RUSSIA/РОССИЯ THREAD—ASSANGE CHRGD W/ SPYING—DJT IMPEACHED TWICE-US TREASURY SANCTS KILIMNIK AS RUSSIAN AGNT
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BREAKING: FOOTAGE FROM THE White House!
Disgusting cacsGOP senator: It’s a ‘biblical miracle’ that Trump is president
GREG NASH
BY MALLORY SHELBOURNE
Sen. Luther Strange (R-Ala.), the lawmaker appointed to fill the seat vacated by Attorney General Jeff Sessions, recently said that President Trump’s victory is “a biblical miracle.”
"President Trump is the greatest thing that's happened to this country," Strange said in a forum hosted by the Montgomery County Republican Executive Committee, as reported by AL.com.
"I consider it a biblical miracle that he's there."
Strange’s comments come as multiple Republican lawmakers are challenging him for his Senate seat in the upcoming August GOP primary.
Lawmakers running for the Senate seat include Rep. Mo Brooks (R-Ala.), who in his campaign has said he will shut down the government in order to obtain funding for a wall on the U.S.-Mexico border. The wall had been a signature campaign promise of Trump during his presidential bid.
Brooks also attended the forum, along with several other candidates running for the Senate seat.
Brooks has slammed Strange as “an establishment Republican” who is backed by "pro-Amnesty establishment money.”
Poetical Poltergeist
Precise and cold hearted
fukk tucker, Tucker sucks.Trump's lawyer may bounce 
Donald Trump Jr.’s Russian Connection Has Ties to Former Kremlin Spies
The lawyer who offered up Hillary dirt to the Trump campaign totally swears she doesn’t work for the Russian government. Her client list suggests otherwise.
Photo Illustration by The Daily Beast
The Russian lawyer who peddled dirt on Hillary Clinton to Donald Trump Jr. has ties to former Russian military and intelligence officials, a key congressional committee will hear in testimony next week.
William Browder, an American financier who has investigated Russian corruption for more than a decade, will brief the Senate Judiciary Committee at a hearing next week on the lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya’s ties to the Russian government—including to former top members of the GRU and the FSB, two of the Kremlin’s main intelligence agencies. Those ties were spelled out in documents that Browder shared with the committee and provided to The Daily Beast this week.
“Veselnitskaya may have had her own agenda in requesting a meeting with Trump,” according Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, a former CIA officer who led the agency’s European directorate of operations. “But Russian intelligence practice is to co-opt such a person by arming them with secret intelligence information and tasking them to pass it to Trump’s people and get their reaction.”
“The key point is that essentially no Russian citizen or lawyer has compromising material on Hillary Clinton which has not been supplied to them from Russian intelligence,” Mowatt-Larssen wrote on Tuesday. “The simple assertion that she had such information is tantamount to declaring that Veselnitskaya was acting as agent of Russian government in this particular role.”
Five days after Veselnitskaya met with Trump Jr. and other senior members of the Trump campaign, the Democratic National Committee revealed that its email servers had been hacked. The culprits, U.S. intelligence would later announce publicly, were Russian hackers working on behalf of the country's military intelligence agency, the GRU, and its Federal Security Service, or FSB.
The documents provided by Browder delve into the backgrounds of attorneys, lobbyists, and business executives behind what Browder says is a concerted push by the Russian government to roll back U.S. sanctions imposed in 2012. That network is also at the center of new evidence that Donald Trump Jr., the president’s eldest son, solicited damaging information on Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clintonfrom people whom he was told were representing, and passing on information from, the Russian government.
Recent developments on Trump Jr.’s communications with those individuals, and additional details that Browder has shared with the committee and will recap next week, threaten to spoil an opportunity for Republicans to sow doubt about allegations of Trump-Russia collusion. The involvement of figures at the center of Browder’s allegations in the emerging Trump Jr. scandal threaten to turn the hearing into an examination of the Trump campaign’s apparent willingness to enlist Russian government agents on its behalf.
The hearing was planned months ago, Browder told The Daily Beast on Monday, and will examine a group called the Human Rights Accountability Global Initiative (HRAGI) Foundation, a group that has lobbied Congress to roll back the Magnitsky Act. That law was named after Russian lawyer Sergei Magnitsky, who was kidnapped, tortured, and executed in 2009 after working to expose high-level Russian government corruption.
