I'm gonna insert something new into this conversation. If you consider yourself a logical person, I suggest you consider it deeply before replying. And I'm speaking to all the following people:
It's not all ya'all fault that you're all full of shyt. You weren't around then, and you clearly haven't read the statements of the knowledgeable people that were. But let's get a few things straight.
1. The bomb was NOT necessary for Japan to surrender. Japan had been trying to surrender for months.
2. An invasion was NOT necessary. An invasion was never, ever necessary. In fact, we could have invaded fewer islands, had fewer casualties, and ended the war months earlier if we hadn't fukked shyt up with the stupid fukking Potsdam declaration, which everyone who knew anything about Japan stated was a huge fukking mistake.
3. The bomb was NOT the reason Japan surrendered. Japan surrendered because Russia was about to invade and because in the end, America let them keep the emperor, the condition they'd been asking for all along.
4. This shyt is NOT revisionist. Please read the following:
"It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender... My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children." - Fleet Admiral William Leahy, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during World War II
"When I asked General MacArthur about the decision to drop the bomb, I was surprised to learn he had not even been consulted. What, I asked, would his advice have been? He replied that he saw no military justification for the dropping of the bomb. The war might have ended weeks earlier, he said, if the United States had agreed, as it later did anyway, to the retention of the institution of the emperor." - Norman Cousins, consultant to General Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers Southwest Pacific Area
"Obviously . . . the atomic bomb neither induced the Emperor's decision to surrender nor had any effect on the ultimate outcome of the war." - Brigadier General Bonner Fellers, in charge of psychological warfare on General MacArthur's staff
"The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace before the atomic age was announced to the world with the destruction of Hiroshima and before the Russian entry into war...The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military standpoint, in the defeat of Japan I felt that it was an unnecessary loss of civilian life...
We had them beaten. They hadn't enough food, they couldn't do anything." - Fleet Admiral Chester William Nimitz, Commander in Chief of Pacific Forces
"...the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing." - Dwight Eisenhower reflecting on the event 18 years later
"...in [July] 1945... Secretary of War Stimson, visiting my headquarters in Germany, informed me that our government was preparing to drop an atomic bomb on Japan. I was one of those who felt that there were a number of cogent reasons to question the wisdom of such an act. ...the Secretary, upon giving me the news of the successful bomb test in New Mexico, and of the plan for using it, asked for my reaction, apparently expecting a vigorous assent."
"During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of 'face'. The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude..." - Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander Europe
"[When he heard] 'the Potsdam declaration in July, demand that Japan surrender unconditionally or face 'prompt and utter destruction.' MacArthur was appalled. He knew that the Japanese would never renounce their emperor, and that without him an orderly transition to peace would be impossible anyhow, because his people would never submit to Allied occupation unless he ordered it. Ironically, when the surrender did come, it was conditional, and the condition was a continuation of the imperial reign. Had the General's advice been followed, the resort to atomic weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki might have been unnecessary." - Biographer William Manchester describing the reaction of General Douglas MacArthur to the Potsdam declaration
"I am convinced that if you, as President, will make a shortwave broadcast to the people of Japan - tell them they can have their Emperor if they surrender, that it will not mean unconditional surrender except for the militarists - you'll get a peace in Japan - you'll have both wars over." - former president Herbert Hoover two months before the bomb was dropped
"...the Japanese were prepared to negotiate all the way from February 1945...up to and before the time the atomic bombs were dropped; ...if such leads had been followed up, there would have been no occasion to drop the [atomic] bombs....The use of the atomic bomb, with its indiscriminate killing of women and children, revolts my soul." - Herbert Hoover reflecting after the bomb was dropped
"...in the light of available evidence I myself and others felt that if such a categorical statement about the [retention of the] dynasty had been issued in May, 1945, the surrender-minded elements in the [Japanese] Government might well have been afforded by such a statement a valid reason and the necessary strength to come to an early clearcut decision...If surrender could have been brought about in May, 1945, or even in June or July, before the entrance of Soviet Russia into the [Pacific] war and the use of the atomic bomb, the world would have been the gainer." - Joseph Grew, former Ambassador to Japan and Under Secretary of State when the bomb was dropped
"I have always felt that if, in our ultimatum to the Japanese government issued from Potsdam [in July 1945], we had referred to the retention of the emperor as a constitutional monarch and had made some reference to the reasonable accessibility of raw materials to the future Japanese government, it would have been accepted. Indeed, I believe that even in the form it was delivered, there was some disposition on the part of the Japanese to give it favorable consideration. When the war was over I arrived at this conclusion after talking with a number of Japanese officials who had been closely associated with the decision of the then Japanese government, to reject the ultimatum, as it was presented. I believe we missed the opportunity of effecting a Japanese surrender, completely satisfactory to us, without the necessity of dropping the bombs." - John McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War when the bomb was dropped
"I think that the Japanese were ready for peace, and they already had approached the Russians and, I think, the Swiss. And that suggestion of [giving] a warning [of the atomic bomb] was a face-saving proposition for them, and one that they could have readily accepted." He continued, "In my opinion, the Japanese war was really won before we ever used the atom bomb. Thus, it wouldn't have been necessary for us to disclose our nuclear position and stimulate the Russians to develop the same thing much more rapidly than they would have if we had not dropped the bomb." - Ralph Bard, Under Secretary of the Navy when the bomb was dropped
"It seemed to me that such a weapon was not necessary to bring the war to a successful conclusion, that once used it would find its way into the armaments of the world..." - Lewis Strauss, Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy when the bomb was dropped
The first atomic bomb was an unnecessary experiment...It was a mistake to ever drop it...[the scientists] had this toy and they wanted to try it out, so they dropped it...It killed a lot of Japs, but the Japs had put out a lot of peace feelers through Russia long before. - Admiral William F. Halsey Jr., Commander U.S. Third Fleet
"I didn't like the atom bomb or any part of it." - Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief of U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations (King believed that a naval blockade would force Japan into surrender without any invasion or bombs ever being necessary.)
