reasonable_doubter
Banned
It looks very nice
But what are them roads looking like
some africans are trying to get around bad roads altogether,
https://face2faceafrica.com/article...nventor-who-created-africas-first-flying-taxi
Essential The Africa the Media Doesn't Tell You About
- Thread starter TommyHilltrigga
- Start date
some africans are trying to get around bad roads altogether,
https://face2faceafrica.com/article...nventor-who-created-africas-first-flying-taxi
reasonable_doubter
Banned
eu is a three legged stool; france/gb/germany..... if france loses its colonies, it may fall and if they fall the eu falls as well....
Algeria: resistance to IMF and World Bank plans
November 2 2019
Since February 22, Algeria has been experiencing large mass demonstrations. Initiated against then-president Bouteflika's fifth term, they have evolved into the fight against an undemocratic political system that threatens national sovereignty and workers' rights.
Trying to preserve its institutions, the regime initially removed Bouteflika. Power was taken directly by the Armed Forces summit and fake presidential elections were called in a first attempt on July 4 — which failed in the face of popular pressure — and then on December 12.
Seeking support from the major powers and international financial capital, the regime tries to impose, as soon as possible, counter-reforms intended by the IMF and the World Bank.
It turns out that in 2006 Algeria renationalized oil extraction. And in 2009, the so-called 51/49 rule was adopted, whereby all foreign investment cannot exceed the 49% control limit of a company and 51% must be Algerian capital.
Now the regime has introduced a 2020 budget law that suppresses the 51/49 rule and a bill that eases state control over oil once again. They also want to make a pension reform that raises the retirement age from 60 to 65 and reduces the retirement benefit to 60% of the last salary (currently the amount is 80%). All of this before December 12.
“No to handing over our oil”
The popular rejection of these measures was immediate and appeared in all its dimensions during the 34th and 35th weeks of mobilization: “no handing over our oil”, “the 2020 budget proposal mortgages the country's future”. According to the declaration of the Algerian Workers' Party of October 12, “the regime and the system it embodies are in crisis. After failing in all its attempts to convince 'politically' that the exit would be in the presidential election, the regime cannot enforce it by force.
For the overwhelming majority of the people, this presidential election is synonymous with maintaining the regime. The mobilization and rejection of the presidential election and the system does not slow down, which introduces doubt, even among those who have decided to participate in it. The press questions the lack of enthusiasm of the candidates and the 'enigmatic silence' of the principals among them. Then the regime panics and increases the pace of repression. It panics, it wants to go faster because it knows time is against it.”
In another statement, from October 21, analyzing the popular reaction to the 2020 budget and oil bill projects, the Workers' Party states that “the massive popular demonstration on Sunday, October 13, in Algiers and other cities, is a qualitative leap that demonstrates that the radical change required by millions has a political, economic and social content. It is a practical demonstration of what the Workers' Party has always said: there can be no national sovereignty without popular sovereignty and without sovereignty over national wealth.
For the Workers' Party, the means that will allow the people, really and practically, to fully exercise their sovereignty is the establishment of a Sovereign Constituent Assembly that will end the regime condemned by millions of Algerians and will enable the introduction of a new republic capable of giving a positive response to popular aspirations that have been continually raised for eight months.”
Algeria: resistance to IMF and World Bank plans
November 2 2019
Since February 22, Algeria has been experiencing large mass demonstrations. Initiated against then-president Bouteflika's fifth term, they have evolved into the fight against an undemocratic political system that threatens national sovereignty and workers' rights.
Trying to preserve its institutions, the regime initially removed Bouteflika. Power was taken directly by the Armed Forces summit and fake presidential elections were called in a first attempt on July 4 — which failed in the face of popular pressure — and then on December 12.
Seeking support from the major powers and international financial capital, the regime tries to impose, as soon as possible, counter-reforms intended by the IMF and the World Bank.
It turns out that in 2006 Algeria renationalized oil extraction. And in 2009, the so-called 51/49 rule was adopted, whereby all foreign investment cannot exceed the 49% control limit of a company and 51% must be Algerian capital.
