Anti-Americanism in Russia as Seen by Feng Yujun

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Anti-Americanism in Russia as Seen by Feng Yujun

"[Anti-Americanism] has had a significant impact on the Russian psyche, awakening both xenophobic and isolationist sentiments ... Russia's current situation is reminiscent of post-World War I Germany"

www.sinification.com

Anti-Americanism in Russia as Seen by Feng Yujun​

"[Anti-Americanism] has had a significant impact on the Russian psyche, awakening both xenophobic and isolationist sentiments ... Russia's current situation is reminiscent of post-World War I Germany"​

THOMAS DES GARETS GEDDES
SEP 21, 2023


China’s top diplomat Wang Yi (王毅) was in Moscow on Monday where he met Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov. In a Telegram statement following this meeting, Russia's foreign ministry mentioned that "the closeness of the positions of the parties regarding U.S. actions in the international arena, including those of an anti-Russian and anti-Chinese nature, was noted."

Today’s piece is, rather fittingly, focused on Russian anti-Americanism as viewed by one of China’s top Russia analysts, Feng Yujun (冯玉军).

Feng is a scholar worth following among China’s establishment intellectuals. He is now a senior figure within Fudan University’s international relations department, having spent over two decades at CICIR (a key think tank linked to China’s Ministry of State Security) where he worked alongside the likes of Yuan Peng (now CICIR’s president) and Yan Xuetong (one of China’s most famous international relations scholars). I should also point out that, much like Chinese think-tank analysts, most IR academics who work at China’s top universities are connected, more or less closely, with China’s policymaking circles and are involved in the writing of internal reports (内参) for them.

Feng is an interesting figure for he has also been one of the most outspoken critics of Russia since the beginning of the war in Ukraine and I know that he has been subjected to various pressures as a result of this. His views on Russia are on the fringe of the types of arguments commonly held openly by Chinese international relations experts. Not least because some of the criticism that he directs against Moscow’s policies could easily be construed as criticism against similar policies implemented by Beijing. This is again quite obvious in today’s piece.

Other than his outspokenness, what probably distinguishes Feng from at least some of his colleagues when it comes to Russia is what I understand to be a belief that raw geopolitical interests should not automatically trump values in international relations. For a broader overview of how Chinese analysts have been assessing their country’s ties with Russia, see here:

That being said, this does not mean that Feng’s views are not shared by others within these circles. He is simply more willing than most to express them publicly. Indeed, dissatisfaction with the Kremlin’s erratic behaviour and its war in Ukraine is widespread among China’s intellectual elite – though few would recommend abandoning Beijing’s current policy towards Moscow. Both aspects were made all the more evident to me during my conversations with scholars from across China’s political spectrum over the summer.

Enough of this longwinded introduction. If you enjoy reading this newsletter, please do think of sharing and citing it as widely and often as possible. Sinification’s one year anniversary is fast approaching and if it is to survive beyond this fateful date, it needs more exposure and some form of funding.

The following is a summary of Feng’s views on anti-Americanism in Russia:

Summary

1. Historically, anti-US sentiment in Russia has come to the fore every time Moscow has decided to shift its policy from one of economic reform and modernisation to one more focused on maintaining domestic stability. This remains true today.
2. Deep down, Russia knows that it is predominantly a European/Western nation that has long sought to be accepted by the West. This is what makes anti-Western sentiment in Russia so conflicted.
3. Nevertheless, post-imperial Russia has often constructed its identity in contrast with a “morally corrupt” America, seeking to attribute to this American “Other” some of those traits that it is often guilty of possessing itself: an aggressive and expansionist foreign policy that, if it could, would seek to dominate the world.
4. Jealousy, an inability to emulate American successes and a deep-seated “inferiority complex” vis-à-vis the West have all contributed to Russia’s hostility towards the US.
5. Furthermore, just as anti-US sentiment can be linked to anti-Semitism in Europe, so can it be in Russia.
6. Russian anti-Americanism is also a political tool that aims to foster national unity, bolster the Kremlin’s domestic legitimacy and build a global “anti-US camp” so as to weaken America’s global hegemony.
7. But playing this anti-America card is a double-edged sword that may well end up both hollowing out Russia’s national identity and jeopardising the country’s long-term economic prospects and social progress.
8. Moreover, anti-Americanism has encouraged the emergence of xenophobic, pro-fascist and militaristic views in Russia.
9. The resurgence of Russian anti-Americanism has gone hand in hand with the rise of Moscow’s “expansionist hawks” and has been one of the driver’s of the Kremlin’s increasingly aggressive behaviour abroad since the late 2000s.
10. Today’s Russia is reminiscent of post-World War I Germany: a deeply humiliated and resentful former empire (or something akin to one) with an “insatiable desire” to restore its former glory.

