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Essential The Africa the Media Doesn't Tell You About
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Is a Belated Western Rival to China’s Belt and Road Too Late?
Howard W. French
Wednesday, March 31, 2021
A pedestrian crosses a bridge over a new 30-mile highway that was built by three Chinese companies and financed by the African Development Bank and the Exim Bank of China, leading north of Nairobi, Kenya, Oct. 10, 2012 (AP photo by Ben Curtis).
Far more than they appeared to at first glance, two news stories in recent days have framed America’s position in the world at the outset of Joe Biden’s presidency in unusually stark and powerful ways.
The first trumpeted a $400 billion investment agreement between Beijing and Tehran, with China vastly increasing its trade with Iran. It comes at a moment when the United States is hoping to force the Iranian government back to the negotiating table to reinstate and even broaden the international agreement aimed at preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The Trump administration withdrew from that deal, reimposing harsh sanctions on Iran that Biden hasn’t lifted.
The second news item, which received much less attention, was Biden revealing that he has suggested to U.S. allies, starting with the United Kingdom, that they try to blunt China’s many recent geopolitical advances by getting into the game of major international infrastructure projects and competing with the signature foreign policy initiative of the Xi Jinping era: the Belt and Road Initiative. “I suggested we should have, essentially, a similar initiative, pulling from the democratic states, helping those communities around the world that, in fact, need help,” Biden told reporters.
The first thing that must be said about such an American proposal, still presumably embryonic, is just how belated such an idea is. The United States stood by idly in the 1990s as China first began testing ideas about how to greatly expand its role in the global political economy. That is because those first steps came in Africa, a continent that Washington has always traditionally treated as an afterthought, or stepchild of the international system—as a place that generates thankless problems and few opportunities.
Back then, as a reporter for The New York Times, I listened as American diplomats in many African capitals told me that China’s building initiatives—first, stadiums and parliaments, and then airports, highways, ports and railways—wouldn’t amount to very much, and surely cast no political shade on the U.S. in Africa. Then, a decade later, and indeed up to the present, as all of these Chinese-built infrastructure projects steadily expanded, America’s rhetoric turned scornful and defensive. What China was really up to, it claimed, was setting up debt traps for guileless Africans who were implicitly clueless about their own self-interest and naively accepted Chinese terms without driving a hard bargain for themselves.
The biggest problem with this narrative is wide out in the open, exposed for anyone to see: Neither the U.S. nor its richest allies have proposed anything of substance to compete with China over the basic infrastructure so vitally needed by African countries. And yet few in American officialdom or among prominent commentators engage with this problem.
The way that China used its African development experiences as a laboratory for the rollout of something even bigger to come, both in its economic scope and geopolitical impact, has also gone widely unnoticed. When Xi announced the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, the early excuses for not taking it seriously were as seductive as rationales to ignore China’s earlier work in Africa. The initiative, whose price tag has since been estimated at over $1 trillion, was not really coherent, its critics claimed; the numbers were inflated; the projects wouldn’t pay for themselves; and countries across Asia would resist, fearing domination by Beijing. Meanwhile, just as China had in Africa, the Belt and Road kept advancing, not only throughout Asia, but well into Europe, where Western countries like debt-strapped Greece sought out Chinese investment. Even Britain, traditionally Washington’s closest ally, has expressed interest in joining the Belt and Road, ignoring America’s warnings not to sign on to China’s initiative.
The moral of this story is less about Chinese economic or political prowess, though, than it is about the failure of the world’s richest states, mostly Western powers, to generate and support what are known as “public goods,” at least of the tangible, physical kind. Unlike China, the West has confused the idea of the provision of such goods with notions of aid, persuading itself that to help poorer societies address their development challenges is a matter of pure charity—surrendering wealth to the less fortunate.
The costs of this confusion are manifold. The most obvious one involves watching a geopolitical rival, China, advance unopposed. Another goes to the loss of business opportunities in what is often fancied as the “developing world,” meaning the portions of the planet where global population growth and much of its new wealth generation are concentrated. The final cost, and the most overlooked, is the opportunity to moderate international migration. There is tremendous denial involved here, with the West deluding itself that huge migratory shifts in the global population can be avoided in the decades ahead. Yet demographic growth and climate change will combine to ensure that ever larger numbers of people will move from the Global South to the West—and eventually, probably to East Asia as well. The best thing the U.S. and its allies in Europe can do is engage actively with less developed countries to make their economies as viable and prosperous as possible. That should come with the understanding that South-to-North migration will be an indispensable part of maintaining their own economic vitality in the face of demographic shifts in the West, with rapidly aging populations and falling birth rates.
These realities come together most glaringly in two regions of the world currently generating major refugee flows: West Africa and Central America. It is anything but a coincidence that the economic realities for people in these two regions are dismal and scarcely improving. Nor is it a coincidence that they hardly feel connected to the global economy in terms of their own productive possibilities at home.
If the history of Western empire and its post-colonial aftermath cannot explain all of this, it nonetheless plays an important and wrongly neglected role. West Africa was brought under French and British imperial dominance during the late-19th century. Soon after, a sprinkling of big, European-built ports were dug and railways laid on the continent. But France and Britain, and other European colonial powers, largely gave up on such infrastructure efforts in Africa by World War I. Instead, what ensued was a kind of low-intensity extraction, both of raw materials and of manpower, to help fight in European wars. With their independence, African countries have largely been left to their own devices economically. It is as if the attitude of Europeans and of the West more broadly has been to say, You can’t expect us to develop you.
