Essential The Africa the Media Doesn't Tell You About

[loyola llothta]

15 August 2019

Sudan’s “Constitutional Declaration” Leaves Out Key Political Forces. Attempted Military Coups and Regional Intrigue

Factions within military accused of attempted coups while reports of purge of “Islamists” continue
By Abayomi Azikiwe

Members of the Sudanese Professional Association (SPA), a leading organization within the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), announced on August 9 that they would have no representatives in the soon to be created transitional government.

This report comes in the midst of a whirlwind of political developments inside the oil-producing African state which has experienced social unrest, a military coup and ongoing negotiations aimed at establishing an effective interim process.

Former President Omer Hassan al-Bashir of the National Congress Party (NCP) was ousted in a putsch on April 11, just five days after the commencement of a sit-in outside the defense headquarters in the capital of Khartoum. The occupation remained until it was violently dispersed nearly two months later at the aegis of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), an important component of the security apparatus in the country.

Demonstrations began in Sudan during mid-December as a rise in bread prices triggered thousands of people to move into the streets in protest. Soon enough the demands shifted from economic grievances to the call for the resignation of President al-Bashir.

A Political Declaration agreed to by the FFC and the Transitional Military Council (TMC) which has ruled the nation since April 11, laid a framework for a Sovereign Council where representatives from both the TMC and FFC will share power for 39 months leading up to multi-party elections. The terms of the implementation of the Constitutional component of the three-pronged transitional framework will remain uncertain particularly with the absence of a pathway towards peace which is contingent upon its adoption by the armed opposition groupings, the Left and other disaffected tendencies.

However, the armed Sudanese Revolutionary Front (SRF) and the Sudanese Communist Party (SCP) have already expressed their displeasure with the terms of the Political Declaration leaving the possibility of continuing demonstrations and other forms of resistance. This same position has carried over as it relates to the Constitutional Declaration agreement as well. The third component of the transitional arrangement, the Legislative Council, is yet to be determined by the principal negotiators of the FFC and the TMC.



Sudanese celebrate the signing of the Constitutional Declaration on August 9, 2019 (Photo by EWN)

Other groups which have significant followings, the National Umma Party and the Sudanese Congress Party (SCP) have also revealed they will not be a part of the transitional government based in Khartoum. An apparent restless populace which has been the target of highly repressive measures by the security forces may not be willing to remain optimistic in light of a myriad of unanswered questions related to the country’s future.

SRF affiliates have been engaged in military operations against the central government for many years. Two of the principal members of the alliance are fighting against SAF and RSF units in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and the Darfur region.

Consequently, when the SPA said it would not participate in the transitional government, additional questions came to the fore. Moreover, how long will the negotiations continue on outstanding issues related to the Political Declaration and the Constitutional Declaration? A Legislative Council is also under discussion which would theoretically seal a pathway towards a new dispensation.

In an article published by Sudan Tribuneon August 9, it says that:

“The Sudanese Professionals’ Association and the opposition Unionist Gathering have announced that they will not participate in the transitional government due to be formed in late August. The two groups were the spearhead of the protest movement that lasted for months before to topple the regime of Omer al-Bashir in April 2019.”




This same above-mentioned dispatch goes on to note:

“Babikir Faisal the Chairman of the Unionist Gathering’s Executive Committee told reporters on Wednesday (Aug. 7) that they would not take part in the upcoming government. ’The Gathering will not participate in the transitional government,’ Babikir told a news conference on Wednesday. He stressed that there are no quotas in the transitional government and that what is circulating through the media are ‘mere rumors.’”

Therefore, despite the extensive discussions between the FFC and TMC in both Khartoum and in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, under the mediation of the African Union (AU), existing contentious issues are unresolved. There can be no effective transition to even a bourgeois democratic government without securing sustainable peace treaties mandating the laying down of arms and the creation of an inclusive administration.

Attempted Military Coups and Regional Intrigue

Another key element of the Sudanese political crises is the numerous accounts of attempted counter-coups within the SAF itself. Several high-ranking military officials have been arrested where they join former President al-Bashir in detention.

