GnauzBookOfRhymes
Superstar
Ex diplomat claiming that State Dept. is pushing foreign visitors to book Trump Hotel when in D.C.
trump probably has that bytch wired.
45РОССИЯ—ASSANGE CHRGD W/ SPYING—DJT IMPEACHED TWICE-US TREASURY SANCTS KILIMNIK AS RUSSIAN AGNT
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Ex diplomat claiming that State Dept. is pushing foreign visitors to book Trump Hotel when in D.C.
trump probably has that bytch wired.
At this point, it's pretty much held as conventional wisdom that rednecks or hillbillies were not the majority of the 63 million who voted for Trump. White resentment is all-encompassing with respect to social class. Peter Theel, a gay Stanford grad and Silicon Valley royalty, was one of Trump's biggest and most controversial supporters. But the types you speak of are very quiet about their support. Fox News and right wing talk radio are partly to blame for this.
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Mantis Toboggan M.D.
Drink wolf cola
I have a buddy like that down here too. Always crying on FB about the media's unfair treatment of Trump
I know a lot of people like this that the switch flipped as soon as he ran. They’re all basically activated sleeper agents whose trigger for activation was a trump type figure running for president.
Right, it's just that's often the face of the Trump supporter....
@GnauzBookOfRhymes, yeah, that's exactly on point. He's been a conservative his whole life, I remember a Rush Limbaugh book in his house, like on the mantle, before I even had any idea about politics, and how reprehensible these people were. His son used to talk about his insane conservative Dad all the time. This was right after 9/11, the whole country took a steep turn right, and his Dad probably has gotten more and more right/racist in the years since. I don't want to say it was harmless, but it was normalized. It's sick. It always was, I guess. This is just the full unveiling of these people. I don't want to have to shake his hand again, I made a promise to myself, I'm not playing nice with any Trump supporters, unless extreme circumstances.
Uh...this is a big story...David Corn back with some new HOT shyt 
Hackers compromised the Trump Organization 4 years ago—and the company never noticed
Hackers Compromised the Trump Organization 4 Years Ago—and the Company Never Noticed
The perpetrators have possible ties to Russia.
David Corn and AJ VicensNov. 1, 2017 9:01 PM
Mother Jones illustration; Olivier Douliery/Abaca Press/Sipa/AP
Four years ago, the Trump Organization experienced a major cyber breach that could have allowed the perpetrator (or perpetrators) to mount malware attacks from the company’s web domains and may have enabled the intruders to gain access to the company’s computer network. Up until this week, this penetration had gone undetected by President Donald Trump’s company, according to several internet security researchers.
In 2013, a hacker (or hackers) apparently obtained access to the Trump Organization’s domain registration account and created at least 250 website subdomains that cybersecurity experts refer to as “shadow” subdomains. Each one of these shadow Trump subdomains pointed to a Russian IP address, meaning that they were hosted at these Russian addresses. (Every website domain is associated with one or more IP addresses. These addresses allow the internet to find the server that hosts the website. Authentic Trump Organization domains point to IP addresses that are hosted in the United States or countries where the company operates.) The creation of these shadow subdomains within the Trump Organization network was visible in the publicly available records of the company’s domains.
Here is a list of a Trump Organization shadow subdomains.
The subdomains and their associated Russian IP addresses have repeatedly been linked to possible malware campaigns, having been flagged in well-known research databases as potentially associated with malware. The vast majority of the shadow subdomains remained active until this week, indicating that the Trump Organization had taken no steps to disable them. This suggests that the company for the past four years was unaware of the breach. Had the infiltration been caught by the Trump Organization, the firm should have immediately decommissioned the shadow subdomains, according to cybersecurity experts contacted by Mother Jones.
registered a long list of domain names, many of which it has never put to use. Some examples: barrontrump.com, donaldtrump.org, chicagotrumptower.com, celebritypokerdealer.com, and donaldtrumppyramidscheme.com.
