RUSSIA 🇷🇺 Thread: Wikileaks=FSB front, UKRAINE?, SNOWED LIED; NATO Aggression; Trump = Putins B!tch

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The Oligarchs Are Next: Russian Businessmen Prepare for U.S. Sanctions
Russia’s wealthiest individuals are busy hiring lawyers and searching for lobbyists in Washington
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Putin meets with Russian businesspeople in the Kremlin in 2015 / Kremlin.ru

The Russian members of the Forbes list are worried about the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act that U.S. President Donald Trump signed into law on Aug. 2, 2017. By “adversaries” it means Iran, Russia, and North Korea.

The Act stipulates that the U.S. Treasury Department, Director of National Intelligence, and the Secretary of State have 180 days — that is, until approximately February 2018 — to present a detailed report on Russian “oligarchs” and senior officials involved in Russia’s foreign policy to a special committee of the U.S. Congress.

The document indicates that anyone whose name appears on the list could be targeted with personal sanctions. Such sanctions typically prohibit individuals from entering U.S. territory, freeze their assets, and ban them from doing business with U.S. citizens and companies.

Who’s at Risk?
We spoke with dozens of Russians on the Forbes list. Almost all of them were aware of this provision of the law and admitted that they were doing everything possible to keep their names off the list.

One individual said that it had been necessary to fly to Washington to get a clearer picture of the situation. But, the person said, the journey had not been fruitful.

“Nothing is clear: no one is working on these sanctions and no one is drawing up the list of who will be included,” he said, adding that even local lobbyists were unable to uncover anything more about the process.

“The sanctions will not be based on any particular criteria or sources of information.”

Although the Act does not mention any specific names, Russia’s business community agrees that metals tyc00n Oleg Deripaska is most at risk.

His name has come up repeatedly with the U.S. authorities, especially concerning his communications with former Trump campaign manager Paul Manafort. Deripaska’s representatives did not respond to inquiries from journalists.

The Alfa Group headed by Mikhail Fridman is also at risk. That business is mentionedin the scandalous dossier of former British intelligence officer Christopher Steele that was published in BuzzFeed last year.

It states that the Alfa Group allegedly carried out Putin’s orders and helped interfere in U.S. elections. Alfa Group is currently suing BuzzFeed and the parties that orderedthe dossier, demanding that they refute the inaccuracies it contains.

The media have often pointed to Alisher Usmanov and Roman Abramovich as the two businessmen with the closest ties to Vladimir Putin. Their representatives declined to comment.

An assistant to one Russian businessman explained that not only are the people on the Forbes Top Ten are at risk, even those whose names have appeared only a single time in medias rankings of major government contractors will have trouble sleeping easily.

During the Obama administration, Russian businesspeople could obtain answers to their sanctions-related questions from State Department sanctions policy coordinator and Atlantic Council expert Daniel Fried. However, he resigned immediately after the elections and, as of July, his post remained vacant.

“It’s unclear who to consult now,” said one Russian businessperson on the Forbes list.

Another added: “I see it this way: the Americans are telling us to take our problems to Putin and to leave them alone.”

The Russian authorities are well aware that large businesses could have problems. Approximately two years ago, President Putin gathered Russia’s major businesspeople for a meeting at which he warned them of the risk of personal sanctions, one participant of that meeting said.

Another participant said that, even then, Putin saw what was coming and issued instructions on what precautions they could take. Presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov did not respond to journalist’s questions on the subject.

What might be in store for the oligarchs and their businesses?
According to the text of the Act that President Trump signed, by February 2018 the U.S. authorities must accomplish the following:

— Identify the circle of senior officials involved in foreign policy and oligarchs with close ties to the Russian authorities;

  • — Determine their relationship to Vladimir Putin and members of the Russian ruling elite;

  • — Determine whether those individuals are involved in corrupt actions;

  • — Estimate the amount of wealth and the sources of income of those individuals and their family members – spouses, children, parents, and brothers and sisters, including their assets, investments, and any other business interests and significant share holdings they have in any companies anywhere;

  • — Determine whether they have business relations and assets outside of Russia;

  • — Assess the potential impact imposing sanctions against these “oligarchs,” state-owned and partially state-owned companies would have on those entities themselves, and on the economies of Russia, the U.S., and U.S. allies.

