Go look throughout Asian history. They treat each like complete shyt. Besides ww1 and 2 Asia has had the biggest wars and death totals and it's not close
After reading this NYT article on the Nagasaki bombing, U.S. was truly pathetic
- Thread starter Da King
- Start date
Go look throughout Asian history. They treat each like complete shyt. Besides ww1 and 2 Asia has had the biggest wars and death totals and it's not close
Misanthrope
None of the above '16
Some thoughts.
1. As Japan had not quit the war by August 1945, even after the fire-bombing of Tokyo, what reason is there to assume that the Japanese would have surrendered unconditionally without the horror of the Atomic Bombs? Even after the nukes, there was an attempted military coup when Japan tried to accept the Potsdam Declaration's terms of surrender. A conditional surrender may not have removed the people around the Emperor who actually ran Japan into the ground, or the Kwantung Army. A "conditional" surrender, or a surrender with "status quo ante" may have left the Japanese free to keep shytting on Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria.
2. Japan was attempting in June/July to surrender under some terms, but they ignored neutral countries like Switzerland and the Vatican to try to negotiate with the Soviets [smh]. They ignored the Potsdam declaration to try to simp to the Soviets. The Soviets were purposely shytting on the effort in order to start their own invasion of Japan. They declared war on August 8, 1945, and could have been in Hokkaido by the end of the month.
3. The only 3 options to stop a Japan that ignored the Potsdam Declaration would have been to drop the nukes, stop shipping and starve them out until they quit, or to invade Japan. Starving them out would probably have been worse on the people of the entire country, but obviously better for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. American commanders thought that invading the home islands would have a massive death toll, based on the harsh fighting and massive death toll that occurred during the Okinawa campaign. The idea of "saving a million Americans" came from the casualty projections for Operation Coronet [Invasion of the Tokyo area] and Operation Olympic [Invasion of Kyushu]. The Army estimates were 1.2 million casualties [note, in the military a casualty is anyone rendered unable to fight], and 267,000 dead Americans, not to mention the amount of Japanese that would need to be killed. The Japanese supposedly had a million soldiers on Kyushu, waiting for an invasion.
In my opinion, we probably could have forced Japan to surrender without dropping the second bomb. But Japan probably would have hung on long enough to either force a stepped up invasion of Kyushu with probably more dead Japanese, and to let the USSR invade the Home Islands. If the USSR makes it into Japan, we would have been hard-pressed to make them back off and accept the terms of the Yalta conference. They probably would have fought for a divided Japan with a Soviet occupation zone.
Imagine Japan split in 2 like Korea or Germany, or having Tokyo partitioned. Both of those countries are still dealing with the effects of letting Russians separate their countries and install communism. As far as war crimes and such go, everyone important in this war did foul shyt. Everyone. Russia, Japan, America, Germany, even England.
1. As Japan had not quit the war by August 1945, even after the fire-bombing of Tokyo, what reason is there to assume that the Japanese would have surrendered unconditionally without the horror of the Atomic Bombs? Even after the nukes, there was an attempted military coup when Japan tried to accept the Potsdam Declaration's terms of surrender. A conditional surrender may not have removed the people around the Emperor who actually ran Japan into the ground, or the Kwantung Army. A "conditional" surrender, or a surrender with "status quo ante" may have left the Japanese free to keep shytting on Korea, Taiwan and Manchuria.
2. Japan was attempting in June/July to surrender under some terms, but they ignored neutral countries like Switzerland and the Vatican to try to negotiate with the Soviets [smh]. They ignored the Potsdam declaration to try to simp to the Soviets. The Soviets were purposely shytting on the effort in order to start their own invasion of Japan. They declared war on August 8, 1945, and could have been in Hokkaido by the end of the month.
