activity, in contrast to the politically-‘liberatory’ kidnapping of the early years. Their former leader, Henry Okah, got a 24-year sentence from a South African judge for supporting car-bombing terrorism in 2012 and he tried to escape a Pretoria prison
twice in the last two months, including earlier this month. And although an amnesty led to substantial MEND disarmament once Nigeria’s president Goodluck Jonathan (a Delta native) came to power, this year has witnessed a resurgence of
kidnapping and
sabotage, which in the last two months disabled Shell and Agip pipelines carrying more than a fifth of Nigeria’s crude to ships.
MEND and the Islamic extremist movement Boko Haram have created the most intense battlefields within the MINTs and BRICS. In contrast to Nigerian guerrilla and terrorist attacks, leftists have been active the past few weeks in Mexico, where mass anti-privatization protests addressed energy and education. A frightened Newsweek reporter last October reported from Mexico’s “streets of fire,” as protests “have become more frequent, volatile and violent, analysts say, a response to major domestic policy shifts and growing alienation among the young and unemployed.”
Indonesia recently witnessed
two million protesting workers demanding 50 percent wage increases, while activists in
Turkey competed with Brazil for the largest take-overs of public space in major cities last year. The potential destruction of Istanbul’s
Gezi Park was just as important a symbolic statement of crony-capitalist power as Sepp Blatter’s politically-destructive relationship with Brazilian Workers Party president Dilma Rousseff, herself prone to neoliberal tendencies such as raising public transport prices beyond affordability.
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This year has witnessed a resurgence of kidnapping and sabotage, which in the last two months disabled Shell and Agip pipelines carrying more than a fifth of Nigeria’s crude to ships.”
Russia has witnessed mass protests, many very courageous in that authoritarian context: a democracy movement in late 2011, a freedom of expression battle involving a risque rock band in 2012, gay rights in 2013 and at the Winter Olympics, and last month’s anti-war protests.
Indian activists shook the power structure over corruption in 2011-12, a high-profile rape-murder in late 2012, and a municipal electoral surprise by a left-populist anti-establishment political party in late 2013. And
Chinese activists protest tens of thousands at a time, at roughly equivalent rates in
urban and rural settings, especially because of
pollution, such as the early April protest throughout
Guandong against a Paraxylene factory.
Millions hate these kind of repressive relationships in the MINTS and BRICS, exemplified by the
‘toxic collusion’ – so named by Marikana mineworker victims’ lawyer Dali Mpofu – uncovered in emails between Cyril Ramaphosa, other Lonmin bosses and South African politicians and massacre-ready police. But South Africa’s
diverse protests, probably numbering far more than the 12 399 (including 1882 violent ones) that minister
Nathi Methethwa counted last year alone, still fail to link up. Indeed, many have
xenophobic tendencies (like that of April 5th in Maake, Limpopo), pointing out how structures of power stay in place through divide-and-conquer.
That doesn’t mean they won’t come together, and if Occupy Nigeria could emerge from nowhere to win a dramatic victory against petrol price hikes in early 2012, then a higher GDP figure will not distract the masses with false pride. Likewise, many increasingly radicalised South Africans will continue the long, slow struggle to replace neoliberal nationalism with something more durable, and in doing so will have to reiterate to the society why it’s not appropriate to count the decline of natural resources as a positive contribution to GDP, while
the resource curses continue.