In addition, there were rumors of ongoing “purges of Islamists” military personnel from the SAF. Defining what the term “Islamists” actually means within the context of contemporary Sudan is undoubtedly complex. The previous government of the NCP under al-Bashir was categorized by some as “Islamist.”

At the same time there are other political tendencies such as the Umma Party and the Popular Congress Party (PCP), long in opposition to the NCP, as also fitting into this characterization. These factors raise the question as to the nature of the political disagreements obviously plaguing the military apparatus.

For example, the crackdown on the mass demonstrations which occurred in the capital of Khartoum on June 3 has been attributed to the RSF. In a sense the SAF has attempted to distance itself from some of the harsher forms of repression which have resulted in the deaths of more than 300 people.

On the international level, there are reports that the RSF militias are supplying weapons to opposition forces in the Central African Republic (CAR). The Seleka Coalition, an alliance of several organizations dominated by the CAR’s minority Muslim population, has recently signed a peace deal with the government in the capital of Bangui.

Seleka Coalition affiliates are said to be concerned about a possible offensive to disarm their forces. This comes amid the increasing presence of advisors from the Russian Federation who were requested to assist the military of the CAR by its current President Faustin-Archange Touadera. The appeal was made directly to Russian President Vladimir Putin on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in 2017.

Moreover, SAF units are still cooperating with Saudi Arabia and other regional states in the now more than four-year old war being wage in Yemen. This is a United States engineered bombing and ground campaign designed to weaken the Ansurallah (Houthis) Movement. The U.S., Britain and their allies contend that the Ansurrallah are backed by the Islamic Republic of Iran and therefore viewed as a threat to the strategic balance of forces in the Middle East.

The Aims of Imperialism in Sudan

Washington’s foreign policy towards Sudan has been geared towards regime-change and a total capturing of the state for the purpose ensuring compliance with its political and economic objectives in North and Central Africa. The fact that the previous government of President al-Bashir had exercised a degree of independence from successive U.S. administrations, both Democratic and Republican, resulted in hostile actions towards the NCP over a number of years.

The al-Bashir government had made firm economic agreements with the People’s Republic of China in regard to its drilling and export of oil. Ousted President al-Bahir also defied the warrants issued against him by the International Criminal Court (ICC), saying that they would not recognize this imperialist construct as having any authority over the country and its leaders.

Nevertheless, this modicum of independent domestic and international policy would shift after 2014 with the decline in petroleum prices and the worsening economic outlook for the Republic of Sudan in the aftermath of the partitioning of the South. The Republic of South Sudan came into being in 2011 largely as a result of the contradictions which developed during the period of British colonialism in the late 19th and early-to-mid 20th centuries until the country became liberated in 1956.

Britain ruled Sudan as two separate entities involving the North and the South. These divisions fomented two civil wars, from 1955-1972, and later from 1983 through 2003. The transition to partition reduced the economic and territorial status of the Republic of Sudan, which prior to the independence of Juba, was the largest geographic nation-state in Africa.

The U.S., Britain and the State of Israel supported the creation of the Republic of South Sudan. As events have developed since 2013, the Republic of South Sudan has not proven to be a viable state and has been inflicted with civil war due to a split within the ruling Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A). Both Juba and Khartoum are suffering from internal conflict and economic malaise. Consequently, the imperialist legacy of domination has effectively impeded the genuine development of the now two separate states.

Of course this contemporary history has profound significance for other regional states and Africa as a whole. The necessity for the resolution of internal conflict and the maintenance of sovereignty is the major question facing the AU. The degree to which the Republic of Sudan can resolve its present situation will prove instructive to other African and developing nations.

Sudan's "Constitutional Declaration" Leaves Out Key Political Forces. Attempted Military Coups and Regional Intrigue - Global Research

 

[loyola llothta]

 

[loyola llothta]

28 August 2019
U.S. Africa Command Marks a Controversial Return to Libya
By Alaeddin Saleh

The spokesman of Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous coalition Mohammed Al-Ghasri confirmed in an interview to a Libyan media outlet “Ain Libiya” that U.S. African Command team arrived at Air Defense College airbase located in Libyan port city of Misurata on July 22.

