theworldismine13
God Emperor of SOHH
http://thinkafricapress.com/niger/stable-instability-sahelian-state-mali-example
When Mahamadou Issoufou was elected President of Niger in March 2011, he inherited a country which lacked many of the basic trappings of a state. A desperately poor, landlocked nation of 17 million straddling the southern edge of the Sahara, Niger has suffered from violent rebellions, chronic famine, cyclicaldroughts and flash floods, all of which are exacerbated by limited state capacity and decades of failed governance.
External shocks emanating from the multiple weak states with which Niger shares long borders have further threatened the country's stability. The fall of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 saw some 200,000 Nigeriens who were living in Libya, some of whom were working as mercenaries, return to Niger. The result was a sudden influx of arms, unemployed battle-hardened men, and the decimation of livelihoods for entire communities reliant on remittances earned abroad.
The ensuing conflict in Mali in 2012 saw tens of thousands of Malians seeking refuge in Niger, straining local communities who were already on the brink of starvation. Most recently, several thousand more refugees have spilled into southern Niger from northern Nigeria, where the government is caught up in a nasty counterinsurgency against Boko Haram.
In late May, Islamist militants affiliated with Mokhtar Belmokhtar — an Algerian national and veteran terror operative in the Sahara and Sahel with links to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) — carried out twin bombings in northern Niger, targeting military barracks in the town of Agadez and a uranium mine near Arlit. The attacks were allegedly carried out to avenge the death of Abou Zeid, an AQIM leader who had been killed by Chadian troops in Mali. Subsequently, many feared that the destabilising violence that has plagued Niger’s neighbours had finally arrived within its own borders.
Crisis management
Yet President Issoufou, it seems, has managed each of these crises with aplomb, employing a mix of short-term troubleshooting while endeavouring to launch bold, long-term development initiatives directly linked to security.
After the collapse of Mali, for example, Niger immediately deployed upwards of 5,000 forces to the Malian border, increased the salaries of key military units, and shifted close to $80 million allocated for health and education programs to the defense budget. In the spring of 2012, when most governments were advocating a negotiated solution to the quagmire in northern Mali, Nigerien officials — who have often expressed frustration with regional responses to the proliferation of armed Islamist groups — were among the first to call for an armed intervention. When the French intervention in Mali finally did happen in January of this year, Niger sent 600 troops to help France combat the mosaic of Islamist rebels occupying northern Mali.
These reactive measures have been coupled with forward-looking development ventures, most notably the $4.8 billion Economic and Social Development Plan (PDES) and its concomitant $2.5 billion Strategy for Development and Security (SDS), both of which are reliant on funding from donor nations eager to ensure that Niger can remain an exception to its neighbours.
Niger has also gone to great lengths to bill itself as a useful and reliable counterterrorism ally, courting defense dollars from the US and France, while forging bilateral partnerships within the region, most recently through a military co-operation agreement with Mauritania. In the country,French special forces are operating in various locations, while the US began flying an unspecified number of unarmed predator drones out of the airport in the capital city of Niamey.