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The Official Chinese 🇨🇳 Espionage & Cold War Thread
What Are Uyghurs Doing in Syria?
They helped overthrow Assad, but potential terrorist ties complicate the community's future in the country.
foreignpolicy.com
Uyghur Fighters in Syria and the Future of the Turkistan Islamic Part…
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Umar FarooqApril 4, 2025, 6:00 AM
Masked fighters in camouflage stand in lines holding guns.
Masked fighters in camouflage stand in lines holding guns.
An image released by the Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria shows fighters in formation in Idlib on Sept. 28, 2024. Turkistan Islamic Party in Syria/muhsinlar.net
DAMASCUS—On a recent Friday afternoon at the Umayyad Mosque in Syria’s capital, Uyghur fighters joined thousands of other worshippers for weekly prayers as just another group of rebels in uniform. Since the fall of dictator Bashar al-Assad, Uyghurs have become increasingly visible around Damascus, but their future in the country is tenuous and could prove an obstacle for a new government in Syria seeking to assure global powers that it can keep foreign fighters from threatening those beyond its borders.
Over the last decade or so, thousands of Uyghurs made their way to Syria from China via Turkey. Today, Uyghur leaders in Syria say their community numbers around 15,000, including 5,000 fighters. Most live in the rebel-held city of Idlib or in enclaves near the city of Jisr al-Shughur. The “Turkistanis,” as many Syrians refer to them, have opened schools and operate gas stations and restaurants. At neighborhood bakeries, they churn out traditional round, thick flatbreads, which some of their Syrian neighbors have developed a taste for as well. The vast majority do not have passports, but like others in the rebel-held areas, they have ID cards, and hundreds are enrolled in Idlib University, where the interim government has announced they, like local Syrians, can attend tuition-free.
The interim Syrian government has included them in its official military structure as well, a nod to the role their fighters played in toppling Assad—a war that Uyghur leaders say cost around 1,100 Uyghur lives. In January, hundreds of military commanders dressed in uniform assembled to hear Syrian leader Ahmed al-Sharaa give his first speech since toppling Assad, and among them was Abdulaziz Davud Hudaberdi, an ethnic Uyghur from a village near Aksu in China. Hudaberdi came to Syria in 2012 and leads the local branch of the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP), a group that most of the Syrian Uyghurs belong to. As the head of the rebels’ 133rd Division, he was instrumental in helping to end the Assad regime and was rewarded with a position as a brigadier general in the Syrian army, along with two other Uyghurs who were appointed colonels. There are about half a dozen foreign fighters who have been given such ranks in the new Syria.
The TIP’s presence in Syria could prove consequential for the future of the country as it looks to have international sanctions against it lifted. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which led the charge against Assad and has since been dissolved and folded into the new government, is listed as a terrorist organization by the United Nations. China has indicated the presence of groups such as the TIP continue to dissuade it from supporting any change in that designation.
Beijing’s views on the TIP, though, run up against concerns about how it treats the Uyghur minority at home, sparked by reports of mass incarceration and allegations of a state-led effort to erase the ethnic group’s religious and cultural distinctiveness. China’s policy in Xinjiang—or East Turkistan, as some Uyghurs refer to it—has garnered the ethnic minority sympathy among Western governments and emboldened some in the Uyghur diaspora to openly call for independence from Beijing, even if that means fighting for it. For the Uyghur diaspora globally, the TIP is the first successful fighting force their cause has had.
“We are proud of them,” said Rukiye Turdush, a Uyghur Canadian academic and former head of the East Turkistanian Federation of Canada. She said the scenes of Syrian prisoners being freed from captivity gave her hope that Uyghurs, kept in prisons and so-called reeducation camps in China by some estimates in the hundreds of thousands, would one day be free as well. “Some people said when they opened the doors of Assad’s prisons, they cried a lot because they felt like they were opening Chinese prisons,” Turdush said.