The history is different in Central America, where the United States never had a formal empire, even if its informal one—through notorious corporate proxies like the United Fruit Company—was perfectly real. Fearful of revolution, Washington briefly awoke to the development needs of the region during the Cold War. But not since President John F. Kennedy’s regional development initiative, the Alliance for Progress, has Washington paid more than lip service to the needs of Central Americans for much more robust growth and economic opportunity.
The consequences of this post-imperial apathy in these two parts of the world can be seen in global economic rankings like the United Nations’ Human Development Index. Honduras ranks a lowly 132nd, with most of its neighbors clustered nearby. In West Africa, Senegal has long been considered one of France’s most successful colonial and post-colonial stories, drawing praise for its democracy and stability. Yet the U.N. ranks Senegal 168th on its Human Development Index, meaning that life for most its citizens is dire and not improving.
Countries like these represent seas of opportunity for China, and who can blame Beijing for making whatever connections it can? El Salvador signed a Belt and Road cooperation agreement with China in 2017, and Beijing is eyeing more infrastructure investments in Central America today; in 2018, Senegal became the first West African country to join the Belt and Road Initiative. These countries are seas of opportunity for the West, too, if only the U.S. and others would notice. But where economic development is concerned, few or no connections are being made, and the failures of this blindness will continue to be felt in lost opportunity costs.
Is a Belated Western Rival to China’s Belt and Road Too Late?
Howard W. French
Wednesday, March 31, 2021
A pedestrian crosses a bridge over a new 30-mile highway that was built by three Chinese companies and financed by the African Development Bank and the Exim Bank of China, leading north of Nairobi, Kenya, Oct. 10, 2012 (AP photo by Ben Curtis).
Far more than they appeared to at first glance, two news stories in recent days have framed America’s position in the world at the outset of Joe Biden’s presidency in unusually stark and powerful ways.
The first trumpeted a $400 billion investment agreement between Beijing and Tehran, with China vastly increasing its trade with Iran. It comes at a moment when the United States is hoping to force the Iranian government back to the negotiating table to reinstate and even broaden the international agreement aimed at preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. The Trump administration withdrew from that deal, reimposing harsh sanctions on Iran that Biden hasn’t lifted.
The second news item, which received much less attention, was Biden revealing that he has suggested to U.S. allies, starting with the United Kingdom, that they try to blunt China’s many recent geopolitical advances by getting into the game of major international infrastructure projects and competing with the signature foreign policy initiative of the Xi Jinping era: the Belt and Road Initiative. “I suggested we should have, essentially, a similar initiative, pulling from the democratic states, helping those communities around the world that, in fact, need help,” Biden told reporters.
The first thing that must be said about such an American proposal, still presumably embryonic, is just how belated such an idea is. The United States stood by idly in the 1990s as China first began testing ideas about how to greatly expand its role in the global political economy. That is because those first steps came in Africa, a continent that Washington has always traditionally treated as an afterthought, or stepchild of the international system—as a place that generates thankless problems and few opportunities.
Back then, as a reporter for The New York Times, I listened as American diplomats in many African capitals told me that China’s building initiatives—first, stadiums and parliaments, and then airports, highways, ports and railways—wouldn’t amount to very much, and surely cast no political shade on the U.S. in Africa. Then, a decade later, and indeed up to the present, as all of these Chinese-built infrastructure projects steadily expanded, America’s rhetoric turned scornful and defensive. What China was really up to, it claimed, was setting up debt traps for guileless Africans who were implicitly clueless about their own self-interest and naively accepted Chinese terms without driving a hard bargain for themselves.
The biggest problem with this narrative is wide out in the open, exposed for anyone to see: Neither the U.S. nor its richest allies have proposed anything of substance to compete with China over the basic infrastructure so vitally needed by African countries. And yet few in American officialdom or among prominent commentators engage with this problem.
The way that China used its African development experiences as a laboratory for the rollout of something even bigger to come, both in its economic scope and geopolitical impact, has also gone widely unnoticed. When Xi announced the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013, the early excuses for not taking it seriously were as seductive as rationales to ignore China’s earlier work in Africa. The initiative, whose price tag has since been estimated at over $1 trillion, was not really coherent, its critics claimed; the numbers were inflated; the projects wouldn’t pay for themselves; and countries across Asia would resist, fearing domination by Beijing. Meanwhile, just as China had in Africa, the Belt and Road kept advancing, not only throughout Asia, but well into Europe, where Western countries like debt-strapped Greece sought out Chinese investment. Even Britain, traditionally Washington’s closest ally, has expressed interest in joining the Belt and Road, ignoring America’s warnings not to sign on to China’s initiative.
The moral of this story is less about Chinese economic or political prowess, though, than it is about the failure of the world’s richest states, mostly Western powers, to generate and support what are known as “public goods,” at least of the tangible, physical kind. Unlike China, the West has confused the idea of the provision of such goods with notions of aid, persuading itself that to help poorer societies address their development challenges is a matter of pure charity—surrendering wealth to the less fortunate.
The costs of this confusion are manifold. The most obvious one involves watching a geopolitical rival, China, advance unopposed. Another goes to the loss of business opportunities in what is often fancied as the “developing world,” meaning the portions of the planet where global population growth and much of its new wealth generation are concentrated. The final cost, and the most overlooked, is the opportunity to moderate international migration. There is tremendous denial involved here, with the West deluding itself that huge migratory shifts in the global population can be avoided in the decades ahead. Yet demographic growth and climate change will combine to ensure that ever larger numbers of people will move from the Global South to the West—and eventually, probably to East Asia as well. The best thing the U.S. and its allies in Europe can do is engage actively with less developed countries to make their economies as viable and prosperous as possible. That should come with the understanding that South-to-North migration will be an indispensable part of maintaining their own economic vitality in the face of demographic shifts in the West, with rapidly aging populations and falling birth rates.