Browder was a friend and client of Magnitsky’s, and has worked for years to pass, and then preserve, the sanctions imposed by the law on individuals and entities suspected of complicity in Magnitsky’s murder. Browder filed a complaint with the Department of Justice this year alleging that HRAGI, its attorney Natalia Veselnitskaya, and a number of other Russian individuals and companies were lobbying for Magnitsky’s repeal on the Russian government’s behalf.
Veselnitskaya told NBC News on Tuesday that she sought a meeting with Trump Jr. solely to discuss issues surrounding Magnitsky sanctions and has “never worked for [the Russian] government.” But that’s not what Browder is alleging. Her client list and circle of anti-Magnitsky advocates, he says, include former Russian government officials—including a former counterintelligence operative and a close colleague of a former state security official—and government-owned companies considered close to President Vladimir Putin’s regime and susceptible to the influence of Russian intelligence agencies.
Vesilnitskaya represents HRAGI, which has reported lobbying Congress on issues pertaining to a ban on the adoption of Russian children by American families. In a very broad sense that is accurate—the ban was imposed by President Vladimir Putin as retaliation for the Magnitsky Act—but Browder says the group’s primary goals are to rescind sanctions and discredit those, like Browder, pressing for their preservation.
Among HRAGI’s lobbyists is Rinat Akhmetshin, who has described himself as a former Russian counterintelligence officer, but said he is no longer in the government’s employ. HRAGI removed Akhmetshin from its roster of lobbyists on May 8, five days before the Justice Department settled a long-running corruption caseagainst a Russian company called Prevezon Holdings. Prevezon’s owner is an HRAGI lobbying client. Veselnitskaya is his lawyer.
HRAGI’s other clients include Vladimir Lelyukh, a top executive at Sberbank Capital, a subsidiary of the state-owned Russian bank involved in the real estate, energy, transportation, and automotive sectors. Sberbank Capital’s CEO, Ashot Khachaturyants, is a former senior official in Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) and its Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.
State-owned Russian financial institutions are common conduits for surreptitious intelligence work in the country. Jared Kushner, the president’s son-in-law and senior adviser, has faced scrutiny over a January meeting a top executive at another bank with ties to Russian intelligence, Moscow-based Vnesheconombank.
The initial connection between Veselnitskaya and Trump Jr. came by way of Emin Agalarov, a Russian pop star and real estate investor, and his father, Azerbaijani-Russian businessman and Putin ally Alas Agalarov. They had met Trump Jr. when the Miss Universe pageant was hosted in Moscow in 2013. During that visit, the Agalarovs met for dinner with the elder Trump and Herman Gref, Sberbank’s chief executive and one of the pageant's official sponsors.
Gref, Khachaturyants, Sberbank, and Sberbank Capital were all named as defendants in a lawsuit filed in a federal court in new York last year alleging they were complicit in efforts by close Putin associates to fraudulently take control of a Russian granite company.
In March, Sberbank brought on a new attorney to fight those charges—a lawyer who has become a household name this year.
The lawyer was Marc Kasowitz. He now represents the President of the United States.
A spokesman for Kasowitz did not respond to questions about how he came to represent Sberbank, but new information presented at next week’s hearing could lead to questions from committee Democrats on those and other unexplored Russia connections.
That could dramatically alter the direction of the Browder hearing. Its initial focus appeared to tee up committee Republicans to cast doubt on allegations of Trump-Russia. Now talk of Trump Jr.’s Kremlin contacts will likely dominate the event.
Of particular interest to Grassley is the involvement of Washington political research firm Fusion GPS. Browder singled out the firm for its alleged involvement in the anti-Magnitsky effort. It was also involved in the creation of a research document last year that claimed the Russian government had collected blackmail material on Trump, and that his team had colluded with Russian government agents to hobble the Clinton campaign.
Most of the Steele dossier—named for its author, a former British intelligence agent—remains unverified. The dossier, and Fusion GPS’s role in it, has been invoked by defenders of the president—including his legal team—to cast doubt on collusion allegations, and prior statements from Grassley indicated he would likely take that tack during the hearing.