  • — Determine the potential impact of imposing secondary sanctions against Russian oligarchs. (Secondary sanctions are especially odious because they carry force beyond U.S. territory. Anyone winding up on that “blacklist” would find themselves unable to obtain financing not only from U.S. banks, but also from European financial institutions.)
What are the consequences?
The imposition of sanctions against a particular businessperson does not necessarily mean that his or her entire business would be affected automatically, explained Moscow State University International Law Professor Ilya Rachkov.

However, sanctions targeting individuals and those against businesses usually go hand in hand.

In any case, any major businessperson placed on such a “blacklist” faces enormous risks. First, the U.S. and European authorities try to keep up with each other on the issue of sanctions. Second, the U.S. authorities strictly monitor compliance with secondary sanctions worldwide, and those found in violation of the rules can face heavy fines.

The U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), a division of the U.S. Treasury Department, is responsible for drawing up sanctions lists. It was that same agency that, in 2014, included Gennady Timchenko, Arkady and Boris Rotenberg, and Yury Kovalchuk in its Specially Designated Nationals sanctions list based on the fact that they are “part of President Putin’s inner circle.” A number of others were added to that list later, including Rosneft head Igor Sechin.

The OFAC has almost complete authority to expand its list of restrictions independently. Here are some of the agency’s powers, extensively reported on by the RBC business outlet in 2014;

— The agency can freeze assets in U.S. accounts, limit access by foreigners and foreign organizations to the U.S. financial system, and prohibit U.S. banks from cooperating with any financial institution in the world;

  • — There are serious fines for those who circumvent the agency’s sanctions;

  • — Once an individual or organization is “blacklisted” by the OFAC, it is extremely difficult to undo. There is no clearly defined mechanism for challenging such a decision and the OFAC has the right simply to ignore such complaints.

  • — In February 2011, the OFAC needed only 72 hours to freeze former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s U.S. account holding $30 billion.
Preparing for sanctions
“This is not something you can prepare for,” sighed one Russian member of the Forbes list, although several other businesspeople said they were working closely with their lawyers.

Law firms are even making the rounds with workshops on how to prepare for the event. However, at least one person who has attended such sessions reports that the lawyers have nothing to offer that could be of any comfort. Their best advice is for businessmen to divorce their wives and register all their assets in the names of their former spouses.

The most high-profile example of this is the divorce of Roman Abramovich and Daria Zhukova. The pair made an official announcement of the move on Aug. 7, just five days after the signing of the U.S. law, but sources close to Abramovich claim that the couple had made the decision much earlier.

It recently emerged that Oleg Deripaska’s wife, Polina, became the owner this month of an almost 7-percent share of Deripaska’s En+ holding company – owned by UC Rusal and energy assets – valued at $500 million to $600 million. That transaction also has no connection to sanctions, according to one Deripaska associate. It remains unknown whether it was connected with the pair’s marital status, or what that status is.

Businesspeople also have the option of selling off their assets, as Onexim owner Mikhail Prokhorov has been doing since last year. He sold a seven-percent stake in UC RusAl in August — eight days after Trump signed the sanctions act — and recently decided to prune it back a little more. Prokhorov did not respond to a request for comment.

Is there a chance sanctions will not be applied?
Last week, Trump began designating various government agencies and executive bodies to implement the law, although none has yet been charged with carrying out the provision regarding oligarchs.

Two senators – Ben Cardin and John McCain – simultaneously appealed to Trump and his administration to “implement the law to the full extent.”

The original Russian-language version of this article first appeared in The Bell.


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Russia Uses Its Oil Giant, Rosneft, as a Foreign Policy Tool

Russia Uses Its Oil Giant, Rosneft, as a Foreign Policy Tool
By CLIFFORD KRAUSSOCT. 29, 2017

AUG. 23, 2017
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President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, right, met with President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela at the Kremlin this month. Pool photo by Yuri Kadobnov
Russia is increasingly wielding oil as a geopolitical tool, spreading its influence around the world and challenging the interests of the United States.

But Moscow risks running into trouble, as it lends money and makes deals in turbulent economies and shaky political climates.

The strategy faces a crucial test this week in Venezuela, a Russian ally that must come up with a billion dollars to avert defaults on its debts.

Russia has been making a flurry of loans and deals all centered on the Venezuelan oil business, money that could make the difference between the government’s collapse and its survival. In return, Moscow is getting a strategic advantage in Washington’s backyard.