3. The only 3 options to stop a Japan that ignored the Potsdam Declaration would have been to drop the nukes, stop shipping and starve them out until they quit, or to invade Japan. Starving them out would probably have been worse on the people of the entire country, but obviously better for Hiroshima and Nagasaki. American commanders thought that invading the home islands would have a massive death toll, based on the harsh fighting and massive death toll that occurred during the Okinawa campaign. The idea of "saving a million Americans" came from the casualty projections for Operation Coronet [Invasion of the Tokyo area] and Operation Olympic [Invasion of Kyushu]. The Army estimates were 1.2 million casualties [note, in the military a casualty is anyone rendered unable to fight], and 267,000 dead Americans, not to mention the amount of Japanese that would need to be killed. The Japanese supposedly had a million soldiers on Kyushu, waiting for an invasion.
In my opinion, we probably could have forced Japan to surrender without dropping the second bomb. But Japan probably would have hung on long enough to either force a stepped up invasion of Kyushu with probably more dead Japanese, and to let the USSR invade the Home Islands. If the USSR makes it into Japan, we would have been hard-pressed to make them back off and accept the terms of the Yalta conference. They probably would have fought for a divided Japan with a Soviet occupation zone.
Imagine Japan split in 2 like Korea or Germany, or having Tokyo partitioned. Both of those countries are still dealing with the effects of letting Russians separate their countries and install communism. As far as war crimes and such go, everyone important in this war did foul shyt. Everyone. Russia, Japan, America, Germany, even England.
Yup.
I'm gonna insert something new into this conversation. If you consider yourself a logical person, I suggest you consider it deeply before replying. And I'm speaking to all the following people:
lol at ya'll rewriting history. japan started a beef they couldn't handle. they got put in their place and haven't popped off since.
It's not all ya'all fault that you're all full of shyt. You weren't around then, and you clearly haven't read the statements of the knowledgeable people that were. But let's get a few things straight.
1. The bomb was NOT necessary for Japan to surrender. Japan had been trying to surrender for months.
2. An invasion was NOT necessary. An invasion was never, ever necessary. In fact, we could have invaded fewer islands, had fewer casualties, and ended the war months earlier if we hadn't fukked shyt up with the stupid fukking Potsdam declaration, which everyone who knew anything about Japan stated was a huge fukking mistake.
3. The bomb was NOT the reason Japan surrendered. Japan surrendered because Russia was about to invade and because in the end, America let them keep the emperor, the condition they'd been asking for all along.
4. This shyt is NOT revisionist. Please read the following:
"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender... My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children." - Fleet Admiral William Leahy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II
"When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor." - Norman Cousins, consultant to General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Southwest Pacific Area
"Obviously . . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor's decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war." - Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, in charge of psychological warfare on General MacArthur's staff
"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into war...The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan I felt that it was an unnecessary loss of civilian life...
We had them beaten. They hadn't enough food, they couldn't do anything." - Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz, Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces
"...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." - Dwight Eisenhower reflecting on the event 18 years later
"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent."
"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..." - Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
"[When he heard] 'the Potsdam declaration in July, demand that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary." - Biographer William Manchester describing the reaction of General Douglas MacArthur to the Potsdam declaration
"I am convinced that if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll have both wars over." - former president Herbert Hoover two months before the bomb was dropped
"...the Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945...up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ...if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs....The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul." - Herbert Hoover reflecting after the bomb was dropped
"...in the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision...If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer." - Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan and Under Secretary of State when the bomb was dropped
"I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs." - John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War when the bomb was dropped
"I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and, I think, the Swiss. And that suggestion of [giving] a warning [of the atomic bomb] was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted." He continued, "In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb. Thus, it wouldn't have been necessary for us to disclose our nuclear position and stimulate the Russians to develop the same thing much more rapidly than they would have if we had not dropped the bomb." - Ralph Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy when the bomb was dropped
"It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world..." - Lewis Strauss, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy when the bomb was dropped
The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment...It was a mistake to ever drop it...[the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it...It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before. - Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet
"I didn't like the atom bomb or any part of it." - Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations (King believed that a naval blockade would force Japan into surrender without any invasion or bombs ever being necessary.)