Fusion GPS says it had nothing to do Trump Jr.’s meeting, and that its role in the anti-Magnitsky push extended only to a legal sub-contract involving the case brought against Prevezon in 2013. “Fusion GPS learned about this meeting from news reports and had no prior knowledge of it,” the firm said in statement. “Any claim that Fusion GPS arranged or facilitated this meeting in any way is false.”
The firm’s apparently peripheral involvement in the larger scheme to, in Browder’s telling, roll back Magnitsky sanctions nevertheless spurred Grassley to dig further into Fusion GPS’s involvement. But now, with new revelations regarding Trump Jr.’s attempts to solicit opposition research from foreign agents, the thrust of Judiciary’s hearing appears poised to shift considerably.
A spokesperson for the committee did not respond to multiple requests for comment on the hearing.
Browder’s Justice Department complaint, and Fusion GPS’s involvement in it, have been invoked to suggest that the Russian government may not have been so clearly in Trump’s camp last year. For Judiciary Committee Republicans, Trump Jr.’s emails have made that position considerably more difficult.
At the very least, those emails will provide the committee’s Trump critics with plenty of ammunition to turn the Browder hearing’s focus from the Steele dossier directly back onto the administration and its Russian contacts.
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I'll get the clips on here or something, I will never watch 1 minute of that fukking fukk face's show, I fukking hate his fukking guts. CNt wait for my drive to work tomorrow to listen Rachel though, 2 Red Bull's, and I'll prolly smoke a half a pack, won't want to get out of the car.This Don Jr. Hannity thing should be good.
The media was wholly complicit in Trump's rise regardless.
I guess Joe trying to get some positive points here.
People surprised GOP acted they way they did, they want power. Even at any cost. Simple as that.
Too ashamed to be a republican so you become an independent and still vote republican brehs
Many independents are republicans, they're just ashamed as you said.Too ashamed to be a republican so you become an independent and still vote republican brehs
Just like some Trump voters.
All that matters is what you choose when you vote.
Inside Russia's propaganda machine
Russians got so much experience in propaganda and fukking up their media.
This is what Trump wants.
A Mysterious Case Involving Turkey, Iran, and Rudy Giuliani
A Mysterious Case Involving Turkey, Iran, and Rudy Giuliani
By Dexter Filkins
April 14, 2017
In the year since his arrest by the F.B.I., the questions—and conspiracy theories—about the Turkish-Iranian businessman Reza Zarrab have only multiplied.
PHOTOGRAPH BY OZAN KOSE / AFP / GETTY
The mysterious case of Reza Zarrab, a Turkish-Iranian businessman facing federal charges in New York, has grown even stranger over the past couple of weeks.
Zarrab, who is thirty-three, was arrested by F.B.I. agents, in Miami, last March. At the time, he was one of the flashiest and wealthiest businessmen in Turkey. He sported a pouf of black hair; owned twenty houses, seven yachts, and a private jet; was married to one of Turkey’s biggest pop stars; and counted among his friends Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s strongman President.
The U.S. government, however, believes that Zarrab masterminded a sprawling operation to help the Iranian government evade economic sanctions that were put in place to hinder the country’s nuclear-weapons program. Zarrab’s operation—which relied on what the Turkish government claimed was a legal loophole in the sanctions—involved shipping gold to Iran in exchange for oil and natural gas, which Zarrab then sold. The scheme, according to prosecutors in New York’s Southern District, involved moving enormous amounts of cash, gas, and gold; at the operation’s peak—around 2012—Zarrab was buying a metric ton of gold and shipping it to Iran every day. The Obama Administration protested Zarrab’s operation, which the media dubbed “gas for gold,’’ but he carried on anyway. For the Iranians, the gold was as good as American cash, and it helped shore up the rial, Iran’s currency, whose value was collapsing.
Since last March, Zarrab has been sitting in the Metropolitan Correctional Center, in Manhattan, awaiting trial. The questions—and conspiracy theories—about him and his case, meanwhile, have only multiplied. At the time of his arrest, Zarrab was more or less living under the protection of the Turkish government, and he had every reason to believe that the U.S. government was after him. Why, then, did he fly to Miami? Zarrab told agents that he was on a family trip to Disney World. But many Turks who follow the case believe that Zarrab flew to the United States in an attempt to strike a deal with American prosecutors.
