The Contrarian/Anti-Woke left continue trend of Anti-Democrat/Black & Dirtbag Leftist grift
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Piff Huxtable
Delaney 2020,2024,2028...
10 posts, 30 Tweets, 80 Tags, Zero Daps
that's Nap Autist Callcenter at its peak
that's Nap Autist Callcenter at its peak
David Feldman on Majority Report was mocking this kid so good on Friday @storyteller
Sameera and Jackson are the latest lefty grifters turning full Trumpist
Satsui no Hadou
CHICANO 🇲🇽 🇺🇸
This patsoc bullshyt is so fukking insane to me. I’ve been into leftist politics for about fifteen years, so all this spin on Twitter is so repugnant to me. How far does your head have to be firmly planted up your ass to ever suggest communism and maga together is logically consistent?
You were fans of them both Jackson and sameera because you’re a contrarian leftist too. That’s why you were on Bernie’s nuts as well.
This keeps happening to you
Satsui no Hadou
CHICANO 🇲🇽 🇺🇸
On second thought, this just might be a coordinated attempt at co-opting socialist rhetoric for fascist ends. That is what they do. It is no coincidence that shortly after appearing on tucker Carlson, #magacommunism was trending on Twitter. I really do believe that this is just a bit more of the dark money being funneled to various “opposition” groups to carry out the leg work.
I been telling yall about Ruy Teixeira
www.wsj.com
Ruy Teixeira on the Democratic Majority That Never Emerged - WSJ
James TarantoAug. 26, 2022 5:18 pm ET
The new era is one of narrow and frequently shifting majorities. Partisans in the 1990s and 2000s saw the promise of a permanent realignment under a succession of young leaders—Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, George W. Bush, Barack Obama—and in 2016 Donald Trump was supposed to doom the GOP. But none of those expectations panned out. Joe Biden is the fifth consecutive president whose immediate predecessor was from the other party, and it will be a surprise if he doesn’t become the fifth incumbent in a row to see his party lose its House majority in a midterm election. If Republicans take the Senate, it will be the seventh time in 30 years that chamber’s majority has flipped.
The brightest of those false dawns was surely the one that shined on Democrats as Mr. Bush’s presidency waned. In the 2006 midterms they administered what he called a “thumping.” Two years later they expanded their congressional majorities as Mr. Obama won election with nearly 53% of the nationwide popular vote, still the largest majority in any presidential election since 1988.
Ruy Teixeira saw that victory coming. In August 2002 he and John Judis argued in “The Emerging Democratic Majority” that a variety of trends were converging in their party’s favor. Mr. Clinton had led a move to the center that broadened the Democrats’ appeal. Educated professionals, traditionally a Republican constituency, were becoming more liberal on social issues and voting accordingly. Racial and ethnic minorities, most notably Hispanics, already favored the Democrats and were growing rapidly as a share of the electorate.
All these premises were true, and the conclusion was plausible, maybe even compelling. Messrs. Teixeira and Judis expected the GOP to do well in the wartime midterms of 2002, as it did, but the book affirmed their confidence that “when the fear of terror recedes, and when Americans begin to focus again on job, home, and the pursuit of happiness, the country will once again become fertile ground for the Democrats’ progressive centrism and postindustrial values.”
By 2008 the Democratic majority appeared to have emerged. If history had ended in 2009, Messrs. Judis and Teixeira would have been prophets. But in 2010 Mr. Obama and his party suffered their own thumping, which the president called a “shellacking.” Six years later, Hillary Clinton couldn’t even beat Mr. Trump, and the GOP took the White House and held Congress. Democrats became the majority party again in 2018 and 2020, but nobody thinks that status is permanent.
What went wrong? Mr. Teixeira, 70—his Portuguese surname is pronounced teh-SHARE-uh—addresses the question in a two-hour Zoom interview from his home in Silver Spring, Md. The most glaring problem can be summed up in a four-word phrase that gained currency during the Obama years: “coalition of the ascendant.” In an article published three days after the 2008 election, progressive journalist Ronald Brownstein defined that coalition as consisting of “growing elements of American society: young people, Hispanics and other minorities, and white upper-middle-class professionals.”
That sounds a lot like the emerging Democratic majority, but something was missing. Mr. Teixeira notes that he and Mr. Judis had argued the Democrats “had to retain the loyalties and the voting support of a very significant sector of the white working class.” Instead, that support “cratered” in 2010 and again in 2016. It recovered some in 2012 and 2020, but the long-term trend is unpromising.