Like many of the Uyghurs who ended up in Syria, Hudaberdi spent years looking for a place to settle outside China. The 48-year-old was in and out of prison in China through the late 1990s and 2000s. In 2010, he obtained a fake passport and made his way to Malaysia. From there, Hudaberdi traveled to Iran and then Afghanistan, where he linked up with fledgling Uyghur militant groups that struggled to maintain a presence amid U.S. drone strikes in Afghanistan and Pakistani military operations across the border in Waziristan.
Uyghur immigrants who traveled to Afghanistan in the 1990s were given permission to settle there by the Taliban. By 1998, one Uyghur leader there, Hasan Mahsum, had established training camps and launched the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM). After 2001, China successfully lobbied to have ETIM listed as a terrorist organization by the United States, and the group’s leadership fled to Pakistan’s Waziristan area, where they developed closer ties to al Qaeda. Mahsum was killed in a Pakistani military raid on an al Qaeda base in 2003. His successor, Abdul Haq al-Turkistani, was appointed to al Qaeda’s leadership council in 2005 and managed to survive U.S. drone strikes over the years, but the group was diminished in numbers to the point that the United States delisted it as a terrorist organization in 2020, saying that “there has been no credible evidence that ETIM continues to exist.” Beijing insists the TIP is just the ETIM operating under a different name and that it continues to be affiliated with al Qaeda, attributing a string of incidents in China—from assassinations of pro-government imams to knife attacks—to the group, as well as the 2016 suicide bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan.
Sean Roberts, a professor at George Washington University who studies Uyghur populations, says none of these attacks are “clearly attributed” to either the TIP or ETIM. The TIP spokesperson in Syria affirmed that the group was not responsible for these attacks. The spokesperson added that the TIP has no aspirations to launch international terrorist campaigns, as these are counterproductive to the group’s long-term mission to garner global political support, and that it no longer has ties to al Qaeda.
When Hudaberdi moved to Syria in 2012, it was at a time when a stream of Uyghur migrants were making their way there. By some estimates, thousands of young men crossed into rebel-held Syria, chiefly through neighboring Turkey. This was part of a movement that was encouraged in part by the tacit approval of the Turkish government, said Roberts, who conducted extensive interviews with the migrants. In so doing, Turkey was trying to walk a fine line: It already hosted millions of Syrian refugees, but President Recep Tayyip Erdogan also sought to maintain public support for the Uyghur cause to keep nationalists onside.
“A lot of the people who ended up [in Syria] were people who basically had left China to go to Turkey,” Roberts said. “It seems some people within Turkey, potentially some of them with Turkish government approval, suggested they go down to Syria, that there you have to work with this group, you’ll get training with the military, you’ll be able to someday go back and fight for your homeland, and your families will be taken care of.”
The TIP in Syria says its members were drawn to the country looking for a place to settle but that many joined the fight against Assad because it reminded them of tactics deployed against them in China: large-scale spying, indefinite imprisonment, and discrimination based on ethnic and religious beliefs. “The Uyghurs saw parallels between the oppressive regime of Bashar al-Assad and that of the Chinese Communist Party,” the TIP spokesperson said, “and as a result, they joined the fight alongside Syrians.”
In the ensuing years, TIP fighters went on to take part in rebel campaigns in Jisr al-Shughur, Aleppo, Idlib, and Latakia. Hudaberdi lost family members to regime airstrikes, including his wife and two sons. In 2021, he graduated from HTS’s military academy in Idlib, and in late 2024, he led fighters participating in the blitz that saw the rebels eventually reach Damascus.
The chance of the TIP still having links to global jihadi groups has kept some Uyghur diaspora leaders from expressing support for it, Roberts said. Many Uyghur diaspora groups in the West “have shied away from saying the group even exists, claiming [the TIP] is a conspiracy by China to discredit them globally.” Meanwhile, others take the position that “we should be proud to have overthrown Assad, who is a horrible dictator, and this shows if we ever did have a state, we could have a military.”