Now the regime has introduced a 2020 budget law that suppresses the 51/49 rule and a bill that eases state control over oil once again. They also want to make a pension reform that raises the retirement age from 60 to 65 and reduces the retirement benefit to 60% of the last salary (currently the amount is 80%). All of this before December 12.
“No to handing over our oil”
The popular rejection of these measures was immediate and appeared in all its dimensions during the 34th and 35th weeks of mobilization: “no handing over our oil”, “the 2020 budget proposal mortgages the country's future”. According to the declaration of the Algerian Workers' Party of October 12, “the regime and the system it embodies are in crisis. After failing in all its attempts to convince 'politically' that the exit would be in the presidential election, the regime cannot enforce it by force.
For the overwhelming majority of the people, this presidential election is synonymous with maintaining the regime. The mobilization and rejection of the presidential election and the system does not slow down, which introduces doubt, even among those who have decided to participate in it. The press questions the lack of enthusiasm of the candidates and the 'enigmatic silence' of the principals among them. Then the regime panics and increases the pace of repression. It panics, it wants to go faster because it knows time is against it.”
In another statement, from October 21, analyzing the popular reaction to the 2020 budget and oil bill projects, the Workers' Party states that “the massive popular demonstration on Sunday, October 13, in Algiers and other cities, is a qualitative leap that demonstrates that the radical change required by millions has a political, economic and social content. It is a practical demonstration of what the Workers' Party has always said: there can be no national sovereignty without popular sovereignty and without sovereignty over national wealth.
For the Workers' Party, the means that will allow the people, really and practically, to fully exercise their sovereignty is the establishment of a Sovereign Constituent Assembly that will end the regime condemned by millions of Algerians and will enable the introduction of a new republic capable of giving a positive response to popular aspirations that have been continually raised for eight months.”
Algeria: resistance to IMF and World Bank plans
the one with the pretty girls
our Guinea
I can confirm this. Met a chick this weekend from Guniea. Miriam was her name. Ole girl was BADD. Slim petite ting with a some serious curves and a nice lil booty.
Forgot to grab her number
The unbundling of Eskom, Not just a Roadmap, But a Death Trap for South Africa’s Energy Independence
Published by admin at November 1, 2019
Pravin Gordhan, South Africa's minister for public enterprises, arrives for a news conference to announce the Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd. rescue plan in Pretoria, South Africa, on Tuesday, Oct. 29, 2019. Photographer: Waldo Swiegers/Bloomberg via Getty Images Background: Eskom power lines run through an open field in Johannesburg, South Africa, 08 June 2015. PHOTO: EPA/KIM LUDBROOK
The South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) joins NUMSA and NUM in opposing the decision to go ahead with the unbundling of Eskom.
What is at stake here is much more significant than simply breaking Eskom into three separate parts. The proposals made in the DPE’s Roadmap for Eskom in a Reformed Electricity Supply Industry, if implemented, will wreak havoc on South Africa’s energy system. The reason offered for the restructuring of Eskom into three subsidiary businesses – generation, transmission and distribution – is to “reduce the risk that Eskom poses to the country through its dependence on fiscal allocations and inability to supply the economy with adequate power.” But what is being proposed will leave Eskom in a worse state and leave consumers worse off. By 2030, South Africa will have lost its energy independence, sovereignty and will be dependent on multinationals based in Europe and China. Costs will rise astronomically, and these costs will either be recovered through increased tariffs, state interventions, or both. We will be back to square one, but we will have lost control over our energy system.
Moreover, there is no attempt to account how it came that a world leading energy company ended up with a massive debt of between R450 and R500 billion. There is no attempt to explain how unbundling will address this debt trap. No explanation is given as to how breaking up Eskom into three components with three CEOs, three executives, three boards and staff will drive the costs down.