President Nicolás Maduro of Venezuela was all smiles this month on a visit to Moscow seeking fresh financial backing, thanking Vladimir V. Putin “for your support, both political and diplomatic.”

Moscow, through the state oil giant Rosneft, is trying to build influence in places where the United States has stumbled or power is up for grabs. Its efforts are also driven out of necessity, as American and European sanctions have forced Rosneft to find new partners and investments elsewhere.

The company, which Russia has long relied on to finance its government and social programs, has been pushing deeply into politically sensitive countries like Cuba, China, Egypt and Vietnam, as well as tumultuous places where American interests are at stake.

Rosneft is looking for deals around the eastern Mediterranean and Africa, areas of tactical importance beyond the energy picture. It is wielding economic and political sway in northern Iraq, by making big oil and natural-gas deals in Kurdish territory. And it is angling to bid for control of Iranian oil fields as tensions between Tehran and Washington escalate.

Rosneft is “trying to create opportunities that can be extremely valuable in geopolitical ways,” said Amy Myers Jaffe, an energy security expert at the Council on Foreign Relations. “They really give the Russian government unbelievable leverage on questions of importance to the United States.”

The new push by Rosneft follows a clampdown on Russia.

Rosneft, which is 50 percent owned by the Russian state, is led by Igor I. Sechin, a former deputy prime minister and a close Putin ally. After the Russian invasion of Crimea three years ago, the United States and Europe hit Mr. Sechin with sanctions.

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A Siberian oil field controlled by Rosneft, the Russian state-owned oil company. Rosneft has long been a source of money for the Russian government. Sergei Karpukhin/Reuters
Since then, Exxon Mobil and other Western oil companies have been prevented from using their technological expertise to help Rosneft develop deepwater, shale and Arctic oil and gas fields. That has forced Rosneft to go far and wide to find new oil fields to replace its reserves.

Rosneft’s biggest bet so far is Venezuela. Over the past three years, Russia and Rosneft have provided Caracas with $10 billion in financial assistance, helping Venezuela stave off default at least twice under the weight of as much as $150 billion in debt.

Russia is effectively taking China’s place as Venezuela’s principal banker. While President Hugo Chávez was in power, China lent Venezuela tens of billions of dollars for projects to be paid for with oil. But China quietly stopped making new loans, leaving Russia to fill the void.

Last year, Rosneft took a 49.9 percent stake in Citgo, the Venezuelan state oil company’s refining subsidiary in the United States, as collateral for a $1.5 billion loan to the Venezuelan company. The state oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela, or Pdvsa, used the money to pay its bills and keep its oil fields producing.

The deal was sharply criticized by members of Congress, who warned that an eventual Russian takeover of Citgo would threaten national security. Citgo operates about 4 percent of American refining capacity and has a sprawling network of pipelines and gas stations. And Caracas remains highly dependent on the American market, since few refineries outside the United States can process large quantities of low-quality Venezuela crude.

In April, Rosneft went further, providing a $1 billion advance payment for crude oil produced by the state oil company, crucial aid for it to make nearly $3 billion in payments to bondholders.

But Russia’s investments are not without risk. Venezuela’s oil fields are aging and in disrepair. Oil service companies have been withdrawing after years of partial payments for their work. And fresh American sanctions have largely prohibited long-term loan transactions with Pdvsa or investments in other new government debt, making Venezuela’s financial straits even more acute.

“Russia is the only country that can give Venezuela a lifeline to survive through the rest of the year,” said Francisco J. Monaldi, an energy policy analyst at Rice University. “China has the capacity but not the willingness to do it, and that’s why Venezuela is so desperate to get the Russian support. There is no other way out.”

Venezuela is now Rosneft’s second-largest source of crude, after Russia itself. The Russian company resells about 225,000 barrels a day of Venezuelan oil, equivalent to 13 percent of Venezuela’s exports.

More Venezuelan oil could soon flow to Russia. Rosneft is negotiating with the Venezuelan state oil company to trade its collateral in Citgo for stakes in oil fields, as a way to gain more reserves at bargain basement prices and avert any sanctions or other legal issues with Washington.

“There is absolutely a geopolitical element to these deals,” said Helima Croft, global head of commodity strategy at RBC Capital Markets. “Rosneft acquires cheap acreage in Venezuela, but does it also expand Vladimir Putin’s influence in our backyard? Yes.”

