"The truth is Petraeus really was exceptional."

[zerozero]

Dexter Filkins: How General Petraeus Turned the Tide in Iraq : The New Yorker

Nowadays, most general officers, at least most American ones, do not see combat. They don’t fire their weapons, and they don’t get killed; for the most part, they don’t even smoke. In wars without front lines, American generals tend to stay inside fortified bases, where they plan missions and brief political leaders via secure video teleconferences. Their credentials are measured as much by their graduate degrees as by the medals on their dress uniforms. They are, for the most part, deeply conventional men, who rose to the top of the military hierarchy by following orders and suppressing subversive thoughts.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, most of the criticism has centered on the political leaders—Bush, Cheney, and Rumsfeld—who ordered the invasions and grossly mismanaged the occupations that followed. Less criticism has focussed on the soldiers and the generals who led them. This is understandable: the military didn’t start these wars, and the relatively small number of Americans who fought in them—after a decade, less than one per cent of the population—bore the burden for the rest of the country. In all those “Support Our Troops” bumper stickers and campaign applause lines, it has not been difficult to discern a sense of collective guilt.

In the summer and fall of 2003, many of those generals turned their men loose on Iraq’s population, employing harsh measures to round up insurgents and compel civilians to hand them over. The central tactic was to sweep villages in the country’s Sunni heartland—the center of the insurgency—and haul in the military-age men. These young men, who were mostly of no intelligence value, were often taken to Abu Ghraib, where their anger ripened. I witnessed several such roundups, and could only conclude that whichever of these men did not support the uprising when the raids began would almost certainly support it by the time the raids were over. Faced with a small but significant insurgency, American commanders employed a strategy that insured that it would metastasize.

By late 2006, the Sunni insurgency had been largely taken over by extremist groups like Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, who were attacking Shiites, the country’s largest sect. The Shiites turned to their own militia, the Mahdi Army—and to the death squads—to protect them, igniting the civil war. The situation seemed hopeless—and this sense of hopelessness gave an opening to the American insurgents. Kaplan tells the story well. From the beginning of the Iraq war, a number of officers and policy intellectuals, including Petraeus, believed that the war had to be fought a different way. In the few places where the principles of counter-insurgency had been put into practice—as they had in Tal Afar, in 2005, by a gutsy colonel named H. R. McMaster—the anarchy receded. The idea was this: The parties to the civil war—the Sunni minority and the Shiite majority—would never reach an accommodation as long as they were still butchering each other. The only chance lay in forcing a pause that would allow the bargaining to begin. Only a massive deployment of troops could provide that kind of pause.

So how much of Petraeus’s success was due to Petraeus? He was smart, and he was diligent, but was that enough? “I have plenty of clever generals,’’ Napoleon purportedly said. “Just give me a lucky one.” Indeed, the crucial lesson of the surge is that it succeeded only because other things in Iraq were changing at exactly the right time. The most important of these was the Awakening, the name given to the cascading series of truces made by Sunni tribal leaders with their American occupiers. Many Sunnis were appalled by the sectarian attacks—and were also fearful of genocide at the hands of the Shiite death squads. They asked the Americans for help, and U.S. officers, sensing a chance to turn the tide against Al Qaeda, seized the opportunity.

Sitting in what surely feels like a retirement come too early, Petraeus must wonder where he will rank in the pantheon of American generals. It’s too soon to tell exactly, of course, but his legacy looks reasonably clear. Iraq was a bloody tie, but without his extraordinary efforts it would have been much worse. Afghanistan, which he was called in to rescue, looks as if it will end badly. That’s probably not enough to get him into the temple with Ike, but, given the wars that he was handed, it’s hard to imagine an American general who could have done better. Petraeus was lucky—just not lucky enough.

 

[Type Username Here]

Fantastic piece 00. Thanks for posting it.

The entire history of the Iraq War can be summarized by this piece from it:

So how much of Petraeus’s success was due to Petraeus? He was smart, and he was diligent, but was that enough? “I have plenty of clever generals,’’ Napoleon purportedly said. “Just give me a lucky one.” Indeed, the crucial lesson of the surge is that it succeeded only because other things in Iraq were changing at exactly the right time. The most important of these was the Awakening, the name given to the cascading series of truces made by Sunni tribal leaders with their American occupiers. Many Sunnis were appalled by the sectarian attacks—and were also fearful of genocide at the hands of the Shiite death squads. They asked the Americans for help, and U.S. officers, sensing a chance to turn the tide against Al Qaeda, seized the opportunity.
By the time Petraeus arrived, the Awakening had already begun. Still, he made the decisive choice not just to make peace with the former insurgents but to pay them not to fight us. The program, called the Sons of Iraq, put a hundred thousand gunmen, most of them Sunni former insurgents, on the payroll, for three hundred dollars a month each. The idea strongly echoes the Army’s counter-insurgency field manual, drafted under Petraeus’s supervision: “Offering amnesty or a seemingly generous compromise can also cause divisions within an insurgency.” In this case, at least, it was a genteel way of describing old-fashioned baksheesh. By the end of 2007, the Americans were holding bicycle races with their former enemies.