"The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air....
it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse." - Commanding General of U.S. Army Air Forces Henry H. "Hap" Arnold
"Arnold's view was that it [the dropping of the atomic bomb] was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military's job to question it." - Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, deputy to Hap Arnold
"The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all." - Major General Curtis E. LeMay, Commander of the Twenty-First Bomber Command
"if they knew or were told that no invasion would take place [and] that bombing would continue until the surrender, why I think the surrender would have taken place just about the same time." - General Carl Spaatz, in charge of U.S. Army Air Force Operations in the Pacific when the bomb was dropped
"Both men...felt Japan would surrender without use of the bomb, and neither knew why the second bomb was used." - former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman, describing the opinions of General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, Commander of the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force, and General Frederick L. Anderson, Deputy Commanding General at USASTAF
Russia's entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped. - General Claire Chennault, Army Air Forces Commander in China
"What prevented them from suing for peace or from bringing their plot into the open was their uncertainty on two scores. First, they wanted to know the meaning of unconditional surrender and the fate we planned for Japan after defeat. Second, they tried to obtain from us assurances that the Emperor could remain on the throne after surrender."
"The Potsdam Declaration, in short, wrecked everything we had been working for to prevent further bloodshed...
"Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia.
"Washington decided that Japan had been given its chance and now it was time to use the A-bomb.
"I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds." - Ellis Zacharias, Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence when the bomb was dropped
"[T]he poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia." - Colonel Charles "Tick" Bonesteel, Chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section
"we brought them [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs." - Brigadier General Carter Clarke, military intelligence officer in charge of preparing intercepted Japanese cables for Truman
"While I was working on the new plan of air attack... concluded that even without the atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a matter of months. My own view was that Japan would capitulate by November 1945." - Paul Nitze, Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Group
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." - Paul Nitze, reporting the Survey's conclusions. Nitze would later become U.S. Secretary of the Navy
"Careful scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts opened over the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why the Truman administration used atomic weapons against Japan.... The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it.... The hoary claim that the bomb prevented 500,000 American combat deaths is unsupportable." - J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, publishing in the academic journal Diplomatic History
“First, intelligence and other advice to President Truman, in significant part based on intercepted and secretly decoded Japanese cable traffic, indicated that from at least May 1945 on, Japan wished to end the war and seemed likely to do so if assurances were given that the emperor would not be eliminated. Second, similar advice to the president suggested that the shock of Soviet entry into the war (expected in early August) would likely tip the balance, almost certainly if combined with assurances conce rning the emperor. Third, Truman was advised by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Admiral Leahy, the acting Secretary of State Joseph E. Grew, and others to let Japan know that the emperor would not be eliminated; contrary to the claims of some historians, Truman made clear that he had no serious objection to offering such assurances.” - historians Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, writing in the Christian Science Monitor
"Prof. Albert Einstein... said that he was sure that President Roosevelt would have forbidden the atomic bombing of Hiroshima had he been alive and that it was probably carried out to end the Pacific war before Russia could participate." - Albert Einstein as quoted in the New York Times, 1946
Read that shyt. Military commanders across the table knew that Japan was READY TO SURRENDER and that the bombs WERE NOT NECESSARY. It was a political fukking decision made to test out the power of the bombs and intimidate Russia, and to ensure that we took control of Japan's surrender and not Russia.
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Japan wasn't ready. They kept p*ssy footing unlike the Germans who knew the gig was up.Yup.
I'm gonna insert something new into this conversation. If you consider yourself a logical person, I suggest you consider it deeply before replying. And I'm speaking to all the following people:
It's not all ya'all fault that you're all full of shyt. You weren't around then, and you clearly haven't read the statements of the knowledgeable people that were. But let's get a few things straight.
1. The bomb was NOT necessary for Japan to surrender. Japan had been trying to surrender for months.
2. An invasion was NOT necessary. An invasion was never, ever necessary. In fact, we could have invaded fewer islands, had fewer casualties, and ended the war months earlier if we hadn't fukked shyt up with the stupid fukking Potsdam declaration, which everyone who knew anything about Japan stated was a huge fukking mistake.
3. The bomb was NOT the reason Japan surrendered. Japan surrendered because Russia was about to invade and because in the end, America let them keep the emperor, the condition they'd been asking for all along.