One such group is the International Union of East Turkistan Organizations, which has been active for nearly two decades in Turkey. The largely conservative umbrella organization is led by Hidayet Oguzhan, an ethnic Uyghur from Kashgar who studied in Pakistan and later settled in Turkey. “The Syrians overthrowing the dictator and murderous Assad regime and taking over the government has been an incredibly great glimmer of hope for us, the people of East Turkistan,” Ogyzhan said in a statement posted on social media.
The future of the TIP in Syria will depend on what kinds of concessions the new government is forced to make to outside powers. Technically, Hudaberdi and the thousands of Uyghur fighters who make up the TIP are now part of the Syrian military. But they still do not have Syrian citizenship. Sharaa, for his part, has said foreign fighters were an integral part of the rebel victory and has mused that providing them with citizenship was something worth looking at. His government has also attempted to assure others that it no longer has global jihadi ambitions.
And while HTS made far more headway than the Taliban have since taking power in Afghanistan, there may be important lessons from that conflict for Syria, said Iftikhar Firdous, the editor of the Khorasan Diary, which monitors jihadi activity in the region. “The HTS takeover of Syria is the second case of a jihadist militant group that has taken control of a full country in this century,” Firdous said. He questioned whether the TIP’s members have been organically integrated into Syria or simply incorporated on paper to assuage global concerns about their presence. In Afghanistan, the Taliban have paid foreign fighters to put aside their global jihadi aspirations, while in Syria, HTS took an equally top-down approach, including the TIP in its military chain of command.
For China, a militant Uyghur presence in neighboring Afghanistan was a bigger threat than one in Syria. That is partly why Beijing has been keen to court the Taliban
The Dragon in the PX: How the Chinese Communist Party Set Up Shop on U.S. Military Bases
Who knew the fastest way for the Chinese Communist Party to infiltrate U.S. military bases wasn’t through spies or satellites—but by hawking protein powder and fish oil at the local GNC?
sofrep.com
China building world's biggest military base in prep for US war - Asia Times
PLA is reportedly building a new command center in southwest Beijing with a size at least 10 times bigger than that of the Pentagon in the US
asiatimes.com
China builds huge wartime military command centre in Beijing
Complex will be bigger than Pentagon and include bombproof bunkers for leaders, say US officials
www.ft.com
China builds huge wartime military command centre in Beijing
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Complex will be bigger than Pentagon and include bombproof bunkers for leaders, say US officials
China’s military is building a massive complex in western Beijing that US intelligence believes will serve as a wartime command centre far larger than the Pentagon, according to current and former American officials.
Satellite images obtained by the Financial Times that are being examined by US intelligence show a roughly 1,500-acre construction site 30km south-west of Beijing with deep holes that military experts assess will house large, hardened bunkers to protect Chinese military leaders during any conflict — including potentially a nuclear war.
Several current and former US officials said the intelligence community was closely monitoring the site, which would be the world’s largest military command centre — and at least 10 times the size of the Pentagon.
Based on an assessment of satellite images obtained by the FT, major construction started in mid-2024. Three people familiar with the situation said some intelligence analysts had dubbed the project “Beijing Military City”.
The construction comes as the People’s Liberation Army develops new weapons and projects ahead of the force’s centenary in 2027. US intelligence said President Xi Jinping had also ordered the PLA to have developed the capability to attack Taiwan by then.
The PLA is also rapidly expanding its nuclear weapons arsenal and working to better integrate its different branches. Military experts believe the PLA’s lack of integration is among its biggest weaknesses compared with the US armed forces.
“If confirmed, this new advanced underground command bunker for the military leadership, including President Xi as the chairman of the Central Military Commission, signals Beijing’s intent to build not only a world-class conventional force but also an advanced nuclear warfighting capability,” said Dennis Wilder, the former head of China analysis for the CIA.
The Director of National Intelligence, which oversees the US intelligence community, did not comment on the project. The Chinese embassy in Washington said it was “not aware of the details” but stressed that China was “committed to the path of peaceful development and a defence policy that is defensive in nature”.
Renny Babiarz, a former imagery analyst at the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency who has analysed imagery of the area, said there were at least 100 cranes working over a 5 sq km area developing underground infrastructure.