These realities come together most glaringly in two regions of the world currently generating major refugee flows: West Africa and Central America. It is anything but a coincidence that the economic realities for people in these two regions are dismal and scarcely improving. Nor is it a coincidence that they hardly feel connected to the global economy in terms of their own productive possibilities at home.
If the history of Western empire and its post-colonial aftermath cannot explain all of this, it nonetheless plays an important and wrongly neglected role. West Africa was brought under French and British imperial dominance during the late-19th century. Soon after, a sprinkling of big, European-built ports were dug and railways laid on the continent. But France and Britain, and other European colonial powers, largely gave up on such infrastructure efforts in Africa by World War I. Instead, what ensued was a kind of low-intensity extraction, both of raw materials and of manpower, to help fight in European wars. With their independence, African countries have largely been left to their own devices economically. It is as if the attitude of Europeans and of the West more broadly has been to say, You can’t expect us to develop you.
The history is different in Central America, where the United States never had a formal empire, even if its informal one—through notorious corporate proxies like the United Fruit Company—was perfectly real. Fearful of revolution, Washington briefly awoke to the development needs of the region during the Cold War. But not since President John F. Kennedy’s regional development initiative, the Alliance for Progress, has Washington paid more than lip service to the needs of Central Americans for much more robust growth and economic opportunity.
The consequences of this post-imperial apathy in these two parts of the world can be seen in global economic rankings like the United Nations’ Human Development Index. Honduras ranks a lowly 132nd, with most of its neighbors clustered nearby. In West Africa, Senegal has long been considered one of France’s most successful colonial and post-colonial stories, drawing praise for its democracy and stability. Yet the U.N. ranks Senegal 168th on its Human Development Index, meaning that life for most its citizens is dire and not improving.
Countries like these represent seas of opportunity for China, and who can blame Beijing for making whatever connections it can? El Salvador signed a Belt and Road cooperation agreement with China in 2017, and Beijing is eyeing more infrastructure investments in Central America today; in 2018, Senegal became the first West African country to join the Belt and Road Initiative. These countries are seas of opportunity for the West, too, if only the U.S. and others would notice. But where economic development is concerned, few or no connections are being made, and the failures of this blindness will continue to be felt in lost opportunity costs.
Is a Belated Western Rival to China’s Belt and Road Too Late?
loyola llothta
☭☭☭
loyola llothta
☭☭☭
Germany and Namibia: What's the right price to pay for genocide?
By Tim Whewell
BBC News, Namibia
March 31, 2021 | 23:19:05
A deal that could set a precedent for former colonies all around the world is being thrashed out between Germany and Namibia, to heal the wounds of what's now widely regarded as a genocide by colonial forces. But how do you make up for destroying an entire society? In Namibia, descendants of both victims and colonisers are arguing fiercely about the talks.
"Along this whole beach, there was a concentration camp," says Laidlaw Peringanda. "The barbed wire ran where you see the car park today."
The artist and social activist is pointing past a row of open-air cafes and a children's playground on the promenade in Swakopmund, Namibia's main seaside resort, where the cold breakers of the Atlantic crash against the edge of the Namib Desert.
"My great-grandmother told me some of our family were brought here and forced to work, and they died."
He's talking about the years 1904-1908, when present-day Namibia was the German colony of South West Africa. Tens of thousands died as colonial forces brutally suppressed uprisings by two of the main peoples of the country, the Herero and Nama, killing many and driving others into a desert (the Omaheke Desert in the east of the country) where many starved to death. Survivors ended up in camps where they were used as slave labour, dying of cold, malnutrition, exhaustion and violence. As many as 65,000 of the 80,000 Herero living in German South West Africa at the start of colonial rule are estimated to have perished, as well as perhaps 10,000 of an estimated 20,000 Nama.
Since 2015, when Germany formally acknowledged that the atrocities constituted genocide, it has been negotiating a restorative justice deal with Namibia that will set a global precedent. Never before has a former colonial power sat down with a former colony in this way to work out a comprehensive agreement about the legacy of the past.
Germany has said it will make a formal apology - though the wording is still to be worked out. But the bigger question for Namibians is what form any material compensation will take.
Laidlaw Peringanda at a mass grave of concentration camp victims
Laidlaw Peringanda, like most Hereros, is in no doubt about what he wants from the talks - a massive financial deal that will help restore his people to the prosperity he believes they enjoyed, as cattle-herders, before the genocide. Afterwards, most of their land was split into private farms for German settlers. And today most Herero and Nama live either on small overcrowded areas of communal land that were later allocated to them, or in towns - many in the "informal settlements" or shanty towns that house 40% of Namibia's people.
In Swakopmund, there's a massive social gulf between the pretty, colonial-era town centre with its pastel-painted gabled buildings - home still to many grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the original colonists - and the shacks cobbled together from planks and metal sheeting that extend for miles to the north.
"They don't have flushing toilets, they don't have drinkable water, there's no electricity," Laidlaw says.
"Some of the people living there, they are descendants of the victims of the concentration camps. It's really unfair what is happening.
"Germany must buy back our ancestral land."
That's a demand you hear over and over again.
The hope is that the German government will fund a land reform programme to enable farms to be bought from German Namibian farmers, and distributed to Herero and Nama.