Why would he do that? It’s not clear if any deal was ever discussed, but Zarrab is probably in possession of enough evidence to implicate several senior members of Turkey’s government, whom American prosecutors say Zarrab was bribing so that he could carry on with his scheme. Zarrab, prosecutors have told a federal judge in New York, used “his tremendous wealth not only to purchase several homes, yachts and other assets, but also to buy access to corrupt politicians in Turkey.”
Zarrab’s far-flung activities first came to public light four years ago—entirely by accident. On January 1, 2013, a cargo plane from Accra, Ghana, was diverted to Istanbul’s main international airport, because of fog. When customs officials searched the plane, they found three thousand pounds of gold bars. Turkish prosecutors—who at that time still had enough independence to challenge the central government—determined that Zarrab had been paying millions of dollars in bribes to senior officials in Erdoğan’s government, and they had the businessman arrested and charged. The police themselves were stunned. “We didn’t expect this little investigation to give way to a bigger one,’’ Nazmi Ardıç, the chief of the Istanbul police department’s organized-crime unit, told me in 2015.
According to documents filed in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, the Minister for the Economy, Zafer Çağlayan, accepted more than forty-five million dollars in cash, gems, and luxury goods from Zarrab. When police entered the home of Süleyman Aslan—the C.E.O. of Halk Bank, which Zarrab allegedly used to launder his money—they found shoeboxes stuffed with four and a half million dollars. (Both Çağlayan and Aslan have denied any wrongdoing.) Wiretapped phone conversations also appeared to implicate members of Erdoğan’s family.
The cargo-plane incident and subsequent investigation of Zarrab roiled Turkish politics. Erdoğan, instead of backing down, accused Fethullah Gülen, an imam and former ally living in exile in the Poconos, in Pennsylvania, of trying to mount a coup against him. It was then that Erdoğan initiated the first in a series of purges across the Turkish government, firing, transferring, or jailing thousands of police officers and prosecutors. Afterward, the charges against Zarrab were dropped, and he was released from prison. The power struggle between Erdoğan and Gülen climaxed last summer, when followers of Gülen inside the Turkish military took part in a real attempted coup against Erdoğan’s government. Erdoğan beat back the uprising, but not before more than two hundred and sixty people were killed. Since then, Erdoğan has been busy arresting and detaining anyone linked to the country’s democratic opposition, and many people who are not.
Zarrab’s arrest in the U.S. occurred a few months before the attempted coup. Since then, Erdoğan has tried to have Zarrab sprung; last year, his government asked Loretta Lynch, then the U.S. Attorney General, to release him, and Erdoğan himself raised the issue last September in a meeting with Joe Biden, then the Vice-President. Erdoğan even accused the U.S. Attorney who indicted Zarrab, Preet Bharara, as well as the judge overseeing the case, Richard Berman, of having links to Gülen, whom Erdoğan describes as a “terrorist.” Bharara and Berman, Erdoğan charged, had been “wined and dined” by Gülen’s organization.
Why does Erdoğan care so much about Zarrab? It could be that Erdoğan is just a loyal friend. But the evidence found by Turkish prosecutors in the original case against Zarrab suggests that Erdoğan himself, or his family, could be tied to Zarrab’s scheme. Perhaps Erdoğan is afraid that Zarrab, facing decades in prison, will eventually talk.
After his arrest, in Miami, Zarrab hired some of the most expensive lawyers in New York. They tried to secure a comfortable bail arrangement—and failed. They then sought to have the case thrown out entirely, and failed at that, too. For a time, it looked as though the Zarrab case was headed for trial. Then, last month, came several dramatic developments. Zarrab fired most of his lawyers and hired Rudy Giuliani, a confidant of President Trump, and Michael Mukasey, the former U.S. Attorney General. Then Trump fired Bharara, the prosecutor who indicted Zarrab in the first place. With a legal team friendly to the President in place, and a hostile prosecutor out of the way, Zarrab may be hoping for a sweet deal from the prosecution. It has since been revealed that Giuliani and Mukasey travelled to Turkey in February to meet with Erdoğan about the case—another of Zarrab’s lawyers said that they were seeking a “diplomatic solution” to the situation. Berman, the judge, has asked that Giuliani and Mukasey provide more information about their role in the case.