He said that USAF aircraft carrying American military came to Libya in a framework of cooperation with the UN-backed Government of National Accord Presidential Council in field of combating the Islamic State.

“We welcome any kind of cooperation in this sphere,” added Mohamed Al-Ghasri.

Previous report also claims that the USAF C17-A Globemaster III, a large military transport aircraft (10-0222) callsign RCH157, left the Aqaba airport, Jordan, for Misurata.

This is the first statement made by officials of both Libya and the United States, concerning the return of U.S. troops to Libya since the AFRICOM announced last April a temporarily relocation of all security personnel from this country. The move caused by the “increase of unrest” subsequent to the launch of military operation to capture Tripoli by the Libyan commander Khalifa Haftar.

“The command is making the personnel adjustments in response to the evolving security situation. U.S. Africa Command will continue to monitor conditions on the ground in Libya, and assess the feasibility for renewed U.S. military presence, as appropriate,” the US AFRICOM said in an April statement.

Contradicting statements

Given the promises to re-establish the military presence in Libya, a report on the arrival of American military doesn’t come as a surprise.

However, on July 25 the U.S.


AFRICOM spokeswoman Becky Farmer stirred things up by saying to the London-based Ashark Al-Awsat newspaper that no force was sent to Misurata.

Thus, the official version announced by the U.S. mouthpiece appeared to be completely at odds with what Mohammed Al-Ghasri stated. The Al-Bunyan Al-Marsous alliance – made up basically of armed groups and Islamist factions from Misurata – was formed in 2016 and took a leading part in cooperation with the US in eradicating the ISIS terrorists in the city of Sirte. Seems that this time they failed to coordinate moves.

Such discrepancies contained in those statements conveyed an impression that Washington still officially attempts to maintain a cautious position on Libya and was reluctant to help escalate confrontation between the Government of National Accord and the Libyan National Army led by commander Khalifa Haftar.

Many analysts consider that the United States has no clear and unified approach to resolving the long-standing conflict in North African country and continues to be confronted with the dilemma which of two warring parties they should support.

The U.S. shift to the Tripoli’s unity government and the city-state of Misurata

It’s important to point out that Misurata remains the main bastion of the anti-Haftar military forces, the bulk of them Islamist.

In this context, the decision to dispatch the U.S. troops namely to Misurata might have become a marker for a major shift in policies and modus operandi of the United States toward the oil-rich country. This shift can mean that Americans took a side of the GNA that has been long relying on a wide range of influential militias in domestic affairs, and on the backing of Qatar and Turkey in external.

In addition, it’s worth noting that to date no official response has been released neither on the AFRICOM website nor its Twitter. Neglecting these discrediting claims circulated by the GNA high-ranking military official seems suspicious as it used to pay close attention to the image of its military mission in Libya as well as the public perception of its tasks performed. AFRICOM also hardly worked on preventing its actions in Libya to be misinterpreted.

On this occasion, silence had precisely the opposite effect and put an apparently feeble attempt to obscure yet uncertain involvement of the American military in the Libyan conflict in the spotlight. If it’s true, this might jeopardize the reputation of the US as a neutral and “uniquely qualified external actor” capable of exerting influence on the rival parties and broker the peace.

Beyond that, any involvement in malicious activities in one of the pivotal countries in Northern Africa isn’t a good advertisement for the AFRICOM and its newly appointed commander U.S. Army General Stephen Townsend. On one hand the renewal of the American military presence in Libya could serve as an effective starting point for the career development of the new commander, who previously advocated for a more proactive role of the US in the region amid the growing foreign interference there. But on the other, Washington, in this case, will no longer be able to act as a neutral international mediator in the Libyan crisis.