German Namibians are believed to be the biggest group among the white farmers who own about 70% of the country's farmland, and some of their holdings are vast - one covers 400 sq miles.
How realistic is this? Namibia's chief negotiator, Dr Zed Ngavirue, says Germany has "acknowledged they need to do something to help us reconstruct our society" and agreed to provide some money - as part of a wider agreement - to buy up land from willing sellers.
Zed Ngavirue, chief negotiator
But he adds: "I couldn't try and fool myself that the land issue will be solved by Germany. It's not loss of land as a result of German colonisation only."
Many more white settlers arrived after Germany lost its colony in World War One, and South West Africa came to be ruled by South Africa for 70 years. And since independence in 1990 land has been bought both by black Namibians and by foreigners.
The German government refuses to use the word "reparations" but Zed Ngavirue says other practical projects being discussed include possible German help with health, education, housing and water desalination. He says the talks are too delicate to name any sums yet.
As for the German side, it declines to say anything publicly about the progress of the talks.
After six years without a result, Laidlaw is one of many Herero and Nama growing increasingly impatient.
He argues that Germany should be talking not just to the Namibian government, but also directly to Herero and Nama leaders, such as Herero paramount chief Vekuii Rukoro, who has attempted to sue Germany for compensation in the US courts, so far without success. The fear is that any benefits from a government-to-government deal may go partly to communities that never suffered in the genocide, such as the Ovambo, now Namibia's largest ethnic group.
Vekuii Rukoro
Chief Rukoro's adviser Festus Mundjuua says the government wants "to put their hands on the cash because they have their own projects for which they have no money". That's denied by the government, which says any funds will be managed by affected communities.
But it's not just victims' descendants who are sceptical about the talks. So too are some of Namibia's remaining 30,000 or so German speakers, descendants of the colonists.
"The genocide myth is nothing more than moral blackmail," says historian Dr Andreas Vogt. Like many German-Namibians, he argues that the infamous "extermination order" signed by the commander of the colonial forces, Gen Lothar von Trotha, in 1904, saying that "any Herero found inside the German frontier, with or without a gun or cattle, will be executed", was not state policy and was never implemented.
"The portrayal of - on the one side - a genocidal, brutal and unforgiving German colonial authority, and on the other, the pristine and completely innocent Herero people is tainted. It takes two parties to tango," Vogt says.
He and many other German Namibians point out that the Herero rebelled against German rule in 1904 - killing about 120 German settlers - but were then defeated at the decisive Battle of Waterberg.
Last year a German-Namibian who served as a government minister shortly after independence, Anton von Wietersheim, helped launch an initiative to encourage German-speaking Namibians to discuss the past, both among themselves and together with Herero and Nama representatives, though plans for a conference of German-Namibians have been delayed because of Covid-19.
"The realisation has still to come to many of our white compatriots about what situation these affected people are actually in as a result of the historic happenings," he says.
Von Wietersheim believes that if German-Namibians back the genocide talks it will encourage Germany to reach a deal, which Namibia is keen to conclude before German elections in September.
Herero prisoners in chains (1904)
German-Namibian academic and activist Henning Melber, who has studied the background to the talks, believes other former colonial powers in Europe have privately expressed concerns to Germany that an agreement with Namibia might set off an avalanche of claims against various colonisers by nations in Africa, south-east Asia and elsewhere.
Tanzania, the successor to another former German colony, Tanganyika, is already demanding reparations for atrocities, and potentially other former colonies could follow suit.
But Melber says: "I think Germany would be flexible about the amount it could offer, if it had some guarantee that (the deal) would close the chapter once and for all. The issue is to avoid a precedent with wide implications."
A train with prisoners leaving for the concentration camp
For his part, Zed Ngavirue, a veteran diplomat, avoids any promises about what can be achieved.
"Politics is the art of the possible," he says with a smile.
But in the squalid slums outside Swakopmund, where some Herero work today on minimum wages for the descendants of Germans who used their great-grandparents as slaves, there's not the same understanding.
"Young people, some of them are fed up, they want to take the land by force," Laidlaw Peringanda says. "So maybe the German government should not play hide and seek with us."
Germany and Namibia: What's the right price to pay for genocide?
By Tim Whewell
BBC News, Namibia
March 31, 2021 | 23:19:05
A deal that could set a precedent for former colonies all around the world is being thrashed out between Germany and Namibia, to heal the wounds of what's now widely regarded as a genocide by colonial forces. But how do you make up for destroying an entire society? In Namibia, descendants of both victims and colonisers are arguing fiercely about the talks.
"Along this whole beach, there was a concentration camp," says Laidlaw Peringanda. "The barbed wire ran where you see the car park today."
The artist and social activist is pointing past a row of open-air cafes and a children's playground on the promenade in Swakopmund, Namibia's main seaside resort, where the cold breakers of the Atlantic crash against the edge of the Namib Desert.
"My great-grandmother told me some of our family were brought here and forced to work, and they died."
He's talking about the years 1904-1908, when present-day Namibia was the German colony of South West Africa. Tens of thousands died as colonial forces brutally suppressed uprisings by two of the main peoples of the country, the Herero and Nama, killing many and driving others into a desert (the Omaheke Desert in the east of the country) where many starved to death. Survivors ended up in camps where they were used as slave labour, dying of cold, malnutrition, exhaustion and violence. As many as 65,000 of the 80,000 Herero living in German South West Africa at the start of colonial rule are estimated to have perished, as well as perhaps 10,000 of an estimated 20,000 Nama.