For each of over a hundred of these Trump domains, the intruder created two shadow subdomains, with the names of these subdomains generally following a pattern: three to seven seemingly random letters placed before the real domain name. Here are examples from the list: bfdh.barrontrump.com and dhfb.barrontrump.com; bfch.donaldtrump.org and bxdc.donaldtrump.org; cesf.chicagotrumptower.com and vsrv.chicagotrumptower.com; dxgrg.celebritypokerdealer.com and vsrfg.celebritypokerdealer.com; and bdth.donaldtrumppyramidscheme.com and drhg.donaldtrumppyramidscheme.com.
The available historical data for these shadow subdomains indicate most of them were created in August 2013. When they first were set up, the shadow subdomains were aimed at one of 17 IP addresses on a network that was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and they were hosted on servers owned by a company called the Petersburg Internet Network, a server provider with a reputation for hosting nefarious actors.
In a January 2015 blog post about fraudulent IP routing and malware, Doug Madory, the director of internet analysis at Dyn, called the Petersburg Internet Network “perhaps the leading contender for being named the Mos Eisley of the Internet,” a reference to the wild and seedy spaceport city on the planet Tatooine in the Star Warsmovies. Currently, the IP addresses for these shadow Trump subdomains are registered to a different entity in Russia. According to several cybersecurity experts, the fact that the IP addresses point to Russia does not mean the Trump Organization breach originated there.
The shadow Trump Organization subdomains point to IP addresses in the range between 46.161.27.184 and 46.161.27.200—and these addresses are part of a larger network. In October 2013, a security researcher identified a website called bewarecommadelimited.org deploying an exploit kit that was intended to pilfer passwords and other information from targeted computers and noted it was associated with this IP address: 46.161.27.176. That IP address is within the same network as the IP addresses used for the shadow Trump Organization subdomains—an indication that these subdomains might have been part of a network used to deploy malware against other computers.
This week, a researcher named C. Shawn Eib wrote a blog post highlighting the existence of the shadow subdomains, which had been referenced in a Twitter thread several weeks ago. Eib noted that “more than 250 subdomains of domains registered to the Trump Organization redirect traffic to computers in St. Petersburg, Russia.”
Another computer security expert, who also asked not to be named, notes that this network of shadow subdomains may have been established by a criminal enterprise looking to use the Trump Organization’s computer system as the launching pad for various cyberattacks on other individuals or entities. But, he adds, this breach also could be exploited by state or nonstate actors attempting to infiltrate the Trump Organization. “At the least,” he remarks, “it shows the Trump Organization has been badly run.”
In his blog post, Eib notes, “With an organization of this size, and with the added security concerns and scrutiny that a presidential campaign and victory would entail, it would be inexcusable for this to not have been discovered by their IT department. Any basic security audit would show the existence of these subdomains, and what servers they’re leading to. This is sloppy at best, and potentially criminally negligent at worst, depending on the traffic that is being run through these servers.”
All of the legitimate Trump Organization domains and the suspected subdomains were registered through GoDaddy. The creation of the shadow subdomains suggests that the hacker (or hackers) compromised the company’s GoDaddy account and, depending on how the account was penetrated, the intruders could have obtained passwords and access to other computers in the Trump Organization network.
The creation of these Trump Organization subdomains looks like a classic case of domain-shadowing, according to Steve Lord, a British cybersecurity expert at Raw Hex, a startup that trains people on micro-electronics and computer coding. He examined internet records and reviewed the matter for Mother Jones. Lord notes the Trump Organization shadow subdomains fit the pattern of a major case of domain-shadowing that in 2011 struck clients of GoDaddy, one of the largest domain registrars in the world.
In a March 2015 blog post, Nick Biasini, a threat researcher at Cisco’s Talos Security Intelligence and Research Group, described how domain-shadowing works:
These accounts are typically compromised through phishing. The threat actor then logs in with credentials and creates large amounts of subdomains. Since a lot of users have multiple domains this can provide a nearly endless supply of domains…This behavior has shown to be an effective way to avoid typical detection techniques like blacklisting of sites or IP addresses.