The only way to win this type of war is to have the people on your side. It takes the ability of the enemy to hide among the safety of the population.

General P is one of the best Generals we have had in the last 50 years, but the tide of the Iraq War changed when the Iraqis, especially Sunnis, realized that one group was worse than the other. Bottom line.

 

[zerozero]

Fantastic piece 00. Thanks for posting it.

The entire history of the Iraq War can be summarized by this piece from it:



The only way to win this type of war is to have the people on your side. It takes the ability of the enemy to hide among the safety of the population.

General P is one of the best Generals we have had in the last 50 years, but the tide of the Iraq War changed when the Iraqis, especially Sunnis, realized that one group was worse than the other. Bottom line.

It kinda looks from this article and other stuff I've seen like the Sunni militants and (Sunni) Al-Qaeda "started it" though.

I remember back then a lot of people said that dismissing the Iraqi army was one of the worst decisions cause a lot of them became insurgents (but this article argues even newly American trained people went and joined the militant groups later)

 

[Shogun]

Its a shame that America has such a twisted sense of morals. The fact that he had women on the side is completely irrelevant to his effectiveness as a leader.

shyt, we almost got rid of Clinton for this. Who really cares?

 

[Mr. Somebody]

Its a shame that America has such a twisted sense of morals. The fact that he had women on the side is completely irrelevant to his effectiveness as a leader.

shyt, we almost got rid of Clinton for this. Who really cares?

The woman was sharing intelligence information though. Meaning he talked on the pillow. I think he has oaths against that/

 

[Gallo]

Its a shame that America has such a twisted sense of morals. The fact that he had women on the side is completely irrelevant to his effectiveness as a leader.

shyt, we almost got rid of Clinton for this. Who really cares?

No one is questioning his leadership. I don't know if you know anything about the security clearance process but people get denied clearance for even minor infractions. After the story broke, with his clearance level, there is no way that he could continue in any capacity - even at the analyst level.

 

[Shogun]

The woman was sharing intelligence information though. Meaning he talked on the pillow. I think he has oaths against that/

you right

 

[Mr. Somebody]

you right

Hes one of those guys where its like *why did it have to be you friend*

 

[69 others]

Its a shame that America has such a twisted sense of morals. The fact that he had women on the side is completely irrelevant to his effectiveness as a leader.

shyt, we almost got rid of Clinton for this. Who really cares?

it wasn't about morality but more about his actions compromising national security. in that position he could of been blackmailed, setup, robbed, etc and his actions showed that he had some weakness. i think classified information was even found on the woman he was having the affair with computer. if it was someone with lower rank and without access to top secret info i don't think anyone would give a damn

 

[Nascimento]

"The entire history of the Iraq War" Really breh? One of the best generals in 50 years? What exactly is the notion that Petraeus is some brilliant strategist based on? Fluff pieces like that article?

The article is simplistic, rhetorical, and lacking in substance. It betrays a superficial understanding of what took place in Iraq during those years, one that is exclusively informed by Western media and sources. As such, it regurgitates the spin that was cooked up as propaganda for extending the war machine to Afghanistan, which of course happened much to the delight of bankers, globalists and components of the military-industrial-media complex.

The truth is that the trend of decline in violence was already underway pre-surge, because Shiite militias had by 2007 largely achieved their objectives of sectarian cleansing of Sunnis and consolidating their positions in Baghdad. A few less dead Sunnis is the extent of what the troop surge achieved - the "Awakening" came as Sunnis finally realized they we fighting a losing war, not because of American bribes. Ultimately, while it may have established secure borders between the sects, it was of little consequence to the fate of the country post-Saddam.

This infatuation with Petraeus is silly. His reputation as a military commander is undeserved and a result of his savvy in dealing with media and PR. He was simply first and foremost a politician. No qualms about throwing predecessors under the bus, and collaborating with authors for how many books is it now?

 

[zerozero]

simplistic, rhetorical, and lacking in substance.

qualities far more characteristic of your comment than than the article breh. sounds like you didn't read it. the only information in your post (sectarian cleansing, petreaus was good at PR) is all contained in the article. heck the parts where he might have been lucky cause of the turn of events and the fact that the sunnis were already standing down is contained in the very quotes I put in here

 

[Type Username Here]

"The entire history of the Iraq War" Really breh? One of the best generals in 50 years? What exactly is the notion that Petraeus is some brilliant strategist based on? Fluff pieces like that article?