Since 2015, when Germany formally acknowledged that the atrocities constituted genocide, it has been negotiating a restorative justice deal with Namibia that will set a global precedent. Never before has a former colonial power sat down with a former colony in this way to work out a comprehensive agreement about the legacy of the past.
Germany has said it will make a formal apology - though the wording is still to be worked out. But the bigger question for Namibians is what form any material compensation will take.
Laidlaw Peringanda at a mass grave of concentration camp victims
Laidlaw Peringanda, like most Hereros, is in no doubt about what he wants from the talks - a massive financial deal that will help restore his people to the prosperity he believes they enjoyed, as cattle-herders, before the genocide. Afterwards, most of their land was split into private farms for German settlers. And today most Herero and Nama live either on small overcrowded areas of communal land that were later allocated to them, or in towns - many in the "informal settlements" or shanty towns that house 40% of Namibia's people.
In Swakopmund, there's a massive social gulf between the pretty, colonial-era town centre with its pastel-painted gabled buildings - home still to many grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the original colonists - and the shacks cobbled together from planks and metal sheeting that extend for miles to the north.
"They don't have flushing toilets, they don't have drinkable water, there's no electricity," Laidlaw says.
"Some of the people living there, they are descendants of the victims of the concentration camps. It's really unfair what is happening.
"Germany must buy back our ancestral land."
That's a demand you hear over and over again.
The hope is that the German government will fund a land reform programme to enable farms to be bought from German Namibian farmers, and distributed to Herero and Nama.
German Namibians are believed to be the biggest group among the white farmers who own about 70% of the country's farmland, and some of their holdings are vast - one covers 400 sq miles.
How realistic is this? Namibia's chief negotiator, Dr Zed Ngavirue, says Germany has "acknowledged they need to do something to help us reconstruct our society" and agreed to provide some money - as part of a wider agreement - to buy up land from willing sellers.
Zed Ngavirue, chief negotiator
But he adds: "I couldn't try and fool myself that the land issue will be solved by Germany. It's not loss of land as a result of German colonisation only."
Many more white settlers arrived after Germany lost its colony in World War One, and South West Africa came to be ruled by South Africa for 70 years. And since independence in 1990 land has been bought both by black Namibians and by foreigners.
The German government refuses to use the word "reparations" but Zed Ngavirue says other practical projects being discussed include possible German help with health, education, housing and water desalination. He says the talks are too delicate to name any sums yet.
As for the German side, it declines to say anything publicly about the progress of the talks.
After six years without a result, Laidlaw is one of many Herero and Nama growing increasingly impatient.
He argues that Germany should be talking not just to the Namibian government, but also directly to Herero and Nama leaders, such as Herero paramount chief Vekuii Rukoro, who has attempted to sue Germany for compensation in the US courts, so far without success. The fear is that any benefits from a government-to-government deal may go partly to communities that never suffered in the genocide, such as the Ovambo, now Namibia's largest ethnic group.
Vekuii Rukoro
Chief Rukoro's adviser Festus Mundjuua says the government wants "to put their hands on the cash because they have their own projects for which they have no money". That's denied by the government, which says any funds will be managed by affected communities.
But it's not just victims' descendants who are sceptical about the talks. So too are some of Namibia's remaining 30,000 or so German speakers, descendants of the colonists.
"The genocide myth is nothing more than moral blackmail," says historian Dr Andreas Vogt. Like many German-Namibians, he argues that the infamous "extermination order" signed by the commander of the colonial forces, Gen Lothar von Trotha, in 1904, saying that "any Herero found inside the German frontier, with or without a gun or cattle, will be executed", was not state policy and was never implemented.
"The portrayal of - on the one side - a genocidal, brutal and unforgiving German colonial authority, and on the other, the pristine and completely innocent Herero people is tainted. It takes two parties to tango," Vogt says.
He and many other German Namibians point out that the Herero rebelled against German rule in 1904 - killing about 120 German settlers - but were then defeated at the decisive Battle of Waterberg.
Last year a German-Namibian who served as a government minister shortly after independence, Anton von Wietersheim, helped launch an initiative to encourage German-speaking Namibians to discuss the past, both among themselves and together with Herero and Nama representatives, though plans for a conference of German-Namibians have been delayed because of Covid-19.
"The realisation has still to come to many of our white compatriots about what situation these affected people are actually in as a result of the historic happenings," he says.
Von Wietersheim believes that if German-Namibians back the genocide talks it will encourage Germany to reach a deal, which Namibia is keen to conclude before German elections in September.
Herero prisoners in chains (1904)
German-Namibian academic and activist Henning Melber, who has studied the background to the talks, believes other former colonial powers in Europe have privately expressed concerns to Germany that an agreement with Namibia might set off an avalanche of claims against various colonisers by nations in Africa, south-east Asia and elsewhere.
Tanzania, the successor to another former German colony, Tanganyika, is already demanding reparations for atrocities, and potentially other former colonies could follow suit.
But Melber says: "I think Germany would be flexible about the amount it could offer, if it had some guarantee that (the deal) would close the chapter once and for all. The issue is to avoid a precedent with wide implications."
A train with prisoners leaving for the concentration camp
For his part, Zed Ngavirue, a veteran diplomat, avoids any promises about what can be achieved.
"Politics is the art of the possible," he says with a smile.
But in the squalid slums outside Swakopmund, where some Herero work today on minimum wages for the descendants of Germans who used their great-grandparents as slaves, there's not the same understanding.
"Young people, some of them are fed up, they want to take the land by force," Laidlaw Peringanda says. "So maybe the German government should not play hide and seek with us."