In the post, Biasini noted that the practice of domain-shadowing goes back to 2011 and, like everything else in the tech world, has become more sophisticated over time.
When cyber professionals notice suspected malware coming through their networks or in the wild, they often share this information with public malware databases so the broader information security community is aware and can analyze the potential malware. In the case of the Trump-related subdomains, many have been flagged as suspected malware carriers by IT professionals and security researchers who then uploaded references to these subdomains to VirusTotal, a malware research database.
VirusTotal lists the findings of cybersecurity firms that analyze URLs suspected of being associated with malware. For many but not all of the Trump-related subdomains, according to the VirusTotal listings, Kaspersky, the Russian antivirus company, detected a possible association with malware. (Kaspersky is in the news now due to allegations that it has worked with the Russian government to steal data from US government computers, a claim the company denies. Many security researchers, though, agree that the company is highly skilled at identifying Russian malware.)
“It’s telling that Kaspersky detected [this malware], while others didn’t,” Lord tells Mother Jones. That could be a measure of the malware’s sophistication.
The cybersecurity expert who shared the list with Mother Jones says he could find no legitimate use for the subdomains. He notes that the full scope of the attackers’ breach of the Trump Organization domains remains unclear, but he adds that the hackers who have launched attacks from this block of IP addresses have the ability to wage highly sophisticated cyber assaults. “I’d have to imagine that the file and mail servers on the Trump Org network would be the world’s largest repository of information that could be used to gain leverage over our president,” he remarks. He also points out that this breach signals the Trump Organization did not employ secure IT: “The big thing is that they didn’t notice.”
In response to request for comment, the Trump Organization sent this statement:
There has been no “hack” within the Trump Organization and the domain names [in question] do not host active websites and do not have any content. Publishing anything to the contrary would be highly irresponsible. Moreover, we have no association with the “shadow domains” you reference…and are looking into your inquiry with our third party domain registrar. There is no malware detected on any of these domains and our security team takes any and all threats very seriously.
The security expert who first shared the list of subdomains with Mother Jones notes that it is true that shadow subdomains “do not currently host active websites and that there is no reason to believe that there is currently any malware active on these domains.” But, he remarks, the Trump Organization’s registrar account “was likely compromised since someone created these hundreds of records and if it wasn’t an authorized Trump Org person, that only leaves unauthorized persons.”
Shown the Trump Organization’s statement, Lord replied,
There’s two possible situations as I see it. Either they set up their own domain records to point at servers hosted in St. Petersburg, Russia…or someone else did. In either case, the question is why. For an organization on the cusp of a number of investigations about suspicious links to Russia, I’d hoped they would’ve given more public thought to the possibility that their domain ownership was at some point hijacked possibly through no fault of their own before denying everything.
The Trump Organization did not respond to follow-up questions.
The security expert who first alerted Mother Jones to the Trump-related shadow subdomains noted that as soon as the Trump Organization responded for this story, records related to the subdomains began disappearing.
@DonKnock @SJUGrad13 @88m3 @Menelik II @wire28 @smitty22 @Reality @fact @Hood Critic @ExodusNirvana @Blessed Is the Man @THE MACHINE @OneManGang @dtownreppin214 @JKFrazier @tmonster @blotter @BigMoneyGrip @Soymuscle Mike @Grano-Grano @.r. @GinaThatAintNoDamnPuppy!
Hackers compromised the Trump Organization 4 years ago—and the company never noticed
Hackers Compromised the Trump Organization 4 Years Ago—and the Company Never Noticed
The perpetrators have possible ties to Russia.
David Corn and AJ VicensNov. 1, 2017 9:01 PM
Mother Jones illustration; Olivier Douliery/Abaca Press/Sipa/AP
Four years ago, the Trump Organization experienced a major cyber breach that could have allowed the perpetrator (or perpetrators) to mount malware attacks from the company’s web domains and may have enabled the intruders to gain access to the company’s computer network. Up until this week, this penetration had gone undetected by President Donald Trump’s company, according to several internet security researchers.
