All the big money tech bros who had large accounts in svb caused the bank run lmaoooo
Depositors will get their money back but not the shareholders lmaooo
You saw it with the 2016 electionOn the one hand it's fascinating to see a social media caused bank run, but on the other hand, it's scary to see the real damage caused by social media. I hate to see the damage a nation state might be able to pull off now that Twitter has gutted all of their safe guards
You saw it with the 2016 election
All the big money tech bros who had large accounts in svb caused the bank run lmaoooo
Depositors will get their money back but not the shareholders lmaooo
I mean more like ai deep fake videos of Biden designed to cause panic
Breh the savings account at my bank are pureTroubled banks trigger bank runs, I saw a great take last night that banks have been getting away with these fractional percent savings accounts for decades now, and people are starting to figure out "hey I can buy a 6 month CD at 5% fukk my bank".
I don't have a ton of cash but I'm about to close my savings account and start dumping into CDs instead myself.
Monday is going to be interesting as a whole lot of people are going to re-learn "oh yeah, FDIC insurance has a cap" and start withdrawing money from bank.
You can find the full paper here.We analyze U.S. banks’ asset exposure to a recent rise in the interest rates with implications for financial stability. The U.S. banking system’s market value of assets is $2 trillion lower than suggested by their book value of assets accounting for loan portfolios held to maturity. Marked-to-market bank assets have declined by an average of 10% across all the banks, with the bottom 5th percentile experiencing a decline of 20%.
We illustrate that uninsured leverage (i.e., Uninsured Debt/Assets) is the key to understanding whether these losses would lead to some banks in the U.S. becoming insolvent-- unlike insured depositors, uninsured depositors stand to lose a part of their deposits if the bank fails, potentially giving them incentives to run.
A case study of the recently failed Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) is illustrative. 10 percent of banks have larger unrecognized losses than those at SVB. Nor was SVB the worst capitalized bank, with 10 percent of banks having lower capitalization than SVB. On the other hand, SVB had a disproportional share of uninsured funding: only 1 percent of banks had higher uninsured leverage. Combined, losses and uninsured leverage provide incentives for an SVB uninsured depositor run.
We compute similar incentives for the sample of all U.S. banks. Even if only half of uninsured depositors decide to withdraw, almost 190 banks are at a potential risk of impairment to insured depositors, with potentially $300 billion of insured deposits at risk. If uninsured deposit withdrawals cause even small fire sales, substantially more banks are at risk. Overall, these calculations suggests that recent declines in bank asset values very significantly increased the fragility of the US banking system to uninsured depositor runs.
. . . Prior to the recent asset declines all US banks had positive bank capitalization. However, after the recent decrease in value of bank assets, 2,315 banks accounting for $11 trillion of aggregate assets have negative capitalization. This calculation underscores that recent declines in bank asset values significantly decreased bank capitalization and bank insolvency risk.