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The Rosneft logo at a gas station in the southern Russian city of Stavropol. Moscow is using Rosneft to try to build influence in places where the United States has stumbled or power is up for grabs. Eduard Korniyenko/Reuters
Rosneft’s Venezuela model is also finding traction in the Middle East, where Russia is looking for ways to support the government of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, make friends in Iran and help drive a wedge between Turkey and the West.

In the Kurdish region of northern Iraq, Moscow is seeking influence with competing sides. It follows a Kurdish referendum favoring independence from Baghdad that both the United States and Turkey fear will bring more instability to the region.

Russia also formally opposes Kurdish independence. But that did not stop Rosneft from signing a $400 million deal with the Kurdistan regional government this month for oil field drilling rights.

Russia had already invested more than $4 billion over the past year in the Kurdistan oil fields. And Rosneft became the largest buyer of Kurdish oil as Western oil companies reduced their investments.

“For Russia to be able to play in and have influence over Kurdish politics is useful in Syria, and it’s useful as a counterpressure on Turkey as well,” said David L. Goldwyn, who was the State Department’s top energy diplomat in the first Obama administration.

Now, Rosneft is angling for stakes in coming Iranian oil field auctions even while Mr. Putin seeks energy and other deals with Saudi Arabia, Iran’s archrival.

All the wheeling and dealing appears to be at its most aggressive in Venezuela, where Moscow’s engagement is more risky.

The Venezuelan government says it has more than $9 billion in currency reserves, though much of that is gold that must be sent abroad to liquidate, a transaction that can take time.

The next major debt payment comes due on Thursday, for $1.2 billion, on a Pdvsa bond that is maturing. Flirting with default, the company scrambled to pay most but not all of a $1 billion bond due on Friday, while the country still owes $350 million more in payments that were due this month.

The American sanctions against Venezuela, declining production and recurring pipeline and port disruptions have prompted several refiners to turn to other Latin American countries for supplies.

Should there be a default and the Maduro government collapses, Russia and Rosneft could be left holding bad loans that a new government might not want to pay.

“Will Russia continue to fund Venezuela?” asked Siobhan Morden, Nomura Holdings’ head of Latin America fixed income strategy. “That is still a question. I don’t know.”
 

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In Snub to U.S., Russia and Egypt Move Toward Deal on Air Bases
By DAVID D. KIRKPATRICKNOV. 30, 2017

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President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi of Egypt in Moscow in 2015. Mr. Sisi has sought to cultivate closer direct ties to Russia and the Russian military as a partial hedge against the dependence of Egypt’s military on American aid, equipment and maintenance. Ivan Sekretarev/Agence France-Presse — Getty Images
LONDON — Egypt, in what appeared to be a snub to the Trump administration, has reached a preliminary agreement to allow Russian military jets to use its airspace and bases, both sides said Thursday.

If finalized, the agreement would give Russia its deepest presence in Egypt since 1973, when Cairo expelled the military of the Soviet Union and instead became Washington’s closest Arab ally.

The United States has provided Egypt more than $70 billion in aid in the four decades since, at a rate of more than $1.3 billion a year in recent years. The cost is often justified in part by the argument that it secures the use of Egypt’s airspace and bases for the American military.

Egyptian and American analysts called the preliminary deal the latest sign of the waning influence of the United States as President Trump has diminished its military and diplomatic footprint in the region and the world.

“Power abhors a vacuum and when the United States pulls back we can’t be under the impression that the world is going to stand by and wait for us,” said Matthew Spence, a former deputy assistant secretary of defense for Middle East policy under the Obama administration, which faced similar criticism for its policy toward the region. “The danger, and the reality, is that other countries will take advantage of the opportunity presented when America chooses to pull back.”

In practical terms, the presence of Russian jets in Egypt would raise concerns about the operational security of American military personnel and require coordinating with American military planes in the same airspace.

“It’s a major problem for the United States-Egypt defense relationship,” said Andrew Miller, a former senior State Department official who is now at the Project on Middle East Democracy.

It was unclear to what extent Washington was informed about the agreement. The Trump administration has not yet replaced the ambassador to Cairo, whose three-year term ended in July.

Edgar Vasquez, a State Department spokesman, said only, “We are aware of these reports and are monitoring the situation.”