 

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Name: Feng Yujun (冯玉军)
Year of birth: 1970 (age: 52/53)
Position: Director of the Centre for Russian and Central Asian Studies and deputy director of the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University
Formerly: China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR) from 1994 to 2016
Research focus: Russia and the Soviet Union; China’s international strategy and great power relations; Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO)
Education: BA Hebei University (1991), MA Jilin University (1994), PhD China Foreign Affairs University (2001)
Experience abroad: Two years in Russia and half a year in Japan as a visiting scholar

“Anti-Americanism is an important movement and ideological trend in contemporary international politics. Since ‘the Second World War [WWII], anti-Americanism has evolved into a global phenomenon and become more widespread within the international community’.
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Since the end of US-Soviet cooperation after WWII and the subsequent descent into the Cold War, the Soviet Union has been the main long-time flag-bearer of global anti-Americanism.”

“It should be noted, however, that Russia's anti-Americanism is not immutable. It is not rare to see shifts between anti-Americanism and pro-Americanism. Historically, periods of good relations between Russia and the United States have usually occurred during wars in which the two countries were allies or during periods of economic reform when the Russian leadership saw the United States as an engine of technological innovation and productivity growth. Examples include the period of Tsar Nicholas I's railway building, the industrialisation of the Soviet Union in the 1930s, the reform periods under Khrushchev, Gorbachev and Yeltsin, and Medvedev's 'modernisation' phase.”

“Conversely, the United States was often regarded as a threat or even a hostile force by Russian officials and society whenever there was an anti-reform movement within Russia or whenever the country's goal shifted from a commitment to modernisation to the maintenance of stability. This usually took place at the end of the rule of Russian or Soviet leaders, such as in the last years of Tsar Nicholas II's reign, during the last years of Stalin’s era, and in the later years of Brezhnev's rule.”
“Today, reforms and modernisation have disappeared from the Russian government's plans. Security and the restoration of 'old glories' [历久荣耀] have become the main themes of its domestic and foreign policies. Against this background, anti-Americanism has once again become part of its official ideology and popular consciousness. This reality confirms once again the diagnosis made many years ago by the director of the Russian Institute for Strategic Assessments, Alexander Konovalov (Aлександp Коновалов), that the essence of anti-Americanism lies in the fact that the elites and the general public, without understanding America's [political] system, policies and culture, 'regard the United States as a hostile force that is opposed to Russia, and believe that it hopes for Russia’s decline and disintegration'.”

“Even if anti-Americanism and anti-Westernism are rampant [甚嚣尘上] in today’s Russia, we must nevertheless fully recognise their complexity and ability to change. As the éminence grise of Russian politics, Vladislav Surkov (Bладислав Cуpков), [once] said, ‘Russia, which considers itself as belonging to Europe, is not willing to break away from Europe and is always hoping for Europe's embrace and recognition. It has a deep-seated reverence for Western civilisation and cultural values [它从骨子里是崇尚西方文明和文化价值观的], but wants to accept them in a selective way, not copy them wholesale. It is precisely because Russians believe in their heart of hearts that they are Europeans and part of the 'West', that Russia's national and cultural identities are conflicted [是矛盾的], just as [its] anti-Westernism is too. The location of the 'I' and the 'Other' overlap, boundaries are blurred, and the Russia located in the eastern part of Europe is like an 'I within the Other and the Other within the I' [‘他者中的我者、我者中的他者’ ]".
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Jealousy, Humiliation and Propaganda

“It has been argued that ‘jealousy of America's prosperity [繁荣] and success, coupled closely with a new sense of commercial, diplomatic, and moral impotence’, has been an important source of anti-Americanism in Europe.
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If this is true for Europe, it is even truer for Russia, which is even more economically and culturally backward. When the optimism of the reform advocates was crushed [by declining living standards and the overall weakening of the country], Russia [began] wholly to reject the Western values of democracy and free market economy to which it had been unable to adapt. In turn, the hopes it had placed in the United States were transformed into mistrust and even hostility.”