Germany and Namibia: What's the right price to pay for genocide?
loyola llothta
☭☭☭
loyola llothta
☭☭☭
Red Shield
Global Domination
Premeditated
MANDE KANG
meh...imma give her the benefit of doubt. as long as she's not touching any of Magufuli mining and natural resources laws or favoring multinationals.hmmm
The Pandemic and Geopolitics Have Created New Opportunities For South African Wines in China
April 2, 2021 | by Marcus Ford
File image of South African Gerald Cakijana, 25, shows his hand print on a wine label at the Soweto wine festival in South Africa. FATI MOALUSI / AFP
Whilst COVID-19 disrupted trade flows across the globe and pushed industries into financial trouble, the South African wine sector has, somewhat remarkably, been spared. This is largely due to wine exports to China soaring by 50% after Beijing enforced a 212% tariff on Australian wines after escalating geopolitical tensions.
The question we’ve been tackling at Wines of South Africa, is how can South African wine producers use this opportunity to gain a firmer foothold in the Chinese wine market?
The ban on alcohol sales during South Africa’s nationwide lockdown, along with the government shutting its borders to trade, coupled with the loss of wine tourists, resulted in a domestic surplus of around 400 million bottles of wine. Such circumstances had the potential to devastate the industry which is crucial to the South African economy. In 2019, the wine industry contributed 1.1% of GDP ($3.69 billion) as well as providing 269,096 jobs (accounting for 1.6% of national employment) and $1.28 billion in household incomes. Wine tourism also contributed $1.81 million and 36,406 employment opportunities.
In 2019, South Africa only captured 0.9% of the Chinese wine market share, a tiny amount compared to the top three countries: Australia (35.4%), France & Monaco (28.7%), and Chile (14.2%). Comparatively, China is South Africa’s 4th top destination for wine exports accounting for 4% of its total wine exports.
Tariffs imposed on Australia resulted in a 95% decline in Australian wine exports to China in December 2020 compared to the same period in 2019, thus creating an opportunity for South African producers. On the other hand, however, this also demonstrates the risks of the market when political clashes emerge.
How Did China Become One of the Most Important Markets for Wine?
Understanding the boom in Chinese wine demand requires a brief history lesson. Wine was first sought after in China from 1997 following the publication of the ‘The French Wine Paradox’, which emphasized that red wine reduced the probability of heart disease, and thus the idea of wine being part of a healthy lifestyle took hold. As the Chinese hospitality sector flourished, so has the demand for wine. Wine has become increasingly associated as part of business entertainment and a banquet essential, as well as a luxury for the wealthy.
Chinese domestic wine production has also grown since the 2000s. However, the quality has not kept up with those of imported origins, with consumers beginning to understand the difference regarding wine quality.
This Brings Us to Today, a Window of Opportunity for South African Wines
Recently, the wine market has begun to mature, with consumers becoming more engaged in wine, especially as education programs and digital channels have made information on high-quality, international wines more widely available. According to Wine Australia, there are an estimated 52 million customers in China for imported wine, which is almost double the size compared to seven years ago.
Despite the recent increase in South African wine exports, numerous challenges to entering the Chinese market exist. Importantly, overall demand for wine in China has declined due to COVID-19, with imports down by around 30%, due to the lack of occasions for wine consumption as large gatherings and celebrations were ceased.
Other obstacles exporters must navigate include transport logistics, foreign regulations, procedures and legal requirements, alongside general cultural and language differences. As such, producers must be strategic and ensure they pick the right partners when exporting.
Only a handful of platforms exist for supporting South African wine brands entering the Chinese market. For instance, Africa Reimagined, a Beijing-based trade consultancy, assists African brands, including South African wines, in navigating the Chinese market. To support the growth of exports, Wines of South Africa provides in-depth knowledge of the Chinese market, supplemented with guidance, market research, and distribution partnerships. For example, we published a comprehensive Wine Export Guide, which provides an overview of the typical wine export procedure, alongside providing detailed methods to overcome market-entry challenges. We also work with the Cape Export Network, an online portal that matches distributors and importers with South African exporters.
But What More Is Needed to Support the Growth of South African Wine Exports?
To understand how South Africa can increase its exports, we must look at the methods of other top wine exporters. For instance, China has established Free Trade Agreements with import destinations such as Australia, Chile, and New Zealand, which brought duties down from 14% to zero from 2012-2019. If South Africa could establish a similar agreement on its wines it would help our producers overcome a major cost barrier and support overall export promotion.
Second, promoting the exposure of South African wines both online and offline is key. Chinese consumers use e-commerce platforms to purchase and research wines with 49% of wine consumers from China’s urban upper-middle-class purchasing wine through e-commerce. Harnessing the power of e-commerce platforms as the Chinese middle-class continues to expand can promote our products and further our sales. Additionally, increasing South African wines on Chinese supermarket shelves will elevate the reputation of our wines.
Deepening wine exportation is an effective way for China-South Africa agriculture cooperation compared to other cooperation methods. This is because South African wine producers have considerable experience in exporting their products worldwide, exporting almost 50% of all wine produced in 2018. In 2020, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands ranked as the top three export destinations, each experiencing a 23%, 4%, and 17% export growth, respectively. As the industry is already significantly developed, it does not need extensive development cooperation for it be viable but instead requires institutional support from government cooperation.
2021 Provides a Crucial Chance for South African Wine Producers
Wine is viewed as part of a healthy lifestyle and we forecast this will have a positive impact on increasing wine sales post-COVID. Indeed, we have already begun to see wine sales increasing as China’s economy and consumption are bouncing back fast. China’s GDP is forecast to grow at a minimum of 6% per year – every percentage point of growth brings new consumers which South African brands can capitalize on. We must use this time to establish a secure foothold in the market for future gains.