News of the preliminary agreement came as the United States diplomatic corps has been severely reduced and American foreign policy is facing challenges from all corners.

North Korea had tested its longest-range missile yet the day before, in defiance of bellicose warnings from Mr. Trump and at a time when the positions of assistant secretary of state for East Asia and American ambassador to South Korea both remain empty.

The prime minister and Parliament of Britain, Washington’s closest ally, have publicly rebuked Mr. Trump for promoting online videos from a British far-right group demonizing Muslims.

In the Middle East, the administration has no assistant secretary of state for Near Eastern affairs or ambassadors to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Jordan, Egypt or Qatar. And on Thursday, a White House plan surfaced to oust Secretary of State Rex W. Tillerson, who had presided over the mass resignations of senior diplomats while watching his authority undermined by repeated contradiction or belittling from the Oval Office.

The Obama administration had been criticized by allies for retreating from the Middle East, in particular for failing to intervene aggressively enough against the Iranian- and Russian-backed government of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria in his civil war against rebels challenging his rule.

Under Mr. Trump, the United States has further reduced its support for Syrian rebels, backed off its onetime goal of removing Mr. Assad from power and taken a back seat to Moscow in the Syrian peace process.

President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia has stepped in, expanding Moscow’s influence in the Middle East and seeking to regain influence lost with the collapse of the Soviet Union, the end of the Cold War and the expansion of America’s military presence around the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.

Russia has carried out an aggressive air campaign in Syria that has fortified Mr. Assad, cementing his position as a client of Moscow and protecting a Russian naval base on Syria’s Mediterranean coast.

Russia has sought to make inroads with American allies as well. In September, it agreed to sell $2 billion worth of advanced missiles to Turkey, a NATO member that previously clashed with Russia over its Syria policy. In October, Russia agreed to sell $3 billion worth of missiles to Saudi Arabia, another close American ally on the other side of the Syrian conflict.

With Washington seemingly in retreat, “very few if any of the states in the region are willing to rely solely on alliance with the United States and depend on the United States as the insurance policy for their security,” said Gamal Abdel Gawad Soltan, a scholar at the Al Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, a state-financed research institute in Cairo.

In contrast, he said, “Russia has proven to be quite effective, and that has been attractive to countries around the region.”

Egypt, under the rule of Gamal Abdel Nasser, tried in the early 1950s to build counterbalancing alliances with the United States and the Soviet Union. But Washington soon lost patience with Nasser’s nonalignment policy and his anti-colonialist speeches, and Egypt fell more fully into the camp of the Soviets until the 1970s, when President Anwar Sadat switched his allegiance to the West.

Egypt’s current president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, who took power in a military takeover that ousted an Islamist president in 2013, has been rekindling Cairo’s Cold War alliance with Moscow. American officials believed he may have been trying to press Washington to keep delivering more aid of its own, a variation of Nasser’s strategy of playing off global rivals.

But American officials have scoffed at the idea that Russia could provide the kind of military support that the Soviet Union once promised, much less replace the supplies, training and maintenance that the Egyptians have come to depend on from Washington.

“Egypt would often hold out Russia as an alternative to American cooperation, and our attitude to some degree was, ‘Good luck with that!’ ” said Mr. Spence, the former Defense Department official.

But when the Obama administration temporarily suspended military aid to Egypt in 2013 in response to the government’s mass shootings of more than a thousand of his political opponents, Mr. Sisi visited Moscow and agreed to buy $3.5 billion in jets, helicopters and missiles from Russia. Last year, the two countries held joint antiterrorism drills, with Russian paratroopers conducting training exercises in Egypt with Egyptian paratroopers.

Egypt also signed a preliminary agreement for Russia to build nuclear power facilities in Egypt, although there has been no sign of any construction.

Mr. Sisi and Mr. Putin have collaborated more concretely to support a shared ally in Libya, Gen. Khalifa Hifter, who is based in eastern Libya across the border from Egypt. Russia has established a small military presence in a remote part of Egypt’s western desert to back the general, according to American officials briefed in the situation.

Their support for General Hifter has put Egypt and Russia at odds with the United States and other Western powers, which have backed a unity government in Tripoli in an attempt to end the civil strife that has plagued Libya.