4. This shyt is NOT revisionist. Please read the following:
"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender... My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children." - Fleet Admiral William Leahy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II
"When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor." - Norman Cousins, consultant to General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Southwest Pacific Area
"Obviously . . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor's decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war." - Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, in charge of psychological warfare on General MacArthur's staff
"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into war...The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan I felt that it was an unnecessary loss of civilian life...
We had them beaten. They hadn't enough food, they couldn't do anything." - Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz, Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces
"...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." - Dwight Eisenhower reflecting on the event 18 years later
"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent."
"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..." - Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
"[When he heard] 'the Potsdam declaration in July, demand that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary." - Biographer William Manchester describing the reaction of General Douglas MacArthur to the Potsdam declaration
"I am convinced that if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll have both wars over." - former president Herbert Hoover two months before the bomb was dropped
"...the Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945...up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ...if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs....The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul." - Herbert Hoover reflecting after the bomb was dropped
"...in the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision...If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer." - Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan and Under Secretary of State when the bomb was dropped
"I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs." - John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War when the bomb was dropped
"I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and, I think, the Swiss. And that suggestion of [giving] a warning [of the atomic bomb] was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted." He continued, "In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb. Thus, it wouldn't have been necessary for us to disclose our nuclear position and stimulate the Russians to develop the same thing much more rapidly than they would have if we had not dropped the bomb." - Ralph Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy when the bomb was dropped
"It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world..." - Lewis Strauss, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy when the bomb was dropped
The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment...It was a mistake to ever drop it...[the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it...It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before. - Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet
"I didn't like the atom bomb or any part of it." - Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations (King believed that a naval blockade would force Japan into surrender without any invasion or bombs ever being necessary.)
"The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air....
it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse." - Commanding General of U.S. Army Air Forces Henry H. "Hap" Arnold
"Arnold's view was that it [the dropping of the atomic bomb] was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military's job to question it." - Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, deputy to Hap Arnold
"The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all." - Major General Curtis E. LeMay, Commander of the Twenty-First Bomber Command
"if they knew or were told that no invasion would take place [and] that bombing would continue until the surrender, why I think the surrender would have taken place just about the same time." - General Carl Spaatz, in charge of U.S. Army Air Force Operations in the Pacific when the bomb was dropped
"Both men...felt Japan would surrender without use of the bomb, and neither knew why the second bomb was used." - former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman, describing the opinions of General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, Commander of the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force, and General Frederick L. Anderson, Deputy Commanding General at USASTAF
Russia's entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped. - General Claire Chennault, Army Air Forces Commander in China
"What prevented them from suing for peace or from bringing their plot into the open was their uncertainty on two scores. First, they wanted to know the meaning of unconditional surrender and the fate we planned for Japan after defeat. Second, they tried to obtain from us assurances that the Emperor could remain on the throne after surrender."
"The Potsdam Declaration, in short, wrecked everything we had been working for to prevent further bloodshed...
"Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia.
"Washington decided that Japan had been given its chance and now it was time to use the A-bomb.
"I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds." - Ellis Zacharias, Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence when the bomb was dropped
"[T]he poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia." - Colonel Charles "Tick" Bonesteel, Chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section
"we brought them [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs." - Brigadier General Carter Clarke, military intelligence officer in charge of preparing intercepted Japanese cables for Truman
"While I was working on the new plan of air attack... concluded that even without the atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a matter of months. My own view was that Japan would capitulate by November 1945." - Paul Nitze, Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Group
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." - Paul Nitze, reporting the Survey's conclusions. Nitze would later become U.S. Secretary of the Navy
"Careful scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts opened over the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why the Truman administration used atomic weapons against Japan.... The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it.... The hoary claim that the bomb prevented 500,000 American combat deaths is unsupportable." - J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, publishing in the academic journal Diplomatic History
“First, intelligence and other advice to President Truman, in significant part based on intercepted and secretly decoded Japanese cable traffic, indicated that from at least May 1945 on, Japan wished to end the war and seemed likely to do so if assurances were given that the emperor would not be eliminated. Second, similar advice to the president suggested that the shock of Soviet entry into the war (expected in early August) would likely tip the balance, almost certainly if combined with assurances conce rning the emperor. Third, Truman was advised by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Admiral Leahy, the acting Secretary of State Joseph E. Grew, and others to let Japan know that the emperor would not be eliminated; contrary to the claims of some historians, Truman made clear that he had no serious objection to offering such assurances.” - historians Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, writing in the Christian Science Monitor
"Prof. Albert Einstein... said that he was sure that President Roosevelt would have forbidden the atomic bombing of Hiroshima had he been alive and that it was probably carried out to end the Pacific war before Russia could participate." - Albert Einstein as quoted in the New York Times, 1946
Read that shyt. Military commanders across the table knew that Japan was READY TO SURRENDER and that the bombs WERE NOT NECESSARY. It was a political fukking decision made to test out the power of the bombs and intimidate Russia, and to ensure that we took control of Japan's surrender and not Russia.