“Imagery analysis suggests the construction of several possible underground facilities linked via possible underground passageways, although additional data and information is needed to more fully assess this construction,” said Babiarz, now vice-president of analysis and operations at AllSource Analysis, a geospatial analysis service group.
The site was busy with construction activity earlier this month, in contrast to a dearth of development in most big real estate projects in China, which has been gripped by a property sector crisis. There were no showrooms typically associated with a commercial real estate project. Unusually for a commercial project, there are no official mentions of the construction site on the internet in Chinese.
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While there was no visible military presence at the site, there were signs warning against flying drones or taking photographs. Guards at one gate abruptly said that entry was prohibited and refused to talk about the project. One supervisor leaving the construction site refused to comment on the project.
Access to the back of the project has been blocked by a checkpoint. A guard said the public could not access popular hiking and tourist areas near the site, which a local shopkeeper described as a “military area”.
One former senior US intelligence official said that while the PLA’s current headquarters in central Beijing was fairly new it was not designed to be a secure combat command centre.
“China’s main secure command centre is in the Western Hills, north-east of the new facility, and was built decades ago at the height of the cold war,” said the former official. “The size, scale and partially buried characteristics of the new facility suggest it will replace the Western Hills complex as the primary wartime command facility.
“Chinese leaders may judge that the new facility will enable greater security against US ‘bunker buster’ munitions, and even against nuclear weapons,” the former intelligence official added. “It can also incorporate more advanced and secure communications and have room for expanding PLA capabilities and missions.”
One China researcher familiar with the images said the site had “all the hallmarks of a sensitive military facility”, including heavily reinforced concrete and deep underground tunnelling.
“Nearly 10 times bigger than the Pentagon, it’s fitting for Xi Jinping’s ambitions to surpass the US,” said the researcher. “This fortress only serves one purpose, which is to act as a doomsday bunker for China’s increasingly sophisticated and capable military.”
The construction of the site comes amid a multi-year redevelopment of Beijing’s western outskirts. But there has been speculation online in China about why houses in the Qinglonghu area were being razed.
In one post on Baidu Zhidao, the Chinese search engine’s equivalent of Quora, one user said: “Are they going to build the Chinese Pentagon in Qinglonghu?”
Two people close to Taiwan’s defence ministry also said the PLA appeared to be building a new command centre, though some experts questioned if the area was suitable for underground bunkers.
“The land area is much larger than a normal military camp and military school, so it can only be assumed that it is a site for an administrative organisation or a large training base,” said Hsu Yen-chi, a researcher at the Council on Strategic and Wargaming Studies think-tank in Taipei.
In Secret Meeting, China Acknowledged Role in U.S. Infrastructure Hacks
A senior Chinese official linked intrusions to escalating U.S. support for Taiwan
Dustin VolzApril 10, 2025 at 1:54 pm
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China building in Beijing.
WASHINGTON—Chinese officials acknowledged in a secret December meeting that Beijing was behind a widespread series of alarming cyberattacks on U.S. infrastructure, according to people familiar with the matter, underscoring how hostilities between the two superpowers are continuing to escalate.
The first-of-its-kind signal at a Geneva summit with the outgoing Biden administration startled American officials used to hearing their Chinese counterparts blame the campaign, which security researchers have dubbed Volt Typhoon, on a criminal outfit, or accuse the U.S. of having an overactive imagination.
U.S. officials went public last year with unusually dire warnings about the uncovered Volt Typhoon effort. They publicly attributed it to Beijing trying to get a foothold in U.S. computer networks so its army could quickly detonate damaging cyberattacks during a future conflict.
The Chinese official’s remarks at the December meeting were indirect and somewhat ambiguous, but most of the American delegation in the room interpreted it as a tacit admission and a warning to the U.S. about Taiwan, a former U.S. official familiar with the meeting said.
A Taiwan Air Force fighter jet landing in Hsinchu, Taiwan.