Information is hidden to the public that Eskom is effectively subsidising overseas private firms. The country is not being told that the Independent Power Producers are importing readymade renewable equipment such as solar panels out of the country. They are creating employment in other parts of the country but generate profits at the expense of the public utility, Eskom. Above all, Eskom is not allowed to enter the renewable space which is designed and reserved for the Independent Power Producers who have been asked to invest in renewables without taking any risks. Their profits are guaranteed for the next twenty years. This is a rip off and a deliberate milking dry of the public utility. This will render Eskom useless to bolster the chance of the private sector to take over the provision of the public good not in a too distant future. The question that arises is who really stand to benefit from this? What model of a competition is this? Wake up South Africa and smell the coffee, the country is being sold the to the highest bidder!
The DPE’s Roadmap claims that breaking up Eskom will usher in a “new business model.” This model is not consistent with the principle that electricity is a public good that should be used for human development and to strengthen the national economy. The proposed new model can be labelled “electricity for profit” where private interests, many based outside of South Africa, will enjoy Government backed guaranteed returns on investment as a result of 20-year power purchase agreements (PPAs).
Without mentioning the word “privatisation” once in the entire Roadmap for Eskom document, it is plainly obvious that what the DPE is proposing comes straight from the World Bank’s privatisation handbook. It is consistent with the Bank’s “privatisation in stages” approach attempted in many other countries.
According to this plan, first the public utility is broken up, but its component parts will remain–for a while–in public hands. Then for-profit independent power producers (IPPs) are offered long term contracts (power purchase agreements, or PPAs) to take over new generation capacity. We have seen this already with the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Programme, or REIPPP. Privately-owned generation is phased in, publicly owned generation is phased out.
According to the DPE, Eskom’s future in power generation will be as one of many generators bidding for PPA contracts. It is claimed that this is but a steppingstone that “will thereafter transition to an open‐market model.” In other words, Eskom’s generation must first compete with other IPPs as if it were a private entity. According to the DPE, “Consideration is being given to create two or more generation subsidiaries to introduce intra‐company competition among the generation subsidiaries and drive efficiencies in generation.” In other words, separate parts of Eskom’s fleet will be forced to compete against each other on what will be an overcrowded generation market and sluggish energy demand. This is how privatisation happens: impose “market rules””, split up the business and sit back and watch how public entities struggle to reconcile their public mission of providing affordable electricity with the imperatives of profit making.
The DPE points to Vietnam as a successful example of this approach, but it fails to mention that demand for electricity in Vietnam has been rising at an average of 7% per year and nearly all of this added demand is being provided by new coal-fired capacity. In the context of South Africa, revenues from what is now Eskom’s existing fleet will plummet and the “death spiral” will intensify. With the planned decommissioning of 12GW of coal by 2030 under IRP 2019, it is clear where things are heading. Eskom’s share of generation will fall from 90% to 60% by 2030, and fall still further after that. The share of private generation will rise accordingly. But South Africa will still be dependent on coal-fired power for most of its electricity.
The DPE’s Roadmap for Eskom proposes that a separate Transmission Entity be formed, one that is “100% Owned by Eskom Holdings” (Eskom-TE). Eskom-TE will buy energy from generators as procured by the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy. Therefore, Eskom TE will have no control over the mix of generation that will be procured; it will simply have to do what it is told. The current use of PPAs for renewables will ensure that Eskom TE will be required to purchase ever larger volumes of wind and solar power, which is variable, costly and “non dispatchable,” at a pre-agreed price that must be high enough to deliver returns on investment for private developers and technology companies based overseas. The DPE says the goal is to “foster a competitive” market, but without the certainty of an “out of market” PPA, no private company will be able to raise finance for new projects. , nor will there be competition without an explicit sovereign guarantee that REIPPP currently enjoys.
The proposal to create a separate Transmission Entity is both myopic and inward looking. The DPE should learn the lessons from other countries. As more renewable energy comes on line, the greater the technical and financial burdens fall on the transmission networks. Seen in the context of the adoption of the IRP, this will incur costs to upgrade the grid and–because renewable energy is variable–the development of storage capacity, spinning reserve costs and technologies that better balance supply with demand. Who will pay for this? Not the IPPs. The system costs associated with integrating an enormous amount of privately-owned renewable energy (an estimated 16.5 GW of additional capacity by 2030) will become Eskom-TE’s responsibility. The DPE says these costs will be “ring fenced and clearly defined.” But this does not make the costs go away. To recover these costs, tariffs will have to increase, or the state will need to provide public money in order to sustain the “energy for profit” business model.