Stop ignoring all of this shyt and reinterpreting it with 80 years of history in your corner.
You're a horrible fukking poster. But you don't have to be a horrible fukking person.
Read the quotes and admit you were wrong.
I'm not talking about stuff reinterpreted 80 years later. I just gave you quotes made AT THE TIME from all of the most important military leaders and a lot of state department and intelligence officials as well. Those are from 1945, motherfukker. Get a new argument.
You can claim I'm revisionist, but what are you going to say to
General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Southwest Pacific Area
General Carl Spaatz, in charge of U.S. Army Air Force Operations in the Pacific
General Frederick L. Anderson, Deputy Commanding General at USASTAF
General Claire Chennault, Army Air Forces Commander in China
Fleet Admiral William Leahy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations
Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz, Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces
Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet
Hap Arnold, Commanding General of U.S. Army Air Forces
Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, deputy to Hap Arnold
Major General Curtis E. LeMay, Commander of the Twenty-First Bomber Command
Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, in charge of psychological warfare on General MacArthur's staff
Ellis Zacharias, Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence
Colonel Charles "Tick" Bonesteel, Chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section
Brigadier General Carter Clarke, intelligence officer in charge of preparing intercepted Japanese cables for Truman
John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War
Ralph Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy
Lewis Strauss, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy
former president Herbert Hoover
Paul Nitze, Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Group and US Secretary of the Navy
J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Albert Einstein
They, unlike you and I, were there right when it happened. So what sort of bullshyt can you pedal in response to them?
ZEB WALTON
ayo! - BEZ
the bomb was also used to make russia fall the fukk back
So you're cool with 200,000 civilians in an already-defeated country being killed and tens of thousands more maimed and suffering for life, just so we can send a message to one of our own allies who happen to be the enemy of the very people we're unnecessarily killing?
That's the sort of horrific moral justification that war brings. Look at what you're willing to say.
Not like it even kept Russia from falling back in Korea or Vietnam though...we're talking about 5+ million deaths as a result of those two conflicts. The Russians pretty much immediately ran all over eastern Europe and East Asia the second the war was over, so a lot of good the "fall the fukk back" did.
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Broke Wave
The GOAT
Yeah, that worked bruh. They fell all the way the fukk back huh?
JahFocus CS
Get It How You Get It
Yup.
I'm gonna insert something new into this conversation. If you consider yourself a logical person, I suggest you consider it deeply before replying. And I'm speaking to all the following people:
It's not all ya'all fault that you're all full of shyt. You weren't around then, and you clearly haven't read the statements of the knowledgeable people that were. But let's get a few things straight.
1. The bomb was NOT necessary for Japan to surrender. Japan had been trying to surrender for months.
2. An invasion was NOT necessary. An invasion was never, ever necessary. In fact, we could have invaded fewer islands, had fewer casualties, and ended the war months earlier if we hadn't fukked shyt up with the stupid fukking Potsdam declaration, which everyone who knew anything about Japan stated was a huge fukking mistake.
3. The bomb was NOT the reason Japan surrendered. Japan surrendered because Russia was about to invade and because in the end, America let them keep the emperor, the condition they'd been asking for all along.