In 2013, a hacker (or hackers) apparently obtained access to the Trump Organization’s domain registration account and created at least 250 website subdomains that cybersecurity experts refer to as “shadow” subdomains. Each one of these shadow Trump subdomains pointed to a Russian IP address, meaning that they were hosted at these Russian addresses. (Every website domain is associated with one or more IP addresses. These addresses allow the internet to find the server that hosts the website. Authentic Trump Organization domains point to IP addresses that are hosted in the United States or countries where the company operates.) The creation of these shadow subdomains within the Trump Organization network was visible in the publicly available records of the company’s domains.
Here is a list of a Trump Organization shadow subdomains.
The subdomains and their associated Russian IP addresses have repeatedly been linked to possible malware campaigns, having been flagged in well-known research databases as potentially associated with malware. The vast majority of the shadow subdomains remained active until this week, indicating that the Trump Organization had taken no steps to disable them. This suggests that the company for the past four years was unaware of the breach. Had the infiltration been caught by the Trump Organization, the firm should have immediately decommissioned the shadow subdomains, according to cybersecurity experts contacted by Mother Jones.
registered a long list of domain names, many of which it has never put to use. Some examples: barrontrump.com, donaldtrump.org, chicagotrumptower.com, celebritypokerdealer.com, and donaldtrumppyramidscheme.com.
For each of over a hundred of these Trump domains, the intruder created two shadow subdomains, with the names of these subdomains generally following a pattern: three to seven seemingly random letters placed before the real domain name. Here are examples from the list: bfdh.barrontrump.com and dhfb.barrontrump.com; bfch.donaldtrump.org and bxdc.donaldtrump.org; cesf.chicagotrumptower.com and vsrv.chicagotrumptower.com; dxgrg.celebritypokerdealer.com and vsrfg.celebritypokerdealer.com; and bdth.donaldtrumppyramidscheme.com and drhg.donaldtrumppyramidscheme.com.
The available historical data for these shadow subdomains indicate most of them were created in August 2013. When they first were set up, the shadow subdomains were aimed at one of 17 IP addresses on a network that was based in St. Petersburg, Russia, and they were hosted on servers owned by a company called the Petersburg Internet Network, a server provider with a reputation for hosting nefarious actors.
In a January 2015 blog post about fraudulent IP routing and malware, Doug Madory, the director of internet analysis at Dyn, called the Petersburg Internet Network “perhaps the leading contender for being named the Mos Eisley of the Internet,” a reference to the wild and seedy spaceport city on the planet Tatooine in the Star Warsmovies. Currently, the IP addresses for these shadow Trump subdomains are registered to a different entity in Russia. According to several cybersecurity experts, the fact that the IP addresses point to Russia does not mean the Trump Organization breach originated there.
The shadow Trump Organization subdomains point to IP addresses in the range between 46.161.27.184 and 46.161.27.200—and these addresses are part of a larger network. In October 2013, a security researcher identified a website called bewarecommadelimited.org deploying an exploit kit that was intended to pilfer passwords and other information from targeted computers and noted it was associated with this IP address: 46.161.27.176. That IP address is within the same network as the IP addresses used for the shadow Trump Organization subdomains—an indication that these subdomains might have been part of a network used to deploy malware against other computers.
This week, a researcher named C. Shawn Eib wrote a blog post highlighting the existence of the shadow subdomains, which had been referenced in a Twitter thread several weeks ago. Eib noted that “more than 250 subdomains of domains registered to the Trump Organization redirect traffic to computers in St. Petersburg, Russia.”
Another computer security expert, who also asked not to be named, notes that this network of shadow subdomains may have been established by a criminal enterprise looking to use the Trump Organization’s computer system as the launching pad for various cyberattacks on other individuals or entities. But, he adds, this breach also could be exploited by state or nonstate actors attempting to infiltrate the Trump Organization. “At the least,” he remarks, “it shows the Trump Organization has been badly run.”