Meanwhile, if the current REIPP programme is allowed to grow as projected, more than half of South Africa’s generating capacity, and virtually all of its renewables’ capacity, will by 2030 be operating under long term PPAs with companies that are not based in South Africa and who source technologies mostly from Europe or China. With up to 12GW of coal-fired generation decommissioned in the next 15 years, South Africa will be vulnerable to price blackmail by multinational companies. The country will be in danger of both losing its energy independence, sovereignty and of being denied access to the technologies needed to generate its own electricity.
It is ironic that the proposal to unbundle Eskom and to introduce a “new business model” (electricity as a profit-making commodity, and not as a public service) is being pursued at a time
The unbundling of Eskom, Not just a Roadmap, But a Death Trap for South Africa’s Energy Independence
Published by admin at November 1, 2019
Pravin Gordhan, South Africa's minister for public enterprises, arrives for a news conference to announce the Eskom Holdings SOC Ltd. rescue plan in Pretoria, South Africa, on Tuesday, Oct. 29, 2019. Photographer: Waldo Swiegers/Bloomberg via Getty Images Background: Eskom power lines run through an open field in Johannesburg, South Africa, 08 June 2015. PHOTO: EPA/KIM LUDBROOK
The South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) joins NUMSA and NUM in opposing the decision to go ahead with the unbundling of Eskom.
What is at stake here is much more significant than simply breaking Eskom into three separate parts. The proposals made in the DPE’s Roadmap for Eskom in a Reformed Electricity Supply Industry, if implemented, will wreak havoc on South Africa’s energy system. The reason offered for the restructuring of Eskom into three subsidiary businesses – generation, transmission and distribution – is to “reduce the risk that Eskom poses to the country through its dependence on fiscal allocations and inability to supply the economy with adequate power.” But what is being proposed will leave Eskom in a worse state and leave consumers worse off. By 2030, South Africa will have lost its energy independence, sovereignty and will be dependent on multinationals based in Europe and China. Costs will rise astronomically, and these costs will either be recovered through increased tariffs, state interventions, or both. We will be back to square one, but we will have lost control over our energy system.
Moreover, there is no attempt to account how it came that a world leading energy company ended up with a massive debt of between R450 and R500 billion. There is no attempt to explain how unbundling will address this debt trap. No explanation is given as to how breaking up Eskom into three components with three CEOs, three executives, three boards and staff will drive the costs down.
Information is hidden to the public that Eskom is effectively subsidising overseas private firms. The country is not being told that the Independent Power Producers are importing readymade renewable equipment such as solar panels out of the country. They are creating employment in other parts of the country but generate profits at the expense of the public utility, Eskom. Above all, Eskom is not allowed to enter the renewable space which is designed and reserved for the Independent Power Producers who have been asked to invest in renewables without taking any risks. Their profits are guaranteed for the next twenty years. This is a rip off and a deliberate milking dry of the public utility. This will render Eskom useless to bolster the chance of the private sector to take over the provision of the public good not in a too distant future. The question that arises is who really stand to benefit from this? What model of a competition is this? Wake up South Africa and smell the coffee, the country is being sold the to the highest bidder!
The DPE’s Roadmap claims that breaking up Eskom will usher in a “new business model.” This model is not consistent with the principle that electricity is a public good that should be used for human development and to strengthen the national economy. The proposed new model can be labelled “electricity for profit” where private interests, many based outside of South Africa, will enjoy Government backed guaranteed returns on investment as a result of 20-year power purchase agreements (PPAs).
Without mentioning the word “privatisation” once in the entire Roadmap for Eskom document, it is plainly obvious that what the DPE is proposing comes straight from the World Bank’s privatisation handbook. It is consistent with the Bank’s “privatisation in stages” approach attempted in many other countries.