4. This shyt is NOT revisionist. Please read the following:
"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender... My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children." - Fleet Admiral William Leahy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II
"When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor." - Norman Cousins, consultant to General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Southwest Pacific Area
"Obviously . . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor's decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war." - Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, in charge of psychological warfare on General MacArthur's staff
"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into war...The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan I felt that it was an unnecessary loss of civilian life...
We had them beaten. They hadn't enough food, they couldn't do anything." - Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz, Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces
"...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." - Dwight Eisenhower reflecting on the event 18 years later
"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent."
"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..." - Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
"[When he heard] 'the Potsdam declaration in July, demand that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary." - Biographer William Manchester describing the reaction of General Douglas MacArthur to the Potsdam declaration
"I am convinced that if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll have both wars over." - former president Herbert Hoover two months before the bomb was dropped
"...the Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945...up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ...if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs....The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul." - Herbert Hoover reflecting after the bomb was dropped
"...in the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision...If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer." - Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan and Under Secretary of State when the bomb was dropped
"I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs." - John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War when the bomb was dropped
"I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and, I think, the Swiss. And that suggestion of [giving] a warning [of the atomic bomb] was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted." He continued, "In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb. Thus, it wouldn't have been necessary for us to disclose our nuclear position and stimulate the Russians to develop the same thing much more rapidly than they would have if we had not dropped the bomb." - Ralph Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy when the bomb was dropped
"It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world..." - Lewis Strauss, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy when the bomb was dropped
The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment...It was a mistake to ever drop it...[the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it...It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before. - Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet
"I didn't like the atom bomb or any part of it." - Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations (King believed that a naval blockade would force Japan into surrender without any invasion or bombs ever being necessary.)
"The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air....
it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse." - Commanding General of U.S. Army Air Forces Henry H. "Hap" Arnold
"Arnold's view was that it [the dropping of the atomic bomb] was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military's job to question it." - Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, deputy to Hap Arnold
"The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all." - Major General Curtis E. LeMay, Commander of the Twenty-First Bomber Command
"if they knew or were told that no invasion would take place [and] that bombing would continue until the surrender, why I think the surrender would have taken place just about the same time." - General Carl Spaatz, in charge of U.S. Army Air Force Operations in the Pacific when the bomb was dropped
"Both men...felt Japan would surrender without use of the bomb, and neither knew why the second bomb was used." - former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman, describing the opinions of General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, Commander of the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force, and General Frederick L. Anderson, Deputy Commanding General at USASTAF
Russia's entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped. - General Claire Chennault, Army Air Forces Commander in China
"What prevented them from suing for peace or from bringing their plot into the open was their uncertainty on two scores. First, they wanted to know the meaning of unconditional surrender and the fate we planned for Japan after defeat. Second, they tried to obtain from us assurances that the Emperor could remain on the throne after surrender."
"The Potsdam Declaration, in short, wrecked everything we had been working for to prevent further bloodshed...
"Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia.
"Washington decided that Japan had been given its chance and now it was time to use the A-bomb.
"I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds." - Ellis Zacharias, Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence when the bomb was dropped
"[T]he poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia." - Colonel Charles "Tick" Bonesteel, Chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section
"we brought them [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs." - Brigadier General Carter Clarke, military intelligence officer in charge of preparing intercepted Japanese cables for Truman
"While I was working on the new plan of air attack... concluded that even without the atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a matter of months. My own view was that Japan would capitulate by November 1945." - Paul Nitze, Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Group
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." - Paul Nitze, reporting the Survey's conclusions. Nitze would later become U.S. Secretary of the Navy
"Careful scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts opened over the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why the Truman administration used atomic weapons against Japan.... The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it.... The hoary claim that the bomb prevented 500,000 American combat deaths is unsupportable." - J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, publishing in the academic journal Diplomatic History
“First, intelligence and other advice to President Truman, in significant part based on intercepted and secretly decoded Japanese cable traffic, indicated that from at least May 1945 on, Japan wished to end the war and seemed likely to do so if assurances were given that the emperor would not be eliminated. Second, similar advice to the president suggested that the shock of Soviet entry into the war (expected in early August) would likely tip the balance, almost certainly if combined with assurances conce rning the emperor. Third, Truman was advised by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Admiral Leahy, the acting Secretary of State Joseph E. Grew, and others to let Japan know that the emperor would not be eliminated; contrary to the claims of some historians, Truman made clear that he had no serious objection to offering such assurances.” - historians Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, writing in the Christian Science Monitor
"Prof. Albert Einstein... said that he was sure that President Roosevelt would have forbidden the atomic bombing of Hiroshima had he been alive and that it was probably carried out to end the Pacific war before Russia could participate." - Albert Einstein as quoted in the New York Times, 1946
Read that shyt. Military commanders across the table knew that Japan was READY TO SURRENDER and that the bombs WERE NOT NECESSARY. It was a political fukking decision made to test out the power of the bombs and intimidate Russia, and to ensure that we took control of Japan's surrender and not Russia.