Democrats not only neglected white working-class voters but grew overtly hostile toward them. The term “ascendant” implied a moral judgment—a “Manichaean view of the political universe where all the good was on one side,” as Mr. Teixeira puts it. The prevailing view of the other side? “ ‘Well, look, they voted for Donald Trump. Donald Trump!’ Nobody could understand this,” he says. Instead of trying to make sense of it and win them over, “it was just like, ‘Well, this is a coalition of the descendant. These are the reactionaries, the racists, the xenophobes,’ ” or, as Mrs. Clinton memorably put it, the “basket of deplorables.”
On Wednesday Rep. Charlie Crist, the Democratic challenger to Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, outdid Mrs. Clinton by issuing a televised public appeal for rejection: “Those who support the governor should stay with him and vote for him, and I don’t want your vote. If you have that hate in your heart, keep it there. I want the vote of the people of Florida who care about our state—good Democrats, good independents, good Republicans.”
Mr. Teixeira is a man of the left. He describes his own political philosophy as “social democracy.” Yet last month he quit the Center for American Progress, where he had been a senior fellow for years, and joined the American Enterprise Institute, an eclectic center-right think tank. He says progressives anathematize not only Trump supporters but those who seek to understand them: “It was kind of like, ‘Ho ho, you say those Trump voters have real problems. Well, here’s the reality of it: They really just basically hate black and brown people and immigrants.’ ”
The left’s oversimplification is what’s laughable, especially when you consider two points: First, Mr. Obama was elected twice, which means that millions of citizens supported Mr. Trump after casting a ballot or two for a black president. Second, not all Trump supporters were white. In fact, according to exit polls, Mr. Trump’s shares of the nationwide black, Hispanic and Asian vote in 2016 were 2, 2 and 3 points greater, respectively, than Mitt Romney’s in 2012. Even as he lost in 2020, Mr. Trump improved on his own performance among these segments by 4, 3 and 5 points, respectively.
To be sure, Democrats still dominate the minority vote. The same exit polls found Mr. Biden received the votes of 87% of blacks, 65% of Hispanics and 61% of Asians (and only 41% of non-Hispanic whites). But the bottom line in an election is the vote total, not the breakdown. If the partisan gap among minority voters continues to narrow, that could offset the effect of demographic growth even if these segments of the electorate continue to favor Democrats.
The enormous racial and ethnic disparities in partisan preference can also mask similarities in behavior. Working-class voters of all races are becoming less Democratic. “If you look at the nonwhite working class—black, Hispanic, Asian, but particularly driven by Hispanics—Democrats have lost 19 margin points between 2012 and 2020, while they’ve gained 16 margin points among white college-educated voters,” Mr. Teixeira says.
Racial and ethnic appeals also raise delicate questions of substance and tone. An obvious example is racial preferences in college admissions, which confer an advantage on blacks and Hispanics at the expense of whites and more recently Asians. It takes political deftness to advance such policies without alienating those voters who bear their costs.
In Mr. Teixeira’s view, Democrats in the Obama years “had a better idea about how to appeal to so-called people of color. First, they didn’t call them ‘people of color.’ It was more like, ‘We’re all in this together. We’re Americans—black, white, whatever, red states, blue states. We want to have an America where everybody can rise up together.’ ”
By contrast, Mr. Teixeira quotes the “antiracist” scholar Ibram X. Kendi: “The only remedy to past discrimination is present discrimination.” That isn’t a new idea—Justice Harry Blackmun, borrowing from Ford Foundation President McGeorge Bundy, wrote in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978): “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.”
Even these blunt sentiments seem genteel compared with what Mr. Teixeira reports having heard lately from erstwhile colleagues on the left: “You’re going to tell all white people in this country they have white privilege and we’re a white-supremacist society? And that we’re all guilty of microaggressions every day in every way? Not only is this substantively wrong in my opinion, but as politics it’s bat s— crazy. You can’t win if people think that’s where you’re coming from. What country do you think you’re living in?”
That’s a rhetorical question, but here’s an answer: We’re living in a country where most institutions are dominated by graduates of colleges and universities that have made it their mission to proselytize on behalf of crazy ideas. That includes the Democratic Party to a vastly greater extent than the GOP, especially the post-Trump GOP.
Mr. Teixeira acknowledges that this is a development “The Emerging Democratic Majority” failed to foresee: “We didn’t anticipate the extent to which cultural liberalism might segue into cultural radicalism and the extent to which that view, particularly as driven by younger cohorts, would wind up imprinting itself on the entire infrastructure in and around the Democratic Party—the advocacy groups, the foundations, academia of course, certainly the lower and middle levels of the Democratic Party infrastructure itself.”