“To a certain extent, Russia's anti-Americanism is sometimes an extreme reaction to its ‘inability to be pro-American’ [亲美而不得] … In the modern world, the Americans have been the teachers of the Russians. They have had a huge amount of authority and Russia has been quietly imitating their ways. This is similar to Peter the Great learning much from the Swedes as he was fighting against them in the early 18th century.”
“It has been argued that Russia’s anti-Americanism is largely a rejection of Western values. In fact, Western values are acceptable to Russia, but what is not is blind emulation without a proper understanding and interpretation of them. Russians' perception of present-day America derives mainly from three events: the war in Iraq, NATO's eastward expansion and the encouragement of 'colour revolutions' in the 'post-Soviet space'. This is the result of the Kremlin's propaganda work. The Russian public widely believes that aggression and the expansion of its sphere of influence form an important part of American foreign policy, and that this constitutes a violation of Russian interests. But in their fierce attacks on America, the Russians have deliberately ignored some of the ways in which their diplomacy ends up being similar to that of the United States, though the methods used may differ [异曲同工之处].”
“Linked to this rise in anti-Americanism, the number of Russian expansionist ‘hawks’, who see military power as the main means of resolving international disputes, is also on the rise. However, it should be noted that 'bipolar thinking' is no longer an essential feature of the Russian elite’s international strategic outlook. They do not seek global dominance, 'but they do share, to a large extent, a sense of having been humiliated and a feeling of extreme disappointment following Russia's failure to make it into the 'first tier [of developed countries]' [第一梯队]. In order to retain the support of both the elite and the public, the Russian government has had to adopt a tougher foreign policy. Maintaining its sphere of influence in Russia’s 'immediate neighbourhood' has become a national interest that the Russian decision-making elite is prepared to defend by force'.
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“It is against this backdrop that we have witnessed the launching of multiple Russian military operations in the 'post-Soviet space' since the Russo-Georgian War of 2008.”

Russian Anti-Americanism Through the Lens of Social Psychology

“Social psychology reveals the roots of Russian anti-Americanism from a different perspective. According to this school of thought, since '‘America’ is a common reference point, a lingua franca, a threat, a friend and a source of anxiety for the peoples of the world',
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Russia and the United States have for decades been playing the role of 'structural opposites' to each other. That is to say, they have formed conceptions of the 'I' by comparing themselves with one another. This socio-cultural mechanism involves seeing oneself in contrast with the ‘Other’ and attributing to this ‘Other’ those very traits that one is trying so hard to get rid of. A description of the Other is also a description of oneself: by describing Russia as an authoritarian state, the Americans are also asserting their democratic [credentials]; and by portraying Americans as people who are only interested in money, Russia is confirming its own ideological superiority. That is why, in times of domestic crises, disputes between the United States and Russia always escalate.”

“Much of Russia's anti-Americanism can be attributed to the phenomenon of 'projection' in social psychology – the transfer of one's own negative emotions and [their] motives to the target of one's criticisms. In fact, the Russians' urge to accuse the United States of dominating the world is merely a projection of their own desires and ambitions. At the same time, Russian anti-Americanism also contains certain feelings of inferiority [一些自卑感]. The Russians often feel that the United States treats Russia in a negative and unfair manner, which [also] gives expression to Russia's indignation towards US egoism and double standards. However, the root cause of this [feeling] lies, to a large extent, in a desire for 'self-justification' [‘自我辩解’ 的愿望] arising from the disintegration of the Soviet Union and Russia's loss of status as one of the world's 'poles'. This is arguably a protective mechanism contained in Russian anti-Americanism, an attempt [by Russia] to shield itself from its inferiority complex. It [i.e. this protective mechanism] deals with Russia's inferiority problem by denouncing American policies as 'morally corrupt' and contrasting them with Russia's 'moral politics' [道德政治].”