Dropping the ETHER!
#factsdoe
ZEB WALTON
ayo! - BEZ
chill out bro. i didnt OK it for that alone. if youre going to pretend the bomb didnt save american lives then go on and think that.
edit: read below. they funded communism but they didnt ahve the balls to drop a bomb like we did did they? We did the same things they did.
the cold war never turned intoa war thougn did it? Russia who tried to bully everyone only took it to countries in tehir vicinity and poor asian countries noone gave a fukk about.
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ZEB WALTON
ayo! - BEZ
Russia never did attack us did they.Yeah, that worked bruh. They fell all the way the fukk back huh?
That bomb scared them so much they literally spent themselves into collapse trying to keep up with us. So yea... shyt worked perfectly in the end. Russia never dared come into a war with us and the USSR collapsed because they literally spent their entire budget on weapons they didnt even use against the enemy they bought them for.
yall too thick headed for this politics shyt
Broke Wave
The GOAT
They collapses because they spent their entire budget on weapons... Did you research this stuff or is this something you heard? No disrespect, I am just curious because that is actually totally untrue... The Russians never planned to attack America.. Not once. Look at CIA reports in the 60s when the Russians were at their strongest... The CIA said that the Russians had no interest in conflict with the U.S.
Read the quotes. It wasn't just me who doesn't think the bomb saved American lives, it was General Eisenhour, General MacArthur, and pretty much everyone who mattered through the whole structure except the politicians who did it. And even then, former president Hoover AND former president Roosevelt never would have done that.
Wait a second....you're talking about being scared of "Russia invading the USA" scenarios, and you're calling me too thick-headed for politics?
When has Russia EVER threatened to invade the USA? When has Russia EVER had the capacity to bring their troops across the ocean and invade a nation whose territory they could never, ever, ever have the slightest chance of controlling? When had Russia EVER tried to bully anyone other than the countries in their vicinity?
Think about why Russia signed that deal with Germany and Japan in the first place. They never wanted control of the whole world, and they knew they could never get it. They wanted total power over everything within their own sphere of influence. And by bombing Germany and Japan into the ground, we fed right into their hands and gave them MORE power than they had ever had, not less.
Keep on talking like us killing 200,000 people in Japan is the reason why the Soviet Union collapsed 46 years later.
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This ass clown
Did you even read what you quoted or where it came from?
These are all POST-HOC DISCUSSIONS
You can't tell me shyt about everyone looking back on monday morning hating themselves for the weekend.
Of course none of them are particularly still in love with the idea
But all of these "minds" you quote were gung-ho for it when it came time to drop the bomb, so all of this goalpost moving just shows how much of a fraud you want to be when it comes to representing the mentality of people who had to make that decision
THEY
WERE
NOT
DEFEATED
They were STILL pushing hard on China. They were STILL pushing hard in Manchuria.
They were STILL fighting for islands in the pacific
They were STILL trying to negotiate terms
They were STILL having internal conflicts about how to admit defeat
Japan was not this cuddly little rabbit like you're making them out to be.
The deal was unconditional surrender....and they chose not to abide by that. Even still, they didn't admit defeat after the first one.