A decade ago, “the typical response of people on the left when you’d bring this up was, ‘Oh, it’s just crazy kids in the universities. Not to worry—once they get out into the real world, they’ll act quite a bit differently. It’s a fad, like goldfish swallowing or something.’ But that turned out to be so wrong. They came out in large numbers, they did not give up their points of view, they pressed them vigorously, and more and more of them came out of the universities.”
If Democrats stand for unacceptable ideas and are openly contemptuous of enormous numbers of their fellow citizens, how do they manage to win elections at all? That’s an easy one: Republicans have some unpopular ideas too, and in any election voters are constrained to consider the alternative. In 2020, in their collective judgment, Mr. Biden was a lesser evil than Mr. Trump.
“Both parties have problems—deep problems—in terms of being able to develop a stable majority coalition,” Mr. Teixeira says. But the Democrats’ difficulties may run deeper. “Many of the Republican Party’s current problems revolve around the figure of Trump and the personalized Trumpism.” If Republicans “can get rid of or sideline that one figure”—admittedly a big if, at least in the next two years—“they suddenly might have a relatively clear path to developing an appeal . . . to the center of the American electorate.”
If a Republican majority emerges, Mr. Teixeira suggests, Mr. Trump will have made it possible: “He broke the Republicans out of the endless attempt to replicate pure Reaganism and went in a different direction that was actually successful in expanding the working-class base of the Republican Party.”
His warning to Democrats: “You won’t always have Trump to kick around. You’re going to have to deal with smarter, better versions of a similar thing.” More specifically: “Watch out for Ron DeSantis.” You may need his votes even if you don’t want them.
Mr. Taranto is the Journal’s editorial features editor.
Wonder Land: The first Trump presidency began with the Russian collusion narrative. Now we have its offspring—the classified-documents narrative, which like its predecessor, is heavy on insinuation and light on facts. Images: Shutterstock/AFP/Getty Images Composite: Mark Kelly
@Reflected @skylove4 @Kyle C. Barker @Neo The Resurrected ONE @ColdSlither @wire28 @Th3G3ntleman @ezrathegreat @Jello Biafra @humble forever @Dameon Farrow @Piff Perkins @Pressure @johnedwarduado @Armchair Militant @panopticon @Tres Leches @ADevilYouKhow @dtownreppin214 @DrDealgood @Red Shield
Opinion | Ruy Teixeira on the Democratic Majority That Never Emerged
A coalition with working-class voters turned out to be more than woke college grads were able to endure.
www.wsj.com
Ruy Teixeira on the Democratic Majority That Never Emerged - WSJ
James TarantoAug. 26, 2022 5:18 pm ET
The new era is one of narrow and frequently shifting majorities. Partisans in the 1990s and 2000s saw the promise of a permanent realignment under a succession of young leaders—Bill Clinton, Newt Gingrich, George W. Bush, Barack Obama—and in 2016 Donald Trump was supposed to doom the GOP. But none of those expectations panned out. Joe Biden is the fifth consecutive president whose immediate predecessor was from the other party, and it will be a surprise if he doesn’t become the fifth incumbent in a row to see his party lose its House majority in a midterm election. If Republicans take the Senate, it will be the seventh time in 30 years that chamber’s majority has flipped.
The brightest of those false dawns was surely the one that shined on Democrats as Mr. Bush’s presidency waned. In the 2006 midterms they administered what he called a “thumping.” Two years later they expanded their congressional majorities as Mr. Obama won election with nearly 53% of the nationwide popular vote, still the largest majority in any presidential election since 1988.
Ruy Teixeira saw that victory coming. In August 2002 he and John Judis argued in “The Emerging Democratic Majority” that a variety of trends were converging in their party’s favor. Mr. Clinton had led a move to the center that broadened the Democrats’ appeal. Educated professionals, traditionally a Republican constituency, were becoming more liberal on social issues and voting accordingly. Racial and ethnic minorities, most notably Hispanics, already favored the Democrats and were growing rapidly as a share of the electorate.
All these premises were true, and the conclusion was plausible, maybe even compelling. Messrs. Teixeira and Judis expected the GOP to do well in the wartime midterms of 2002, as it did, but the book affirmed their confidence that “when the fear of terror recedes, and when Americans begin to focus again on job, home, and the pursuit of happiness, the country will once again become fertile ground for the Democrats’ progressive centrism and postindustrial values.”