U.S. Africa Command Marks a Controversial Return to Libya - Global Research

 

[Yehuda]

The Sudanese Revolution: The Third and Last?

by Nicole Guardiola
15 July 2019

Bread, Peace, Justice. Three simple words that sum up the initial programme of the popular uprising in Sudan which began in December 2018 and is ongoing. However, the mass movement that brought President Omar al-Bashir down did not end when he was toppled by the military on April 11. People are still mobilized peacefully and orderly for they want to bring their democratic national revolution to completion, the third since the country gained independence in 1956.

The previous attempts took place in 1964 e 1985 and ended with military coup d’état that gave place to new dictatorships, more iron-fisted and liberticidal than the previous. The last, put in place in 1989 by coronel Omar el Bashir and his mentor, ideologist Hassan al Tourabi, both Muslim Brothers, lasted three decades.

However, the so-called “international community”, which dedicated to the events in Sudan not even one-tenth of the attention given to the Venezuelan or Algerian crises, was awakened by the rumble of the fall of the dictator of Khartoum. It was as if Western, Arab and African governments understood suddenly that a democratic revolution in Sudan may have devastating effects on the stability of neighbouring countries and on the regional balance of power, entailing feverish political and diplomatic agitation.

Very few specialists are interested in the particularities of Sudan, which many consider “too dark to be Arab and too Arab to be African”, following French journalist Christophe Ayad’s formula.

Sudanese demonstrators celebrate the arrest of long-time President Omar al-Bashir by the armed forces, outside the Defense Ministry. Ala Kheir/Picture Alliance via Getty Images

It is a “curse” that haunts the Sudanese ever since ancient times, because the long history of “bilād as-sūdān” (country of the black people, in Arab), used in the 11th century by Andalusian historian Al-Bakri, was always eclipsed by the grandeur of Pharaonic Egypt. This concept was eternalized by racist European colonizers of the 19th century, who thought that black people were too wild and backward to have history.

Granted that the field missions conducted by swiss archaeologist Charles Bonnet put an end to sarcasm and violent controversy caused by the theses of Ki Zerbo and Cheik Anta Diop about the African origins of Pharaonic civilization, discovering in the north of Sudan in 2003 monumental statutes of black Pharaohs of the 25th dynasty which ruled over Upper and Lower Egypt for more than a century, modern historians continue to think that Arab cultural and military influences are important bases for Sudanese identity.

A veil of forgetfulness fell on the Sudanese kingdoms of Kerma, Kush and Meroë, once rich and powerful for facilitating the communication between the Mediterranean and Central Africa, so much so that the African Union accepted the secession of Southern Sudan in 2011 with the justification that it was impossible for the northern, Arab and Muslim half and the southern, Animist and Christian half to be one state.

A past always present

What is past is past, and has nothing to do with the present? Not so true, if we judge by the name “Kandake” adopted by Sudanese women, very active in protests in the last months, and the garment and gold moon-shaped earrings of student Alaa Salah, dubbed “revolution icon”. Effectively, “Kandake” was the title of the warring queens of Meroë (which Roman historians translated as “Candace”). The most famous among them was Amanishakheto, who stopped the legions of Augustus Caesar and reached the Samos Treaty with the Roman emperor in 24 BC, giving rise to the intense and advantageous commercial relations between the two empires.

These references to ancient history shows the Sudanese revolutionists of 2019 want to free themselves from the temporality of the Middle East, from the way analysts present and frame the fall of Omar al Bashir as a late sequel to the 2011 “Arab Spring”, similar to the Algeria’s “Hirak”.

Thirty years of Islamic military dictatorship of Omar el Bashir might have wiped out the major milestones of modern Sudanese history from commentators’ memories and from African public opinion, but most Sudanese have every reason not to forget, because they have family members who were victims of wars, military coups and repressions that deeply wounded their country since the late 19th century. From the Madhist War against Anglo-Egyptian domination (1881-1899) to the two Sudanese Civil Wars (1965-1972 and 1983-2003), to the multiple on-going conflicts in Darfur and Kordofan, not to mentioning the civil war which broke out in Southern Sudan two years after independence, we do not know for certain the number of Sudanese who lost their lives as a consequence of an almost permanent state of war. The United Nations put it at five to seven million of deaths since 1956, one of the biggest genocides of the 20th century, of which Omar el Bashir was undoubtedly one of the actors, but not the only one nor the biggest culprit.