In his blog post, Eib notes, “With an organization of this size, and with the added security concerns and scrutiny that a presidential campaign and victory would entail, it would be inexcusable for this to not have been discovered by their IT department. Any basic security audit would show the existence of these subdomains, and what servers they’re leading to. This is sloppy at best, and potentially criminally negligent at worst, depending on the traffic that is being run through these servers.”
All of the legitimate Trump Organization domains and the suspected subdomains were registered through GoDaddy. The creation of the shadow subdomains suggests that the hacker (or hackers) compromised the company’s GoDaddy account and, depending on how the account was penetrated, the intruders could have obtained passwords and access to other computers in the Trump Organization network.
The creation of these Trump Organization subdomains looks like a classic case of domain-shadowing, according to Steve Lord, a British cybersecurity expert at Raw Hex, a startup that trains people on micro-electronics and computer coding. He examined internet records and reviewed the matter for Mother Jones. Lord notes the Trump Organization shadow subdomains fit the pattern of a major case of domain-shadowing that in 2011 struck clients of GoDaddy, one of the largest domain registrars in the world.
In a March 2015 blog post, Nick Biasini, a threat researcher at Cisco’s Talos Security Intelligence and Research Group, described how domain-shadowing works:
These accounts are typically compromised through phishing. The threat actor then logs in with credentials and creates large amounts of subdomains. Since a lot of users have multiple domains this can provide a nearly endless supply of domains…This behavior has shown to be an effective way to avoid typical detection techniques like blacklisting of sites or IP addresses.
In the post, Biasini noted that the practice of domain-shadowing goes back to 2011 and, like everything else in the tech world, has become more sophisticated over time.
When cyber professionals notice suspected malware coming through their networks or in the wild, they often share this information with public malware databases so the broader information security community is aware and can analyze the potential malware. In the case of the Trump-related subdomains, many have been flagged as suspected malware carriers by IT professionals and security researchers who then uploaded references to these subdomains to VirusTotal, a malware research database.
VirusTotal lists the findings of cybersecurity firms that analyze URLs suspected of being associated with malware. For many but not all of the Trump-related subdomains, according to the VirusTotal listings, Kaspersky, the Russian antivirus company, detected a possible association with malware. (Kaspersky is in the news now due to allegations that it has worked with the Russian government to steal data from US government computers, a claim the company denies. Many security researchers, though, agree that the company is highly skilled at identifying Russian malware.)
“It’s telling that Kaspersky detected [this malware], while others didn’t,” Lord tells Mother Jones. That could be a measure of the malware’s sophistication.
The cybersecurity expert who shared the list with Mother Jones says he could find no legitimate use for the subdomains. He notes that the full scope of the attackers’ breach of the Trump Organization domains remains unclear, but he adds that the hackers who have launched attacks from this block of IP addresses have the ability to wage highly sophisticated cyber assaults. “I’d have to imagine that the file and mail servers on the Trump Org network would be the world’s largest repository of information that could be used to gain leverage over our president,” he remarks. He also points out that this breach signals the Trump Organization did not employ secure IT: “The big thing is that they didn’t notice.”
In response to request for comment, the Trump Organization sent this statement:
There has been no “hack” within the Trump Organization and the domain names [in question] do not host active websites and do not have any content. Publishing anything to the contrary would be highly irresponsible. Moreover, we have no association with the “shadow domains” you reference…and are looking into your inquiry with our third party domain registrar. There is no malware detected on any of these domains and our security team takes any and all threats very seriously.
The security expert who first shared the list of subdomains with Mother Jones notes that it is true that shadow subdomains “do not currently host active websites and that there is no reason to believe that there is currently any malware active on these domains.” But, he remarks, the Trump Organization’s registrar account “was likely compromised since someone created these hundreds of records and if it wasn’t an authorized Trump Org person, that only leaves unauthorized persons.”