It was not immediately clear what Egypt hoped to receive in return for allowing Russia to use its air bases or airspace. A draft agreement released by Moscow on Thursday gave Egypt only reciprocal rights to use Russian airspace or air bases, suggesting that Russia sought to obtain for free advantages for which the United States has being paying dearly for decades.

Some analysts speculated that Cairo might hope to persuade Moscow to restore tourist flights that it cut off because of security concerns after militants downed a Russian chartered jet leaving the resort of Sharm el Sheikh two years ago.

Egypt may also hope to persuade Russia to move ahead with the preliminary deal to build a nuclear power plant. “There is a long history of Russian preliminary agreements that take forever or never occur,” said Mr. Miller, the former State Department official.

Russian state media suggested that the agreement might help Moscow’s military campaign in Syria, another area where Mr. Putin and Mr. Sisi have found common ground.

Egypt’s Persian Gulf patrons, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, have viewed the fight against the Assad government as a proxy war against its regional ally, Iran. But Mr. Sisi has sometimes shown sympathy for Mr. Assad as a fellow strongman defending the status quo and fighting political Islam.

Vladimir Fitin, head of the Near and Middle East Center at the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, said that access to Egyptian airports would allow Russian military aircraft to refuel on their way to Syria, according to a report by RIA Novosti, a state-controlled Russian news service.
 

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Nato’s logistical battle to deter Russia
The alliance is building up its presence on its eastern front, but the practical problems are formidable
4 hours ago
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© FT montage; Getty Images; Reuters
When the last US Abrams battle tanks left Germany in 2013, it marked the end of a 69-year presence, and told of a western military alliance untroubled by potential problems on Europe’s borders. Just a few years later American armour is again fanning out across the continent’s east with a mission not just to show strength to an emboldened Russia, but to test whether the mundane matter of logistics might hobble Nato’s response to any provocative action.

The scores of US fighting vehicles that in September rolled on to the docks in Gdansk in Poland were the latest to join an urgent effort to test the obstacles to rapid Nato deployment in Europe.

Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea tops a list of security worries that have brought the “peace dividend” era after the fall of the Berlin Wall to an abrupt end. General Robert Neller, the US marine corps commandant, warned US troops stationed in Norway late last month that he felt “there’s a war coming”. His spokesperson later said the general did not believe a battle imminent, but was stressing the need “to be ready for the full spectrum of conflict”.

Just a week earlier, a senior Russian official had accused Nato of forcing Moscow against its will into “military competition in the centre of Europe”.

“After the wall came down . . . it didn’t even occur to anybody that we would have to be moving across eastern Europe in any kind of military formation,” says General Ben Hodges, until recently commander of the US Army Europe. “We all thought Russia was going to be our partner. Everybody started downsizing their military as fast as they could.”

Now, a senior Nato official says the alliance is “looking at all those things we forgot how to do”. He admits the pact — or at least some of its members — could have been quicker to heed warnings from events such as a wide-ranging cyber attack in Estonia in 2007 and the brief Russia-Georgia war in 2008. “All of the indicators were there,” he says. “We took our eye off the ball.”

Others in Nato dispute that it has been too slow to adjust to big changes in the international security environment. But officials in both the alliance’s sprawling Brussels headquarters and the capitals of its 29 member states agree that there is an urgent need to sharpen operations in Europe. Both Nato and the EU have launched multi-pronged initiatives to address logistics concerns from easing transport bottlenecks to reforming time-consuming border customs procedures.

The military overhaul in Europe is providing a new test of Nato’s capacity for reinvention, nearly 70 years after it was founded. The alliance is now trying to demonstrate its ability to protect a post-cold war frontier that stretches from the Arctic Circle to northern Syria.

General Ben Hodges, until recently commanding general of the US Army in Europe © AFP
The challenges facing Nato range from the capabilities of cash-strapped European militaries, to the commitment of President Donald Trump’s US administration and the intentions of President Vladimir Putin’s Russia. Nato also faces questions about whether its scaled-up territorial security is proportionate — or risks provoking the very kind of conflict it is supposed to prevent.

“Nato certainly doesn’t want a new cold war, [but] the world has changed and therefore Nato has to change,” says Jens Stoltenberg, the pact’s secretary-general, who took over less than a year after the Crimea conflict began. “For the first time in our history, we need to do crisis management beyond our borders and at the same time step up . . . our efforts for collective defence in Europe.”