The flipside of the Sudanese national tragedy is the indomitable resistance and political pioneering spirit of its people, little known and recognized by their Arab and African contemporaries.

After the independence granted hastily by the United Kingdom in 1956, Sudan staged the first Arab democratic revolution, in 1964. The first elected Arab female deputy (and among the first elected African female deputies) was Sudanese Fatima Ibrahim (deceased in 2017), feminist, Muslim and Communist, founder of the Union of Sudanese Women in 1952, recipient of the UN Human Rights Prize in 1993. The Sudanese Communist party (founded in 1946) was the most influential in the Arab world and a major player in Sudanese politics up to its rupture in 1971 with the military regime of Gafar al Numeri in 1971, having helped to take power in 1969 and remove the principle leaders, many of whom also led the powerful Sudanese trade union movement with three pillars: the railway workers of Atbara, docks of Port Sudan and the agricultural workers of Gezira, the biggest breadbasket of the Horn of Africa.

Back to revolution

The protestors who surrounded the Defense Ministry in Khartoum since the “million-person march” on April 6 know that their success so far is due to their large turnout and their unity despite ideological, religious, tribal and generational differences. They also attribute their success to the wise guidance of the “Sudanese Professionals Association”, a clandestine organization formed by activists coming from the liberal middle class (lawyers, doctors, teachers and student journalists) who led the uprising from the first protest, which took place in Atbara on December 19.

Omar al-Bashir completely dismissed their strife in February 2019, when in fact the SPA manged to win the confidence and mobilize a growing number of Sudanese, reaching a level of professionalism that challenges the alleged spontaneity of a uprising for bread and gasoline led by young people and women through social networks.

The slogans were carefully chosen, combining literary Arabic, local languages and popular patois, and were used in a series of diversified (night marches, strikes, civil disobedience) and decentralized actions throughout the country, including Darfur and Kordofan. What we get, however, is a concerted and carefully executed operation that unites all movements and incorporates all oppositions in the heart of the Alliance for Freedom and Change. The AFC is a heterogeneous front of dozens of civil associations and parties, including those defeated in previous revolutions, secular leftists led by Communist Siddiq Yousef, Islamic centrists of the National Umma Party, the historical leader of which, Imam Saadq al-Mahdi, led the government brought down in 1969 in a coup d’état by Omar el Bashir and his mentor Hassan Tourabi. The former made a triumphant comeback to Khartoum, welcomed by thousands of people, in 2017 after 28 years in exile. The various components of AFC keep their autonomy but allow the Alliance to be the spokesperson and military junta representative in the on-going negotiations to organize the transition and set up the institutions to govern Sudan up to general elections.

But the dialogue with the transitional military junta became challenging after the initial agreement was reached in late April to share power between the military and civilians, and foreign interference is evidently growing.

An African Union Supporting Stabilization

On 16 April, the Peace and Security Council of the African Union demanded that power be returned to the civilians within 15 days; otherwise, Sudan would be excluded from the AU. However, on 23 Abril, the organization extended the time limit to three months after the emergency summits (about Susan and Libya) convened by Abdel Fattah al-Sissi, the then rotating president, and attended by South Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Rwanda, among others.

According to the Egyptian president, the top priority in relation to Sudan is to help the country overcome the dire financial crisis, restore political and social stability and avoid any uncontrollable slippage. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates had already prepared and made available three billion dollars at the disposal of the Transition Council, an offer rejected immediately by the protestors. For the SPA, accepting it would be replacing dictatorship with dictatorship, like in Egypt, and forsaking liberty, democracy and any form of political, economic or social change.