A Taiwan Air Force fighter jet landing in Hsinchu, Taiwan. Photo: ritchie b tongo/Shutterstock
In the months since the meeting, relations between Washington and Beijing have sunk to new lows, locked in a historic trade war. Top Trump administration officials have said the Pentagon will pursue more offensive cyber strikes against China. Beijing has continued to mine its extraordinary access to U.S. telecommunications networks enabled by a separate breach, attributed to Salt Typhoon, U.S. officials and lawmakers say.
The administration also plans to dismiss hundreds of cybersecurity workers in sweeping job cuts and last week fired the director of the National Security Agency and his deputy, fanning concerns from some intelligence officials and lawmakers that the government would be weakened in defending against the attacks.
Officials say Chinese hackers’ targeting of civilian infrastructure in recent years presents among the most troubling security threats facing the Trump administration.
In a statement, the State Department didn’t comment on the meeting but said the U.S. had made clear to Beijing it will “take actions in response to Chinese malicious cyber activity,” describing the hacking as “some of the gravest and most persistent threats to U.S. national security.” The Trump White House National Security Council declined to comment.
The Chinese embassy in Washington didn’t respond to specific questions about the meeting, but accused the U.S. of “using cybersecurity to smear and slander China” and spreading disinformation about “so-called hacking threats.”
During the half-day meeting in Geneva, Wang Lei, a top cyber official with China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, indicated that the infrastructure hacks resulted from the U.S.’s military backing of Taiwan, an island Beijing claims as its own, according to current and former U.S. officials familiar with the conversation.
Wang or the other Chinese officials didn’t directly state that China was responsible for the hacking, the U.S. officials said. But American officials present and others later briefed on the meeting perceived the comments as confirmation of Beijing’s role and was intended to scare the U.S. from involving itself if a conflict erupts in the Taiwan Strait.
About a dozen representatives from both countries, including senior officials from the State Department, the National Security Council, the Pentagon and U.S. intelligence agencies, attended the high-level meeting, which hasn’t been previously reported. It was led by Nate Fick, then the ambassador-at-large for cyberspace and digital policy in the Biden administration, officials said.
In Geneva, Wang’s comments came after the U.S. stressed that China didn’t appear to understand how dangerous prepositioning in civilian critical infrastructure was, and how much the U.S. would view it as an act of war, the former U.S. official said. Additionally, the Biden administration wanted to convey doubts that China’s political and military leadership, including President Xi Jinping, were fully aware of the activities of the hackers, the official said.
Both the Biden White House and the Trump transition team were briefed about the meeting and provided detailed summaries afterward, the people said.
China’s Salt Typhoon cyber operations into U.S. telecom networks included those belonging to AT&T.
China’s Salt Typhoon cyber operations into U.S. telecom networks included those belonging to AT&T. Photo: Gabby Jones/Bloomberg News
The Geneva summit occurred amid a cascade of revelations about the extent of China’s far-reaching and unusually aggressive Salt Typhoon cyber operations into U.S. telecommunications networks, including those belonging to AT&T and Verizon. That campaign allowed hackers working for China’s Ministry of State Security to spy on the unencrypted calls and texts of scores of top government officials and political figures, including those within the presidential campaigns of Donald Trump and Kamala Harris.
While that issue was also raised during the meeting in Geneva, it was largely tabled to focus on the separate hacking into civilian critical infrastructure by Volt Typhoon because it is considered an unacceptable provocation, the officials said. The telecom intrusions, while considered a historic counterintelligence failure, are viewed as more akin to traditional cyber espionage that the U.S. also conducts against adversaries.
A Chinese official would likely only acknowledge the intrusions even in a private setting if instructed to do so by the top levels of Xi’s government, said Dakota Cary, a China expert at the cybersecurity firm SentinelOne. The tacit admission is significant, he said, because it may reflect a view in Beijing that the likeliest military conflict with the U.S. would be over Taiwan and that a more direct signal about the stakes of involvement needed to be sent to the Trump administration.
“China wants U.S. officials to know that, yes, they do have this capability, and they are willing to use it,” Cary said.
Write to Dustin Volz at dustin.volz@wsj.com