The article is simplistic, rhetorical, and lacking in substance. It betrays a superficial understanding of what took place in Iraq during those years, one that is exclusively informed by Western media and sources. As such, it regurgitates the spin that was cooked up as propaganda for extending the war machine to Afghanistan, which of course happened much to the delight of bankers, globalists and components of the military-industrial-media complex.

The truth is that the trend of decline in violence was already underway pre-surge, because Shiite militias had by 2007 largely achieved their objectives of sectarian cleansing of Sunnis and consolidating their positions in Baghdad. A few less dead Sunnis is the extent of what the troop surge achieved - the "Awakening" came as Sunnis finally realized they we fighting a losing war, not because of American bribes. Ultimately, while it may have established secure borders between the sects, it was of little consequence to the fate of the country post-Saddam.

This infatuation with Petraeus is silly. His reputation as a military commander is undeserved and a result of his savvy in dealing with media and PR. He was simply first and foremost a politician. No qualms about throwing predecessors under the bus, and collaborating with authors for how many books is it now?

Yes, he was one of the best Generals in the last 50 years. The man practically redefined counter-insurgency TTPs.

He was taking counter insurgency measures in his AO while the rest of the generals and politicians had a thumb stuck up their asses pretending this was the Gulf War in 91. Then, he was given command of the Central Command, and began to right the ship in two different theaters.

The man made significant contributions to modern warfare strategy.

Your post tells me you didn't even read this "fluff" piece because it was anything but fluff.

 

[Type Username Here]

As such, it regurgitates the spin that was cooked up as propaganda for extending the war machine to Afghanistan, which of course happened much to the delight of bankers, globalists and components of the military-industrial-media complex.

You know we we're in Afghanistan first, correct?

 

[Nascimento]

qualities far more characteristic of your comment than than the article breh. sounds like you didn't read it. the only information in your post (sectarian cleansing, petreaus was good at PR) is all contained in the article. heck the parts where he might have been lucky cause of the turn of events and the fact that the sunnis were already standing down is contained in the very quotes I put in here

My comment is a couple hundred word discussion putting into question the reverance for Petraeus and the surge. Unlike the article I didn't have 5000 words at my disposal. Do you actually have a point to make?

Yes, he was one of the best Generals in the last 50 years. The man practically redefined counter-insurgency TTPs.

He was taking counter insurgency measures in his AO while the rest of the generals and politicians had a thumb stuck up their asses pretending this was the Gulf War in 91. Then, he was given command of the Central Command, and began to right the ship in two different theaters.

The man made significant contributions to modern warfare strategy.

Your post tells me you didn't even read this "fluff" piece because it was anything but fluff.

I am curious as to what support you have for these claims, because in my view the surge and counter-insurgency was insignificant for the drop in violence and overall course of events.

And "right the ship in two different theaters" is a funny statement. Where exactly were these ships headed

I feel we have completely different perspectives on this. Maybe for balance you'd like to read a more comprehensive analysis here. To quote from its conclusions:

In sum, it is worth repeating that the surge did have an impact on security in Iraq. However, the increase in the number of troops was in itself of little significance. Moreover, the actions of U.S. forces as part of the surge and COIN tactics only abetted trends that were already apparent by the end of 2006. The primary factors that must be taken into consideration when explaining the decrease in violence during the surge are the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis (for the most part) from mixed neighborhoods in Baghdad, which led Sunni insurgents to realize that hopes of reclaiming the pre-2003 status-quo were lost; some Sunni disillusionment in Anbar with al-Qa’ida and like-minded terrorist groups as far back as mid-2005; and Nouri al-Maliki’s consolidation of his political power and the security forces in his turn against the Shi’i militias.

The implications of these conclusions for U.S. policy today and potential future conflicts are clear. Obama’s strategy in Afghanistan has been based on the premise that the surge and COIN tactics in Iraq were the main reasons behind the reduction in violence and instability. This view imputes too much influence to the U.S. military and seems to deny the importance of local Iraqi actors.

You know we we're in Afghanistan first, correct?

I do. Maybe you need a timeline on number of deployed troops in Afghanistan and Iraq?

 

[zerozero]

My comment is a couple hundred word discussion putting into question the reverance for Petraeus and the surge. Unlike the article I didn't have 5000 words at my disposal. Do you actually have a point to make?

That's exactly what I'm asking you breh. You couched your comments as a criticism of the article but they're not related to the text you're supposedly responding to