The leaders of the popular movements suspected that the military – that has given in so far to the more consensual and symbolic demands, such as releasing detained politicians, imprisoning and punishing Omar el-Bashir and some other figures of his regime accused of corruption – wanted to preserve the power monopoly, using for this effect the repressive apparatus of the previous system. Military power remains intact, even after the removal of General Salah Gosh, who led the all-powerful National Intelligence and Security Service for 25 years. The Service administers the Rapid Support Forces, which is feared by all Sudanese. The military is still watching the protests, having refrained until now from interfering, but for how much longer?

Perhaps the military is waiting for more favourable conditions before they end the protests, when fatigue and the high temperatures will have reduced significantly the turnout and enthusiasm of the protesters? Or is it waiting for the Ramadan to divide the Muslims and create a cleavage between them and the leftist non-believers?

General Abdul Fattah al-Burhan, current president of the transitional Military Council just became head of government, but protestors wished for civilian technocrats to be in his place. The spokesperson of the Military Junta accused the SPA of wanting to abolish the Sharia, or Islamic law, which was not mentioned in their Constitution project. If so, the Junta threatens to halt the negotiations and convene elections in six months, instead of the two years initially announced and of the four years the AFC thought necessary to prepare for a rigorous, free and democratic election.

The revolutionists fought back by appealing for general civil disobedience. Strong-arm tactics are reinstated as the power balance tilts towards the military and new violence may break out at any moment.

The Sudanese Revolution: The Third and Last?

 

[Yehuda]

SAFTU condemns snail’s pace of employment equity progress

Published by admin at August 29, 2019

The South African Federation of Trade Unions deplores the fact that 20 years after the passing the Employment Equity Act, the latest report of the Commission for Employment Equity (CEE) shows that South African employment is still far away from reflecting the country’s racial demographics.

In the private sector white men, who represent just 5.1% of the economically active population, plus white women who represent 3.9%, hold 66.5% of top management positions, 54.4% of senior managers and 37.4% of professionals. In comparison, Africans, who account for 78.8% of the economically active population, occupy only 15.1% of these top positions.

In comparison, among government employees, 72.23% of top managers, 69% of senior managers and 71.1% of the professionally qualified are black Africans.

Across the board, top and senior management remain male dominated. At top management level, 76.5% are male in 2018, with the number of women top managers increasing by just 1.5% from the 22% recorded in 2016. Among senior managers, 65.5% were male and 34.5% women.

This big difference between the public and private sectors, shows that transformation is entirely possible, but that most private companies have made no serious attempt to achieve similar results as have been achieved in the public service. They do not care about social transformation but purely about making profits. And the ANC government has done nothing force them to comply with the Act.

While SAFTU agrees with Labour Minister Thulas Nxesi’s comment that “Our country is not moving on transformation… It is clear that self-regulation is not working and that when certain groups are underrepresented it means there are talents and skills which are underutilised”, this is an understatement.

These figures reveal an outrageous national scandal, which provides further proof that political transformation has not been accompanied by social and economic transformation for the black majority. Economic apartheid remains.

This continued level of inequity, discrimination and racist attacks against black workers and women creates even more anger than they face already, with unemployment at 38.5% on the expanded definition that includes those who’ve given up finding employment, more than half of the country living in poverty and inequality that is not only the widest in the world but is also racially based inequality.

The wealth of the privileged white private sector as been created by the labour of the super-exploited black African workers, who occupy 75.5% of semi-skilled workers and 83.7% of the unskilled workforce.

This report will take the country even closer to the precipice of a social explosions the already rocketing number of community and workplace protests and strikes. These are increasingly merging together in Total Shutdown campaigns.

The CEE report also exposes even more starkly the abject failure of the ANC government’s policies to bring about even the most minimal improvements in employment equity in the private sector, just as in all other areas in which the interests of the workers and the poor majority have been sacrificed in favour of the super-rich, mainly white and male elite who own the commanding heights of the economy.

The once-proud national liberation movement still makes empty promises of reform and transformation but have totally failed to turn world into deeds, preferring to adopt neoliberal capitalist policies, dictated by credit-rating agencies have only improved the very white monopoly capitalist class which they pretend to be fighting against.