According to this plan, first the public utility is broken up, but its component parts will remain–for a while–in public hands. Then for-profit independent power producers (IPPs) are offered long term contracts (power purchase agreements, or PPAs) to take over new generation capacity. We have seen this already with the Renewable Energy Independent Power Producers Programme, or REIPPP. Privately-owned generation is phased in, publicly owned generation is phased out.
According to the DPE, Eskom’s future in power generation will be as one of many generators bidding for PPA contracts. It is claimed that this is but a steppingstone that “will thereafter transition to an open‐market model.” In other words, Eskom’s generation must first compete with other IPPs as if it were a private entity. According to the DPE, “Consideration is being given to create two or more generation subsidiaries to introduce intra‐company competition among the generation subsidiaries and drive efficiencies in generation.” In other words, separate parts of Eskom’s fleet will be forced to compete against each other on what will be an overcrowded generation market and sluggish energy demand. This is how privatisation happens: impose “market rules””, split up the business and sit back and watch how public entities struggle to reconcile their public mission of providing affordable electricity with the imperatives of profit making.
The DPE points to Vietnam as a successful example of this approach, but it fails to mention that demand for electricity in Vietnam has been rising at an average of 7% per year and nearly all of this added demand is being provided by new coal-fired capacity. In the context of South Africa, revenues from what is now Eskom’s existing fleet will plummet and the “death spiral” will intensify. With the planned decommissioning of 12GW of coal by 2030 under IRP 2019, it is clear where things are heading. Eskom’s share of generation will fall from 90% to 60% by 2030, and fall still further after that. The share of private generation will rise accordingly. But South Africa will still be dependent on coal-fired power for most of its electricity.
The DPE’s Roadmap for Eskom proposes that a separate Transmission Entity be formed, one that is “100% Owned by Eskom Holdings” (Eskom-TE). Eskom-TE will buy energy from generators as procured by the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy. Therefore, Eskom TE will have no control over the mix of generation that will be procured; it will simply have to do what it is told. The current use of PPAs for renewables will ensure that Eskom TE will be required to purchase ever larger volumes of wind and solar power, which is variable, costly and “non dispatchable,” at a pre-agreed price that must be high enough to deliver returns on investment for private developers and technology companies based overseas. The DPE says the goal is to “foster a competitive” market, but without the certainty of an “out of market” PPA, no private company will be able to raise finance for new projects. , nor will there be competition without an explicit sovereign guarantee that REIPPP currently enjoys.
The proposal to create a separate Transmission Entity is both myopic and inward looking. The DPE should learn the lessons from other countries. As more renewable energy comes on line, the greater the technical and financial burdens fall on the transmission networks. Seen in the context of the adoption of the IRP, this will incur costs to upgrade the grid and–because renewable energy is variable–the development of storage capacity, spinning reserve costs and technologies that better balance supply with demand. Who will pay for this? Not the IPPs. The system costs associated with integrating an enormous amount of privately-owned renewable energy (an estimated 16.5 GW of additional capacity by 2030) will become Eskom-TE’s responsibility. The DPE says these costs will be “ring fenced and clearly defined.” But this does not make the costs go away. To recover these costs, tariffs will have to increase, or the state will need to provide public money in order to sustain the “energy for profit” business model.
Meanwhile, if the current REIPP programme is allowed to grow as projected, more than half of South Africa’s generating capacity, and virtually all of its renewables’ capacity, will by 2030 be operating under long term PPAs with companies that are not based in South Africa and who source technologies mostly from Europe or China. With up to 12GW of coal-fired generation decommissioned in the next 15 years, South Africa will be vulnerable to price blackmail by multinational companies. The country will be in danger of both losing its energy independence, sovereignty and of being denied access to the technologies needed to generate its own electricity.