Shown the Trump Organization’s statement, Lord replied,
There’s two possible situations as I see it. Either they set up their own domain records to point at servers hosted in St. Petersburg, Russia…or someone else did. In either case, the question is why. For an organization on the cusp of a number of investigations about suspicious links to Russia, I’d hoped they would’ve given more public thought to the possibility that their domain ownership was at some point hijacked possibly through no fault of their own before denying everything.
The Trump Organization did not respond to follow-up questions.
The security expert who first alerted Mother Jones to the Trump-related shadow subdomains noted that as soon as the Trump Organization responded for this story, records related to the subdomains began disappearing.
@DonKnock @SJUGrad13 @88m3 @Menelik II @wire28 @smitty22 @Reality @fact @Hood Critic @ExodusNirvana @Blessed Is the Man @THE MACHINE @OneManGang @dtownreppin214 @JKFrazier @tmonster @blotter @BigMoneyGrip @Soymuscle Mike @Grano-Grano @.r. @GinaThatAintNoDamnPuppy!
Michael Flynn Followed Russian Troll Accounts, Pushed Their Messages in Days Before Election
Michael Flynn Followed Russian Troll Accounts, Pushed Their Messages in Days Before Election
Trump’s notoriously Kremlin-friendly national security adviser amplified Russian messages right when they mattered most—in the days leading up to Nov. 8, 2016.
Photo Illustration by Lyne Lucien/The Daily Beast
Former White House National Security Adviser Michael Flynn followed five Twitter accounts based out of the Russian-backed “troll factory” in St. Petersburg—and pushed their messages at least three times in the month before the 2016 election.
Over 2,750 troll accounts based out of the Kremlin-backed Internet Research Agency were made public by House investigators on Wednesday. The accounts, some of which had previously been identified by The Daily Beast as Russian-generated, were pulled from Twitter due to their ties to the troll factory over the past three months.
The Daily Beast had previously discovered Flynn, Donald Trump Jr., Trump campaign manager Kellyanne Conway, and Trump campaign digital director Brad Parscale retweeted Ten_GOP several times in the month before the election.
The news that Flynn also pushed Russian propaganda comes at an unwelcome time for the former three-star general and head of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Flynn is one of the people under investigation by Robert Mueller’s widespread probe into Russian influence in the 2016 campaign.
During Flynn’s brief tenure as President Trump’s top national security aide, Flynn pushed for cooperation between the Russian and American military that would have been, at best, borderline illegal. Flynn ultimately resigned amidst reports that he had undisclosed meetings with Russian Ambassador Sergey Kisylak during the campaign.
Of course, Flynn wasn't necessarily hostile to Russian agitprop. In December of 2015, he traveled to Moscow for a gala celebrating Russia Today, the Kremlin’s propaganda network. At Flynn’s side for dinner: Russian president Vladimir Putin.
Flynn followed the accounts Jenn_Abrams, LauraBaeley, Pamela_Moore13, SouthLoneStar, and Ten_GOP. Baeley, Abrams and Moore falsely claimed they were female American Trump supporters. SouthLoneStar claimed it was an account by a “Proud Texan and American Patriot” who featured “Islam is against Western culture” in its Twitter bio.
Just three days before the 2016 election, Flynn posted that a Ten_GOP tweet “must be retweeted frequently,” tagging Trump campaign social media director Dan Scavino, his son Mike Flynn Jr., and far-right agitator Mike Cernovich.
A day before the election, Flynn cited Ten_GOP again, saying “@realdonaldtrump & @mike_pence will be our next POTUS & VPOTUS.”
The Ten_GOP tweets were two of just 25 tweets by Trump’s future national security adviser in the two days before the election.
When Flynn quote-tweeted Pamela_Moore13 in October, it was one of his three total tweets from that day.
“Let's take our country back from the hands of those who care less about you & I and more about power & money,” his tweet reads.
“Moore” claimed she lived in Texas and said she was “pro-God” and “anti-racism,” but often posted xenophobic rants.