"The Japanese position was hopeless even before the first atomic bomb fell, because the Japanese had lost control of their own air....
it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse." - Commanding General of U.S. Army Air Forces Henry H. "Hap" Arnold
"Arnold's view was that it [the dropping of the atomic bomb] was unnecessary. He said that he knew the Japanese wanted peace. There were political implications in the decision and Arnold did not feel it was the military's job to question it." - Lieutenant General Ira C. Eaker, deputy to Hap Arnold
"The war would have been over in two weeks without the Russians entering and without the atomic bomb. The atomic bomb had nothing to do with the end of the war at all." - Major General Curtis E. LeMay, Commander of the Twenty-First Bomber Command
"if they knew or were told that no invasion would take place [and] that bombing would continue until the surrender, why I think the surrender would have taken place just about the same time." - General Carl Spaatz, in charge of U.S. Army Air Force Operations in the Pacific when the bomb was dropped
"Both men...felt Japan would surrender without use of the bomb, and neither knew why the second bomb was used." - former Ambassador to the Soviet Union Averell Harriman, describing the opinions of General Carl "Tooey" Spaatz, Commander of the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force, and General Frederick L. Anderson, Deputy Commanding General at USASTAF
Russia's entry into the Japanese war was the decisive factor in speeding its end and would have been so even if no atomic bombs had been dropped. - General Claire Chennault, Army Air Forces Commander in China
"What prevented them from suing for peace or from bringing their plot into the open was their uncertainty on two scores. First, they wanted to know the meaning of unconditional surrender and the fate we planned for Japan after defeat. Second, they tried to obtain from us assurances that the Emperor could remain on the throne after surrender."
"The Potsdam Declaration, in short, wrecked everything we had been working for to prevent further bloodshed...
"Just when the Japanese were ready to capitulate, we went ahead and introduced to the world the most devastating weapon it had ever seen and, in effect, gave the go-ahead to Russia to swarm over Eastern Asia.
"Washington decided that Japan had been given its chance and now it was time to use the A-bomb.
"I submit that it was the wrong decision. It was wrong on strategic grounds. And it was wrong on humanitarian grounds." - Ellis Zacharias, Deputy Director of the Office of Naval Intelligence when the bomb was dropped
"[T]he poor damn Japanese were putting feelers out by the ton so to speak, through Russia." - Colonel Charles "Tick" Bonesteel, Chief of the War Department Operations Division Policy Section
"we brought them [the Japanese] down to an abject surrender through the accelerated sinking of their merchant marine and hunger alone, and when we didn't need to do it, and we knew we didn't need to do it, and they knew that we knew we didn't need to do it, we used them as an experiment for two atomic bombs." - Brigadier General Carter Clarke, military intelligence officer in charge of preparing intercepted Japanese cables for Truman
"While I was working on the new plan of air attack... concluded that even without the atomic bomb, Japan was likely to surrender in a matter of months. My own view was that Japan would capitulate by November 1945." - Paul Nitze, Vice-Chairman of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey Group
"Based on a detailed investigation of all the facts and supported by the testimony of the surviving Japanese leaders involved, it is the Survey's opinion that certainly prior to 31 December 1945 and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated." - Paul Nitze, reporting the Survey's conclusions. Nitze would later become U.S. Secretary of the Navy
"Careful scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts opened over the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why the Truman administration used atomic weapons against Japan.... The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it.... The hoary claim that the bomb prevented 500,000 American combat deaths is unsupportable." - J. Samuel Walker, chief historian of the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, publishing in the academic journal Diplomatic History
“First, intelligence and other advice to President Truman, in significant part based on intercepted and secretly decoded Japanese cable traffic, indicated that from at least May 1945 on, Japan wished to end the war and seemed likely to do so if assurances were given that the emperor would not be eliminated. Second, similar advice to the president suggested that the shock of Soviet entry into the war (expected in early August) would likely tip the balance, almost certainly if combined with assurances conce rning the emperor. Third, Truman was advised by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy, Admiral Leahy, the acting Secretary of State Joseph E. Grew, and others to let Japan know that the emperor would not be eliminated; contrary to the claims of some historians, Truman made clear that he had no serious objection to offering such assurances.” - historians Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, writing in the Christian Science Monitor
"Prof. Albert Einstein... said that he was sure that President Roosevelt would have forbidden the atomic bombing of Hiroshima had he been alive and that it was probably carried out to end the Pacific war before Russia could participate." - Albert Einstein as quoted in the New York Times, 1946
Read that shyt. Military commanders across the table knew that Japan was READY TO SURRENDER and that the bombs WERE NOT NECESSARY. It was a political fukking decision made to test out the power of the bombs and intimidate Russia, and to ensure that we took control of Japan's surrender and not Russia.
...all these guys knew full well what they were doing 
....dudes straight acting like they weren't in charge of the shyt 
for White people and how they're morally superior to non-White armies in warfare.