 

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Russia’s Weimar Syndrome

“A 'Weimar Syndrome', characterised by resentment over the loss of its empire and an insatiable desire [无限渴望] to restore it, has also been an important factor behind Russia's growing anti-Americanism. The collapse of the Soviet Union turned Russia into a 'humiliated giant' [受辱的巨人] striving to recover its former status as a great power. Russia's current situation is reminiscent of post-World War I Germany. In 2006, Yegor Gaidar (Его́р Гайда́р), the flag-bearer of Russia's market-economy reforms, pointed to Russia's 'post-imperial' nostalgia in an article entitled The Weimar Syndrome, stressing that: 'to try to make Russia into an empire again would mean to call into question its current existence. The unwillingness of the Weimar Republic's authorities to tell the truth about the outbreak of the First World War was one of the most important factors that contributed to its collapse. Not conducting a systematic study of the institutional reasons that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union, and wallowing in the illusion that the Soviet Union was 'destroyed by external enemies' is dangerous for the future of the country’.
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“The famous Russian politician Leonid Radzikhovsky (Леонид Pадзиховский) also believes that ‘the spectre of the 'Weimar syndrome' has been troubling Russia since 1991’ and stresses that: ‘Behind Russia's anti-Americanism lies, in fact, an imperial complex and a defence mechanism [堡垒意识]. These complexes [or feelings] have combined organically with xenophobia to form a stable structure for authoritarian thinking and have become a breeding ground for pro-fascist views’.
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One could say that the contrast between the continuing might of the United States and the declining power of Russia, which was once a world power, has produced a strong sense of inferiority among Russia's political elite. This sense of inferiority, coupled with its great power complex [大国情结] and imperial sentiment [帝国情怀], which persisted in post-USSR [Russian] thought, provided fertile ground for the spread of anti-Americanism in Russia.”

“After the end of the Cold War, America’s ‘victor syndrome’ [胜利者综合征] also became an important factor fuelling anti-Americanism in Russia. The American analyst Paul Cohen admits that, 'After December 1991 the American political establishment declared ‘We won the Cold War, Russia lost’, and the United States became the only superpower in the world. In the eyes of the American elite, Russia, like post-war Germany or Japan, was no longer a fully sovereign country and an equal. For the United States, this meant that Americans could now interfere in Russia's domestic affairs and that Russian foreign policy should be subordinated to American interests. These assumptions have continued to this day’.
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It is fair to say that Russia's ‘Weimar syndrome’ and America's ‘victor syndrome’ are two sides of the same coin.”


The Relationship Between Anti-Semitism and Anti-Americanism in Russia

“Anti-Americanism in Europe is to a large extent closely connected with anti-Semitism. This phenomenon also exists in Russia. In the eyes of those Russians who are attached to the natural economy and to a village community system, the money-driven, profit-hungry, universalistic and individualistic American culture is the 'worst possible consequence' of the Jewish people's association with rootless modernity and capitalism. There have been many anti-Semitic movements throughout Russian history. In present-day Russia, anti-Semitism has two important sources:

1. Internally, many of the Russian tyc00ns who became rich overnight during [Russia’s] privatisation process were Jews. The huge [wealth] disparity that exists in Russia and a 'hatred of the rich' that is inherent to Russian culture have led Russians to harbour resentment towards their own Jewish [compatriots];
2. Externally, 'conspiracy theories' have led Russians to blame many disasters on Wall Street’s 'Jewish club'.”

Anti-Americanism as a Political Tool for Moscow

“Russian anti-Americanism during the course of its historical development has gradually become a systemic doctrine and even an ideology, playing a variety of functions and producing a wide range of effects.”

1. “First, in the absence of an official ideology in Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union, anti-Americanism became an important means of forging national unity and strengthening national identity.”
2. “Second, anti-Americanism can provide legitimacy to Russia's domestic governance.”
3. “Finally, anti-Americanism is also an important tool for Russia at the international level to win over allies and build an 'anti-US camp', using this to weaken the global hegemony of the United States.”