By 2008 the Democratic majority appeared to have emerged. If history had ended in 2009, Messrs. Judis and Teixeira would have been prophets. But in 2010 Mr. Obama and his party suffered their own thumping, which the president called a “shellacking.” Six years later, Hillary Clinton couldn’t even beat Mr. Trump, and the GOP took the White House and held Congress. Democrats became the majority party again in 2018 and 2020, but nobody thinks that status is permanent.
What went wrong? Mr. Teixeira, 70—his Portuguese surname is pronounced teh-SHARE-uh—addresses the question in a two-hour Zoom interview from his home in Silver Spring, Md. The most glaring problem can be summed up in a four-word phrase that gained currency during the Obama years: “coalition of the ascendant.” In an article published three days after the 2008 election, progressive journalist Ronald Brownstein defined that coalition as consisting of “growing elements of American society: young people, Hispanics and other minorities, and white upper-middle-class professionals.”
That sounds a lot like the emerging Democratic majority, but something was missing. Mr. Teixeira notes that he and Mr. Judis had argued the Democrats “had to retain the loyalties and the voting support of a very significant sector of the white working class.” Instead, that support “cratered” in 2010 and again in 2016. It recovered some in 2012 and 2020, but the long-term trend is unpromising.
Democrats not only neglected white working-class voters but grew overtly hostile toward them. The term “ascendant” implied a moral judgment—a “Manichaean view of the political universe where all the good was on one side,” as Mr. Teixeira puts it. The prevailing view of the other side? “ ‘Well, look, they voted for Donald Trump. Donald Trump!’ Nobody could understand this,” he says. Instead of trying to make sense of it and win them over, “it was just like, ‘Well, this is a coalition of the descendant. These are the reactionaries, the racists, the xenophobes,’ ” or, as Mrs. Clinton memorably put it, the “basket of deplorables.”
On Wednesday Rep. Charlie Crist, the Democratic challenger to Florida Gov. Ron DeSantis, outdid Mrs. Clinton by issuing a televised public appeal for rejection: “Those who support the governor should stay with him and vote for him, and I don’t want your vote. If you have that hate in your heart, keep it there. I want the vote of the people of Florida who care about our state—good Democrats, good independents, good Republicans.”
Mr. Teixeira is a man of the left. He describes his own political philosophy as “social democracy.” Yet last month he quit the Center for American Progress, where he had been a senior fellow for years, and joined the American Enterprise Institute, an eclectic center-right think tank. He says progressives anathematize not only Trump supporters but those who seek to understand them: “It was kind of like, ‘Ho ho, you say those Trump voters have real problems. Well, here’s the reality of it: They really just basically hate black and brown people and immigrants.’ ”
The left’s oversimplification is what’s laughable, especially when you consider two points: First, Mr. Obama was elected twice, which means that millions of citizens supported Mr. Trump after casting a ballot or two for a black president. Second, not all Trump supporters were white. In fact, according to exit polls, Mr. Trump’s shares of the nationwide black, Hispanic and Asian vote in 2016 were 2, 2 and 3 points greater, respectively, than Mitt Romney’s in 2012. Even as he lost in 2020, Mr. Trump improved on his own performance among these segments by 4, 3 and 5 points, respectively.
To be sure, Democrats still dominate the minority vote. The same exit polls found Mr. Biden received the votes of 87% of blacks, 65% of Hispanics and 61% of Asians (and only 41% of non-Hispanic whites). But the bottom line in an election is the vote total, not the breakdown. If the partisan gap among minority voters continues to narrow, that could offset the effect of demographic growth even if these segments of the electorate continue to favor Democrats.
The enormous racial and ethnic disparities in partisan preference can also mask similarities in behavior. Working-class voters of all races are becoming less Democratic. “If you look at the nonwhite working class—black, Hispanic, Asian, but particularly driven by Hispanics—Democrats have lost 19 margin points between 2012 and 2020, while they’ve gained 16 margin points among white college-educated voters,” Mr. Teixeira says.
Racial and ethnic appeals also raise delicate questions of substance and tone. An obvious example is racial preferences in college admissions, which confer an advantage on blacks and Hispanics at the expense of whites and more recently Asians. It takes political deftness to advance such policies without alienating those voters who bear their costs.
In Mr. Teixeira’s view, Democrats in the Obama years “had a better idea about how to appeal to so-called people of color. First, they didn’t call them ‘people of color.’ It was more like, ‘We’re all in this together. We’re Americans—black, white, whatever, red states, blue states. We want to have an America where everybody can rise up together.’ ”
By contrast, Mr. Teixeira quotes the “antiracist” scholar Ibram X. Kendi: “The only remedy to past discrimination is present discrimination.” That isn’t a new idea—Justice Harry Blackmun, borrowing from Ford Foundation President McGeorge Bundy, wrote in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke (1978): “In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race. There is no other way. And in order to treat some persons equally, we must treat them differently.”