The process has intensified since Mr Trump took office. The US leader shocked Nato allies in May when he failed to reiterate American support for the pact’s Article 5 provision, under which members commit to each other’s mutual defence. Since then, he and other US officials have made more reassuring statements but he has also urged, even more directly than previous US administrations, European members to spend more on defence. He claimed in November that this pressure had yielded results: “Billions and billions of dollars are pouring in,” he said. “Nato, believe me, is very happy with Donald Trump and what I did.”

British troops on operations in Orzysz, Poland, last month as part of Nato's Enhanced Forward Presence in Poland and Estonia © MoD/EPA
European countries, who make up the overwhelming majority of Nato members, have signalled that they are taking common security more seriously. All but three of the EU’s 28 member states last month launched the so-called Permanent Structured Cooperation (Pesco) to boost defence co-operation.

A Dutch-led initiative to improve military mobility around Europe, looking at obstacles from red tape to inadequate infrastructure, has been approved under Pesco. It is intended to dovetail with a report on the same subject due from the EU’s European Defence Agency in the spring. Halbe Zijlstra, Dutch foreign minister, has said the military mobility work “should enable the EU to better ensure our own security”.

The flurry of activity reflects the scale of the rethink on the defence of Europe since the Crimea conflict began. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 Nato redirected its operations into international conflicts such as Afghanistan and more recently Libya. US army personnel in Europe fell to just a tenth of its postwar peak of about 300,000, as Washington’s focus shifted to Afghanistan, Iraq and the rise of China.

Russian soldiers march in Sevastopol, Crimea, on the first anniversary of its annexation by Russia © Getty Images
Now the Nato alliance has set up what it styles a deterrent air, land and sea presence in its eastern member states.

There is a “tripwire” first line of defence of about 4,500 Nato troops in forward bases in Poland and the Baltic states of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. Since 2015, a US armoured brigade of about 3,300 personnel has been based on rotation in Europe.

The relatively small size of the alliance’s eastern resources inevitably leads to the question of what would happen if Russia, or another power, decided to test Nato’s strength. Russian troops could be on the outskirts of Tallinn, Estonia’s capital, within 60 hours of an attack starting, a study by the Rand Corporation claimed in 2016. Nato says a “spearhead” reinforcement contingent of 5,000 troops could start deploying anywhere in Europe “within days”. This year the spearhead force will be led by Italy, whose capital Rome is more than 2,000km from Tallinn.
 

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Estonian soldiers stand next to a US Army M1 Abrams tank in March 2017. Many roads and bridges in Europe are not built to take heavily armoured tanks © Getty Images
The logistical problems run deeper than distance. In central and eastern Europe, where many countries were either in the Soviet Union or part of its Warsaw Pact, infrastructure is sometimes sparse or dilapidated. Bridges, tunnels, roads, railways and ports in western Europe have not been constructed in the past 25 years to carry large numbers of heavy US military vehicles. “They are no longer building bridges in Europe with a 70-tonne capacity capable of supporting the weight of an Abrams tank,” observes Doug Lute, former US permanent representative to Nato.

The quantity and variety of glitches is intimidating: a six-hour delay to shipments crossing between Poland and Lithuania due to a change in rail gauge; the obstacles military vehicles face clearing the many Polish railway stations that have only one siding (Warsaw says most stations have more than one); the limitations of Bremerhaven, a German North Sea port, where access is via a single road gate that allows only a total of 1,500 vehicles per day in and out.

The investment the EU and Nato make in improving and reviving infrastructure will ultimately be a “political decision”, says Michael Linick, a contributor to the Rand report. “The more aggressive their posture towards Russia, the more necessary this is.”

Donald Trump shakes the hand of Emmanuel Macron during a Nato summit in Brussels in May, during which he demanded that other Nato members pay more © Bloomberg
Gen Hodges says the European Reassurance Initiative — a US fund set up after the Crimea operation and worth $3.4bn in 2017 — has already financed improvements to railheads so tanks can be unloaded more quickly. Other priorities should include transporters for heavy equipment and fuel storage facilities. “This is stuff that we could put money into immediately,” he adds.

Administrative constraints add a further layer to the deployment challenge. Border checks can be suspended to allow swift movement in the event of a crisis. But in the absence of such a red alert, commanders have to observe domestic rules such as German laws that ban heavy vehicles from the roads at certain times. Nato says it has made a priority of cutting border processing times for troops and materiel from as much as three weeks in some member states to a target of five days.