Expanding our wine exports will generate an array of social and economic benefits for future livelihood improvements across South Africa. Currently, South Africa has the third-highest unemployment rate in Africa, and by the end of 2020, 32.5% of the population was unemployed – a 4% increase from pre-pandemic levels. Youth unemployment is especially high, with a rate of 63% for those aged between 15-24. The pandemic resulted in a further 3 million jobs lost, mainly impacting those employed in the informal sector. High unemployment rates have therefore resulted in limited progress in poverty reduction. Indeed, whilst poverty has fallen from 71% of the population in 1996, it still encumbers 57% of the population as of 2014. Currently, the World Bank estimates that COVID will lead to 2 million more people falling into poverty (living under USD5.50 per day).
Seasonal workers harvest grapes at vineyard in the Hottentots Mountains in Stellenbosch, on February 23, 2021. MARCO LONGARI / AFP
Moreover, labor conditions in the South African wine industry have remained poor despite the industry’s growth. Low wages, coupled with seasonal working contracts, have left workers vulnerable to international market volatility, with over 21,000 jobs lost in the industry by October 2020 due to the pandemic.
Considering this, developing a foothold in the growing Chinese consumer market can provide our exports long-term opportunities from increasing demand. As such, this will stimulate additional direct jobs in wine agricultural production, alongside indirect jobs, such as in logistic and transport services, to meet export demand. As South African brands become more reputable, this will likely generate spill-over effects in wine tourism, therefore providing further employment opportunities in the service sector. The provision of jobs and incomes is critical for empowering people to lift themselves out of poverty.
Further, creating a sustainable long-term footprint for wine exports can support the revitalization of the South African economy in its post-COVID recovery. Our GDP growth dropped sharply to -8% in 2020. Whilst we are forecasted to have a healthy 3% GDP growth in 2021, additional growth is an essential factor for developing our economy and driving poverty reduction, alongside enhancing our ability to meet the Sustainable Development Goals in 2030.
The Pandemic, Coupled With Sino-Australian Tensions, Provides an Opportunity to Revitalize South African Wine Exports to China.
But we need to think long-term. Whilst in the short term the demand for wine is still recovering, the long-term payoffs of entering the market, whilst there is a gap, will bring phenomenal gains for the domestic industry back in South Africa. This is not limited to South Africa, and other wine-producing African countries should also seek to take advantage of this market opening. Put simply, this is an opportunity that African wine producers should not miss.
The Pandemic and Geopolitics Have Created New Opportunities For South African Wines in China
April 2, 2021 | by Marcus Ford
File image of South African Gerald Cakijana, 25, shows his hand print on a wine label at the Soweto wine festival in South Africa. FATI MOALUSI / AFP
Whilst COVID-19 disrupted trade flows across the globe and pushed industries into financial trouble, the South African wine sector has, somewhat remarkably, been spared. This is largely due to wine exports to China soaring by 50% after Beijing enforced a 212% tariff on Australian wines after escalating geopolitical tensions.
The question we’ve been tackling at Wines of South Africa, is how can South African wine producers use this opportunity to gain a firmer foothold in the Chinese wine market?
The ban on alcohol sales during South Africa’s nationwide lockdown, along with the government shutting its borders to trade, coupled with the loss of wine tourists, resulted in a domestic surplus of around 400 million bottles of wine. Such circumstances had the potential to devastate the industry which is crucial to the South African economy. In 2019, the wine industry contributed 1.1% of GDP ($3.69 billion) as well as providing 269,096 jobs (accounting for 1.6% of national employment) and $1.28 billion in household incomes. Wine tourism also contributed $1.81 million and 36,406 employment opportunities.
In 2019, South Africa only captured 0.9% of the Chinese wine market share, a tiny amount compared to the top three countries: Australia (35.4%), France & Monaco (28.7%), and Chile (14.2%). Comparatively, China is South Africa’s 4th top destination for wine exports accounting for 4% of its total wine exports.
Tariffs imposed on Australia resulted in a 95% decline in Australian wine exports to China in December 2020 compared to the same period in 2019, thus creating an opportunity for South African producers. On the other hand, however, this also demonstrates the risks of the market when political clashes emerge.
How Did China Become One of the Most Important Markets for Wine?
Understanding the boom in Chinese wine demand requires a brief history lesson. Wine was first sought after in China from 1997 following the publication of the ‘The French Wine Paradox’, which emphasized that red wine reduced the probability of heart disease, and thus the idea of wine being part of a healthy lifestyle took hold. As the Chinese hospitality sector flourished, so has the demand for wine. Wine has become increasingly associated as part of business entertainment and a banquet essential, as well as a luxury for the wealthy.
Chinese domestic wine production has also grown since the 2000s. However, the quality has not kept up with those of imported origins, with consumers beginning to understand the difference regarding wine quality.
This Brings Us to Today, a Window of Opportunity for South African Wines
Recently, the wine market has begun to mature, with consumers becoming more engaged in wine, especially as education programs and digital channels have made information on high-quality, international wines more widely available. According to Wine Australia, there are an estimated 52 million customers in China for imported wine, which is almost double the size compared to seven years ago.
Despite the recent increase in South African wine exports, numerous challenges to entering the Chinese market exist. Importantly, overall demand for wine in China has declined due to COVID-19, with imports down by around 30%, due to the lack of occasions for wine consumption as large gatherings and celebrations were ceased.