Finally, another new layer of mystery: last month, F.B.I. agents arrested Mehmet Hakan Atilla, the deputy C.E.O. of Halk Bank—the same bank that prosecutors allege that Zarrab used to launder his gas-for-gold transactions—upon his arrival at J.F.K. International Airport, in New York. The case against Atilla was built on much of the same evidence—wiretapped phone conversations—that was used to charge Zarrab. (On Thursday, Atilla pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.) What was going on? Would Atilla simply fly to J.F.K. without a care, even though his former client had been arrested a year earlier in a very public case? Or was something murkier at work?
The Turkish government was not happy with Atilla’s arrest; Halk Bank is one of the largest financial institutions in the country. As with almost everything that goes wrong in Turkey these days, the country’s leaders are blaming Gülen, the exiled imam in the Poconos. “The move against Halk Bank’s Atilla,’’ Binali Yıldırım, the Turkish Prime Minister, said, “is another plan and trick of the Gülen movement.”
A Mysterious Case Involving Turkey, Iran, and Rudy Giuliani
By Dexter Filkins
April 14, 2017
In the year since his arrest by the F.B.I., the questions—and conspiracy theories—about the Turkish-Iranian businessman Reza Zarrab have only multiplied.
PHOTOGRAPH BY OZAN KOSE / AFP / GETTY
The mysterious case of Reza Zarrab, a Turkish-Iranian businessman facing federal charges in New York, has grown even stranger over the past couple of weeks.
Zarrab, who is thirty-three, was arrested by F.B.I. agents, in Miami, last March. At the time, he was one of the flashiest and wealthiest businessmen in Turkey. He sported a pouf of black hair; owned twenty houses, seven yachts, and a private jet; was married to one of Turkey’s biggest pop stars; and counted among his friends Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Turkey’s strongman President.
The U.S. government, however, believes that Zarrab masterminded a sprawling operation to help the Iranian government evade economic sanctions that were put in place to hinder the country’s nuclear-weapons program. Zarrab’s operation—which relied on what the Turkish government claimed was a legal loophole in the sanctions—involved shipping gold to Iran in exchange for oil and natural gas, which Zarrab then sold. The scheme, according to prosecutors in New York’s Southern District, involved moving enormous amounts of cash, gas, and gold; at the operation’s peak—around 2012—Zarrab was buying a metric ton of gold and shipping it to Iran every day. The Obama Administration protested Zarrab’s operation, which the media dubbed “gas for gold,’’ but he carried on anyway. For the Iranians, the gold was as good as American cash, and it helped shore up the rial, Iran’s currency, whose value was collapsing.
Since last March, Zarrab has been sitting in the Metropolitan Correctional Center, in Manhattan, awaiting trial. The questions—and conspiracy theories—about him and his case, meanwhile, have only multiplied. At the time of his arrest, Zarrab was more or less living under the protection of the Turkish government, and he had every reason to believe that the U.S. government was after him. Why, then, did he fly to Miami? Zarrab told agents that he was on a family trip to Disney World. But many Turks who follow the case believe that Zarrab flew to the United States in an attempt to strike a deal with American prosecutors.
Why would he do that? It’s not clear if any deal was ever discussed, but Zarrab is probably in possession of enough evidence to implicate several senior members of Turkey’s government, whom American prosecutors say Zarrab was bribing so that he could carry on with his scheme. Zarrab, prosecutors have told a federal judge in New York, used “his tremendous wealth not only to purchase several homes, yachts and other assets, but also to buy access to corrupt politicians in Turkey.”
Zarrab’s far-flung activities first came to public light four years ago—entirely by accident. On January 1, 2013, a cargo plane from Accra, Ghana, was diverted to Istanbul’s main international airport, because of fog. When customs officials searched the plane, they found three thousand pounds of gold bars. Turkish prosecutors—who at that time still had enough independence to challenge the central government—determined that Zarrab had been paying millions of dollars in bribes to senior officials in Erdoğan’s government, and they had the businessman arrested and charged. The police themselves were stunned. “We didn’t expect this little investigation to give way to a bigger one,’’ Nazmi Ardıç, the chief of the Istanbul police department’s organized-crime unit, told me in 2015.