Western military planners are also under pressure to solve often longstanding problems of incompatible equipment, from radios to fuel nozzles.

Europe’s 28 militaries are themselves an unruly collection of vehicles and weapons. According to a report in October by the Nato parliamentary assembly, which brings together legislators from member countries, the continent has 20 types of fighter jet, compared with six from the US; 29 varieties of destroyer and frigate, compared with just four for the US; and 17 versions of main battle tanks, compared with one produced by its largest member. “Clearly in Europe we have huge waste,” says one EU diplomat. “Everybody has their own defence industry — and no one wants to give theirs up.”

Money shortages also threaten Nato ambitions — even though the alliance’s members spent an estimated $946bn on defence last year. In 2016, only four of the European members — the UK, Poland, Estonia and Greece — met an alliance target to spend the equivalent of 2 per cent of gross domestic product on their militaries. They are expected to be joined by Romania this year, while Latvia and Lithuania have also committed to reaching the goal. EU funds aimed at projects in the union’s poorer regions and worth €63.4bn for the 2014 to 2020 period, are being eyed as a potential source of infrastructure finance.

Many analysts still rate a direct Russian attack on a member state unlikely, arguing that a greater threat is posed by cyber or hybrid warfare — a blend of the conventional and the digital. But European officials insist Moscow has been probing militarily: Russian aircraft movements in or near Baltic state airspace have risen, while naval activity is at its highest level since the cold war. Russian submarines have been deployed in areas such as the Black Sea, eastern Mediterranean and around crucial undersea transatlantic communications cables, Nato officials say.

Moscow has in turn branded Nato’s build up, including the deployment of missile defence systems in Europe, as an aggression aimed at encircling Russia. Alexander Grushko, the country’s ambassador to Nato, condemned last month what he calls the alliance’s “genetic code [which] manifests itself in search for a ‘big enemy’ in the east against which it’s necessary to defend”.

In September, when Moscow held its Zapad military exercise on Russia’s western edge, extra Nato member state soldiers, ships and aircraft spread out around the Baltic territories. It was a small taste of the much larger deployment task for which Nato strategists and EU countries have begun to prepare.

Nato’s new priorities are in one sense the long-delayed fallout from its decision to expand to Russia’s borders by taking in former eastern bloc countries as members after 1999. That growth has placed expensive responsibilities and demands on the alliance’s European members. The question now is whether a continent already facing growing tensions from rising populism to Brexit is ready to shift to a higher military alert.

“Nobody really expected Crimea to happen, but it did,” says another European diplomat. “Now you look and you see: there could be a million things that impede the quick movement of armed forces we need.”


Flash points: The key places in Nato’s rivalry with Russia
The Suwalki gap: The 65-mile border between Poland and Lithuania, the EU’s only land connection with the Baltic states, is seen as particularly vulnerable. Serviced by a single railway line, it is squeezed between the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad and Belarus, historically a Russian ally.

Tapa army base: a Nato battle group, the bulk of it more than 800 British servicemen and women, is headquartered at this alliance forward position in Estonia. The deployment is one of several made by the pact across the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in response to Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea.

Tartus naval facility: This operation on the coast of conflict-racked Syria gives Russia an important strategic foothold in the eastern Mediterranean. Moscow has provided crucial support to the regime of President Bashar al-Assad in Damascus in the country’s near seven-year civil war. Russia’s president Vladimir Putin last week signed off on an agreement to turn the Tartus facility into a full-fledged naval base, according to Russia Today.

Sevastopol naval base: The Crimean port of Sevastopol, home of Russia’s Black Sea fleet, is vital to Moscow’s naval power in the Mediterranean and beyond. Moscow followed up its 2014 annexation of Crimea by renouncing the contracts with Ukraine that limited Russian presence at the Sevastopol facility. Russia has lately deployed six new Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines in the Black Sea and Mediterranean, according to Nato officials.

Keflavik air base: The Icelandic facility’s gradual reawakening is a sign of how the security environment in Europe has changed. A permanently stationed US Air Force contingent left more than a decade ago as part of wider post-cold war drawdown. But the base’s infrastructure still works and has been used in Nato’s enhanced air surveillance operations since Russia’s 2014 occupation of Crimea.
 
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