Never has there been a greater need for a socialist economic programme to bring about real fundamental change in favour of the working-class majority. SAFTU is preparing a detailed response to the neoliberal economic policies in Tito Mboweni’s economic strategy document which has been warmly welcomed by the Democratic Alliance.

SAFTU condemns snail’s pace of employment equity progress

 

[Secure Da Bag]

This is wild.

 

[loyola llothta]

Mozambique, Russia Sign Energy, Security Deals

Aug 22 2019 20:00

Mozambique's President Filipe Nyusi signed energy and security agreements with Russian's Vladimir Putin on Thursday in the first visit by a leader from the southern African state in two decades.

Nyusi's visit came weeks after his government signed a peace deal with former rebel movement Renamo and just two months before elections where the Mozambique leader will seek a second term.

Russia has been looking to expand its influence in Africa and oil and gas producer Mozambique already signed a debt swap agreement with Moscow in 2017.

"On the commercial and economic side our relations are still modest," Putin said after signing the accords. "But we have good prospects."

Bilateral trade between the two countries was $115m in 2018.

The two countries have historic ties stretching back to the 1960s when Soviet Moscow supported a Marxist-inspired Mozambique party fighting against Portuguese colonial rule.

Thursday's agreements include cooperation between the two nation's interior ministries on information protection and a deal with Russian oil producer Rosneft.

"We have natural resources and we expect Russian investments to use those resources for the good of the people," Nyusi said in an interview with Russian news agency TASS, published on the eve of his meeting with Putin.

Mozambique is looking to develop natural gas reserves that could make the African state a major exporter of liquified natural gas despite the threat from an Islamist insurgency in the country's north.

In 2018, Russia and Mozambique agreed to send Russian military advisers to this country, where they were also active during the Soviet era.

Pan-African News Wire

 

[StoneColdSteveAustin]

My African brehs and brehettes need to get those resources under their control. 3B, lack of access to resources, lack of employment.... not good brehs.

Actually there are not enough resources on the world right know to provide a 'american' lifestyle to all the Chinese, let alone 3 b Africans.

At some point to only option to provide new consum items is through recycling. Europe and America are lucky to have a booming economy first to collect all the resources.

 

[loyola llothta]

Actually there are not enough resources on the world right know to provide a 'american' lifestyle to all the Chinese, let alone 3 b Africans.

At some point to only option to provide new consum items is through recycling. Europe and America are lucky to have a booming economy first to collect all the resources.

What

 

[reasonable_doubter]

 

[reasonable_doubter]

In just 3 days, Nigerian tech genius has built workstation that allows people to work outside on solar energy - Face2Face Africa

 

[Premeditated]

off topic, but I didn't know France had a grand Mosque of Djenno inspired army fortress

got damn, the french are filthy

 

[phcitywarrior]

Pretty cool documentary/segment on Nigeria. Paints the country in a new light. However, if you look closely, a lot of what is presented here is very Lagos-centric. We as Nigerians need to diversify outside of just Lagos.

 

[Apollo Creed]

Pretty cool documentary/segment on Nigeria. Paints the country in a new light. However, if you look closely, a lot of what is presented here is very Lagos-centric. We as Nigerians need to diversify outside of just Lagos.

that's how most nations in Africa are (the world really) where everything is based on one major Mega city so all of the development happens there while everything else is in squalor.

 

[phcitywarrior]

that's how most nations in Africa are (the world really) where everything is based on one major Mega city so all of the development happens there while everything else is in squalor.

I get this, but a country of Nigeria's size and regional differences can really support more than one mega city so to speak.

Lagos, Port Harcourt, Abuja, Kano, Warri, Owerri, Enugu, Calabar, Uyo, Ibadan.

There just hasn't been enough Government support in developing the bolded cities. Those cities could serves as regional hubs for various sectors in the economy seeing as they are large cities in different regions in Nigeria.

In the US there's NYC, Chicago, Houston, LA etc, but you still have smaller cities with respectable economies even it's centered around a few industries e.g. Memphis, Omaha, Orlando etc.