“Today's Marseille, France: Hospitals are so overrun by Muslims gimmigrants that local French can no longer get care,” the account tweeted in August, just weeks before it was shut down by Twitter.
Attempts to reach Flynn to comment for this story were not successful.
Since Twitter has suspended the Kremlin-connected accounts and deleted their posts, including a record of all retweets, only tweets where Flynn comments on the troll account’s posts—or “quote tweets” them—remain. Unlike Trump Jr., Conway, Parscale and Flynn Jr., Flynn Sr.’s deleted tweets are not saved by the political tweet archive service Polititweet.
Flynn’s son, Michael Flynn Jr., was an even more ardent consumer of Russian troll content, retweeting the propaganda accounts 47 times in all, according to data in the Polititweet archive. Ten_GOP, an account he retweeted 37 times, benefited the most, with five retweets defending General Flynn, one purporting to debunk Russian election interference, and another pushing misinformation about a Twin Falls, Idaho assault case that Russia was then using to inflame anti-refugee sentiment in the US. The troll account Pamela_Moore13 got eight retweets, and Jenn_Abrams and rightnpr (“Right and Proud”) each enjoyed a single retweet from the junior Flynn, who also favored the Russian account USA_Gunslinger (“Gunslinger Girl” from “Wisconsin”) with a personal reply on election day.
Flynn Jr. could be subpoenaed by the Senate Intelligence Committee after ignoring requests to hand over documents to investigators about the investigation into Russian meddling in the 2016 election. The general’s son was active in the spread of Hillary Clinton-related conspiracy theories stemming from the DNC and John Podesta hacks that were distributed by Wikileaks, including the so-called “Pizzagate” conspiracy.
The elder Flynn also tweeted about the Pizzagate, which falsely claims that Hillary Clinton and her campaign chairman John Podesta were running a pedophile ring out of the basement of a pizza shop that has no basement, in the days before the election.
“U decide - NYPD Blows Whistle on New Hillary Emails: Money Laundering, Sex Crimes w Children, etc...MUST READ!” he tweeted, linking to an entirely fabricated news article on a website called TruePundit six days before polls opened.
He later deleted the tweet.
—with additional reporting by Noah Shachtman
On the flip side, there are people like my wife's uncle in law- an ex FBI guy and former lifelong conservative who walked away from the party with Trump's nomination. I'm still of the belief that there are still good people who pursue and accept the truth, and act on it. Sadly though for every person like him I know there are equally informed and intelligent white men still crying about Obama and going as far out of their way as possible to exculpate Trump or divert any conversations about his wrongdoings. This election has definitely drawn a line in the sand
Not that Tea Pain is credible (!!!), but just sharing anyway. I find it interesting because Flynn's case has been before the grand jury in EDVA, whereas the ones from Monday were in DC. Dana Boente who heads EDVA announced he's resigning last Friday, leading people to speculate the jury was wrapping up. Any other accounts hinting at something coming?
Also, Trump leaves for his 12 day Asia trip on Friday, and you just know Mueller's a savage.
Also, Trump leaves for his 12 day Asia trip on Friday, and you just know Mueller's a savage.
Dorian Breh
Veteran
168 racks? Uzi clears that in like 2 shows
well playedprolly took two weeks to be trained to pronounce "Niger", the right way and not the OTHER way,
hence the white house prolly just accepted the delay to acknowledge disaster to avoid that OTHER disaster
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GnauzBookOfRhymes
Superstar
Breh, they bought the "it's us versus everyone else" line. I saw it myself with friends I had from childhood, and all through school. From the kid who came from nothing to guys I went to school with that were always "establishment/fiscal conservatives" who never once seemed to support the GOP's white nationalism/Tea Party wing. Guys that were hardcore Kasich supporters to the end - but then all of a sudden started liking Trump posts. I saw the "line" being drawn back in 07/08 when even our own side started race baiting during the primaries, but this definitely sealed the deal. Shyt will never be the same after trump.
168 racks? Uzi clears that in like 2 shows