Other obstacles exporters must navigate include transport logistics, foreign regulations, procedures and legal requirements, alongside general cultural and language differences. As such, producers must be strategic and ensure they pick the right partners when exporting.
Only a handful of platforms exist for supporting South African wine brands entering the Chinese market. For instance, Africa Reimagined, a Beijing-based trade consultancy, assists African brands, including South African wines, in navigating the Chinese market. To support the growth of exports, Wines of South Africa provides in-depth knowledge of the Chinese market, supplemented with guidance, market research, and distribution partnerships. For example, we published a comprehensive Wine Export Guide, which provides an overview of the typical wine export procedure, alongside providing detailed methods to overcome market-entry challenges. We also work with the Cape Export Network, an online portal that matches distributors and importers with South African exporters.
But What More Is Needed to Support the Growth of South African Wine Exports?
To understand how South Africa can increase its exports, we must look at the methods of other top wine exporters. For instance, China has established Free Trade Agreements with import destinations such as Australia, Chile, and New Zealand, which brought duties down from 14% to zero from 2012-2019. If South Africa could establish a similar agreement on its wines it would help our producers overcome a major cost barrier and support overall export promotion.
Second, promoting the exposure of South African wines both online and offline is key. Chinese consumers use e-commerce platforms to purchase and research wines with 49% of wine consumers from China’s urban upper-middle-class purchasing wine through e-commerce. Harnessing the power of e-commerce platforms as the Chinese middle-class continues to expand can promote our products and further our sales. Additionally, increasing South African wines on Chinese supermarket shelves will elevate the reputation of our wines.
Deepening wine exportation is an effective way for China-South Africa agriculture cooperation compared to other cooperation methods. This is because South African wine producers have considerable experience in exporting their products worldwide, exporting almost 50% of all wine produced in 2018. In 2020, the UK, Germany and the Netherlands ranked as the top three export destinations, each experiencing a 23%, 4%, and 17% export growth, respectively. As the industry is already significantly developed, it does not need extensive development cooperation for it be viable but instead requires institutional support from government cooperation.
2021 Provides a Crucial Chance for South African Wine Producers
Wine is viewed as part of a healthy lifestyle and we forecast this will have a positive impact on increasing wine sales post-COVID. Indeed, we have already begun to see wine sales increasing as China’s economy and consumption are bouncing back fast. China’s GDP is forecast to grow at a minimum of 6% per year – every percentage point of growth brings new consumers which South African brands can capitalize on. We must use this time to establish a secure foothold in the market for future gains.
Expanding our wine exports will generate an array of social and economic benefits for future livelihood improvements across South Africa. Currently, South Africa has the third-highest unemployment rate in Africa, and by the end of 2020, 32.5% of the population was unemployed – a 4% increase from pre-pandemic levels. Youth unemployment is especially high, with a rate of 63% for those aged between 15-24. The pandemic resulted in a further 3 million jobs lost, mainly impacting those employed in the informal sector. High unemployment rates have therefore resulted in limited progress in poverty reduction. Indeed, whilst poverty has fallen from 71% of the population in 1996, it still encumbers 57% of the population as of 2014. Currently, the World Bank estimates that COVID will lead to 2 million more people falling into poverty (living under USD5.50 per day).
Seasonal workers harvest grapes at vineyard in the Hottentots Mountains in Stellenbosch, on February 23, 2021. MARCO LONGARI / AFP
Moreover, labor conditions in the South African wine industry have remained poor despite the industry’s growth. Low wages, coupled with seasonal working contracts, have left workers vulnerable to international market volatility, with over 21,000 jobs lost in the industry by October 2020 due to the pandemic.
Considering this, developing a foothold in the growing Chinese consumer market can provide our exports long-term opportunities from increasing demand. As such, this will stimulate additional direct jobs in wine agricultural production, alongside indirect jobs, such as in logistic and transport services, to meet export demand. As South African brands become more reputable, this will likely generate spill-over effects in wine tourism, therefore providing further employment opportunities in the service sector. The provision of jobs and incomes is critical for empowering people to lift themselves out of poverty.
Further, creating a sustainable long-term footprint for wine exports can support the revitalization of the South African economy in its post-COVID recovery. Our GDP growth dropped sharply to -8% in 2020. Whilst we are forecasted to have a healthy 3% GDP growth in 2021, additional growth is an essential factor for developing our economy and driving poverty reduction, alongside enhancing our ability to meet the Sustainable Development Goals in 2030.
The Pandemic, Coupled With Sino-Australian Tensions, Provides an Opportunity to Revitalize South African Wine Exports to China.
But we need to think long-term. Whilst in the short term the demand for wine is still recovering, the long-term payoffs of entering the market, whilst there is a gap, will bring phenomenal gains for the domestic industry back in South Africa. This is not limited to South Africa, and other wine-producing African countries should also seek to take advantage of this market opening. Put simply, this is an opportunity that African wine producers should not miss.
The Pandemic and Geopolitics Have Created New Opportunities For South African Wines in China
Premeditated
MANDE KANG
francophone countries have been outgrowing anglophone for a while now. the only anglophone ones are the usual, Kenya, Ghana
which countries do yall think will develop first. not a powerhouse but just develop?
despite c00ntara being a french bootlicker and clearly stealing the last election, Cote I'oviure has grown well the last 10 years. salaries are growing in most field, Abidjan I feel is the most sub saharan african city after South Africa and Botswana. If they can get over ethnic tension, I'll put them as a nominee to develop.
Obama and friends turned that country into an open-air slave market and it's all gravy, I guess.
loyola llothta
☭☭☭
mmmm....