Anti-Americanism is a Double-edged Sword

“Despite its important utility for Russia, anti-Americanism is not a 'panacea' for all [of its] ills, and may even be a 'double-edged sword' that could cause harm to Russia itself. Although anti-Americanism can be an important tool for social mobilisation in Russia for a certain period of time, it may also hinder Russia's long-term economic development and social progress.”

“In this process, an emphasis on Russia being different from the West and on it having a national and social fabric that is based on a unique [Russian] civilisation, while highlighting its confrontation with the West, have become the main elements on which Russia's political consciousness has been constructed. This has inevitably led to the gradual distancing of Russia from the political systems, cultures and values of the West and to its becoming a 'different system' altogether [异质体系]. In turn, this political divide has inevitably led to the economic estrangement and even, in the security sphere, to conflict between Russia and the West (US included). ‘More fundamentally, the image of a homogenising America reflects a mistakenly static view of culture. Efforts to portray local cultures as unchanging often reflect reactionary political strategies rather than descriptions of reality. [As the Peruvian writer Mario Vargas Llosa has put it,] those who argue in favor of cultural identity and against globalisation, betray a stagnant attitude towards culture [that is not borne out by historical fact].’
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“In recent years, anti-Americanism has continued to grow within Russian political circles and among the country’s general public. It may differ from Soviet times in terms of its content, but its impact on people's mindset has in fact been very similar. Anti-Americanism, in whatever form, has had a significant impact on the Russian psyche, awakening both xenophobic and isolationist sentiments. ‘Establishing the West as the enemy actually opens up channels of fear and hostility, both overtly and covertly’ [Feng is citing Russian sociologist Lev Gudkov]. Although it may provide the Russian elite and public with a temporary sense of being 'bound by hatred of a common enemy’ [同仇敌忾], it will end up causing Russia's national identity to lack enduring and stable core values.

“From an external perspective, while anti-Americanism may help Russia gain the sympathy or support of some international forces for a certain period of time, this ad hoc grouping, characterised by deconstructionism rather than constructivism [以解构主义而非建构主义为特征], lacks any real coherence in terms of [Russia’s] strategic interests. Strong anti-Americanism has not only ‘scared off’ Western investors, but it has also fuelled Moscow’s increasingly radical foreign policy moves. [Indeed,] this was a major cause of the 2022 Russo-Ukrainian conflict and it has led to Russia's increasing marginalisation in the current international order with the risk that it will [one day] be reduced to being an ‘isolated island’ [孤岛].”

 

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A Damning Critique of Putinism and Russian Foreign Policy by Feng Yujun and Wen Longjie​

DANIEL CRAIN AND THOMAS DES GARETS GEDDES
·

MAR 14

Russia's Conservative Values-based Diplomacy: A Critique

By Feng Yujun and Wen Longjie – (December 2022)


SUMMARY:
Read full story

1. Russia believes in the superiority of its culture and is on a Messianic mission to spread its conservative values to the rest of the world.
2. Its turn towards conservatism was both a reaction against neoliberalism and a result of its failure to Westernise.
3. Conservatism under Putin and the values it supposedly upholds have no solid foundations and are more akin to a “discursive bubble” and an “empty shell”.
4. Russian conservatism is merely a tool for Moscow to advance its own political interests and gain support for its policies both domestically and abroad.
5. Moscow is also encouraging the current political polarisation of Western societies and using its status as a flag-bearer of conservatism to gain a following of sympathisers and apologists across the world.
6. The “imperial logic” underlying its invasion of Ukraine and its ambition to recover lost Russian territories is not only alarming but has also shattered its long-advocated principle of the primacy of state sovereignty.
7. If Putin and Russia do indeed seek to overturn the current US-led international order, then it should at least have a credible alternative to offer instead, but it does not.
8. Worse, its economy, politics and society are beset with problems that have yet to be resolved. Russia has no viable development model to offer.
9. The war in Ukraine has damaged Russia’s global image, undermined the appeal of its Messianic conservatism and is weakening its economic and political influence in the world.
10. Click here to read the rest of the article