It is ironic that the proposal to unbundle Eskom and to introduce a “new business model” (electricity as a profit-making commodity, and not as a public service) is being pursued at a time
- When the World Bank is itself questioning the viability of this model. According to a recently released World Bank sponsored review of thirty years of privatisation and liberalisation of power systems in developing countries, 60% of new generation investment is publicly funded and transmission and distribution systems remain publicly owned. Furthermore, “Extending access to electricity to the peri-urban and rural periphery often leads a utility into diminishing and even negative marginal returns on investment, particularly if the power consumption of poor households remains very low. Thus, universal electrification cannot be achieved purely by allowing a utility to pursue commercial incentives.” (See World Bank report “rethinking power sector reform in the developing world” published by the World Bank group, Washington DC 2019)Opposes the breakup of Eskom. This is privatisation by stages. Generation, transmission and distribution must remain public
- This model is sustained by expensive power purchase agreements (PPAs) with IPPs where the costs of sustaining and balancing the system fall on the shoulders of public entities or end users.
SAFTU stands ready and in fact demand that the government creates an energy crisis conference wherein we together with progressive local and international energy policy groups can make proposals on how we can rescue Eskom and build a socially owned renewable energy sector in South Africa.
- Opposes the breakup/unbundling of Eskom on basis of legality and rationality. Eskom is an organ of statute and any breakup/unbundling thereof must be preceded by constitutionally valid legislative amendments. Parliament is called to urgently play its constitutionally entrenched role in regard to this matter. The breakup/unbundling of Eskom as proposed is a disguised but brutal form of privatisation of Eskom’s business activities which are essential to sustainable economic growth and job creation. SAFTU insists that Eskom must remain state owned as an integrated utility with generation, transmission and distribution.
- Rejects the “new business model” based on electricity-for-profit. This model is sustained by expensive power purchase agreements (PPAs) with IPPs where the costs of sustaining and balancing the system fall on the shoulders of Eskom whilst electricity consumers suffer higher electricity prices which have increased by more than 310% in the past ten years.
- Supports a just energy transition in South Africa that is carefully planned, avoids job losses, with a reformed vertically and horizontally integrated national utility taking the lead.
- Supports social ownership of renewable energy, with deployment levels based on a clear set of goals and principles. The immediate task is, therefore, the plan to insource the skills and technologies needed to develop a domestic renewable energy industry from 2025 onwards, or sooner if possible.
The unbundling of Eskom, Not just a Roadmap, But a Death Trap for South Africa’s Energy Independence
Secure Da Bag
Veteran
France deploying soldiers to Burkina Faso to stop terrorism.
loyola llothta
☭☭☭
France army force was caught raping women and children afew years ago in one of the Francophone...
loyola llothta
☭☭☭
Burkina Vista Social Club: Afro-Cuban music in the midst of musical and political nostalgia
October 17 2019 | 10:04
A band playing Cuban rhythms in Ouagadougou, September 15 2019 | AFP/Archives
Cuba, Burkina, Sankara, Ouaga, rumba, salsa, cha-cha-cha: Cuban music rhymes with Africa, and in Ouagadougou, Afro-Cuban music is successful in an atmosphere of nostalgia and politics.
Sports Bar, Mezzanine, Kaseto Rimnoma... many bars in Ouagadougou program live orchestras that play Afro-Cuban music for fans often aged 60–70 years or more but still alive on the dance floor. There are some young people but they are rather an exception.
With his Borsalino hat and dark glasses, the bass player plays a Cuban rhythm together with a 65-year-old guitar player who plays without seeming to touch the strings.
At the Boulougou bar, founded in 1952, one would think they are seeing a reformation of the mythical Buena Vista Social Club, which jumped to stardom in the 90s after years of oblivion and when its virtuous members (Compay Segundo, Ibrahim Ferrer, Manuel Mirabal) were already grandfathers. They are Les Elites du Faso, a band from Burkina Faso, composed of musicians who were young at the time of the Cuban Revolution.
"The Burkinabé like Cuban music because it reminds them of the old times, the times of our fathers and our former president Thomas Sankara, who also loved Cuban music", says singer Bobo Seydou, born in 1965.
"Revolutionaries"
Cuban music owes part of its success to Cuba's soft-power politics at the time of the struggles for independence and the anti-imperialist leaders that followed.