Even these blunt sentiments seem genteel compared with what Mr. Teixeira reports having heard lately from erstwhile colleagues on the left: “You’re going to tell all white people in this country they have white privilege and we’re a white-supremacist society? And that we’re all guilty of microaggressions every day in every way? Not only is this substantively wrong in my opinion, but as politics it’s bat s— crazy. You can’t win if people think that’s where you’re coming from. What country do you think you’re living in?”
That’s a rhetorical question, but here’s an answer: We’re living in a country where most institutions are dominated by graduates of colleges and universities that have made it their mission to proselytize on behalf of crazy ideas. That includes the Democratic Party to a vastly greater extent than the GOP, especially the post-Trump GOP.
Mr. Teixeira acknowledges that this is a development “The Emerging Democratic Majority” failed to foresee: “We didn’t anticipate the extent to which cultural liberalism might segue into cultural radicalism and the extent to which that view, particularly as driven by younger cohorts, would wind up imprinting itself on the entire infrastructure in and around the Democratic Party—the advocacy groups, the foundations, academia of course, certainly the lower and middle levels of the Democratic Party infrastructure itself.”
A decade ago, “the typical response of people on the left when you’d bring this up was, ‘Oh, it’s just crazy kids in the universities. Not to worry—once they get out into the real world, they’ll act quite a bit differently. It’s a fad, like goldfish swallowing or something.’ But that turned out to be so wrong. They came out in large numbers, they did not give up their points of view, they pressed them vigorously, and more and more of them came out of the universities.”
If Democrats stand for unacceptable ideas and are openly contemptuous of enormous numbers of their fellow citizens, how do they manage to win elections at all? That’s an easy one: Republicans have some unpopular ideas too, and in any election voters are constrained to consider the alternative. In 2020, in their collective judgment, Mr. Biden was a lesser evil than Mr. Trump.
“Both parties have problems—deep problems—in terms of being able to develop a stable majority coalition,” Mr. Teixeira says. But the Democrats’ difficulties may run deeper. “Many of the Republican Party’s current problems revolve around the figure of Trump and the personalized Trumpism.” If Republicans “can get rid of or sideline that one figure”—admittedly a big if, at least in the next two years—“they suddenly might have a relatively clear path to developing an appeal . . . to the center of the American electorate.”
If a Republican majority emerges, Mr. Teixeira suggests, Mr. Trump will have made it possible: “He broke the Republicans out of the endless attempt to replicate pure Reaganism and went in a different direction that was actually successful in expanding the working-class base of the Republican Party.”
His warning to Democrats: “You won’t always have Trump to kick around. You’re going to have to deal with smarter, better versions of a similar thing.” More specifically: “Watch out for Ron DeSantis.” You may need his votes even if you don’t want them.
Mr. Taranto is the Journal’s editorial features editor.
Wonder Land: The first Trump presidency began with the Russian collusion narrative. Now we have its offspring—the classified-documents narrative, which like its predecessor, is heavy on insinuation and light on facts. Images: Shutterstock/AFP/Getty Images Composite: Mark Kelly
@Reflected @skylove4 @Kyle C. Barker @Neo The Resurrected ONE @ColdSlither @wire28 @Th3G3ntleman @ezrathegreat @Jello Biafra @humble forever @Dameon Farrow @Piff Perkins @Pressure @johnedwarduado @Armchair Militant @panopticon @Tres Leches @ADevilYouKhow @dtownreppin214 @DrDealgood @Red Shield
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white leftists telling on themselves in here 
@Reflected @skylove4 @Kyle C. Barker @Neo The Resurrected ONE @ColdSlither @wire28 @Th3G3ntleman @ezrathegreat @Jello Biafra @humble forever @Dameon Farrow @Piff Perkins @Pressure @johnedwarduado @Armchair Militant @panopticon @Tres Leches @ADevilYouKhow @dtownreppin214 @DrDealgood @Red Shield
@Reflected @skylove4 @Kyle C. Barker @Neo The Resurrected ONE @ColdSlither @wire28 @Th3G3ntleman @ezrathegreat @Jello Biafra @humble forever @Dameon Farrow @Piff Perkins @Pressure @johnedwarduado @Armchair Militant @panopticon @Tres Leches @ADevilYouKhow @dtownreppin214 @DrDealgood @Red Shield