According to documents filed in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, the Minister for the Economy, Zafer Çağlayan, accepted more than forty-five million dollars in cash, gems, and luxury goods from Zarrab. When police entered the home of Süleyman Aslan—the C.E.O. of Halk Bank, which Zarrab allegedly used to launder his money—they found shoeboxes stuffed with four and a half million dollars. (Both Çağlayan and Aslan have denied any wrongdoing.) Wiretapped phone conversations also appeared to implicate members of Erdoğan’s family.
The cargo-plane incident and subsequent investigation of Zarrab roiled Turkish politics. Erdoğan, instead of backing down, accused Fethullah Gülen, an imam and former ally living in exile in the Poconos, in Pennsylvania, of trying to mount a coup against him. It was then that Erdoğan initiated the first in a series of purges across the Turkish government, firing, transferring, or jailing thousands of police officers and prosecutors. Afterward, the charges against Zarrab were dropped, and he was released from prison. The power struggle between Erdoğan and Gülen climaxed last summer, when followers of Gülen inside the Turkish military took part in a real attempted coup against Erdoğan’s government. Erdoğan beat back the uprising, but not before more than two hundred and sixty people were killed. Since then, Erdoğan has been busy arresting and detaining anyone linked to the country’s democratic opposition, and many people who are not.
Zarrab’s arrest in the U.S. occurred a few months before the attempted coup. Since then, Erdoğan has tried to have Zarrab sprung; last year, his government asked Loretta Lynch, then the U.S. Attorney General, to release him, and Erdoğan himself raised the issue last September in a meeting with Joe Biden, then the Vice-President. Erdoğan even accused the U.S. Attorney who indicted Zarrab, Preet Bharara, as well as the judge overseeing the case, Richard Berman, of having links to Gülen, whom Erdoğan describes as a “terrorist.” Bharara and Berman, Erdoğan charged, had been “wined and dined” by Gülen’s organization.
Why does Erdoğan care so much about Zarrab? It could be that Erdoğan is just a loyal friend. But the evidence found by Turkish prosecutors in the original case against Zarrab suggests that Erdoğan himself, or his family, could be tied to Zarrab’s scheme. Perhaps Erdoğan is afraid that Zarrab, facing decades in prison, will eventually talk.
After his arrest, in Miami, Zarrab hired some of the most expensive lawyers in New York. They tried to secure a comfortable bail arrangement—and failed. They then sought to have the case thrown out entirely, and failed at that, too. For a time, it looked as though the Zarrab case was headed for trial. Then, last month, came several dramatic developments. Zarrab fired most of his lawyers and hired Rudy Giuliani, a confidant of President Trump, and Michael Mukasey, the former U.S. Attorney General. Then Trump fired Bharara, the prosecutor who indicted Zarrab in the first place. With a legal team friendly to the President in place, and a hostile prosecutor out of the way, Zarrab may be hoping for a sweet deal from the prosecution. It has since been revealed that Giuliani and Mukasey travelled to Turkey in February to meet with Erdoğan about the case—another of Zarrab’s lawyers said that they were seeking a “diplomatic solution” to the situation. Berman, the judge, has asked that Giuliani and Mukasey provide more information about their role in the case.
Finally, another new layer of mystery: last month, F.B.I. agents arrested Mehmet Hakan Atilla, the deputy C.E.O. of Halk Bank—the same bank that prosecutors allege that Zarrab used to launder his gas-for-gold transactions—upon his arrival at J.F.K. International Airport, in New York. The case against Atilla was built on much of the same evidence—wiretapped phone conversations—that was used to charge Zarrab. (On Thursday, Atilla pleaded not guilty to the charges against him.) What was going on? Would Atilla simply fly to J.F.K. without a care, even though his former client had been arrested a year earlier in a very public case? Or was something murkier at work?
The Turkish government was not happy with Atilla’s arrest; Halk Bank is one of the largest financial institutions in the country. As with almost everything that goes wrong in Turkey these days, the country’s leaders are blaming Gülen, the exiled imam in the Poconos. “The move against Halk Bank’s Atilla,’’ Binali Yıldırım, the Turkish Prime Minister, said, “is another plan and trick of the Gülen movement.”
- Dexter Filkins joined The New Yorker as a staff writer in 2011.
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