Among them was Thomas Sankara, nicknamed the "African Che", who chaired Burkina from 1983 until his assassination in 1987. A Pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist, Sankara — who lived a modest life — tried to eliminate corruption and put focus on education and health while supporting agriculture. His Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), responsible for controlling the population with an iron fist, were the dark side of his regime.
Under Sankara, many Burkinabé went to study in Cuba. Conversely, if Cuba sent political, military, and medical advisers to Africa, the island also had orchestras there, such as the famous Orquesta Aragón.
The private lives of Les Elites du Faso members also tell this story.
Musicians from the band Les Elites du Faso perform on stage in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, September 15, 2019 | AFP
Bobo Seydou is not from Burkina Faso but from Guinea-Bissau where they had "25 years of war for liberation" (1974). "It was the Cubans who provided us with weapons" as well as military instructors against the Portuguese, he said, pointing out that "Amílcar Cabral (murdered in 1973) and Thomas Sankara (murdered in 1987) were revolutionaries".
"At that time, I was in the military. I left the barracks at night to play at funerals, weddings, baptisms. Cuban music was in fashion...", he says. He keeps from this time a finger mutilated by a shooting accident.
In 1978, with his group Africa Ritmo, he left Guinea-Bissau looking for "adventure". "We were young, we left. We dreamed of Europe. We played Cuban music", he recalls. He randomly arrived in Burkina Faso in 1978 and hasn't left since.
Five years later, Sankara takes power. "I played at the CDR conference. We played with him. He loved music. He liked both Cuban and Congolese music", says Bobo.
Orchestre Missile
At that time his band often played at a bar everyone remembers: Don Camilo. "We played everything but also Cuban music or Cuban-inspired personal compositions. Cuban doctors would come to dance".
Portrait of former president Thomas Sankara, killed in October 1987, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, March 3, 2019 | AFP/Archives
Those were wonderful times for musicians. "Sankara lowered the price of drinks and favored live bands. He did not like nightclubs. People were coming out. We were doing great at that time", he says.
Today, although nightclubs are slowly taking over live music, Ouagadougou remains a musical capital with a scene still alive. Music and politics remain linked, since 2014 uprising that overthrew Blaise Compaoré was the work of many young people who called themselves Sankarists and listened to rap and reggae.
The guitar player, Roger Bihoun, 65 years old, can brag about having been a part of the same band as Sankara, who was also a nice guitar player: the Orchestre Missile. "At the time he was an officer. Before being president. He sang and played well. He knew music quite well, although he was not a virtuoso", says Bihoun, who claims to have given Sankara advice on the guitar. "He later had less time to play, but he kept doing it during his presidency".
The revolutions are over but on the dance floor, Ousseny Lamizana, retired and 67 years old, a master of all dance steps, turns young again. "We're having a blast", he says, sitting next to a cold beer. For him, Cuba and Africa are inseparable.
"There is a lot of African culture in Cuban music, rhythm and percussion, of course: salsa comes from Cuba but is African! Rumba is African!!!".
Burkina Vista Social Club: Afro-Cuban music in the midst of musical and political nostalgia
October 17 2019 | 10:04
A band playing Cuban rhythms in Ouagadougou, September 15 2019 | AFP/Archives
Cuba, Burkina, Sankara, Ouaga, rumba, salsa, cha-cha-cha: Cuban music rhymes with Africa, and in Ouagadougou, Afro-Cuban music is successful in an atmosphere of nostalgia and politics.
Sports Bar, Mezzanine, Kaseto Rimnoma... many bars in Ouagadougou program live orchestras that play Afro-Cuban music for fans often aged 60–70 years or more but still alive on the dance floor. There are some young people but they are rather an exception.
With his Borsalino hat and dark glasses, the bass player plays a Cuban rhythm together with a 65-year-old guitar player who plays without seeming to touch the strings.
At the Boulougou bar, founded in 1952, one would think they are seeing a reformation of the mythical Buena Vista Social Club, which jumped to stardom in the 90s after years of oblivion and when its virtuous members (Compay Segundo, Ibrahim Ferrer, Manuel Mirabal) were already grandfathers. They are Les Elites du Faso, a band from Burkina Faso, composed of musicians who were young at the time of the Cuban Revolution.
"The Burkinabé like Cuban music because it reminds them of the old times, the times of our fathers and our former president Thomas Sankara, who also loved Cuban music", says singer Bobo Seydou, born in 1965.
"Revolutionaries"
Cuban music owes part of its success to Cuba's soft-power politics at the time of the struggles for independence and the anti-imperialist leaders that followed.
Among them was Thomas Sankara, nicknamed the "African Che", who chaired Burkina from 1983 until his assassination in 1987. A Pan-Africanist and anti-imperialist, Sankara — who lived a modest life — tried to eliminate corruption and put focus on education and health while supporting agriculture. His Committees for the Defense of the Revolution (CDR), responsible for controlling the population with an iron fist, were the dark side of his regime.
Under Sankara, many Burkinabé went to study in Cuba. Conversely, if Cuba sent political, military, and medical advisers to Africa, the island also had orchestras there, such as the famous Orquesta Aragón.
The private lives of Les Elites du Faso members also tell this story.
Musicians from the band Les Elites du Faso perform on stage in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, September 15, 2019 | AFP
Bobo Seydou is not from Burkina Faso but from Guinea-Bissau where they had "25 years of war for liberation" (1974). "It was the Cubans who provided us with weapons" as well as military instructors against the Portuguese, he said, pointing out that "Amílcar Cabral (murdered in 1973) and Thomas Sankara (murdered in 1987) were revolutionaries".
"At that time, I was in the military. I left the barracks at night to play at funerals, weddings, baptisms. Cuban music was in fashion...", he says. He keeps from this time a finger mutilated by a shooting accident.
In 1978, with his group Africa Ritmo, he left Guinea-Bissau looking for "adventure". "We were young, we left. We dreamed of Europe. We played Cuban music", he recalls. He randomly arrived in Burkina Faso in 1978 and hasn't left since.
Five years later, Sankara takes power. "I played at the CDR conference. We played with him. He loved music. He liked both Cuban and Congolese music", says Bobo.
Orchestre Missile
At that time his band often played at a bar everyone remembers: Don Camilo. "We played everything but also Cuban music or Cuban-inspired personal compositions. Cuban doctors would come to dance".
Portrait of former president Thomas Sankara, killed in October 1987, in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, March 3, 2019 | AFP/Archives
Those were wonderful times for musicians. "Sankara lowered the price of drinks and favored live bands. He did not like nightclubs. People were coming out. We were doing great at that time", he says.
Today, although nightclubs are slowly taking over live music, Ouagadougou remains a musical capital with a scene still alive. Music and politics remain linked, since 2014 uprising that overthrew Blaise Compaoré was the work of many young people who called themselves Sankarists and listened to rap and reggae.
The guitar player, Roger Bihoun, 65 years old, can brag about having been a part of the same band as Sankara, who was also a nice guitar player: the Orchestre Missile. "At the time he was an officer. Before being president. He sang and played well. He knew music quite well, although he was not a virtuoso", says Bihoun, who claims to have given Sankara advice on the guitar. "He later had less time to play, but he kept doing it during his presidency".
The revolutions are over but on the dance floor, Ousseny Lamizana, retired and 67 years old, a master of all dance steps, turns young again. "We're having a blast", he says, sitting next to a cold beer. For him, Cuba and Africa are inseparable.
"There is a lot of African culture in Cuban music, rhythm and percussion, of course: salsa comes from Cuba but is African! Rumba is African!!!".
Burkina Vista Social Club: Afro-Cuban music in the midst of musical and political nostalgia
staticshock
Veteran
Did anyone here attend grade school in Africa?
loyola llothta
☭☭☭
loyola llothta
☭☭☭
loyola llothta
☭☭☭
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I did. K-2nd grade in Nigeria. Then high school in Nigeria as well.